




**MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF THE  
RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT MORIER, G.C.B.  
FROM 1826 TO 1876**






*Wm. H. Arnold*

WINDOM HENRIETTA ARNOLD

MEMOIRS AND LETTERS  
OF THE RIGHT HON.  
SIR ROBERT MORIER, G.C.B.  
FROM 1826 TO 1876

By his Daughter  
MRS. ROSSLYN WEMYSS

WITH PORTRAITS



IN TWO VOLUMES  
VOLUME I

LONDON  
EDWARD ARNOLD  
1911



## PREFACE

THE following Memoirs have been almost entirely compiled from letters, memoranda, diaries, and notes in my possession.

My grateful thanks, however, are due to the friends who have so kindly placed at my disposal letters of my father's; especially to Lady Margaret Cecil for those addressed to Lady Derby, to the Hon. Rollo Russell for the ones on Schleswig-Holstein written to Lord John Russell, to Mr. Bernard Mallet, the late Lady Arthur Russell, Miss Palgrave, and Lady Grant-Duff.

VICTORIA WEMYSS.

LONDON, *November* 1911.



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# MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT MORIER

## CHAPTER I

### PARENTAGE. BIRTH. CHILDHOOD

THE Moriers were of French origin; a Huguenot family, who, on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, had migrated to Switzerland, at the end of the seventeenth century.

Isaac was the first Morier naturalised a British subject. Born in 1750 at Smyrna, where a branch of the family had settled, and where he was to spend the greater part of his life, it was owing to his extensive knowledge of the East that, when compelled by the loss of his fortune in 1803 to seek employment, he entered the service of the Turkey Company, and was by them appointed Consul General at Constantinople in 1804. Two years later, in 1806, the Company was dissolved, and the post converted into that of His Britannic Majesty's Consul, which appointment Isaac Morier continued to hold, until his death in 1817.

He had married in 1775 Clara, daughter of David Van Lennep, Dutch Consul General at Smyrna and President of the Dutch Levant Company, the eldest of a family of beautiful sisters, as remarkable for their personal attractions as for their intellectual gifts; and it is undoubtedly from her that some, at least, of the literary talent of the family is derived, for her letters are distinguished not only by their admirable style, but by the great originality of thought and expression, and the keen sense of humour which later on characterised in so marked a degree the writings of her sons and grandson.

She lived much in England, where her sons were being educated at Harrow, and where two of her sisters, Cornelia,

wife of Admiral Waldegrave,<sup>1</sup> and Mrs. Lee, were settled. Thither, too, fled her third sister, the Marquise de Chabannes La Palice, at the first outbreak of the French Revolution. Many of Mrs. Morier's letters to her husband, then following his fortunes abroad, referred to the sayings and doings of the small society of *émigrés* which she much frequented, and which centred round Calonne, the exiled minister of Louis XVI., whose wife,<sup>2</sup> was a great friend, if not connection, of the Van Lennep sisters.

Clara Morier's four sons all entered the public service, the three elder Diplomacy, the youngest the Navy, and, being endowed with no inconsiderable amount of ability and intellect, all four rose to distinction, taking their full part in the stirring events then ushering in the nineteenth century. Cultured, gifted men of the world, cosmopolitan in the best and truest sense, they all shared this family characteristic: they were all great travellers with a strong literary bent, the one eventually most known being James, the second son, author of *The Adventures of Hadji Baba*, whom Sir Walter Scott declared in the *Quarterly Review* to be the best novelist of the day.

Born at Smyrna in 1780, James entered the diplomatic service in 1807, and was attached to Sir Harford Jones's mission to Persia. Promoted to the rank of Secretary of Legation at Teheran, he came home in 1809, only shortly afterwards to return to Persia as Secretary of Embassy to Sir Gore Ouseley, who was sent there to negotiate a treaty to oppose the then subsisting Franco-Russian Alliance. Both missions were described by him in a *Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor* and *A Second Journey through Persia*, and these two books, with the above-mentioned *Adventures of Hadji Baba*, often called the Oriental Gil Blas, soon established their author as an important authority on all matters concerning Persia, or indeed the East.

On his return to England in 1817, he practically retired from public service, devoting the remainder of his life to literature. He was only once more employed, as Special

<sup>1</sup> Honble. William, b. 1753, d. 1825, afterwards Baron Radstock.

<sup>2</sup> His second wife, 'la belle Madame d'Harvély.'

Commissioner to Mexico, to negotiate a treaty in 1824-6. He died in 1849, having married in 1820 Harriet, daughter of William Fulke Greville.

His elder brother, John Philip, born in 1776, had begun his career in 1799 as Secretary to Lord Elgin, of Elgin Marble fame, at that time ambassador at Constantinople. He was then sent on a secret mission to Egypt, accompanying the Grand Vizier on the Turkish expedition against General Kléber, of which he published an account entitled *Memoir of a Campaign with the Ottoman Army*, and in 1803 was entrusted with a very important political mission to Ali Pasha, a powerful quasi-independent vassal of Turkey, then reigning supreme in Albania. Here he remained some time, having been appointed Consul General at Janina. After filling various posts in Europe and America, he was in 1816 named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Dresden, where he remained till his retirement in 1825. He had married in 1814 Horatia, daughter of Lord Hugh Seymour, a sister of Mrs. Dawson Damer, Mrs. Fitzherbert's adopted daughter. John Morier died in London in 1853.

The youngest brother, William, born in 1790, entered the Navy in 1803, saw much service in the Mediterranean, took part in the bombardment of Stonington during the American War, and, retiring as a post-captain in 1830, attained the rank of retired Vice-Admiral two years before his death, in 1864.

The father of Robert Burnet David Morier was the third brother, David Richard, whom Dean Stanley described as 'a model of the piety and virtue of the antique mould,' and of whom it could with truth be said, that he was 'A man equally admirable in his public and his private life, who compelled the love of all—of those who knew him most, as of those who knew him least.'<sup>1</sup>

His mother speaks of him as being the one amongst her sons who, having the most to do, was always the most careful to write her news, 'et par là il me paraît que vous êtes plus près de moi,' and when, after a life reaching to the extreme limits of old age, he died in 1877, in full possession

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Jowett, July 1877.

of all his faculties, both mental and physical, his son records that ' he closed one of the happiest of lives by a happy and painless death, preserving to the end his perfect bright intelligence, his warm heart, and his playfulness and wit. The loss to me is one out of all proportion to that usually experienced by sons of fifty losing fathers of ninety-four, for so marvellously fresh had his sympathies, moral and intellectual, remained, that there was no one whom I could so absolutely *commune* with as with him, and the absence of whom, in my daily life, could make so large a gap.'<sup>1</sup>

Born at Smyrna in 1784, and, like his brothers, educated at Harrow, David Morier began his diplomatic career in 1804 by being attached to his brother John Morier's mission to Ali Pasha at Janina. Here he spent three years, and collected the materials for his novel, *Photo the Suliote*, published many years later. Left in entire charge of the mission at the early age of twenty-three, he was, on the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Porte, transferred to Sir Arthur Paget's Mission to the Dardanelles, then employed in peace negotiations, and despatched to Egypt to effect the release of the British prisoners taken captive by Mahomet Ali Pasha during General Fraser's expedition against Rosetta in 1807. With the exception of a short mission to Persia in 1809, he remained at Constantinople for four years, first under Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Adair, and then under Mr. Stratford Canning (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redclyffe), with whom he formed a warm friendship destined to last over seventy years.<sup>2</sup> He accompanied the latter to England on the termination of his appointment, and in the subsequent year, 1813, was attached to Lord Aberdeen's Embassy. From then dates the most interesting part of his career, for under Lord Castlereagh.

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Stockmar, 30th December 1877.

<sup>2</sup> Verses written in memory of David Richard Morier by Lord Stratford de Redclyffe, 22nd July 1877.

Thro' length of years—alas, for ever gone—  
A blameless life was his, surpass'd by none,  
A cheerful mind, a conscientious zeal,  
Whereon the heart's religion set its seal,  
And all the charities that kindle love  
Mark'd him as one whose home was fix'd above.

the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Castlereagh again, he was employed in all the historical transactions of the time—the Conferences of Châtillon-sur-Seine, the Congress of Vienna, and the Treaties of Paris—his zeal, tact, and diplomatic experience, and his knowledge of the French language making him an invaluable collaborator, especially to Lord Castlereagh, himself singularly deficient in the latter respect.<sup>1</sup> ‘Lord Castlereagh thoroughly appreciates you, my dear David,’ his mother writes, November 1815, ‘and that alone is a sufficient reward to a spirit as sensitive as yours.’

In 1815 he had married Anna, youngest daughter of Robert Burnet Jones, Attorney-General of Barbadoes, a lineal descendant of Bishop Burnet, and of Elizabeth, daughter of Samuel Eastwick, sometime M.P. for Westbury; a woman of the rarest moral and intellectual gifts, and destined up to the end to exercise the most unbounded influence over her son.

If to his father Burnet Morier was to owe the independence of character, the fearless disregard of obloquy and opposition, the extraordinary impartiality and fair mindedness which later gave him the great hold he undoubtedly possessed over the many he came in contact with, it was from his mother that he inherited the liveliness of mind, quickness of thought, and vividness of perception, the large-hearted toleration and eagerness to know all that was best in men and things which were to be such distinguishing traits of his character,

When the work of the treaties was completed in 1815, the young couple settled down in Paris, where David

---

Tho' born of strangers to that envied shore,  
Where freedom's shout contends with ocean's roar,  
Esteem'd and priz'd in ripening youth he gain'd  
A hold on England's favour long retain'd;  
While duty, source of Nelson's matchless fame,  
Breathed in his every act with kindred aim.  
Farewell! my friend, dear yoke-fellow in days  
When clouds hung dark, tho' streak'd with golden rays.  
Blest was the path thy feet so nobly trod,  
Its guerdon peace, its end, the throne of God,

<sup>1</sup> David Morier used often to describe his feelings, when, on an important occasion, a great dinner at the diplomatic headquarters of the Allies at Dijon in 1814, given to celebrate the news of Napoleon's fall, Lord Castlereagh, called upon to propose the health of the ladies, did so in the following words; ‘Le bel sexe partoutte dedans le monde.’

Morier had been appointed Consul General for France and Commissioner for the claims of British subjects on the French Government, and here it was that, after four daughters,<sup>1</sup> their youngest child and only son was born on the 31st March 1826, and christened Burnet, after his great Whig ancestor—the name he was always known by to his family and friends.

With pride, when he was about four months old, his father, writing to his sister Emily, says, 'I wish you knew my boy. He really is a little love, and attracts the gaze of all the passers-by. Although there is no resemblance in feature, I have detected an air about him which puts me in mind of dear little Hadji,<sup>2</sup> quite enough to show they belong to the same stock.' A pride apparently shared by the whole family, for his grandmother writes, 'As for the baby, whom I shall no longer call baby, since I find him so big for his age, he is superb. His physiognomy is so expressive that one can never forget so fine a child when one has once seen him.'

Four years later, in 1831, his father notes that 'Burnet begins now to read with such facility as to make it a great pleasure to him to read to Nourrice stories from the Bible history in French.'


In 1832 David Morier was appointed to the post of Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Confederation, succeeding his old friend Stratford Canning.

In a letter dated Berne, February 1833, shortly after his promotion, addressed to 'His darling Mother,' he humorously justifies himself against the imputation of not answering letters :—

'I am not quite sure whether my own dearest Mamma does not think *my Excellency* to have grown either a fine gentleman or a lazy dog. You must therefore bear with me whilst I justify myself from the imputation of either, both for your satisfaction, who have taken my defence on yourself and for the information of all complainants in

<sup>1</sup> Dorothea Clara Horatia, b. 1817, d. 1891; Elizabeth Leila, b. 1822, d. 1839; Mary Henrica, b. 1823 m. Sheffield, third son of Sir Th. Neave, Bart., d. 1884; Cecilia, b. 1824, d. 1839.

<sup>2</sup> James Morier.

future. There are twenty-four hours in the day and night. That's sure—and in twenty-four hours surely, there is half an hour to spare for a few lines to a friend. That's true again. Well then, Mr. Devis,<sup>1</sup> why in the name of old Burrup, the stationer, have you not found time for a letter to A.B.C. . . . to Z . . . since you have been plenipotising at Berne? Reply of H.E. Firs'—Because I have been plenipotising. Do you think that I have nothing to learn, nothing to talk, nothing to read, nothing to meditate, nothing to write about my twenty-two sovereign independent ? Have I not to study German in order to understand the forty-six newspapers of this enlightened many puzzled-headed confederation? Have not I to talk politics with my brother Dips, with Landammans, avoyers, "Great Raths," and "Little Raths," and to look wise all the time, and let me tell you that looking wise *all* the time takes up a great deal of time because the effort makes one so very stupid all the time afterwards. *Secundo*—Because I have a wife and five children. Do you think I have nothing to do with them, and for them, and about them? Is no time consumed in scolding them, pinching them, teaching their young ideas which way to shoot so as not to miss fire, walking with them, talking with them, eating with them, yawning with them, and lastly, I am sorry to say, for the last ten days nursing them day and night. *Tertio*—Because I have lots of other things to do, etc. Don't you think, dearest mother, that the reply is *sans réplique*, and am I not an injured and traduced plenipo?'

Burnet's childhood was of the happiest, and to few has it been given to begin life surrounded by such an atmosphere of love and affection.

Of the religious system of training adopted by his father, the following may give some idea:—

'I know of no remedy but getting the faulty child to acknowledge his fault when the moment of irritation is over, and to *pray* against it. I am sure that those who say that *all souls* are alike, and that our nature is not inherently corrupt, can never have superintended a nursery. The

<sup>1</sup> His pet name.



world, the flesh, and the devil are as busy there as with grown-up people, and yet your philosopher tells you to trust to *reason* for bringing the *man* to perfection.'

They lived at the Hübel, a charming country place in the vicinity of Berne. From there, his father, writing when Burnet was seven years old, encloses a prayer written by the latter: 'I am told he wrote it one evening by the light of his veilleuse before going to sleep. He generally reads a prayer out of Osterwald for his *chère nourrice* and the housemaid before he gets to bed.'

At the age of ten his family's eastern and diplomatic training began to assert itself, for writing to 'his precious mamma,' Burnet takes up the 'pen of delight in the fingers of happiness,' at the same time informing his sister Dora that, though 'enough is as good as a feast, yet my thirst after despatches is not yet satisfied. You may conceive my pride at having copied a private letter which is to go to L. P. [Lord Palmerston] by the courier, and for which papa gave me five francs.'

From about the same period dates the following character drawn by himself and addressed to his father:—

'Je trouve que j'ai de la vanité et surtout autrefois j'ai cru que j'étais plus haut que les autres enfants et je vois que quelquefois je mets de la vanité en disant que je dessine mieux les chevaux que mes sœurs et que je me plais à faire le petit connoisseur.

'Je trouve que j'ai souvent des *moments d'humeur* et de susceptibilité et que je me fâche quand on m'appelle "Maître Pastete est un effet combustible."

'Je trouve que j'ai souvent de la peine à fixer mon attention et je me sens souvent de la paresse et des distractions.

'Je suis souvent bruyant et j'ai l'habitude de mettre dans la bouche ce que je trouve.

'Voici, mon cher papa, la liste de quelques uns de mes défauts. Je chercherai à m'en défaire, et je suis, Votre affectionné enfant,  
R. BURNET D. MORIER.'

On a journey to Stuttgart, undertaken with his German tutor, Dr. Wagner, in the summer of 1838, he observantly remarks:—

'Stuttgart is full of places where ladies and gentlemen come to drink bear [*sic*] and eat cheese, a thing which may appear funny, but which is quite true: the Wurtemberg people have a great tendency to this sort of dissipation, but I have been assured that the churches are now much more frequented than twenty or thirty years ago, over and above which there is nothing wrong in this kind of pleasure, because it is generally relations who assemble and chat over their pots of bear [*sic*].'

In the early part of 1839, just whilst his parents were making arrangements to send Burnet to England for his education, weighing the alternative advantages of Eton and a private tutor, they were overwhelmed by a terrible catastrophe. Within the short interval of a week, their two daughters, Leila, aged seventeen, and Cecilia, aged fifteen, were carried off by an epidemic of confluent measles, then raging at Berne, to which the old family butler also fell a victim. Burnet and Dora, the eldest daughter, though both dangerously ill, recovered.

Bitter as was the blow, it was borne by both David Morier and his wife with that simple spirit of Christian resignation and piety which characterised them, but constant references in letters many years afterwards prove how unhealed the wound remained.

Soon afterwards they left the Hübel, too full of painful associations, and removed to the Château of Oberhofen,<sup>1</sup> on the lake of Thun, from where many of the subsequent letters are dated.

The Hübel was then occupied by the Chevalier de Bunsen,<sup>2</sup> at that time Prussian Minister at Berne, and the great friendship which ever afterwards united the two families commenced at this period.

In the summer of 1839, Burnet was taken to England by his parents, and placed under the charge of the Rev. J. Dod at Edgehill, near Chester, strongly recommended by an old family friend, Chancellor Raikes.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Now belonging to Count Pourtalès.

<sup>2</sup> Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias, Chevalier de, b. 1791, d. 1860, statesman, diplomatist and scientist; Prussian Minister to the Court of St. James, 1842-1854.

<sup>3</sup> Raikes, Henry, b. 1782, d. 1854, divine, Chancellor of the Diocese of Chester.

## CHAPTER II

## SCHOOLDAYS

'August 25th, 1839.

'O MY dear papa, I am in another of those dreadful fits of low spirits, I am bathing both my paper and cheeks with tears; they come upon me in the most hideous forms. I imagine I will never see you again, I think I see you lying [*sic*] dying in some out of the way inn, or drowning near Antwerp. Oh, dear papa, don't quiz me, don't call me childish, but do write to me as soon as you have crossed the sea. Let me hear from you more than once a week. . . .'

This letter of Burnet's, the first dated from Edgehill, testifies to the feelings of desolation of the homesick little boy, so suddenly transplanted to such totally novel surroundings; but in truth it must be added, that two days later he writes to his mother: 'The more I examine this place the more I like it, and only regret that you and dear papa don't live at Chester.'

All his life his usually high spirits alternated with deep fits of despondency.

His wish was fulfilled; constant was the flow of letters which reached him from both parents, revealing the wisdom and sympathy with which they watched over his moral and physical development; his mother's letters especially, proving by their well-worded and admirable advice, how much her son was to owe her.

*Mrs. Morier to Burnet Morier*

'September 25th, 1839.

'I recommend you, dearest Burnet, to get a book and put down regularly your expenditure. I know it is sometimes in a hurry tiresome to do, but unless you do, you can never calculate what money you will require, nor check any

imposition nor any inclination to expense in yourself ; for you must always remember, dearest, that the only way to indulge your fondness for giving, is by being economical. When one reflects that a labourer with a family can often not obtain more than eight shillings for a week's labour, it makes one quite ashamed of the thoughtless manner in which one expends small sums.'

*From Burnet Morier to his Mother*

*'October 7th, 1839.*

' . . . I have had very little opportunity of doing good, but Saturday last gave half a crown to James the stable-boy, an excellent religious lad, to give to any poor people he might be disposed. . . . I have given a great deal of money to poor people for little services, such as holding my horse, picking up my whip and so forth, which is also a way to charity.'

A proceeding not entirely approved of by his mother, for, answering, she says : ' I think you made a mistake in elevating the stable-boy into your almoner. It is a great temptation to him, who is probably not overburdened with cash himself, to put into his own pocket what is given for the poor, and as we pray not to be tempted ourselves, we should be careful not to tempt others.' And amongst other advice : ' Remember that *crowing* is always mean spirited, and ungentlemanly, and the surest mark of one who has never studied that most essential of all studies, *himself*.'

His first Christmas holidays were spent with his aunt, Mrs. Dottin,<sup>1</sup> at Bugle Hall, Southampton, and many were the recommendations with which he set out on his travels.

*'December 1st, 1839.*

' . . . The Southampton coach by which you will start on the following morning, starts from the Spread Eagle, Regent Circus, is called the 'Independent,' and leaves at eight. I hope I need not, on this, your first journey alone, recommend prudence to be careful on the railroad, to be in the carriage in time, and neither to put your head nor

<sup>1</sup> Wife of Abel Dottin, M.P. for Hampshire.

your hands out of the window. There are some young people in the world, as you will find as you mix more in it, that think that foolhardiness shows courage, which is a very silly mistake. A good and wise man would risk his life to save that of a fellow creature, but he would never tempt God by exposing it foolishly and unnecessarily. If any of your fellow travellers should strike up an acquaintance with you, and propose your going anywhere with them, you will, of course, decline any such sudden friendships. . . .'

Railways were still a novel mode of locomotion, judging from a letter of David Morier, dated Windsor Castle a few months later :—

'September 5th, 1840.

' . . . Don't be astonished at the date of this my letter. I write while waiting to set off for town by the railroad, which will be my fourth experiment in that line since Wednesday morning. On that day, having previously ascertained, as I thought, that I had no chance of getting my audience to take leave of the Queen for the next ten days, I carried off your dear mother to Aunt Lee's, and spent the night, and we were back in Bond Street by half-past one. I found the house in a hubbub on account of a letter which had been left by a F.O. messenger marked *Immediate* from Lord Palmerston, with injunctions to find me out, dead or alive. This proved a command dated the day before to come here (Windsor) to dine with our Sovereign Lady Victoria Regina yesterday as a stomachique for my audience this morning. All this has been duly effected without trouble or hurry, thanks to the invention of those great walking kettles, and that you may judge of the effects upon Louis,<sup>1</sup> by the good treatment he has received under the Royal roof, I transcribe the following lines I have discovered written by him on a page of the blotting book on which I am now writing from a most comfortable room, looking out on the beautiful Long Walk. "Charmant Château que Dieu te protège. Tu renfermes les délices de ce monde et veuille le Seigneur faire la grâce à toutes personnes qui, y, sont élevées en dignité de passer de tes

<sup>1</sup> His Swien valet

délices aux Délices éternels. L. Decoppet—Suisse." It is not everybody in whom the view of an earthly palace raises the thoughts of a heavenly one. I like the feeling which dictated the prayer, and surely if danger and elevation of station go together, there is no human being who ought to be the subject for more sincere sympathy and earnest prayer of all loyal men than the young Queen who dwells in this "Charmant Château." Cela n'empêche pas qu'on s'y ennuie furieusement. I never witnessed so portentous a yawn as the one uttered last night by the Prime Minister [Melbourne] as the party, only twenty persons altogether, broke up at about eleven. I played at chess with a young lady, and was only saved from an imminent checkmate by the rising of Her Majesty to withdraw. "Sic me servavit Apollo." When you can send me a spirited translation, prose or verse, no matter, of Horace's Epistle, in which that passage is found, I will say—what shall I say, *Dulcissime rerum*, ought it not to be *Dulcissima rerum* ?'

Burnet's progress at Mr. Dod's not being considered very satisfactory, his father a year later moved him to another tutor, the Reverend J. Utterton, at Holmwood parsonage, near Dorking; where, however, he does not seem to have gained much more profit by his studies, for, when three years later he failed in his matriculation examination at Balliol, it was unanimously attributed by his examiners to 'his lamentable deficiency in the rudiments of Latin and Greek'; a result perhaps not so very surprising when it is borne in mind that the choice of tutors seems to have depended more on their religious views than on their classical attainments.

Burnet passed three very happy years at Holmwood; thoroughly accustomed now to English ways and life, his high spirits, ready wit, and warm affections gaining him a host of friends. His maternal grandmother writes to his mother 13th April 1841: 'Your darling boy came to me late on Saturday looking the picture of health, strength and spirits. Never did I see a human creature with so much quicksilver in their frame and so much solidity in their brain. Take him altogether, he is a marvellous creature—

immensely tall and immensely handsome—yourself on a larger scale.’

His holidays were spent with various relatives, and often at Killerton, Sir Thomas Acland’s,<sup>1</sup> an old friend of the Morier family. Happiest of all when he was able to return to his beloved home in Switzerland. Speaking of his arrival there, his mother writes on 11th July 1841 —

‘ . . . In order to get as fast as possible he seems to have tried every possible conveyance, and, speaking fortunately German with tolerable facility, to have managed uncommonly well. At Bâle he found the diligence just setting off, they assured him there was no place, at which he grumbled; that would not do. He then offered a double fare, but they had already put one more than the right number in, and could not in any way stuff in another. He then said as a last resource, he would try what being the son of a plenipo would do. So he pulled out his passport, proved to them who he was, and that it was indispensable that he should reach his father’s without delay; upon which the conductor on learning the name, gave him up his seat, and stowed himself away he does not know where. In this way he got to the next place, and there he went shares with a Swiss officer in a small carriage which brought them to Berne. He had three hours before the diligence started for Thun; instead of resting himself after having been travelling two nights and days without sleep, he went to the riding school, astonished the people who could not believe he was the same little boy they had known before, and under pretence of seeing how the establishment was flourishing, tried every horse in the stable.’

On the eve of his confirmation on 13th June 1842, his mother writes to him :—

‘ . . . Indeed it is a most important era in your life, for amongst all nations the change from boyish dependence to manly responsibility was considered of the greatest importance; you are reading the History of Rome, and therefore could tell me to an hour when the puerile dress was left off

<sup>1</sup> Sir Thomas Acland, Bart., b. 1787, d. 1871, M.P. for Devon.

and the manly robe put on. If I remember my by-gones correctly, it was at sixteen or seventeen, and attended by much ceremony and rejoicing, and yet what was it compared to the equipment St. Paul speaks of which you now at the same age would attempt to wear. Highly as they may have rated the duties of citizen, what are they compared to those of Christian, which add spiritual to moral responsibilities, which include all—duty to God, to the State, to your neighbour, to your family, and to yourself. . . . It is said that those who are brought up on goat's milk are fond of climbing and capering. An old Comte de Rully used to declare that he could see the ears grow of those who were nursed on the milk of asses. You, my dearest boy, were not only born in Paris, but nourished on French milk; I would have you therefore exceedingly on your guard against the two great failings of the Frenchman, *levity* and *vanity*. . . . High spirits accompanied with a pure conscience and love and trust in God have carried men over the roughest ways in the stormiest events of life with a facility astonishing to one equally good perhaps, but by nature of a low and desponding temperament. But on the other hand, they are the greatest snare unless accompanied by a most determined will, an obstinate determination to resist temptation *in its bud*, and all seduction from friends and acquaintances to do anything however trifling that might lead further than a tender conscience will allow, and that manly hardness, which, like the bone of the racehorse or the wood of the oak, is capable from the closeness of its texture to receive the highest polish of religious principle, and bid defiance alike to the example of the greater part of your own sex and the foolish flattery of the other.'

As far back as April 1840, his father had put his name down for Balliol College, 'on Dr. Jenkyns's list of candidates, and as the men at that college stand very high, you will find it necessary to work hard during the next three years in order not to disgrace either your father or your college.'

Meanwhile, it had been decided, with a view of giving a more definite object and greater interest to his studies, that he should compete for a scholarship at the same college



though, as his tutor said, there was no hope that one so young should succeed. It was therefore no disappointment when, on going up for the examination in November 1843, he failed to obtain the scholarship. Great, however, was the consternation when in the following spring he failed to pass his matriculation examination for Balliol.

*Burnet to his Father*

*'June 2nd, 1844.*

' . . . You will have perceived by my last letter to my mother . . . that I had great misgivings as to how my examination would turn out, and now I need not tell you how great is my mortification and pain in having to inform you that my apprehensions have been realised, and that my examination did not turn out successful. The point on which it turned, however, was not that which I feared, but my Latin prose composition, which I am afraid I never paid sufficient attention to in my work. . . . I cannot tell you, dearest father, how great a trial this has been to me, and I am sure if you knew how deeply I felt it, you would feel for me. . . . I find my principal faults to be want of steadiness and perseverance in the pursuit of my duties, want of humility and resting on myself, and no greater check to all these, if rightly used, could have been found than my late failure. Nothing but steady and constant work will redeem the lost ground, it has humbled me in my opinion, and has taught me to put my trust in God—at least I hope I may say it has. . . . '

*The Same to the Same*

*'June 11th, 1844.*

' . . . I cannot sufficiently thank you for your letter of the 2nd June received this morning. There is consolation and encouragement in every line of it, and the oftener I read it, the more strengthened I feel by it. . . . I have, thank God, by this time recovered to a great degree the equilibrium, if such an expression is allowable, of my mind, which was at first quite stunned, as it were stupefied by the shock. . . . About my future prospects, I would not *now* give up Oxford for the world. I have not only before me

to acquire honour, but to wipe out disgrace, and with God's blessing I shall do both. . . . Whatever you do, let me beseech you not to give up the idea of sending me to Oxford. Let me not go into a profession where it could be said, "There is the man who is sent here because he could not get into Oxford." "

His cousin, A. Carlton Cumberbatch, who had been sent to look after him at Oxford, thus reported to his father in May 1844 :—

' . . . I have seen your dear old boy twice ; he is a dear fellow, and I love and admire him ; his character is just what it ought to be at his age, and can be read in his face in five minutes. He requires the management only of a blood horse, and his impetuosity should be restrained with a gentle hand, for I never met with so nervous and sensitive a creature in my life. Poor dear fellow, he has been put to the test by his late examination. It has cut him to the quick, and a hard word would drive him almost to despair.'

His failure notwithstanding, he had made a very favourable impression on his examiners ; the master of Balliol, the well-known Dr. Jenkyns, writing of him soon afterwards in the following terms : ' From his excellent disposition and high moral character, he left us a very favourable impression, and made us deeply regret his failure.' His ill-success being attributed to want of preparation and deficiency in accurate scholarship, Dr. Jenkyns strongly advised him to go to Mr. Holden, a Balliol man, an excellent scholar and capital crammer, a proposal which, though warmly backed by Sir T. Acland, Carlton Cumberbatch, and other friends and counsellors, Burnet at first, from a feeling of loyalty and affection to Mr. Utterton, strongly opposed.

' I think if I left Utterton,' he writes, ' I should be greatly wanting in my duty to him, or at least in common charity to him, and charity to our neighbour is a duty . . . no, my dear father, though I cannot be sufficiently thankful for the kindness of my friends, still, they cannot put themselves into my position. I cannot make them enter into my

feelings, and though false sentiment and morbid sensitiveness are my abhorrence, still people ought to remember that a tutor, especially such a one as Utterton has proved himself to me, is not a piece of machinery, or a mere drudge or beast of burden, whose feelings you would no more consult than a cook would that of a wretched turnspit, and ask him whether he felt hot and close in the pleasant round of his occupations. . . .’

Ultimately, however, the advice of his family and friends prevailed, and Burnet joined Mr. Holden at Upminster in August 1844. His defeat had nerved him to severe efforts, and he set to work with a will to retrieve his failure—all the while, even in the midst of his hardest studies, keeping up an unflagging correspondence with his family.

*Burnet Morier to his Father*

‘UPMINSTER, September 1844.

‘ . . . By the way, my dear father, I have determined at last to keep a commonplace-book, and as I mean it to be a good one of its kind I should not like to begin it without a few hints on your part. Talking of this sort of thing, I do not know whether I mentioned to you having dined some time ago, whilst still in Surrey, at Mrs. Evelyn’s, Wootton Park, the seat and family of old John Evelyn, who lived in Charles the First’s time, and wrote some famous memoirs, and also a book called *Sylva*. It is a curious old house, and surrounded with woods, etc.—scenery so truly English and beautiful as never to be obliterated from my memory. I dined in company with a regular brick of an old antiquary, who was the discoverer of the memoirs some twenty years ago in a heap of letters and papers. Seeing I took an interest in his conversation, the old dog was pleased, and promised to show me the identical memoirs, which he did, and immensely interesting they were. Besides this he showed me heaps of original letters of Charles the First at different periods of his reign down to a few days before his execution, and more beautiful letters, or filled with a more angelic spirit, you cannot conceive.’

*To his mother about the same date*

' . . . I wish very much to know whether you have read *Coningsby*, and if you have, what you think of it. I make a point of never reading novels except in vacation time, but have made an exception in favour of this, as being a book that you cannot very well enter a drawing-room without hearing discussed, and also affording, as I was given to understand, a great insight into the political world of the last twenty years, of which I was dying to know something. It has intensely interested me, and given me a great thorough acquaintance, though just now I cannot afford time for it. But I shall be able in future to appreciate much more the conversation of Acland, etc. At the end of the third volume there are a few cursory remarks on the various fields opened respectively by Diplomacy and the Bar, which, strange to say, had been occupying my thoughts for a long time before, and the line recommended being exactly what I in my mind rather leaned towards, and for the same reason. If you have not read the book yet, get it as soon as you can. . . . '

*From his Mother*

CHÂTEAU DE OBERHOFEN, *March* 1844.

' . . . I am sorry to say I can have no chat with you on the subject of *Coningsby*, not having read it. English novels only get to Berne when pirated, which takes time. The author has the reputation of being an unworthy member of Young England, and not exactly the person whose axioms one would swallow whole; but if he has turned your mind towards the Law rather than Diplomacy, and you have *time*, Lord Eldon's *Memoirs*, I am told, give an excellent picture of what a young man must do in the way of work if he would inherit his big wig. . . . I have been reading lately Arnold's *Memoirs*, which have interested me a good deal; with opinions leading straight to the wildest democracy, both in Church and State, there was a deep and abiding love of his Saviour, and the poor, and an anxious desire for the improvement of his country and her institutions, for

which one cannot help heartily loving him, and at the same time thanking Heaven that he had nothing else to rule over than little boys, to whom he did not talk politics, but in whom he did engraft a portion of that divine love which raised the tone of his school far above all others of the day. . . .’

*The same to the same*

‘CHÂTEAU DE OBERHOFEN, October 21st, 1844.

‘I have done as you bid me, bought *Coningsby*, and have been reading it. With regard to what seems to have made an especial impression upon you, Sidonia’s opinion with regard to the respective merits of Diplomacy and Law, I cannot agree with you, nor admit that the representative of a great and mighty nation is a phantom without nationality, without country and political creed; on the contrary, I know he can be very positively and substantially a person capable of doing much good and preventing great harm, and that he can be the very incarnation of nationality and love, and adhere to his country by all the distance that separates him from her faults and brings him in contact with those of her neighbours; and that the habit of weighing and comparing a variety of political creeds, judging them by a high and holy standard, gives a much more enlarged and enlightened view than is held by those who are straitened and pent up in the trammels of party spirit and party faction at home. Professionally I know few objections to diplomacy, personally I know many. Law certainly avoids expatriation, and if it be followed as Lord Eldon followed it, working from four in the morning with a wet towel round his head until late at night, refusing all society whatever, and interrupting himself merely to run to the other end of the street to purchase six pennyworth of sprats for his dinner, it may, *if* the solicitors who now bring up their sons to the Bar, secure professional aid and carefully exclude all interlopers from any opportunity of showing their powers, will for once favour him with a few briefs, it may by a continuance of the same labour ultimately secure a handsome fortune, a judge’s, or even a chancellor’s wig. But this career is not the one which is

running, I suspect, in your young head. You would enter the Law with a secret hope that something or other might turn up to bring you into the House of Commons where you would hope to distinguish yourself, and obtain office in the Government of the country. *Confess*, is not this it? Is it not politics, and not Law, that you are really hankering after? Now, my dearest Burnet, beware of encouraging this feeling, for it will only lead to misery. You are not so placed as to be able to pursue a political career either with honour or advantage. You are not independent, you must live by your profession, and no politician can do his country service or obtain honour for himself who cannot afford to spurn all office and advantage which might compromise a principle. There is no career so full of snares, so dangerous to probity, as that of politics to a poor and talented man. I could say a great deal more on this subject, but that for the present at least our decision in favour of one profession rather than another does not press.'

A letter which evidently carried conviction.

*Burnet Morier to his Mother*

'June 5th, 1845.

'... My returning love for the diplomatics grows warmer every day. The fact is, I never loved the law *pour ses beaux yeux*, but only looked to it as a stepping-stone for all manner of fine things in the Parliamentary and Prime Minister line. The day of rotten boroughs is, however, over, and next to serving one's country in that line I certainly own nothing can be more noble than supporting her own high character before the astonished eyes of foreigners. A life of public service is certainly one to which circumstances as well as my own inclination seem to point to, and for that purpose no better foundation could be had than three years at Oxford spent as I hope and intend mine may be. Exactitude and business manners, together with a knowledge of the machinery of society to be acquired only in the best society, are equally necessary as cement to such foundations.'

## CHAPTER III

## OXFORD

' March 5th, 1845.

' MY BELOVED FATHER AND MOTHER,—I have, thank God, just passed at Balliol. I am going to matriculate in a few minutes, having already taken the oath.'

To the end of his life, Morier never forgot all he owed to Oxford, to the friendships and interests he formed there, and to which he clung ever after. Thirty-five years later, in 1879, he wrote to Jowett :—

' . . . If I take stock of what Oxford did for me, I can safely say it made me personally acquainted with one Jowett, one Thucydides, and one Aristotle. Number 1, thank God, has never parted from me nor I from him. Number 3 did a deal for me for many years afterwards and even to the present day. In these days of total moral anarchy, it is well worth considering what that old ethical discipline of the unreformed Oxford schools did for the generations it educated. I had this extraordinary advantage, that I came in for the old discipline at the very moment it was being impregnated with the new, so that I got the advantage of both. Say what you will, it is incalculable what a body of ethical doctrine assimilated partly as dogma and partly as science so as to become a very part of one for the rest of one's life, will do for a man. I very much doubt if speculations on the solar spectrum and the microscopic investigation of protoplasm will do as much. Number 2 has always haunted me as the *poire pour la soif*, that I should reserve for the day I should really be called upon to do public work, having a dim but deep recollection of the concentrated political wisdom it contained. . . .'

*Burnet Morier to his Father**' March 11th, 1845.*

' . . . I suppose you will ere this have received my hurried scrawl from Oxford announcing the joyful news of my now being an unworthy member of that University. I must now put you a little more up to details. I heard of the 5th having been appointed for matriculation about a fortnight before, but thought it on the whole best not to mention anything about it, that you might not be more fidgety than needful. I crammed up like bricks to the last. On the morning of the 5th I entered the dread hall which I had left the last time in no very amiable mood. By one o'clock my fate was settled. The master and tutors highly complimented me and said I had done the greatest credit both to myself and tutor. At three o'clock we went through the ceremony before Dr. Jenkyns of having all our names inscribed in a huge book and taking oaths of being good boys, etc. Amongst other things that are written down in latin in the records are what one's worthy parents are. Poor little Jenkyns when he came to Minister Plenipotentiary was regularly flummuxed, and was obliged to ask me how he should put it down in latin. I said I thought Legatus would do, so you will go down to posterity as Legatus ad Helvetios Confederatos. . . . At five we were invested in our academics, viz. cap and gown, white tie and bands, and marshalled before the Vice-Chancellor, where we swore to the Thirty-Nine Articles and No Popery. . . . The next day I went and saw Mr. Woolcombe, my future tutor, who told me what books to read in the meanwhile. I shall in all probability have rooms in October. . . . '

His father, greatly relieved, wrote from Berne, where he was immersed in the Swiss troubles then approaching a crisis :—

*' March 21st, 1845.*

' . . . The delight your letter gave us is not to be expressed, after two previous failures to have got it at last so well, is great and unspeakable comfort. I expect



details of your examination, what were the chief points, etc.'

And a few days later, 25th March 1845 :—

' . . . You are naturally anxious to know the real state of things in this distracted land. A few days will perhaps clear up the at present rather doubtful point whether or no the Frei Schaaren will, at last, have the courage to run the risk of having their heads broken, while they break what is now declared to be the law by the Diet, viz. that the members of the same family have no right to cut one another's throats. The general report, spread since the adjournment of the Tagsatzung, still continues to be that the long-threatened and boasted-of attack on Lucerne is to take place to-day. If it is to be, the sooner the better, for all parties are sick of waiting so long for the drawing up of the curtain, and wish to have done with it. The truth is the Eidgenossenschaft is very ill; seedy, rickety, no patching or plastering will do. The various sorts of court-plasters which have been applied, beginning with ours, continued by jolly old Pontois,<sup>1</sup> carried on by grim gaunt Phillipsberg,<sup>2</sup> and to be concluded by prussic acid, will not effect a radical cure; caustics or the knife can only reach a gangrene, but in the operation the patient may be so cut up as to leave no traces of his former self. All accounts from Vaud agree in describing the revolutionary spirit there as hideous. The worst feature is that it has principally displayed itself among the youth from sixteen and upwards in the shape of everything connected with religious feeling. The churches and chapels have been the scenes of scandalous outrage, and private houses, where prayer-meetings common amongst many families are known to be held, have been invaded by the paid guard of the revolutionary Government. I had a long visit from the *facile princeps*<sup>3</sup> of this movement while at Zürich. He came evidently to talk me over into the belief that it was a pure and holy

<sup>1</sup> Pontois, Comte de, French Minister at Berne.

<sup>2</sup> Austrian chargé d'affaires.

<sup>3</sup> Druey, Deputy for Vaud.

revolution, and that he was a much calumniated innocent. He has so thick a neck and embarrassed a thorax that every word he utters is accompanied by the distressing sound as of a superannuated pair of bellows which no sane person would either lend or borrow, and raises the apprehension lest the speaker should go off in a fit of apoplexy. His fundamental maxim is: the will of the people is the measure of right and wrong and must be obeyed. I had the satisfaction of telling him that the principle of the sovereignty of the people was a monstrous lie. We parted very good friends, and if he could knock me and all Dips on the head to-morrow I doubt not he would do it with right goodwill. But these fanfarons are a set of abject cowards. God bless you, my dearest Burnet. I longed to get your answer as to the details of your examination. Do you not now feel the truth of the Psalmist's words, "It is good for me to have been in trouble that I might keep Thy statutes"?''

The attack of the Freischaaren on Lucerne took place on 1st April and was repulsed with great loss.

*Burnet Morier to his Father*

' April 15th, 1845.

' . . . What a kick-up there has been at Lucerne, hurrah for the licking the Radicals have got. I cannot say I feel the least compassion for them in the world. I saw Bunsen the other day and had a very long talk with him on Swiss politics, ditto with Sir Charles Vaughan.<sup>1</sup> . . . There has been rather a fine *mal entendu* which has given rise to much fun and some bother. Kitty,<sup>2</sup> in order to frighten Aunt Emily, put me up to saying Berne had been bombarded. I immediately took the hint and with a most solemn face entered into the particulars, describing how the balls whizzed about and even lodged in your house. Having taken the hint from Kitty first and she seeing me look so grave, was humbugged herself and

<sup>1</sup> Vaughan, Sir Charles, b. 1774, d. 1849, diplomatist, Minister Plenipotentiary to Confederated States of Switzerland, 1823-1825.

<sup>2</sup> Daughter of John Morier, afterwards married to Hon. F. Grimston.

really believed it had been; she immediately told the cousinhood and my Aunt Morier; the latter goes to a soirée at Lady Palmerston's that evening, and, by way of something to say, enters into a detail of the siege to Lady Shelley. Great, as you may suppose, is the interest and cross-questionings as to the certainty of the information and the faith to be put in it. I am lugged in as the very best possible authority, and a letter is said to have been received by me that day. Lady Shelley immediately goes up and gives the whole account to the Duke of Wellington, who draws a very long face (as well he may, for he was doubtless well up in the whole of the circumstances and must have known that the bombardment of Berne was about as likely as the blowing up of the North Pole). The next morning there was an *éclaircissement*, and my aunt had to write to Lady Shelley.'

Though now a matriculated member of Oxford University, Morier was only to go into residence in October; so, in the meanwhile, he had returned to Upminster to read with Mr. Holden, and there spent the spring and summer, diversified by occasional expeditions to London, which caused his mother some anxiety, fearing, as she did, that social pleasures might lead him to neglect his studies, though in answer to her warning against paying too much attention to the 'fair civilities of Mrs. Dawson-Damer or M. Brunnow'<sup>1</sup> he assures her, 'You need not fear my head being turned by it, as I had last year, when much younger, quite enough to turn it, and yet I think it is straight enough on my shoulders.'

After spending three months in Switzerland with his family, Burnet returned to England on 3rd October to settle down at Oxford.

'... Shall I not be glad,' his mother writes on 10th October, 'to hear of your first impressions on the life you have begun upon, your interviews with Dr. Jenkyns—if you have, as I anxiously hope, rooms in College—your first visits to Don Wall and Don Woolcombe—the old

<sup>1</sup> The Russian Ambassador.

friends you find—the new acquaintances you make—all of which and every possible detail I hope you will give me *at your leisure*; not wait till conscience speaks of courier day and then sit down five minutes before the post. It will not make you conceited, nor will you learn more than you know, when I tell you how constantly you have been in my thoughts since you left us. Perhaps I have never felt your quitting us so keenly. It seemed as if I loved you more as I foresaw the temptations you will now be exposed to will be greater than any you have yet encountered, and that a three months' experience has shown me that you had not yet obtained the thorough command over your temper and your will which may, with God's blessing, attend the efforts which I am sure you feel necessary and are resolved to make, although you do not declare your resolve.'

On 14th October Burnet wrote from London to his father :—

' . . . Obeying my instructions to a T., I arrived at Oxford Thursday evening and presented myself at the gates of Balliol early on Friday morning and asked for Mr. Woollcombe. "Mr. Woollcombe, zur," says the female Cerberus of Balliol, "vy, he is wisitin' with the Master." "The Master," says I, "why, is he not here?" "Oh no, zur, we don't meet till this day week." This is a sell, cries I (and perhaps added in parenthesis, they will believe me another time). I then turned my steps to Mr. Wall, who told me he had been taken quite by surprise and did not understand it yet. So all I had to do was just to turn back again. . . . My name is *not* down for rooms, but Wall says I am certain to be squeezed in somewhere'—which he was. Three days afterwards he announces to his mother that he is at last a resident member of the University. ' . . . I found a very nice bedroom ready for me in College, though no sitting-room. The latter I have accordingly procured for myself in Broad Street, only about three or four hundred yards from the gates of Balliol. . . . I had a long interview with Mr. Woollcombe,

and delivered him my credentials, and he seems in every sense of the word a good fellow.'

His letters home are full of his new interests and experiences. A month later, speaking of a freshman's first term, he says :—

' . . . He is in a perpetual state of filling-up-time-iveness. To understand this you must know that a freshman is not supposed to, and cannot, refuse any invitations the first term ; the second term he asks all men back again, selects his acquaintance, and drops those he does not like. This being the case one's spare time is pretty well filled up.' And referring to the length of lectures he says : ' I do ten chapters of Thucydides instead of five I was used to, and then Jowett, who is one of the best tutors in the University, has a much wider range of questions, including history, etc. . . . You may be glad to hear that I got great kudos for my English theme last week.'

*To his Mother*

*'November 2nd, 1845.*

' . . . I long for one of your two-sheet letters, having heard but once from you since my arrival at this seat of learning, into which I am beginning to get gradually more and more shaken down, though it is not a process that takes place so soon as one might imagine. Woolcombe is my tutor, and a more gentlemanlike nice fellow could not exist as far, at least, as I can see of him in lecture and in the shop, for the tutors may say what they will, but it is impossible for dons and undergraduates to mingle much. Of my acquaintance in College those, of course, I am thickest with are freshmen of my own standing. Of these, those I live with almost entirely are of course my old and tried friends, Slade, Peel, a son of Lawrence Peel and Lady Jane, and Campbell, a son of Lord Cawdor's. The two latter are remarkably nice fellows, and we generally mess, in fact live together. . . . As far as work is concerned, it is impossible in your first term to do any

more than just get up the lectures, do the weekly essay and weekly piece of Latin, catechetics and work at the analyses for the term, viz. one of Thucydides and the divinity one, viz. Ezra and Nehemiah. This, I can assure you, is regular stumping work; but next term I shall have fewer lectures and be more settled down, and I shall then begin my regular *little go* work. . . .'

On 1st April 1846 he tells his father how he spent his twentieth birthday in 'Collections.'

' . . . Can you fancy a poor victim before a Board of Inquisition in some such place as the Dungeon of Spiez? If so, fancy me in Collections. I was kudzied in the highest terms, first by the Master for essays, by Woollcombe for Latin, by Jowett for Thucydides, and Temple for mathematics, which you know is a *voluntary*, and therefore double kudos.' He states his intention to stay up for the Easter vacation: ' . . . It is a bore rather, but as old Slade stays up and Peel and Grosvenor<sup>1</sup> it will not be half so bad.' Of the latter he says: ' . . . He is a most charming fellow, and I hope to introduce him to you this summer. With his high rank and the immense fortune he is coming into, there is not one single atom of pretension of any kind. He has the best temper in the world, and without exception is the best-looking fellow I ever saw. He, together with Glyn, one of my great friends here, and Stephen Lawley, late of this College, brother of my great friend Frank Lawley,<sup>2</sup> are coming abroad this summer.'

His family correspondence seems to have been somewhat neglected at this time, for his mother, writing on 3rd March 1846, rather sardonically observes:—

' I had really begun to be in a rare fidget and fancy no end to your chuckings, your tumbles, and the consequences thereof amounting at least to the dislocation of your right

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards first Duke of Westminster.

<sup>2</sup> Son of Lord Wenlock.

thumb and forefinger, and therefore was considerably relieved when I learned it was only Thucydides and Euclid who were the stumbling-block, and your pitching into them so, and so much to your satisfaction, the only cause for your silence. I rejoice to hear your tutors think you have something in you. What that is, I shall know when it comes out, but should it prove seed of aught that is great or good, grudge no watering you can give or get. Man with all his fourscore years has but one spring.'

The period Morier joined Oxford was one of great political and religious excitement, coinciding, as it did, with the end of the great tractarian movement which had proved so eventful a crisis in the history of the University.

When still at Upminster, on 13th February 1845, he records that—

'Holden has gone up to-day to vote on the Ward question at Oxford, which is creating a vast deal of interest at present; he intends to vote against the Vice-Chancellor,<sup>1</sup> not so much for the sake of Mr. Ward as for the unfair manner in which they gave notice of their intention, only having given Members of Convocation five days to determine the points on which he is to be judged.'

And a week later, on 20th February:—

'The famous Convocation has at length had its meeting and delivered its judgment, and an iniquitous judgment it is, one guided entirely by party spirit and fanatical zeal, a majority consisting of fat little no popery evangelical parsons on one side and men like Grant, Manning, and Acland on the other. . . .'

Describing the scene at Christchurch in a letter to his father a year later, 26th February 1846, he says:—

' . . . I heard Pusey a few Sundays back <sup>2</sup> deliver his first sermon since his suspension. The cathedral was crowded to a fearful excess, dons, undergraduates, and

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Symonds.

<sup>2</sup> On 1st February.

townsmen being heaped up together in incongruous masses. His subject was Confession, and certainly in my humble opinion there was not one word which his bitterest foe could have laid hold of. His delivery as well as the sermon was exactly what I expected and what I am sure you would have liked. The language plain and unadorned, but full of depth and meaning like the calmness of the river, the surest indication of its depth. His delivery corresponded exactly to this, earnest but unimpassioned, with a tone of melancholy winningness in it, almost a weakness in the voice, proclaiming the man of fasting and mortification. The sermon was strictly argumentative and required to be closely followed up. The impression the whole left upon me was as if I had heard some hermit of renowned sanctity just emerged from the wilderness to spend a few hours amongst us. The portly person of his persecutor, the Vice-Chancellor, contrasted anything but to the advantage of the latter, as with pompous tread he wedged his way through the crowd, attended with all the panoply of pokers.\*

His mother, referring to this letter, says :—

‘ . . . If he [Pusey] treats, as I presume he does, on confession to God he cannot express himself too strongly. Without it no progress can be made, no grace obtained ; no duty ought to be performed so regularly, so conscientiously, so minutely, and when it is, confession to our fellow-man will not often be necessary, although I do not presume to say that there may not be many cases where such a course may be both useful and proper if the right man can by any means be found. St. François de Sales, in the little book I gave you, says a good director is one in ten thousand, perhaps if he added another o he would have been still nearer the truth.’

She adds :—

‘ . . . We have depths within us which we know not of, until some deep calamity, some overwhelming trial which rends in twain our heart and spirit opens them to our view, as a traveller crossing the Mer de Glace comes



suddenly on a fearful rent cleft by the storm which has raged but an hour ago.'

Not only was Oxford at that time in the throes of a religious crisis, but in the political world the agitation consequent on the repeal of the Corn Laws was even more momentous. On 23rd January 1846 Morier writes to his mother :—

'I am most deeply interested in the state of affairs, having had long and frequent conversations with both Sir Thomas [Acland] and Tom on the present political crisis. I breakfasted with Sir Thomas this morning and he was in very low spirits about things, after Sir Robert's [Peel] speech last night.'

And on the 22nd March :—

' . . . The present political crisis is certainly a puzzler to me. Having all one's ideas turned topsy-turvey, suddenly to find out that a Cobden has been right for the last three years, a wonder of political prescience, is a shaker. I expect in another year to find that O'Connell is in reality the patriotic redeemer of poor Ireland he pretends to be.'

In a letter from Berne, dated the 3rd March, on the same subject, his mother had said :—

' . . . Here we are still waiting for the termination of the Corn Law debate, while at home, I suppose, the exact number by which Sir Robert [Peel] is to carry it has become settled in each man's mind long ago. As a financial question, our Premier has shown himself so correct in his tariff anticipations that I, for one, when he tells the agriculturists that Free Trade raises prices and proves it from beef to bedding, bow with the farmer, and say Amen, and when he tells the cotton-spinner that Free Trade is to produce such low prices that he will be enabled to compete with the world, I bow again and say, So be it, leaving his long head and weighty arms to bring these two ends to meet. But as a political question, whether by breaking his own party into fractions he has not thereby taken the drag off the democratic wheel and by thus

putting his shoulder to it, given it an impetus which will prevent his ever forming one strong enough to fasten on again, is what he would find it difficult to reply to himself, and indeed what nothing but time can show.'

The enjoyment of the summer vacation of 1846, spent in Switzerland, was considerably marred by the serious illness of Frank Lawley, Morier's great friend, who had accompanied him. October saw him back at Oxford, from whence he writes on the 26th :—

' . . . The close and, I must add, unpleasant vicinity of my "smalls" prevents my writing more than to let you know that I am getting into my reading by degrees. . . . I should have plenty of time for my "little go" work had I nothing else to do, but having just begun Aristotle's *Ethics*, it leaves me but a portion of my time to employ on what at present I am getting in a desperate funk about. . . . An account of my row,<sup>1</sup> copied, I believe, from the *Presse*, having got into the *Times*, *Herald*, and other newspapers, has formed the subject of no few jokes and discussions here, and has occasioned a new nickname, viz., "the old masse of gallantry" which has since been shortened into masse.'

On 17th November :—

' . . . The only piece of extravagance I have been guilty of this term is putting on Walrond as a coach with the ground I have to go over. I could not do without one, and his conversation and company is worth that of a hundred coaches. I am doing Aristotle's *Ethics* with him at present, though I have a public lecture in them besides,—but with such a tough party as Aristotle *il n'y en a pas de trop*. Woolcombe kudized me the other day for my Latin composition, and again urged me strongly to read, at least, at present for a class, and most good naturedly, with the work he has as senior tutor, gives me two hours private coaching a week in the evening, and to choose my own book, which is for the present *Tacitus*,

<sup>1</sup> *Vide infra*, p. 53.

as it is a hard book to construe at the same time correctly and elegantly. I am, joking apart, working in earnest. . . .'

The year 1847 began under unfavourable auspices for the Morier family. Politically the state of Switzerland was growing daily worse; indeed, all idea of law and government seemed to have vanished altogether. Already the year before, in 1846, Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Minister, and ever since Vienna days a staunch friend of David Morier's, knowing how uncongenial Switzerland had become, had offered to move him to Florence, a proposal which David Morier had been obliged most reluctantly to decline on account of the great and recent expense of transferring the Legation inside the town of Berne, stating that he had—'from the beginning found no small difficulty in making my official income, now further diminished by the Income Tax, meet the necessary expenses of my establishment, which I have always felt myself bound as a British Minister to maintain at least on a level with the best appointed missions in this country.' On the other hand, Mrs. Morier's health, which had been failing ever since the shock of her daughters' death in 1839, began to give way entirely. Burnet therefore proposed to his father, then detained in England by public business, to cut the term at Oxford so as to remain with her. 'Oh, this horrid, horrid climate,' he writes on 24th February to his father, already distracted between the conflicting claims of his official duties and the anxiety of his wife's illness, 'Dr. Bourgeois has added his mite to the overwhelming testimony there existed before, that nothing can avail her as long as she stays in this town. Every breath she draws here is poisonous. Let me beg of you, dearest papa, not to use your entreaties but your commands that as soon as it is possible for her to be moved she shall go to some sheltered spot, if it were only some lodging at Thun.'

Convalescence, however, set in, and Burnet was enabled to return to Oxford in April. A graphic account of his

journey home, dated from Boulogne-sur-Mer, 9th April 1847 :—

‘ . . . Got into the Malle Poste at Basle about four o’clock. Nothing particular happened, as I was alone most of the way. We changed Malle-Postes at Troyes, a britska for a berline, and with the latter got an addition in way of live goods in a stout old lady and a silent gentleman. The road is dull enough, nothing varying the eternal monotony of everlasting fallows except now and then a dismal-looking straight line of wood never once breaking the unvaried straight line of the horizon. The only change is the few minutes occupied in rattling through some old fortified town with its now stationary draw-bridge, deep moat, and solid battlemented walls, all the very type of a bygone century, and absurdly out of character with the dwarfish-looking, tight-laced, loosed-breeched French sentinels who now manned their walls. For some sixty or seventy seconds the cynosure of a thousand ragged eyes (excuse the expression, poetical licence for a thousand eyes belonging to ragged proprietors, *vide* Virgil, *Aeneid*, II-14, 436, etc.), while the sweating, neighing, biting, kicking, muddy team is exchanged for one equally neighing, biting, kicking, and as muddy, and we are again off, rattling through the narrow crazy streets, apparently threatening destruction to the tumble-down looking houses on each side, were it not that their almost touching roofs seem to promise each other support.’

Writing to his mother on his return to Balliol, 27th April 1847, after complaining of the dullness of London, he says :—

“ . . . However, thanks to my being in the company of my dear father, I had not only the pleasure of his society, but I was also introduced to some of his friends, amongst others to Sir Stratford Canning, whose acquaintance I had long wished to make. I had the good luck to make one of a double *tête-à-tête* to breakfast the next morning to my introduction, the other two being my

father and Sir R. Inglis.<sup>1</sup> The conversation (in which I, of course, took no share) was, as you may suppose from your knowledge of the component parts, most interesting; the freshness and vividness which the impressions made on my father by the East have retained with the naturally poetical colour of his mind, and the immense store of old Inglis' *plain facts*, acted admirably as a set off to the graphic and masterly delineation of Sir Stratford. Comparing the conversation to a picture, the one might be said to afford the lighter and warmer tints, the second the *matériel*, the big rock, I mean, or foreground, or anything of the sort, not much in itself but indispensable as bringing out the meaning of the artist; whilst the latter would be rather the action of the picture (if you understand what I mean, something akin to what the moral is in a tale). Sir Stratford Canning, next to Sir Thomas Acland, gives me the idea of the greatest cleverness of any man I have met. I should say Sir Thomas was a man of greater natural genius, Sir Stratford the more cultivated intellect; the one has made Nature his principal study, the other has made man. Hence Sir Stratford is more at home when sketching off with a few masterly touches the character of a Talleyrand or a Pozzo di Borgo; Sir Thomas, when describing some scene in the Tyrol. Hence the language of the one is more classical and pure, that of the other more poetical and imaginative.'

In another letter to his mother, equally dated from Balliol, 9th May :—

'... There is very little going on here of general interest. The boat races succeed each other on alternate nights. Balliol has bumped University, but is not likely to get higher. I went a few nights ago by invitation of Walrond to a meeting of the Decad Society. This society, consisting originally of ten members, was got up by Stanley, Woolcombe, Lake, and others about ten years ago, and is a spouting club. They meet once a week in one another's rooms, or in the common rooms of their respective colleges, and discuss some subject or other proposed by one of their

<sup>1</sup> Inglis, Sir Robert, b. 1786, d. 1855, politician.

members and having in general regard to some topic of the day ; only first-rate men belong to it, and it certainly was very interesting to watch (as it was more for discussion than for the display of oratory) the way in which these men, all deeply read in Aristotle, met each other's arguments. The principal speaker was one by name of Conington (John Virgil), who has carried everything before him here, as well as before at Rugby. He is not a man of any extraordinary or original genius, but wonderfully read in almost every branch of science and literature. Clough, Walrond's intimate friend, was decidedly the next best speaker, next to him Walrond. The subject was the advisability of a separation of Church and State. The curious feature, as it struck me, was to hear all these first-rate men, however different in principle, yet all seeming to argue that this separation must take place sooner or later.'

In June 1847 David Morier proceeded to Switzerland to present his letters of recall and bring back his wife, his diplomatic career thus terminating after a period of forty-three years of uninterrupted public service.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE SWISS TROUBLES

THE events which led to David Morier's recall from the Berne Mission were summed up many years later by his son as follows :—

' . . . For generations Switzerland has been either the battlefield for the rival intrigues of its big neighbours, or the green room in which political dramas, to be afterwards acted on the big European stage, have been rehearsed. As long as England considered herself as still belonging to the European family she was, on numberless occasions, able to act as the moderator and peacemaker in regard to quarrels which, originating in Switzerland (refugee question, Jesuit question, etc.), threatened the peace of Europe. Not being *limitrophe* like France, Italy, Austria, or Germany, and having no conceivable interest in common with any of these neighbours, she was marked out as the natural mediator and neutral friend. During the fifteen years that my father was minister at Berne, four or five blazing questions of this kind (the extradition of Louis Napoleon amongst others) were extinguished by the action of England. My father's wisdom and moderation, his long experience and thorough acquaintance with the peculiarities of the position, and the great personal respect which both the then rival governments of France and Austria had for him, enabled him to play the part of moderator with eminent success. These very qualities, however, were the cause of his fall! Lord Palmerston, furious with Guizot about the Spanish marriages, was determined to get his revenge wherever he could find it. Seeing the terror with which the rising revolutionary movement filled the French Government, he suddenly determined on

giving up the business of peacemaker, and, feeling that my father's well established character in this line of business was in the way of a sudden catastrophe, he recalled him and instigated Peel to perform his celebrated feat of precipitating the Sonderbund War (1847), which was, by the impulse it gave to the revolutionary party, the direct cause of the February Revolution which destroyed Guizot, and with him the repose of Europe for generations to come.'

For the better comprehension, however, of the causes leading up to the Swiss Revolution and the war of the Sonderbund, a more detailed explanation will here be necessary.

When, after the era of the first French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the great reconstruction of the map of Europe took place at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Switzerland, after a prolonged period of foreign invasion and internal disorders, settled down under the constitution known as the Federal Compact, under which, her neutrality and independence being guaranteed by England, France, and Austria, the country enjoyed an unexampled spell of prosperity and of material and intellectual progress. Wealth increased, industry prospered, education advanced, arts and literature flourished. This happy state lasted till 1830, when the July Revolution again disturbed the peace of Europe.

Owing to her geographical position and close proximity to the storm centre, Switzerland was the first to feel the evil effects. Political aspirations, which had long lain dormant, revived, and led to disturbances and riots, and even in many cases to the overthrow of existing institutions. Before the end of 1831 eleven cantons had changed both rulers and constitutions; moreover, the country was soon overrun by hordes of political refugees, chiefly of German origin, who not only repaid the protection they received by actively propagating their revolutionary doctrines and by fomenting discontent, but who, by their abuse of the rights of asylum and of the laws of hospitality, were the cause of the Republic being constantly embroiled in difficulties with her neighbours; such, for instance, was



the famous Polish eruption into Savoy under Mazzini's leadership in 1834. A great deal of the mischief afterwards so much deplored was subsequently directly traced to many of these refugees being at that time admitted to the universities of Berne and Zürich, and to the editorship of Swiss journals.

Soon the whole of Switzerland was seething with political trouble; the old religious difficulties in the Catholic and Protestant cantons being revived with increased violence by the suppression of all the convents of Argovy by the government of that canton in 1841. The admission of the Jesuits into Lucerne in 1844, on the one hand, and the invasion of the Catholic cantons by large bodies of armed men known as Corps Francs, or Freischaaren, on the other, formed the culminating point of the agitation. But it must be borne in mind that, however impolitic the former measure may have been, it was strictly *legal* and within the rights of cantonal sovereignty; whereas the organisation of the Freischaaren was radically *illegal*, and a violation of the peace.

One of the causes of the evil, which subsequently grew to such a height, is clearly indicated in an administrative report of the year 1841, drawn up by the Executive Council for the Grand Council of Argovy, and therefore not liable to the suspicion of partiality, addressed as it is to the same public authority which in 1841, by its confiscation of the Argovian convents, was the first to openly violate the federal laws.<sup>1</sup>

' The reports which we receive with respect to the instruction of the people are not favourable, and for the most part contain rather blame than praise. Complaints are made especially of the progressive tendency of the youth of the canton to meetings and insubordination, the adult scholars particularly are distinguished by their irreligious spirit and the rudeness of their manners and character.<sup>1</sup> Our people have been too often excited to insubordination. Too much has been said of their natural *rights* and not enough of their *natural duties*; the public newspapers of the canton have too much inflamed their minds with the pompous words of *light* and *progress*, so that we are now just only reaping what has been sown. The citizens no longer acknowledge any authority; the youth

<sup>1</sup> Report by the School Committee of Zoffingen.

of the canton, without experience and relying on their physical force, continue to break through every restraint which would check their presumption. . . .

The excitement, which had for pretext the Jesuit question, began undoubtedly at first by being fictitious and confined to the meetings called by the Committee of the People's League.<sup>1</sup> Soon, however, the people, inflamed by the mischievous activity of revolutionary agitators and press, were goaded into real fanaticism and into a feverish state of excitement and distrust, which was skilfully seized upon by the Radical Party for the advancement of their aim, *i.e.* the establishment of a Unitarian Government on the ruins of the existing Federal Compact.

'The Radicals,' wrote Morier to Sir R. Gordon at Vienna in May 1845, 'have succeeded in enlarging the scene of contest; from the Grand Council Chambers it has been transferred to popular meetings in the open air, and what was formerly a rivalry for political ascendancy between a few demagogues and their partisans is now assuming every day more and more the character of a rupture between populations of different creeds. The Jesuit question was seized upon with most perverse adroitness and fatal success by the Radical leaders of Argovy and Berne, leagued together to revenge the defeat<sup>2</sup> of their party, La Jeune Suisse, in the Valais a twelvemonth ago. It was to be foreseen that they would so act from the moment that Lucerne passed that ill-advised law [admitting the Jesuits]. The mischief is now done and has fully justified the apprehensions of the friends of good order and the hopes of the anarchists who could not suffer a greater disappointment than to be deprived of their favourite grievance by the withdrawal of that law.'

From the beginning of the troubles, the three guaranteeing Powers—France, Austria, and England—had acted together in the closest accord and done their very best by mutual and conciliatory measures to work at the pacifica-

<sup>1</sup> Denounced by M. Moncau in his presidential speech at the opening of the Diet.

<sup>2</sup> At Trient in the lower Valais, 21st May 1844.

tion of the country, and to try and prevent any isolated or precipitate action which might eventually lead to civil war. Their efforts were energetically seconded by all the other Powers, more especially by Prussia, fully aware that in the then state of Europe any breach of the peace might involve not Switzerland alone, but the whole of Europe in incalculable dangers. As Morier pointed out to Lord Aberdeen on 24th January 1845 :—

‘ The anti-Jesuit movement in Switzerland would, if it became an international question, prove peculiarly embarrassing to both Austria and France in different ways, because of their own relations with the clerical party. France especially was between the Devil and the deep sea, because to uphold the cantonal principle attacked by the Radicals would affront the French democrats ; while the opposite course, viz. the abandonment of the Federal Compact, would alienate the Catholic cantons in Switzerland and react upon the Catholic party in France. The matter was further complicated by the fact that France was one of the Powers guaranteeing the “ independence of the Helvetic body in its present form.” ’

And on 5th March 1845 he again repeats :—

‘ . . . France is so situated as to render her Government most cautious to avoid the appearance of favouring the Jesuits, Austria on the contrary having no motive for keeping on terms with the Radicals. We fortunately,’ he adds, ‘ are so situated as to make it a matter of perfect indifference to us if both parties, Radicals and Jesuits, were safely lodged at the bottom of any Swiss lake.’

Lord Aberdeen’s endeavours from the first had been directed towards supporting the moderate party in the Diet and discouraging foreign intervention,<sup>1</sup> whilst his instructions to Morier, in the opinion of the Geneva magistrates,<sup>2</sup> to whom they had been communicated, were eminently characterised by a spirit of moderation, wisdom, and kindly feeling towards Switzerland. His efforts had

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Lord Aberdeen, 30th April 1845.

<sup>2</sup> The same to the same, 12th March 1846.

the whole-hearted support of the Austrian and French Governments, both expressing their entire accordance with his views as laid down in his dispatch of the 11th February 1845, containing the warning that the 'violation of the Federal Compact by any party, either through violent means or by means of a majority obtained in the Diet for any object subversive of the principle of the cantonal sovereignty, would be considered by the Powers as involving the forfeiture by the Confederation of the advantages of neutrality and territorial inviolability guaranteed to Switzerland under its present form.'

Referring to this dispatch, Prince Metternich, writing to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count Apponyi, proposed that a declaration should be simultaneously made by the Powers represented in Switzerland to the same effect, adding: 'No one more than I do desires the pacification of Switzerland and that it should be a work wholly and entirely Swiss,' and in a further communication to the same, with reference to M. Guizot's wish that all the Powers should be agreed on the Swiss question, Prince Metternich says: 'This wish is equally shared by the Austrian Cabinet, which sees in the unanimous agreement of the Powers the only means of exercising a beneficial influence on the march of Swiss affairs.'

Still more emphatic was M. Guizot who, in a note addressed to the French representatives at Berne, to which the Ministers of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia had given their approval, expressed 'his profound conviction that equitable and patient adjustment of the rights, the interests, and sentiments concerned is the only road to a peaceable and honourable arrangement.'

Morier and the Comte de Pontois, the French Minister, worked in the closest agreement, the former taking a leading part in most of the negotiations, possessing as he did not only Lord Aberdeen's but also M. Guizot's confidence in the highest degree. In a dispatch, dated 13th January 1845, Morier, writing to Lord Aberdeen, says:—

'There is no doubt that the admission of the Jesuits into the Canton of Lucerne is a great political mistake, but

the attempt to expel them by force, which Berne seems to be meditating, is not only a mistake but a crime, since it will involve the ruin of the Confederation. . . . Lucerne is still disposed even now to give up the Jesuits, if the single convent of Muri, illegally suppressed with the other convents of Argovy, were re-established. Let the Protestants be just and the Catholics will be reasonable.'

The real aim of the anti-Jesuit agitators could be gathered from the following passage in the same dispatch :—

' The object of the Bernese rulers is to obtain a majority in the Diet for the proposition that the expulsion of the Jesuits from Swiss territory is a question of *federal* competency, and not to be determined by an appeal *in limine* to the principles of cantonal sovereignty.'

On 5th March 1845, writing from Berne to Lord Aberdeen, Morier says :—

' . . . I believe the revolution in the Canton de Vaud has opened their [the Berne Government] eyes and made them reflect on the contagion of example which might perhaps encourage the ultra-radical central committee of anti-Jesuit agitation to try the experiment of pushing the present avoyers from their seats. M. de Tavel confessed to me that the news of that revolution had filled them with consternation, and well it might, for it has placed at the head of the most flourishing canton in Switzerland a set of men who may best be judged by the cry set up by their partisans—"à bas les braves gens—à bas ceux qui ont des domestiques—à bas les chrétiens—à bas la religion—à bas le bon Dieu." '

This revolution had placed in power as dictator M. Druey, the Vaudois deputy and leader of the ultra-radical party, whose political tenets seem to have been resumed in his dictum, "L'opinion publique, c'est la rue," and whose real object was to suppress the Catholics in the Canton de Vaud. Frequent assaults were made upon chapels and oratories and on private houses where religious services were held. In an interview with Morier, which the latter

reports to Lord Aberdeen on the 26th February 1845, M. Druey told him that

‘the party with whom he acted were resolved at all hazards to effect the expulsion of the Jesuits from Switzerland; that for this purpose they aimed at obtaining a majority<sup>1</sup> to decree the expulsion, which they intended immediately to carry into execution, if need be, by force of arms; that should they fail in having a majority (this result is anticipated by all parties) then a most terrific crisis must ensue — war to the knife, unmitigated by discipline, ending only by the extermination of one of the parties. . . .’ In the same letter Morier adds: ‘I may take the liberty of stating to your Lordship my full conviction that the maintenance of the Jesuit establishments in any part of Switzerland is now become incompatible with the maintenance of public tranquillity, and that no greater service could be rendered to this country than for the Catholic Powers of Europe to unite in urging the Papal See to order the withdrawal of those establishments from the canton immediately.’

On the 24th March 1845 Morier wrote that the extraordinary Diet<sup>2</sup> ‘after a multitude of divisions ended in the discomfiture of the anti-Jesuit cantons, whose deputations failed in obtaining a majority on any of the points they strove for.’ With regard to the volunteer bands, a small majority gave, in Morier’s words, ‘the formal sanction of the highest federal authority to a truism never before disputed in a civilised community, viz. that the confederates, bound together by a common compact, have no right to invade each other’s territory . . . the result of the Diet may be considered upon the whole favourable, in appearance at least, to the cause of the Conservative Party. . . .’

But this was only a lull in the storm. On the 31st March the long-threatened movement began with the invasion of Lucerne territory by a body of six thousand men, consisting of refugees and armed volunteers under the command

<sup>1</sup> From the Diet sittin<sup>g</sup> at Zürich.

<sup>2</sup> Then sitting at Zürich. ;

of the notorious lawyer, Ochsenbein, who <sup>1</sup> 'from his own published report seems to have placed himself beyond the risk of capture or hurt.'

The Berne Government was unable or unwilling to do anything, but the expedition ended in the complete defeat of the Radical invaders, who were signally repulsed and dispersed under the walls of Lucerne on 1st April 1845. This victory toned down for a time the Radicalism of the Berne Government, and induced them to disavow the 'illegal and consequently condemnable measure' which had ended in such discomfiture. The Lucerne Government, acting on the whole with great forbearance, issued a manifesto, the spirit of which may be conveyed in the following extract: 'The desire of revenge is unworthy of victors; it is unworthy of Christians.' At the same time, the Radical press was railing at the Lucerne Government for detaining the prisoners till ransomed, and inciting to a second expedition.

During the month of May, Morier was actively engaged in an endeavour to save Dr. Steiger from the sentence of death passed upon him at Lucerne, which seems to have been thoroughly deserved. This Dr. Steiger had already been implicated in the first attempt <sup>2</sup> to overturn the Lucerne Government, and arrested, but allowed to go free for want of proof. He then went to Berne, where he was received with distinction by the anti-Jesuit party, and since then had been considered as the leader of the Lucerne refugees, and generally designated as the President of the Provisional Government, which it was intended to establish in Lucerne, had the expedition proved successful. In the report of the operations of the Freischaaren, published by Ochsenbein, Dr. Steiger is alluded to as the person who recommended the bombardment of Lucerne, being himself a citizen of Lucerne!

That Morier, to whom the Executive Council of the Berne Republic had addressed an appeal to intercede on his behalf, did his utmost, may be gathered from a letter of M. Rüttimann, avoyer of Lucerne, of 7th May 1845:—

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Lord Aberdeen, 22nd April 1846.

<sup>2</sup> 8th December 1844.

'Les sentiments nobles et généreux de votre lettre ne m'ont pas moins fait une impression vive et touchante. Soyez sûr que je ferai valoir toute mon influence pour que Steiger, tout grand criminel qu'il soit, reçoive sa grâce, pourvu qu'on puisse trouver moyen de le mettre hors d'état de nuire.'

In justice to the Catholics it must be added that the Papal Nuncio actively sided with these efforts. Dr. Steiger shortly afterwards, however, spared the Lucerne Government the trouble of any further deliberations as to his disposal by escaping from prison on 20th June into Zürich territory, where he was received with shouts of triumph by his partisans.

During all this time Morier had been unremitting in his endeavours to induce the Powers to bring pressure to bear upon the Lucerne Government, so as to cause them to withdraw the privilege of the Jesuits, persuaded as he was that this measure was from the first 'deprecated by all reflecting men as well in the Canton of Lucerne as in the rest of Switzerland,'<sup>1</sup> and that 'it is well known that even in the Canton and Government of Lucerne many who most jealously joined in repelling the invasion of the free-booter bands were amongst the most determined adversaries of that [Jesuit] cause.'<sup>2</sup>

The difficulty, however, was that the majority of the peasants identified the cause of the Jesuits with that of Catholicism generally. Morier, therefore, suggested to Sir R. Gordon, Ambassador at Vienna, that 'Prince Metternich could not exert the influence of his Court with greater benefit to the cause of general peace and security of the Catholic interest in Switzerland than by obtaining that Leu (whom he elsewhere describes as the leader of the peasants, "himself an honest, upright, but very obstinate peasant") be induced by a word from the Nuncio to propose to the Grand Council of Lucerne instructions in the sense of a withdrawal of the decree.'

This Grand Counsellor Leu von Ebensohle, the leader

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Lord Aberdeen, 22nd May 1845.

<sup>2</sup> Morier to Sir R. Gordon, Ambassador at Vienna, 11th May 1845.



of the peasant party, was shortly afterwards foully murdered by the Radicals, a crime which their press openly justified.

So far the representatives of the Powers had been in absolute agreement, both Austria and Rome from the first discouraging the admission of the Jesuits, which would probably by then have been abandoned, but for the conduct of their unprincipled assailants. After the attack on Lucerne, however, there were signs that in future Rome and some of the Catholic Powers would, from a mistaken feeling of honour, encourage the Lucerne Government to stand by their original decree. Morier therefore, with the ever-present fear of foreign intervention before his eyes, was most anxious to arrange a compromise which 'Lucerne, being now the victor, might without derogation of principle or honour' accept. His proposal was based on the following :—

'That Lucerne will consent to waive her own undoubted right in this matter, on the condition that the other cantons should desist from their declaration of the competency of a majority of the Diet to interfere in the confessional and educational arrangements of individual cantons—and secondly, that the sequestered property of the convents of Argovy should be applied to the maintenance of a theological seminary for all Swiss Catholics as an indemnity for the suppression of the said convents.'

These endeavours were unfortunately not attended with any results. Switzerland was gradually sinking more and more into a state of anarchy, and in a private letter to Lord Aberdeen, dated 6th June 1845, Morier wrote :—

'The Cantonal Governments are in a state of decomposition, the spirit of ultra-democracy is gaining men, women, and children ; it is becoming what a writer of Geneva on the Swiss democracy calls *la société poussière*, where there is no cement of authority or moral principle or religious feeling to make the unit grains of dust cohere.'

After the attack on Lucerne, and threatened as they conceived themselves to be by further invasions of the Radical party, the Catholic cantons began to concert measures

for mutual protection and to negotiate an alliance offensive and defensive, of which one of the conditions was that at the first alarm of actual attack upon any one of the allies the rest were to come to his assistance without formal summons. The cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwitz, Unterwalden, Zug, Valais, and Freyburg were the parties to this alliance, first kept secret, but which the Lucerne Government begged Count Crotti, the Sardinian Minister, confidentially to communicate to Morier, who equally confidentially transmitted the information to Lord Aberdeen.

This alliance was known as the Catholic League, and later as the Sonderbund.

In the spring of 1846 the ultra-radical party seized the Government of the canton of Berne, which, following the example of the canton of Vaud, now started full sail on a radical course.

A committee of seven was appointed with the object of drafting the new Constitution, whose tendency may be judged by some of its members, comprising as it did Ochsenbein, the commander of the expedition against Lucerne; Funk, a lawyer of doubtful reputation in his profession; Köhler, a former member of the Executive Council, from which he had been excluded some years previously on account of the notorious profligacy of his conduct; and Staempfli, an attorney, editor of the *Berne Zeitung*, the organ of the ultra-radical faction. The latter was the son-in-law of Professor Wilhelm Snell, a German refugee whose removal from the chair of International Law at the Berne University, and banishment from the canton by the late Government, as much on account of his revolutionary doctrine as of the constant state of intoxication in which this professor was seen both in the chair and out of it, had been the question on which the strength of the two parties had been tried.

'There is no saying yet,' wrote Morier to Lord Aberdeen on 6th March 1846, 'what direction the revolution aimed at by the Rads at Berne will take. That it must end in the break up of the present political order of things in the Confederation cannot be doubted. It is now merely a question of time and mode; the spirit and object of the

revolution are not to be mistaken, namely, the establishment of democratic autocracy on the ruins of all existing institutions which impose the slightest restraint on the gratification of the popular will.'

It was at this juncture, when the situation was becoming daily more and more critical and requiring the most delicate handling, that the defeat of Sir Robert Peel's Government caused Lord Aberdeen to be succeeded as Foreign Secretary by Lord Palmerston.

Of the latter's mischievous activities, and the disastrous direction he imparted to English foreign policy, the opinion of so shrewd and broad-minded an observer as King Leopold I. of the Belgians need only be quoted, who, writing to his nephew, Duke Ernst of Coburg Gotha, on 6th April 1847, says :—

' . . . Times are getting somewhat troubled, to which it must be confessed England, *i.e.* the present Cabinet, has contributed to an enormous extent. They have behaved in an uncommonly foolish manner in the Spanish affair, which Lord Palmerston is quite aware of and feels very deeply ; it makes him angry, rude, and threatening, which leads him on to commit fresh mistakes, so that we may now expect unforeseen catastrophes, possibilities of war,' etc.<sup>1</sup>

In a dispatch to Lord Palmerston, dated 24th July 1846, Morier informed him of the report laid before the Diet<sup>2</sup> at its opening by the President : ' The most important of the topics therein adverted to is that of the so-called Catholic League, which is condemned as a violation of the Federal Compact, although the admission is made that the disturbances at the beginning of last year were of a nature to awaken serious uneasiness for the future in some cantons, and that the duty of self-preservation might have impressed on them the necessity of concentrating their force.' Notwithstanding this, Morier anticipated ' with all reflecting men a rupture of the Confederation owing to the irreconcilable views of the two pernicious extremes of Radicalism

<sup>1</sup> *Denkwürdigkeiten Herzogs E. von Coburg*, vol. i. p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> *Sittin* at Zürich.

and Ultramontanism.' With regard to the revision of the Federal Compact, Morier quoted the language of the President as follows: 'Until the existing Federal Compact has undergone amendments calculated to fill the gaps and to remove defects, as well as to define with greater precision the relations between the federal authorities and that of the cantons, it is the sacred duty of the federal authorities to uphold the Compact in spite of all its imperfections, and to defend it against all attack; it must not be forgotten that for the time being the Compact of 1815 is the only bond by which the Confederates, who have such opposite political and religious goals in view, find themselves attached as a nation to the political system of Europe, and every annulment of the provisions of this Compact, so long as they are not adequately replaced by another equally valid provision, must compromise the position which Switzerland occupies in the aforesaid political system.'

The result of the discussions in the Diet<sup>1</sup> relative to the defensive alliance of the seven Catholic cantons ended in a resolution being submitted to the vote by the President, declaring the said alliance to be considered incompatible with the Federal Compact, and accordingly *ipso facto* dissolved; but as this resolution was only supported by ten cantons and two half-cantons, the seven allies were left to maintain or abrogate their engagements towards each other according to the view they entertained of their own interests. They accordingly issued a protocol in which they stated that they were resolved 'to maintain their alliance under all circumstances so long, but *only* so long, as the attempts made in violation of the Federal Compact against the sovereignty and territory of their successive states shall continue.'

At the beginning of September the foreign representatives received official notice of the nomination of MM. Funk and Ochsenbein as President and Vice-President. 'The scandal of M. Ochsenbein's elevation to the highest post in the Confederation,' wrote Morier to Lord Palmerston from Zürich on 4th September, 'should it be allowed, being still further aggravated by the circumstance of his

<sup>1</sup> From 31st August to 4th September 1846.

name having been expunged from the list of officers on the federal staff, in consequence of the part he took in the scandalous attack upon Lucerne. His expulsion had been pronounced by the extraordinary Diet of 1845, on the proposal of the same military council of which the presidency would officially devolve upon him in his capacity as Federal President.'

The first acts of the new Executive Ministers were : the recall of the German revolutionary refugee, Professor Wilhelm Snell ; the granting of the cantonal burghership to the notorious Dr. Steiger, condemned to death for high treason by the Tribunal of Lucerne ; the nomination of Ochsenbein himself to be second deputy for Berne in the place of one already named, which was considered as a gratuitous insult to the Diet, although he declined to appear on some pretext or another in his capacity as deputy at Zürich.

That, in consequence of these nominations, diplomatic relations with the Berne Government would be greatly embarrassed was to be foreseen. On 8th September, writing from Zürich, Morier informed Lord Palmerston that M. de Pontois had submitted to M. Guizot's consideration, whether it would be consonant with the dignity of the French Government to allow its representative to have personal intercourse with a man who had led an expedition openly condemned, and in a manner protested against, in the French note the year before, and on that account judged unworthy to hold an inferior station in the federal military staff.

Both the French and English Ministers concurred to draw the attention of their respective Governments to the importance of this state of things being attentively considered by the Powers interested, to prevent it degenerating into a state of complete anarchy and consequent civil war, which might eventually lead to an intervention earnestly to be deprecated, and that the course it should be found expedient to pursue should be determined previously to the transfer of the directional functions from Zürich to Berne.

A spirit of utter lawlessness began more and more to prevail at Berne. At the beginning of August a baggage

waggon belonging to the Catholic canton of Schwitz, on its way to the federal camp, had been attacked and destroyed by the population of Schuppach, a village in the canton of Berne, and the driver, recognised as one of the Landsturm who the year previously had defeated the Freischaaren, thrown into the Aar. In a quarrel in the streets, shortly afterwards, M. Weber, the Director of the Central Police, one of the retiring Government, felled M. Funk, President of the late Constituent Assembly and of the Supreme Tribunal, to the ground, being himself shortly afterwards assailed in like manner by Captain Karl, the proprietor of the inn where the meetings of the famous Bear Club were held.

On 21st September a brutal attack was made by an individual in the employment of the Bernese Post Office on Burnet Morier, then on a holiday in Switzerland, whilst quietly walking in the streets of Berne in the company of an English clergyman, who afterwards testified how utterly unprovoked the assault had been. Burnet, however, with commendable vigour and promptitude, had knocked his assailant down. Although unofficial complaints for this outrage were addressed to the Executive, they refused to offer 'a single expression of regret, disapprobation, or apology for the conduct of one of their own servants,' for whom, on the contrary, they claimed an indemnity.

His father therefore asked Lord Palmerston's permission to treat the matter seriously :—

' . . . I cannot therefore but express my conviction that nothing less than the determination of the British Government, declared by express authority in the most explicit terms not to overlook any injury or insult wantonly offered to any British subject whatever in any part of Switzerland, will be sufficient to enable H.M. Minister in this country to maintain the position which belongs to the high character of the country he has the honour to represent. For these considerations I deem it my duty now to request your Lordship to authorise me to demand of the Bernese Government, in the name of H.M. Government, the fullest satisfaction to which the latter may judge

themselves entitled to exact in this instance, not merely for the personal outrage committed without provocation against an individual forming part of the family of H.M. Minister, accredited to the Swiss Confederation, but for the additional wrong of the marked neglect, not to say contempt, with which the representations of H.M. Minister respecting that outrage have been treated by the Bernese Government.'

Very shortly afterwards a yet more heinous outrage was to take place, when Morier himself had to complain of an unprovoked insult which 'I received from one of the urban guards during the military occupation of the town on Sunday, who, after being informed of my public character as British Minister in this country, added the insult of gross language to the blow by which he in the first instance stopped my way along the street.'<sup>1</sup>

In vain did Morier urge upon H.M. Government the impossibility, without compromising its own dignity, of leaving such conduct disregarded.

'... H.M. Government will perhaps be disposed to take into consideration how far such a manifest want of courtesy and deference to the representations of H.M. Minister in this instance, which the Bernese Government cannot but suppose is known to your Lordship, can continue to remain unnoticed, without disadvantage to the character and influence of H.M. Mission.'

The Minister, who very few years later was to proclaim so grandiloquently in the House of Commons the sacred rights of the British subject—*Civis Romanus sum*—on behalf of a Gibraltar Jew of doubtful reputation, did not on this occasion feel it incumbent upon him to resent a gross personal insult to the Queen's representative, nor to a member of his family. As to the latter, Lord Palmerston formally declined to allow any demand for reparation to be made to the Berne Government. As to the former,

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Lord Palmerston, 20th October 1846.

<sup>2</sup> Dispatch, Morier to Lord Palmerston, 23rd November 1846.

<sup>3</sup> Don Pacifico debate, 25th June 1850.

six weeks after the occurrence, of which many detailed accounts had been forwarded, he was still writing :—

‘ . . . With reference to your dispatch of 23rd November, explaining the circumstances of the insult offered to you by one of the urban guard, I must still observe that your statement is not sufficiently explanatory of the circumstances to enable me to form a decisive judgment of the case. I should wish to have a connected narrative of what took place.’<sup>1</sup>

The position was gradually becoming untenable. M. de Pontois, the French Minister, was retiring because of ‘ the repugnance he felt, after the strong language held by his Government last year in condemnation of the lawless expedition of the free bands against Lucerne, to be placed in the position of holding personal official intercourse with the members of what is called *Le gouvernement des Freyschaaren*.’

The other Powers contemplated transferring their representatives from Berne to Zürich, so as to avoid personal communication with the Government,<sup>2</sup> ‘ a demonstration on their part which, if it do take place, will not mend their position in the least,’ but which Morier foresaw he would be obliged to follow.

His application to Lord Palmerston, ‘ in consideration of forty-three years’ uninterrupted active service,’ to be transferred to another mission, either Florence or Frankfurt, met with total disregard.

Under these circumstances he therefore proposed to be allowed to proceed to London, on temporary leave, to discuss Swiss affairs fully by word of mouth with Lord Palmerston, a suggestion which the latter, for reasons of his own, eagerly concurred in. He consequently received instructions to return to England, with orders to leave Peel<sup>4</sup> in charge, a transfer of mission to which, when he announced it to the Federal Government, they officially replied :—

<sup>1</sup> Lord Palmerston to Morier, 30th November 1846.

<sup>2</sup> Morier to Lord Palmerston, 6th November 1846.

<sup>3</sup> Morier to Bidwell of the Foreign Office, 20th October 1846.

<sup>4</sup> Afterwards Sir Robert, 3rd Bart., b. 1822, d. 1895.



' . . . Les Burgomestres et Conseil d'État du Canton de Zürich, Directoire actuel de la Confédération Suisse, aiment à réitérer à S.E. l'assurance de leur vive reconnaissance pour la bienveillance distinguée avec laquelle M. Morier a constamment cultivé les relations d'amitié qui existent entre la Confédération Suisse et le Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne.' <sup>1</sup>

Arrived in England, Morier was not long in discovering that it was far less the desire for better information as to the state of Switzerland, than the intention of removing him from his post, which dictated Lord Palmerston's conduct, and that the latter had irrevocably decided on the recall of a diplomatic representative whose principles and sentiments so radically differed from his own.

' . . . From the embarrassed and round-about manner in which here, certainly not unconstrained, he [Lord Palmerston] touched on the affair of the non-satisfaction of the Rads at Berne, I am confirmed in your notion, that his lenity towards the latter was political in *his* sense, and that *my* horror of such dirt does not accord with his feelings. I don't know whether our conversation may not have modified those feelings a little, but at all events I feel so convinced that the actual state of our foreign relations is so transitional to a new and unguessable state, that I cannot but consider it as rather a blessing to be thankful for, than a misfortune to be deplored, to lie by, a watchful spectator, rather than active agent at, this period of transition.' <sup>2</sup>

He was, however, not unnaturally anxious that his recall should not present the appearance of a disgrace :—

' . . . I may confess also, that I feel some anxiety not to quit a post, which I have held for fifteen years of approved service, without leaving on record a proof that my recall from it is not the result of any delinquency on my part.' <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Zürich, 14th December 1846.

<sup>2</sup> David Morier to his wife, 7th March 1847.

<sup>3</sup> Morier to Lord Palmerston, 14th April 1847.

But although Lord Palmerston had himself fully admitted to him in an interview<sup>1</sup> 'that the friendly relations between our Government and the Confederation, so far from being impaired under my guidance, had been maintained on the best footing, and that it would be equally unfair towards me, and impolitic and lowering to H.M. Government, to allow it to be supposed that my withdrawal from the Mission was the effect of disapproval of my conduct or a desire to encourage the Radical revolutionary party,' yet to propitiate these same revolutionaries, whom he had now elected as the instruments of his revenge on Guizot, and with whom he was already actively intriguing, Lord Palmerston did not scruple to sacrifice to their rancour a man who, after forty-three years' approved public service, was at the very time of his dismissal acting under the last instructions received from the Foreign Office founded *upon his own suggestion*. Those instructions simply adopted and approved the conduct suggested by himself.<sup>2</sup>

He was recalled from the Swiss Mission 'not only without any mark of approval or favour, such as others much junior in the service received, but his dismissal was effected under circumstances, which gave it all the appearance of disgrace, and as such, was looked upon and boasted of, by many in Switzerland.'<sup>3</sup>

When Morier returned to Berne for a short while before his definite departure, it was in complete ignorance of the fact that Lord Palmerston, without his knowledge or that of the two other guaranteeing Powers with whom England was supposed to be acting in agreement, had instructed Peel to call on Ochsenbein and congratulate him in the Queen's name on his becoming President, a visit hailed by the latter's supporters with no small satisfaction, and affording the revolutionary party great encouragement. They shortly afterwards denounced the illegality of the Sonderbund,<sup>4</sup> a step taken at the instigation of Ochsenbein, who calmly stated that the expedition of the Freischaaren was produced by the Sonderbund, 'a chrono-

<sup>1</sup> David Morier to his wife, 7th March 1847.

<sup>2</sup> Morier to Lord Aberdeen, 23rd January 1853.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> The name by which the league of the seven Catholic cantons was known

logical arrangement of facts which,' as Morier dryly observed,<sup>1</sup> 'was on a par with the military prowess which the speaker so singularly displayed in the famous affair of 1st April 1845.'

And yet one more effort was to be attempted in the cause of peace.

King Louis Philippe, who for many years had honoured Morier with his friendship and confidence, sent for him on his way through Paris, and had a conversation with him at Neuilly, on the evening of the 30th June 1847, which shall be described in his own words :—

' . . . His Majesty began by observing, that he considered the state of things in Switzerland to be so bad, as to present no prospect of remedy. There were none of the means or elements of stable government in the cantons, no administration, no police, no military force. He saw no issue to the present detested discord but a civil war, in which he hoped and believed that the Radical cantons, should they venture to attack the little primitive cantons in their mountains, would be soundly beaten. In foreign intervention under the present circumstances, the King saw no remedy, but rather an aggravation of difficulties. Both he and his Government were decidedly opposed to intervention. He was resolved not to allow a single French soldier to cross the frontier, knowing that such a step would only make matters worse. The public opinion in France forbade any act of his Government, which would appear to be taken in concert with Absolute Powers in favour of the Sonderbund, which was considered to be the ally and instrument of Jesuitism. As for the notion of France having an eye on Basle or Geneva, it was all nonsense. France and its population and territory was quite as much as they could manage; to dream of conquest and influence as in former times was all folly. It was no longer suited to the days we lived in, etc.

' In the Swiss question, much depended upon the line the British Government would take. The concert between the Great European Powers was in this question essential to

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Lord Palmerston, 8th June 1847.

the preservation of the general tranquillity, which all had in view and were all interested in securing, Great Britain equally with the rest; and he repeated that upon the conduct of the British Government in the Swiss question much depended. As for himself and his Government, the King declared that they would willingly consent to a Conference of the Powers being held, not in Paris, neither in Vienna, but in *London* (as affording the best pledge of impartiality), for the purpose of consulting what could be done in the present crisis, with a view to prevent the apprehended conflict and the ultimate complications, dangerous to the general peace which must result therefrom.

'The King expressed his desire that I would state this his view to Lord Palmerston: "I cannot authorise you officially," observed His Majesty, "to speak on what passes in a *conversation de salon*, but the British Government may be assured, that I am ready to act upon the proposal I have now made to hold a Conference in London"; and His Majesty was pleased to add "that he had known me for many years and was sure that I would faithfully report what he had said on the subject." In reply to the observations, which I took the liberty to make, with respect to the principle on which, and the object for which, the Conference should be held, viz. to secure the national independence and territorial neutrality of Switzerland on the terms declared in the Act of Guarantee of 1815, the King declared his cordial acquiescence, referring to the speech made in the Chamber of Deputies by M. Guizot, as the rule of his Government in Swiss affairs.

'In the course of conversation, which lasted nearly three-quarters of an hour, and of which the above is only an outline (for the King spoke as usual a great deal, and occasionally with much pleasantry and animation), he called Guizot "my excellent and invaluable Minister," and dwelt with some emphasis upon the entire coincidence of their views *against* intervention.'

On Morier's arrival in London from Paris, on 5th July, he applied in writing to Lord Palmerston for an audience, which was granted two days later, on the 7th, when he

delivered the above-mentioned message from King Louis Philippe to Lord Palmerston, who, at the time, seemed much struck with its importance, and on Morier going away, said he would see him again on the same subject.

‘ . . . From that day, however, 7th July 1847, I have never been called for or admitted when calling at his door, and I have had no further communication from him on Swiss affairs.’<sup>1</sup>

Of this conciliatory and fair-minded proposal, which even then, at the eleventh hour, might possibly have effected a truce between the two contending parties, and thus saved the ensuing strife and bloodshed, no mention has ever been made. There is no evidence to prove, that it was ever taken into consideration, or even submitted to the Cabinet. Indeed, there is every reason to suppose, that Lord Palmerston, with characteristic unscrupulousness, simply suppressed it, according so little as it did, with the object he had in view, which was assuredly less the pacification of Switzerland, than the humiliation and overthrow of a detested rival.

His desire, therefore, was not peace, but the sword—his aim, not to prevent but to precipitate civil war, an aim which he was not long in successfully accomplishing. A few weeks after David Morier’s recall, the catastrophe he had so long and so anxiously striven to avert, had taken place; the war of the Sonderbund had broken out, the whole of Switzerland stood in flames.

What all lovers of peace and friends of good order had feared, the revolutionaries hoped for, and every one foreseen, did not fail to come to pass.

The Revolution, which beginning in Switzerland cost David Morier his post, was soon to cost Louis Philippe his throne. It spread all over Europe, carrying civil war into almost every country and deluging the land with blood; thrones were shattered, institutions overthrown, Society shaken to its very foundations; but it enabled Lord Palmerston to wreak his vengeance on the one man whom above all others he hated, M. Guizot.

<sup>1</sup> Written in February 1848.

## CHAPTER V

## OXFORD AGAIN

DAVID MORIER's first care, on giving up the Berne Mission, was to move his wife, whose health had completely broken down and was giving him great anxiety, from Switzerland. They spent the summer at various health-resorts, and finally settled down at Bath on account of its beneficial climate.

Not the slightest bitterness at the unfairness of the treatment meted out to him, tinged in the smallest degree the happy serenity of his nature. On a note, scribbled on one of his son's letters of this period, he thus describes himself: ". . . My name is David, in No. 9 Queen's Square your father tends his wife. An old ex-Dip whose constant care is to abuse F.O. and keep his only son yourself at work.'

To Sir Stratford Canning he wrote on 24th January 1848:—

' . . . If the present generation of worthies of that class [the Bernese Gross Raths] with whom you have had to do, realise their promises of moderation and amnesty given to you, it certainly will be a *progrès* in a direction so opposite to that in which they set out and to their idiosyncracies that you may lay claim to canonisation as the performer of a miracle: for it will prove a conversion from all that is selfish, coarse, violent, and fraudulent to wisdom, forbearance, and patriotism, of which my own experience of the ruling party never discovered a trace. Guizot will have to fight his Swiss battle over again in the Chamber of Deputies as in the Chamber of Peers, where he seems to have succeeded better than he probably will with the former Assembly.

'I suppose Parliament will have communication made

to it of your instructions and reports, but it is despairing for us unhappy Dips to see how little touched Mr. Bull ever is by the most interesting foreign questions, unless they come in a shape to alarm his breeches pockets. But for this stupid indifference of that dull individual the British Public a tolerable *scène d'interpellation* might be made out of the injustice with which two meritorious causes, that of the Sonderbund and of your *ancien secrétaire perpétuel* have been treated, the first by their confederates, the second by his own Chief. Next to promotion a grievance is the best thing ; and were you now in Parliament I should ask you to take the opportunity of vindicating my good name (if I have one) from the injurious surmises and the aspersions of those bear-foxes in Switzerland that after fifteen years' service amongst them I was set aside as *incapax* or *non compos* or heaven knows what else, precisely at the period when had my representations just a twelvemonth ago been attended to, the mischief which I apprehend is not crushed but only, if at all, allayed, might at least have been postponed till the Powers could at least agree as to their view of the subject. But as the world now goes, "Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle," and as dear old Ludolf used to say, "Ce n'est pas là l'embaras."

Even the fact of Canning's accepting an Extraordinary Mission to Berne from Lord Palmerston, thus giving David Morier every appearance of having been in the wrong, did not cast the smallest shadow on their friendship, though it was bitterly resented by both his wife and son ; the former with regard to an invitation from the Inglishes to meet Sir S. Canning, writing :<sup>1</sup> " . . . I beg to be excused, as I care not if ever I see him again," whilst the latter writes :<sup>2</sup>—

" . . . To you, dear mother, I feel I can talk without reserve on the subject that is gnawing at my heart. The deep damnable injustice under which my father is labouring, not at the hands only of that half-hornet, half-butterfly, Lord Palmerston, but of those who have found him their only friend through life.

<sup>1</sup> February 1848.

<sup>2</sup> June 1848.

‘Oh, woe, is that Government, which makes the sting of injustice to be felt by the meanest even of the Government. The debt, you may depend upon it, will and must be paid and with usurious interest. I shall work myself up into a pitch of savageness not quite compatible with the smooth flow of Christian feeling if I go on, so I shall stop, but you will know where there is the gall. It has worked into the whole core of my being and affected its course *à jamais*. How I shall rejoice to be again in the heart of our little circle. Everything around is so dull and cheerless, heartless and cold, unreal and devilish, that if it were possible one might even be led to doubt whether the fire on one’s hearth would keep in. But that, thank God, like the sacred fire of the Prytaneum, for ever burns.’

In a letter to his father, written on the eve of his parents’ departure for Bath, Burnet says :—

‘ . . . I should rather like to have your opinion of a letter signed B that appeared in *The Times* of Tuesday on Switzerland. I wrote it one night in Argyle Street for want of anything better to do. I was rather flattered at their inserting it, but they left out one principal paragraph, and thereby made nonsense of the last sentence. It was to the following effect, and intended to reduce the subject to one of the fundamental maxims of International Law as laid down by Thucydides : “ A demand as of right, instead of an appeal to legal arbitration, thrust by equals upon their neighbours, is alike pregnant with the germs of slavery, be the occasion of the smallest or the greatest magnitude.” This principle, which I emphatically beg any one who can to refute, exists nowhere in my printed letter. . . . Some wonderfully able letters have appeared in the *Spectator* on the other side of the question. They are written by Grote, the Grecian historiographer, perhaps the greatest historian of the present day. He has been to Switzerland to gather information, and the way in which he has worked the question out from its earliest beginnings is marvellous, as also is the mass of knowledge ; the whole bears the stamp of a deep-searching honest mind thoroughly



versed in the work of sifting historical facts. You must read them as soon as possible. . . .'

Meanwhile he was pursuing the course of his studies. In the summer of 1847 he formed one of a reading party under Temple which spent the vacation at Bridlington Quay in Yorkshire.

'I wish you and she' (his mother), he writes enthusiastically to his father,<sup>1</sup> 'could know old Temple well. He is the noblest fellow that was ever born, and such a head! The brick makes a rule (though he has only his fellowship, not £200 a year, to live upon) not to take private pupils in term, in order more conscientiously to fulfil his college duties, but he has promised me *sua sponte* three days a week coaching all next term! There is a chance for one, to be working alongside one of the greatest intellects of the day.'

To his mother he uses the expression—

'There is nae time'—and goes on: 'Pardon my Scotticisms, but as *entremets* to the *pièces de résistance* of ethics and Thucydides, I have been making a beast of myself (excuse an Oxford expression for eating too much) on Burns. I perfectly delight in him, and now that I am used to his Scotch parlance, I hardly feel as if I could ever enjoy English again. By the way, how delighted I am at the character I have for non-reading. Pray by all means keep it up.' And his letter ends: '. . . And mind you do not contradict people, but turn up your eyes and look resigned when they talk of me as a non-reading party!'

October saw him back at Oxford.

'I have been put,' he writes, 'thanks to old Temple's intrigues, into some fierce lectures this term amongst scholars and that style of swell—A History of Philosophy, *i.e.* pure metaphysics, with Jowett, and Aristotle's 'Οργανον with Temple. The old beast somehow knows what he is about in putting me a little above my work, as hitherto I have been rather below it; besides that, he is

<sup>1</sup> 17th August 1847.

going to coach me like a brick twice a week, so that he has driven me right up into a corner and *nolens volens* obliged me to strain every nerve.'

On 8th February he tells his mother :—

'I broke the ice last night at the Union on a motion about the Jews, and, as might have been expected, broke down completely, which served me right, however, as I went down quite unprepared, and not even knowing what the motion was. However, my pecker is up, and I have just put forward a motion in *propria persona*.'

To which his mother answers from Bath :—

'... I cannot resist telling you how pleased I am that you have at last broken the ice and tried your lungs at the Union. As to breaking down, that you will probably do more than once, but don't let it break your spirit and you will probably learn as much from your stumbles as if you had always remained straight on end.'

The second attempt was more successful :—

'I made my *début* the other night at the Union, and with more success than I had any right to expect,—at least so they tell me, and so to a certain extent I feel,—as I did not break down, got worked up after the first nervousness worked off, and found no lack of words. After some opposition my motion was carried. There was a most tremendously full house on the occasion, all my own college, as no motion had been made by a Balliol man for many terms, and all my out-college acquaintance. Temple was satisfied.'

The following Memorandum on the meeting was appended :—

'Thursday, 24th February 1848—Wyatt's Rooms.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Congreve,<sup>2</sup> Wadham, President, in the chair.

Mr. Morier, Balliol, moved :—

"That the establishment of diplomatic relations with the

<sup>1</sup> The Union had not as yet got a house of its own.

<sup>2</sup> The future Positivist.

Court of Rome is peremptorily called for by the present state of politics in Europe."

In the affirmative :—

Mr. Morier, Balliol.  
Mr. Blackstone, C.C.C.  
Mr. Tidman, Lincoln.  
Mr. Dalton, Trinity.

Mr. Grant Duff, Balliol.  
Mr. W. H. Milman, C.C.C.  
Mr. Sandford, Balliol.  
Mr. Conington, University.

In the negative :—

Mr. Smith, Worcester.

Mr. Temple.

Mr. Morier replied. The motion was carried without a division.

In February 1848 the first mutterings of the coming Revolution began to be heard. His mother, writing on 25th February, says :—

' . . . I quite envy your residence at Oxford, which inspires me with a feeling of quiet and repose, the comfortable absence from the noisy and stirring scenes which are reverberated from afar, and tend to unsettle and fidgetise in every other place but that. Yes, even Bath, whose drowsiness you so much condemn, has not night-cap-ism enough to extinguish an audible grunt coming in but every other day ; whereas, were I but at Oxford I should only have to go to that blessed New College Chapel not to care (for four-and-twenty hours afterwards) whether the Pope were deposed, Louis Philippe dethroned, or Sir Robert re-primed.'

His father, writing on 4th March, said :—

' . . . The ecstasy in which people seem to be in Paris, at the order and tranquillity so miraculously restored after the brief hurricane which has swept away another royal race, reminds one of what Madame de Stael said of the same kind of delight at the breaking out of the first great Revolution, which she likened to the pleasurable sensation of a man falling swiftly through the air from a garret window till the moment he alighted on the pavement, " C'est bel et bon tant que cela dure." But, as Sir T. Acland observes, the event is too appalling to produce mere feverish excitement ; it calms and sobers the reflecting mind by the weight of the tremendous consequences it involves.'

And his mother on 30th March :—

‘ . . . The fall of Paris is now matter of history. The fidelity of the armies to the Royal Family seems undeniable. Three of the King’s sons in the fulness of youth were chiefs of its most important branches, the opposing force most contemptible,—an unarmed rabble against a hundred thousand veterans, and a string of forts and fortifications surrounding and commanding the entire city. Tell me if, in ancient or modern history, there is such another instance. I have no books to refer to ; but, except the walls of Jericho, which fell down when the people shouted and the trumpets were blown, I can recollect nothing so unexpected. As to the rest of the world, the conduct of all the Kings, Dukes, Princes, and Governors is so cowardly and disgusting that if my precious mother had not kneaded Church and King into all and every particle of my composition, I know not what might have been the consequences, so far at least as the latter is concerned.’

Vague plans, which had not met with much approbation from his family, of running over to Paris at Easter of this year to watch the events there, took, however, concrete form by the starting for that capital of Jowett and Stanley, and their offer to him to accompany them.

‘ . . . The extraordinary piece of good fortune which will thus throw me on intimate terms during the interesting period of their investigation of *novæ res* with the very two men whose acquaintance I most coveted, and who are certainly the two greatest men of the age, and with whom the intercourse of five days would be equal to ten centuries of coaching, you may suppose I was not so great a fool as to throw away. It has all been settled in so inconceivably a short space of time, in fact, only ten minutes ago, that it was impossible for me to let you know, as we are off in half an hour, and intend to be in Paris by Sunday night.’ Speaking of the dubiousness of the post, he bids his mother ‘ . . . mind this when you write, and only talk generally and approvingly as a Democrat, which, by the way, I much more than half am.’

F. T. Palgrave, a son of Sir Francis Palgrave, had joined the party, which arrived in Paris on the 9th of April.

Stanley at this time writes<sup>1</sup> of Morier as ' . . . a Balliol undergraduate of gigantic size, who talks French better than English, is to wear a blouse and go about disguised to the clubs.'

' PARIS, *April 9th*, 1848.

' MY DEAREST MOTHER,—Here I am, safe and sound, in this city of wonders, the headquarters of political phenomena. Oxford is exchanged for Paris, and what a change !

"The sky is changed !

But what a change. Oh, night and darkness,  
Winds, lakes, clouds, thunders, lightnings, Ye  
Are wondrous strong, but lovely is your strength,  
As is the light of a dark eye in woman."

*Childe Harold*, Canto III.

The words are wrongly quoted owing to my bad memory, but the sentiment contained in them (you must read the whole passage to understand what I mean), describing the change from the exquisite stillness of a summer night to the tremendous, but at the same time grand, horrors of an Alpine storm, is the only thing I can think of to express the sort of impression made upon me by this marvellous contrast. Not forty-eight hours since, and my whole self was being lulled into an exquisite kind of *Penseroso* slumber as I stood in Christchurch Walk, gazing on dear old Oxford's towers and spires, gradually mellowing down from the rich, golden tints of a bright spring sunset to their own dear venerable grey. Term was over, and everything was hushed into heavenly silence. What a tale the scene told ! What associations were called up ! What noble expressions lay there of one great fact in the history of the human mind, its worship and veneration, its childlike affection for the past ! A few hours' steam and rail, and here I am standing on the ruins of one of the most powerful monarchies of the world, its palaces turned into hospitals for those who were wounded in attacking them, its streets bristling with the bayonets of *les hommes en blouse*, to

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Correspondence of A. P. Stanley*, vol. i. p. 401.

whose custody this lately brilliant capital, still mosaiced over with the sumptuous magnificence of former periods of princely splendour, is altogether entrusted. How much fuller of horror and dismal foreboding, but yet how equally pregnant with the other great fact or converse side of that great world's mind, its thirst for advancement, its determined will not to stand still like the sun at Ascalon, but to hurry onward on its brilliant fiery course. The first object that struck one's notice was the numberless Trees of Liberty, raising their bald, withered heads, and seeming very much indeed to require the Phrygian nightcaps of Liberty, with which they were all bedecked. The next object of interest were the Garde Mobile sentries, which on every post have succeeded the National Guard and Line. This is certainly, especially accustomed as one is to see the blue coat and red breeches at every other yard, the thing that strikes you most, and most glaringly impresses you with the fact that the *People* are masters. They are dressed *tel et tel* as most of them fought on the memorable day in their tattered blouses and jackets, and are only armed with a musket. They have hitherto made an excellent police.

'There we stood face to face with the Tuileries. Heavens ! what a stream of tumbling recollections came rushing upon my mind at the sight. The gardens, as you well know, are the classic ground of all my earliest memories, its fountains and trees are the bright spots in that blank period of one's existence before dates, the magnificence of one of its children's balls is my earliest initiation into sights of royal splendour and a brilliant impression of gay colours and fairy forms sun-outdazzling lights it left. And there it stood in the cold dawn looking, with its Republican flag heavily drooping and its gutted windows, the very picture of desolation. But every inch a palace still, it seemed, as if conscious of its degradation, and proudly and with a sort of grandeur to yield to its fate, belying by its very look the chalk-inscribed hieroglyphics over it, "PROPRIÉTÉ NATIONALE," and seeming to say, "a King did, and none but a King could, have built me." . . . What a strange personality associations endue inanimate objects withal.

. . . Too many thoughts had been aroused to allow me quietly to go to bed as my friends did, so I strolled out. The gardens of the Tuileries being shut up at that early hour, I sauntered down to the Place Vendôme. A boy of no more than fifteen or sixteen was on duty, in his blouse and tattered trousers. I entered into conversation with him; in a second or two, with the volubility of a Frenchman, he was detailing all his deeds of prowess on the memorable three days. He was a fine lad, and had great readiness in expressing himself, and a graphicness of description which proved he was relating scenes he had not only seen, but acted in, and which had left an indelible stamp on his mind. There was a strong mixture of ferocity and tenderness, brutality and fine feeling, as he alternately described the wholesale murders and burning alive of the Municipal Guards, and his comrades shot by his side and deluging him with their blood. The gusto with which *il a criblé de balles* the poor wretch who stole a silver spoon, or the awful change from the revelry of a conquering mob to the death silence and uncovered heads as in solemn procession the crucifix was carried from the Chapel of the Tuileries to the Church of St. Roch. I have mentioned this lad's description in particular, as he was the first I spoke to. I have since spoken to dozens of others of the Garde Mobile, of all ages and sizes, and the same strange kind of romantic mixture is there. One general feature, however, is observable in all the people,—in those, I mean, who actually fought and conquered quite exclusive of their demagogues and club preachers (who in most cases at least before the row were more clever than plucky, and kept very quiet after they had once set the mass in motion), a certain elevated tone as of men who really have done a great deed. How long this effect will last and how far it is spread it is impossible to say, but that it does exist to a great extent I have no hesitation in saying. In speaking generally of the whole population, I should say that the principal feature is a *subdued* look, which in a Frenchman is most striking. The bourgeois is desperately down at the mouth, and the Garde Nationale, who here and there is on guard with a gamin of the Garde

Mobile, looks as if he had made but a poor change for the little dapper red-legged "Line" of the Ancien régime. All these, however, are the first general impression. I shall proceed to-morrow to details of my proceedings at the club *estaminets*, etc., when I have talked with the Sovereign People, and watched them gradually seizing the reins of government.'

He continues on the following Saturday :—

' . . . Having got a few hours sleep after my talk with the Garde Mobile, I got up and walked into the Tuileries. The gardens were all loveliness, and presented a very different aspect from the morning, already mantled over with the brightest spring green, and swarming with Parisian life. *They*, barring the great preponderance of the before banished blouse, presented much their usual look. I had often heard of, though never seen, the magnificent views down the Champs Élysées with the Obelisk in the middle. It certainly is the most magnificent thing I ever saw. I don't know whether you recollect a large pedestal with a bronze statue of Cleopatra on the terrace fronting the Seine to the left of the Tuileries as you look towards the Étoile. It forms a debouchment of a secret subterranean passage communicating with the castle. Out of this, on the celebrated Friday, the last Bourbon King of France emerged, and then from the dark cold still vault suddenly faced the noisy tumult of an enraged people, and for a while got carried to and fro in the boiling surge till a hack cab received and gave a safe asylum to what the dramatic cast of French thought at the moment termed *une grande infortune*. This grilled aperture with its whiffs of sepulchral air had a wonderful interest for me, and I have again been to see it.

' After the Tuileries I proceeded by the Carrousel to the Palais Royal. On the former various quacks and singers were trying to amuse the Peuple Souverain, and collected His Majesty into various not unpicturesque groups. There a great yellow Hercules was dangling a huge stone of sixty-five pounds weight in his mouth, and pitching it back over his head, to the great danger of the Sovereign's toes, and



then in a monotonous chant singing the lays of the *pavé* with flatteries without end to the *pavé* monarch. There a patriotic howler, with a certain number of children of all sizes and kinds, was singing Béranger's songs and *Mourir pour la Patrie* in a very husky voice. Next came the Palais Royal, and, as far as the actual battlefield is concerned, the principal object of interest. You must recollect, immediately in front of the principal entrance to the Palais Royal an open space used as a cab-stand. On this stood the Corps de Garde Municipale, commonly called the Château d'Eau from the fact of its also acting as the reservoir to the Palais Royal and the adjacent part of the town. The tank, holding an immense amount of water, ran along the whole length of the top, a handsome fountain in the shape of a shell formed the centre, on either side was the roof of the Corps de Garde tremendously fortified by the late King, as commanding three great inlets to the Carrousel, the Rue de Chartres, St. Thomas du Louvre et du Musée. For the preceding days the cab-stand had been removed and the place occupied by the troops of the line bivouacking. On the fatal Friday it was occupied by a body of Municipal Guards and two troops of the line drawn up in front. There is but one entrance, and that by a low door barred and rendered impregnable except to cannon. The whole base of the building is drilled with meurtrières. It was the first post attacked, the point of rendezvous of the vast masses that came rolling down the quays and every street and allée of the rive droite. It was a sort of point of honour for the various streams that poured in to be the first that attacked the devoted band. For a few moments the soldiers stood the unequal fight, and then after two or three volleys retired in order into the poste, and began a galling fire from the meurtrières. The people, maddened by being exposed to what could not be returned, again and again tried to burn the wicket, which was soon heaped up with dead; volley after volley was discharged at the thick walls, now studded all over with shot holes. At last, finding all unavailing, they procured mattresses from the neighbouring house, and, having saturated them with vitriol and thrust an opening through, I believe, a window

or the door which was at length broken through, they conveyed the mattresses along the staircases, and then set fire to them, and in a minute or two the whole was in a blaze, the soldiers still pouring volleys into the people from the midst of the flames. At last, the building wrapped in flames, the rafters that supported the tank gave way, and a mighty deluge of molten lead and tons of water fell in upon the few that were not burned to death. Only about ten or twelve escaped by a back door, and were saved by my informant, whom I poked out on the spot, and who lived in the house immediately behind the Corps de Garde. The fire was almost instantaneously put out by the falling in of the tank, and the now dark building sent forth a black column of vapour that mingled with the burning rafters quenched in water the fumes of burnt human flesh, a ghastly incense to the Goddess of Liberty. Next morning, all that remained of the building were the blackened walls and the now dry fountain graced by six ghastly heads of Municipals *mis*—as the man, with true French feeling, said—*au frais*.'

This expedition was the commencement of friendships destined to last through life. A few months later Morier again joined Jowett in a reading tour in Scotland.

Detailing his adventures *en route* for Oban to his mother, he tells her how he was nearly trapped into a 'regular old goods tub' without berths, etc., by an insidious waiter, whose brother was steward on board the tub :—

' . . . I came back fuming, but the barefaced way in which the said waiter kept on assuring me that the boat was the fastest sailer in England, and the accommodation of the first class also, overcame my gravity. . . . The landlord gave me a funny account of the sort of way in which party spirit sent people running to church; where before the churches were but half full, now, with the number doubled, not a seat could be got. Can't you fancy the Devil grinning as he drives his teams to church and beats them down upon their knees with a little whip of party spirit ? '

To his father, on 7th August 1848 :—

‘ . . . Jowett is a very shower-bath of knowledge. It comes out in bucketsful every now and then—ten words or so an hour, but which might be worked out in sermons of half a century. He is a giant, as old Boswell said of Johnson.’

Talking of an adventure, when they had got lost, after having started at five o’clock in the afternoon ‘ my counsel suggested by the old Swiss rule of following a stream prevailed. After various fordings, etc., in which Jowett re-enacted Stanley’s part at Paris and sat monkey-fashion on my back,’<sup>1</sup> finally they gave up and made a shelter for the night, ‘ . . . I managed to make a sort of seat with big stones, and scated on this and sheltered as much as possible from the wind by my back to the mound, I made Jowett sit on my knees, which made me warm and kept him dry. We had but one thin plaid, but we made a sort of tent of this to keep the rain out, and patiently abided the morn. I even went to sleep for half-an-hour or so, the rest of the time Jowett and I talked, and I recapitulated to myself the history of the first two years of the Peloponnesian War.’

Morier was back at Oxford for the beginning of Term.

In a letter of his mother’s, dated the 14th November, she asks :—

‘ . . . What is Stanley about ? Has he published anything since his sermons ? When is Temple to set up his college ? What do you hear of the Duke of Argyll’s book *Presbytery Examined* ? I heard it mentioned as remarkably well written, but offensively dogmatic in so young a man.’

To which he replies :—

‘ . . . Stanley has published nothing since his sermons, nor will he, I fancy, till his great work with Jowett comes out—how soon that will be I do not know. They contemplate, I fancy, editing a Commentary of the whole of the New Testament. At first, however, they will publish the Romans. This, though not absolutely a secret, you need not talk about. In the meantime, parties in Oxford are

<sup>1</sup> *Memoirs of Dean Stanley*, vol. i. p. 401.

rather stirring. The old Oxford orthodox Heads-of-House Party has received a tremendous slap in the face by the appointment of Vaughan to the Modern History Professorship. The Ultra-Catholic Party is daily losing ground, and where before their name was legion, they may now be pointed out and counted, as, haggard and fast-worn and cassock-swathed, they shuffle along the streets. A few storm-beaten bulwarks stand erect here and there. Pusey the learned, Marriott the good, Sewell the narrow-minded, but they stand high and dry only to show where the stream has swept by.

'Clough, the conscientious, has just thrown up his fellowship and published a poem entitled 'A Long Vacation Pastoral,' the precursor of a volume of poems that are to appear at Christmas. Good little honest hardworking Woollcombe has been stirring about poor undergraduate halls to be attached to colleges, and others have bestirred themselves otherwise. But there is a passive form of resistance in this Alma Mater of ours which sets all at defiance. The one great object now, however, which has united the efforts of most parties is a reform in the examination statute. But even on this, like the mass of crude flesh which not all the gastric juice of the healthier portion of the University can digest, the Heads of Houses lie like a misshapen nightmare. Not even the gathering storm of a Parliamentary Commission can stir them. It will have to come to barricades after all.' He then goes on to speak of his own personal friends. ' . . . The old stock at least have much thinned. The person I see most of is Müller, my German friend. We have struck up a great intimacy, and a more noble creature does not live. On the whole I live mostly with Jowett, Palgrave, Stanley and Co., but my time is almost entirely filled up with my reading, which is progressing satisfactorily.'

From this period, too, dated his friendship with Froude.

'I was at one time very intimate with Froude,' he wrote, many years later. ' . . . About the close of my time at Oxford, just before he published the *Nemesis of Faith*, but we have only met at far intervals since, owing to my

having lived abroad. I have the highest possible opinion of his abilities, and he has a godlike power of writing English; but like Gladstone, he is organically crotchety and paradoxical, and that will, I think, prevent him ever achieving anything really great, in the highest sense of the word, at least. There is a very great charm in his intercourse, and by his friends he is much loved, but as regards the influence he is capable of exercising, it must, I think, be admitted that he belongs essentially *zu den Geistern die verneinen*, and this not from any momentary phase or imperfect development, but from psychological necessity, his negativeness being not a bit less, it seems to me, in his orthodox revival in the History of England than it was in his earlier works. The genius, however, with which he wields his paradoxes will produce infinite benefit to the study of that portion of English History upon which he is employed, throwing light into dark corners which a less powerful touch would never have reached, and throwing open new gates for criticism which would otherwise have remained closed. I defy any one who has read his History not to feel, however little such readers may have been seduced by his special pleading in favour of Henry VIII., that he has thrown sunlight where all before was darkness, and left men and women where he had found nothing but dummies.'

In December 1848 he spent a couple of days with Froude at Peelwicke on Bassenthwaite Water, being completely knocked up with his work and requiring refitting. He was then working hard for his Degree, and his mother, writing from Dawlish on 23rd February 1849, inquired whether Jowett still promises a second, notwithstanding the incision made in his logic, and also with whom he coaches?

In May 1849 he tells her of a long letter 'just received from Clough from Rome just before the defeat of the French. The letter is not a little interesting, as you may conceive. He was bearer of a letter of introduction from Carlyle to Mazzini, and had several interviews with him. . . . I offer to bet two to one the King of Prussia dies on

the scaffold within a year. Will you take me? Poor Müller has been sadly anxious the last few days, as his mother and sister reside at Dresden.'

In a subsequent letter to his mother he says :—

' . . . My father will in all probability have told you that I had some notion of putting off going up for my degree till October, even at the risk of having to quit Balliol and going to a Hall. There were and are still many pros and cons, too many to be written, but the main features of the case are these. The great object to be gained is what Aristotle would call an "energy," viz. a certain confirmed habit of using one's intellectual faculties, a kind of economy of the brain, which may be applied to any given subject-matter. Now such an energy is only to be gained by a constant well-kept-up application for a sufficient time to form the habit. I had at one time well-nigh given up the hope of acquiring such a habit both from natural indolence and the want of early drilling. But since the great spurt of 1849 begun at Dawlish I have had reason to take quite a new view of the matter and found, I think I can say honestly, that though a devilish hard customer to deal with and a party apt to slip through one's fingers very much when one fancies one has tight hold of and kept—the fact is, I have just about half got the habit now, and it would be a great pity to pluck it half ripe, which a cessation of my work *au beau milieu* would do—I mean a stopping of work in the middle of my books—as even if I began to read Law next day, the schoolbooks would be all shut up, and it is impossible altogether to separate "the energy" from the "concrete work." Now all I was afraid of was, how far I could trust myself to keep up the spurt all the Long. The answer to this I wanted to get by trial of this vacation. Now I have been able quite unassisted and working altogether for myself to make a distinct hole in my work. Other considerations are these. I cannot, though I tried at first—it is against the nature of my beast—to cram. So that an enormous amount of my work is quite undone, though some of it is A1. The consequence is that a "plough" or pluck is

*quite* on the cards. Jowett strongly recommends my putting off, and is perfectly satisfied with my work hitherto.'

At the beginning of the vacation he again returned to Borrowdale.

'MY DEAREST MOTHER,—It is really quite a blessing to be able to sit down with nothing but the murmur of the Derwent and the buzz of mountain insects and the dog-rose-scented whiffs from the hillside and the least taste in life of tobacco to disturb one after the roaring, rushing, clashing, puffing, which act a chorus to all one's thoughts and talks in London. . . . Up here in the hills there is nothing to disturb one, and so my only companions are the citizen Nature and the citizen Müller. Perhaps for the first time *Liberté*, *Fraternité*, *Égalité* are fully realised on earth. It is a wonderful alternative this dropping into an entirely new place and hooking on of one's individual self to a complete new set of eyes. Oneself of yesterday seems so stale and dusty and routine (phonetically routine) after the dipping and washing of one's spiritual body in beautiful new scenery and exchanging the brick-and-mortar thoughts begotten by crowded streets and long, long chimneys for the fresh buxom offspring of sky, mountains, rivers, wind, lakes, lightnings.

'After two days of incessant rain, to-day is exquisitely beautiful. On Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, the great rain mists came down the valley, lashing the old Grange like huge fragments of torn drapery howling in the wind. The river rose three or four feet in a few hours, and boiled and hissed under the windows. Indeed, I began to fancy that the very original firm of storm manufactories must lie somewhere up at the head of the valley; for, once gulped out of its mouth here, they seem to disperse and go breeding little storms all over England. I shut myself up, and after much Rhetoric and a little dinner went searching for "summat" to read. I found an old Tyburn calendar of 1735, and regaled myself with hangings and transportations till my neck began to ache, and then Rhetoric again. Well, yesterday being Saturday, I set off on a pony (having with my usual luck retwisted my old strain so that I am now

unsound on both legs) to meet the mail at Keswick. Old Müller alone made his appearance. The very sight of the mountains has already done him good. Jowett has arrived since this letter began, so we are now three jolly postboys.'

From his mother, 27th July 1849 :—

' . . . I wish particularly to hear the impression you received of Miss Martineau. The works of hers I have met with, clever as they are, have always struck me as exhibiting an unfeminine hardness (which is not synonymous with masculine strength), and which the study of political economy is very likely to produce in a woman's mind if not viewed through the love and charity of a Christian lens. . . . What race of ponies exists in those parts that you can find one to carry you? They must be wonderful creatures.'

He replies :—

' . . . I am sorry I cannot give you any information as regards Miss Martineau, as I did not succeed in making her acquaintance when at Ambleside, or rather Skelwith Bridge, with Froude. I just saw a bit of her, or rather "what my fancy painted her," at about eleven the night I arrived at Ambleside, as, having entirely forgotten Froude's address, I was forced to make an inroad upon her to ascertain it. Her famous mesmerising clairvoyante slavey, Jane, opened unto me many bars, etc., wherewith the habitation was already fenced in, and through the curtain a burning light and a figure, dimly painting itself on the retina of my eye, of a quaint old male in women's clothes writing at a table either from within or without is all I can speak of. From what I hear of her, however, I should say that to the carnal eye she very much represents the idea you had formed of her. She is an able woman, however, and gets through a most supernatural amount of work. Besides half a hundred novels, works on political economy, a long work on Egypt, a kind of rival or brother to Bunsen's, she has just published a history of the *Thirty Years of Peace*. *Du reste*, she is attending bodily to a model



farm of one acre, whereon she keeps two cows and herself throughout the year, and lectures all the apprentices in the Lake Country on political economy. She has walked over every inch of ground about here, and has written a guide-book thereon. All this naturally places her in a very high position in her own esteem; indeed, as was observed by Mr. Myers the other day, she thinks herself at the head of creation, which is certainly a *fausse* position. Of Mrs. Gaskell I saw so little that I really have nothing to write, as she is exceedingly human—not one speck of literary dust soils her Weibheit (femininity), and is thoroughly unaffected. She is still handsome, though her features are on rather too large a scale. Her strength lies, as I think you can see in her book, in a certain truth and reality, an earnestness of character more than in any brilliancy of genius. In fact, I think herself very much an improved edition of her book. Froude's friends, the Manchester lot, I like very much, very unaffected, simple-mannered and simple-thinking people—people with their ten or twelve thousand a year dining at two, and with nothing but maid-servants. They are quite unlike any other English I have ever seen, and have evidently the stamp of a class upon them—a class, by the way, that I intend to see something more of, and shall, in consequence, accept their invitation to Manchester as soon as I can. It is the sterling class just now, and the one in which, if I mistake not, the most vitality resides. I shall come on Mrs. Gaskell for an introduction to the lower classes, and so I hope ere long to see clothed in flesh and blood Cobdens and Mary Bartons. The only other acquaintance I have made here has been the Mr. Myers above mentioned, a friend of Stanley's, who has printed, but not published, a very able book called *Thoughts on the Church*. He married a Miss Marshall, a sister of Mrs. Whewell and of Lady Monteaigle—a nice, clever woman, with two of the loveliest children I ever saw. I have likewise heard that maniac Wolff<sup>1</sup> preach. It was the most disgusting exhibition I ever saw in a church, and I cannot conceive how people who consider a church sacred ground can let such a maniac howl at them for two

<sup>1</sup> Father of Sir H. Drummond Wolff

hours. The subject was that of his monomania, namely, the re-establishment of our Lord's personal kingdom amongst the Jews. It was argued with all the cuteness of a madman, and with a complete recklessness which such people have of the whereabouts they get their premises. As a specimen of what can be proved from what, it was amusing enough, and joined to his appearance, rolled up in a big, fat carcase, great, long, shaggy hair and a twinkling eye peculiar to madness, and his intense enthusiasm when he thought he had made a hit, and his Jew's accent, I was kept in a state of most unpleasant roar the whole time.'

Plans for a further tour in the Isle of Man with Jowett were disconcerted by the sudden death of the Bishop of Norwich,<sup>1</sup> and Morier had to go alone. Writing to Palgrave in the middle of September 1849, he says :—

' . . . ' On leaving Borrowdale about a week ago, in company of Jowett and Gordon, we proceeded to Whitehaven, intending from thence to push on to the snug little island<sup>2</sup> after a couple of days spent at Scott's,<sup>3</sup> at his brother's place at Westwater, Harecroft by name. By a vile arrangement of steamers, however, we were detained at Scott's a week. Jowett remained behind to get a letter from Stanley. He possibly arrives to-morrow; but will, I think, probably join Stanley at Norwich. What a very sudden death the Bishop's was. Stanley was with us the week before, and will be deeply grieved at it. In many respects the breaking up of the Eastern tour will be a great loss. My stay at Scott's was very pleasant. He is in every respect a good fellow, with lots of humour, without much originality, and I should not think any very great power of mind; but he possesses that very excellent substitute, lots of learning. He was as good as, if not very much better than (saving one the trouble of looking up), a book, and not having my lexicon with me I used him as such in getting up the seventh book of *Thucydides*.'

Palgrave's reply is dated 25th September :—

' . . . I saw Stanley on his way from Scotland to Nor-

<sup>1</sup> Stanley's father, on 6th September 1849.

<sup>2</sup> Isle of Man.

<sup>3</sup> Author of the Lexicon.

wich. He seemed much cut up. Although his Eastern journey is given up, he takes advantage of the arrangements already made with Goldwin Smith to cut Oxford next term altogether. Jowett's company, if he has been able to give it, will have been a great comfort. Temple is with his mother in lodgings at Twickenham.'

Temple's sister had been very ill, and so had Lingen, 'which renders all arrangements about Kneller Hall very uncertain.' This was the college that Temple was then proposing to set up, and of which Palgrave was eventually Vice-President. 'I saw Clough,' he continues, 'on his return from Italy, more brown than red, at least externally. Various adventures *à la Bothie* I leave you to learn from his lips. Poems may also be recited to you in some favoured moment. They show that his mechanical skill is bringing itself more *en rapport* with his power of thought.'

In November 1849 Morier went up for his degree, and took a Second Class in *Literae Humaniores*, evidently better than he had expected, for during the examination he tells his mother,—'a third is the most I can possibly get, it may possibly be a fourth, but, never mind, I have made a good fight for it, I feel quite jolly.'

From his mother at Bath, 28th November 1849 :—

' . . . I never felt how true it is that real joy is a serious thing, more than I did this morning, dearest old fellow, on hearing this hard trial of yours was over, and, well over. The Jungfrau seemed to rise majestically from my chest, and I should have been as light as a feather but for the gravity of my pleasure. Thank God, thank God, rises to my lips every minute as I realize the immense anxiety got rid of, and feel how very happy I am in being able to congratulate you, my dear boy, on your success, which, if not as brilliant as you would have it, quite satisfies me. If you despise a bay leaf plucked from a lower stem, I will stick it in my cap and be as proud of it as if it were a heron's plume, for it bears the impress of God's blessing on honest perseverance. I long to see your father come back none the worse for his expedition in such bitter weather, and ask him no end of questions about you. It must have

been a delicious surprise to see him at that moment. Adieu, dear fellow ; may God bless and prosper the future. You have had success enough for encouragement,—not enough to satisfy, which is perhaps the best basis for a fresh fight that could be desired.'

To a letter of thanks from Morier's father, Jowett replies : ' For what little I have been able to do for your son, I have been much more than repaid by his attachment and gratitude.'

Morier to Palgrave, 6th December 1849 : ' Many thanks, indeed, for your letter of congratulation. Much the pleasantest part of getting one's humble little meeds of honour is the reception of these congratulatory epistles. . . . I hope to start for Müller's Vaterland in about a fortnight.'

## CHAPTER VI

## VISIT TO GERMANY

IN fulfilment of a long-standing promise, Morier started for Germany in December 1849, and his first letter from there to his mother is dated the 28th of that month :—

‘ . . . You will probably be wondering at the date of my letter. Shortly, the reason is this. Müller missed my letters, I missed his, so on my arrival at Dessau I found him in a state of frantic and tearing-hair-with-his-hands excitement, exclaiming against all the English and myself in particular, as well he might, having been waiting three weeks for an answer to a letter I had never received. Well, I began to be frantic, and likewise to tear my hair. This was about 9 p.m. on Christmas Day, at which hour I arrived at Dessau, having missed a day owing to the abominable passage I had from Dover.’

*To the Same.*

‘DRESDEN, *January 10th*, 1850.

‘ . . . Chemnitz ’ (whither he had gone with Max Müller from Leipzig), ‘ . . . like the finger-post in the pantomime, is exactly eight German miles, that is twenty-four English, that is twelve hours, German Schnell-post, from everywhere ; that is, in non-pantomimic language, from any railroad. To it and from it you are conveyed in huge yellow boxes called Diligences, which are placed on parallel lines of wood called a sledge. To this four great, gaunt animals, with very pointed collars and very long tails indeed, and still longer traces, are attached, who seem to be everlastingly trying to discover how many of their feet make up a German mile, as never by any chance do they place one foot elsewhere than exactly before the other. Inside a kind of

covered balcony in front of the yellow box sit two men : one holds a number of things of leather, communicating with the four animals before him, and a thing called a whip which for ever and ever he cracks ; the other upon every possible occasion doodles on a cracked *cornet-à-piston*. If it happens to be in the night, and you arrive at a turnpike, the inhabitants of which are all asleep, after about ten minutes fumbling out comes the instrument and a tune is played. Ten minutes pause without a word of any sort being spoken, or the least sign of impatience shown, when half of an English damn well wrapped out would bring the whole place about one, tune number two and pause number two, etc., till, after all his tunes, including Luther's hymn, the Old Hundredth, and most of the new polkas having been gone through, *der gute Mann* thinks it worth his while to appear. The most friendly conversation then ensues, the turnpike man's family, his wife and children are all separately inquired after, then after many "Achs" a parting is at last effected. All this at 2 a.m. in the morning. . . . At Freyberg, a little town in the Erzgebirge, an old watchman, who to judge from his appearance must have been selected for his post about the time of the Reformation, and probably then chosen for his antique appearance, was "blessing the doors from nightly harm" in the quaintest and jolliest of old chants. . . . The German (bourgeois be it understood) lives for the most part up two pair of stairs. A bell subscribed by his name and occupation, if pulled, will probably cause the door to be opened by a *Mädchen* chubby as to her features and with lots of flaxen hair festooned on her head ; by the *Mädchen* you are introduced through a kind of ante-chamber (having on your right hand a kitchen from which savoury steams under the agency of the careful housewife are issuing) into the sitting-room. This is a moderate-sized apartment : on one side is a piano, on the other a green ivy tower under which *die gute Frau* sits and knits (if not in the kitchen), and is spooned by *der gute Mann*. It is very pretty, and, if you could get rid of the association of earwigs and company, would be *höchst ideal*. Around the room are numberless lithographs and silhouettes, partly of Germany's

great men, alas! the only point of Unity, partly of friends and relations. . . . At 7 in the morning the family gets up, and *en bonnet de nuit* and *robe de chambre* partakes of café. This lasts until twelve, when dinner is served. This is the great event of the day; to it the housewife's thoughts and care has been directed all the morning, and with a kind of nervous excitement she watches the removal of the covers and the effect this has on the countenance of her guests. Should the look of anxious expectation which has been sitting there the while be suddenly changed to a radiant expression of recognition, as the eye suddenly greets some well known-fare (namely, pig's face or some other choice German tit-bits) and the distended nostril catches some old familiar sniff, her soul's holiday is there. But if the contrary, and some unfortunate accident . . . ! on this scene of woe I cast a Timanthes' veil. Gastronomy in Germany takes a peculiar and highly characteristic turn. In France, gastronomy takes the form of a sort of hero-worship,—an ideal chef is idolised, shrines are raised to the Vatel and Soyers. It is not any particular dish, but the Man, the power that can call forth the infinite from the finite; the subject matter is lost in infinite form. In England it is a kind of fetish-worship of roast beef and plum pudding as par excellence that which makes them morally and physically superior to frog-eating foreigners; but in Germany it is a particular personal *Leidenschaft* for certain particular bits of certain particular animals dressed in certain particular ways. These bits are wrapped up in a mist of poetical associations. They formed his father's joys. To his children he hands the receipts. Every paper swarms with advertisements informing one that so-and-so at such an hour on the morrow will have such-and-such a dish (and mind, no other) ready for his admirers.'

*To his Father*

'BERLIN, February 2nd, 1850.

' . . . I made the acquaintance of several people, who, as far as *names* go, are interesting; as "men and brothers,"

however, otherwise. Amongst others, Count Brandenburg,<sup>1</sup> the Prime Minister, with whom I chatted some ten minutes. He looks exactly what he is, and what he will go down to history as, a soldier-like fellow of marked and determined character, a man to keep a mob at bay, but *quant au reste* Zero; Van der Heydt,<sup>2</sup> Finance Minister, not much more; Persigny,<sup>3</sup> of whom you know more than myself, and lots of lesser fry. The two most thorough men and statesmen I have met are von Usedom,<sup>4</sup> Prussian Ambassador at Rome; and Bülow, the foreign ditto at Hanover, who not long ago refused the *porte-feuille* for foreign affairs, because the King insisted on having a private foreign correspondence which he was not to see! Madame Usedom was a Miss Malcolm, an old partner of mine, a neighbour of the Lees. We have struck up a great friendship, and in consequence I have seen a great deal of Usedom. He has the reputation of being the best diplomatist they have. . . . Humboldt<sup>5</sup> I have not yet seen, having not yet delivered my letter to him. Of women, the most interesting specimen has been Bettina von Arnim,<sup>6</sup> the celebrated authoress of the letters to Goethe. In outward appearance she has a good deal of the witch about her; she is very wild and has strange ways, often receiving her guests seated on a large round table in the centre of it. The night I called upon her, however, she was very tame, but talked—a steam mill would be a joke to her. However, it was all thoroughly well worth listening to, about Goethe and about her childhood and about the King and the Revolution. She recounted the most marvellous Märchen [fairy-tale] about her childhood, pure inventions, but in which she firmly believed; how she lived near a village which was altogether

<sup>1</sup> Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf von, b. 1792, d. 1850, son of King Frederick William II. by hismorganatic wife, Countess Sophie von Dönhoff, Prussian statesman, Minister of State from 1848-1850.

<sup>2</sup> Van der Heydt, Aug. Freiherr von, b. 1810, d. 1874, Prussian statesman, Minister of State, 1848-1862.

<sup>3</sup> Persigny, Duc de, b. 1808, d. 1872, French statesman and diplomatist.

<sup>4</sup> Usedom, H. L. Graf von, b. 1805, d. 1884, Prussian statesman and diplomatist.

<sup>5</sup> Humboldt, Alexander von, b. 1769, d. 1859, traveller, scientist, author.

<sup>6</sup> Arnim, Bettina von, b. 1788, d. 1859, authoress, sister of Klemens Brentano, grand-daughter of Sophie Laroche, m. 1811 the poet L. von Arnim.



inhabited by a colony of Indian princes, living in Eastern houses and gardens; how their money and remittances from India (they were six hundred in number) used to run short, and then they were in penury, living on the charity of their neighbours; how, when their remittances came, they drove about in carriages altogether made of gold, and hung the Catholic Church, which they frequented, with embroidered tapestries, etc. All this, with a circumstance of detail which, convinced as I was that it was mere myth, was very amusing. Her latest stories about the King and the revolution—she is a strong though (as far as this is possible) a sensible Socialist—were, however, really interesting. . . . In spite of all her folly, however, Bettina is a remarkable person.'

Shortly after his arrival in Berlin he was seized with a virulent attack of quinsy, which for a few days endangered his life. He was nursed through it with devoted care by Max Müller, who, himself in delicate health at the expense of much valuable time which should have been spent in Paris, sat up with him for nights and days.

'BERLIN, *February 29th*, 1850.

'MY DEAR MAX,—I am selfish enough to know that the best news I can send you is that I continue to get better, and have both to-day and yesterday enjoyed long walks in the loveliest of weather. I called on Usedom and had a long and interesting talk with him. He does not seem to think that anything will come of Erfurt.<sup>1</sup> . . . I told him, in case I had to give up Stein,<sup>2</sup> I thought, if I could induce anybody to print them, of bringing out a translation of his letters. He gave me full leave to mention in a preface his name as the author, and offered in parts, which would be less clear to English readers, to furnish me with material to "make smooth the rugged paths." I really think something very good might be made of it. The style is admirably graphic, and the originals of the portraits of Metternich, the King, etc., are of a *weltgeschichtliche*

<sup>1</sup> Assembly at Erfurt, then sitting.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Stein*, which he was then contemplating translating.

interest. . . . I wish I could as easily as the foregoing has been scribbled off make you know the rich load of gratitude for all you have been to me within the last month, which joyfully, and like a triumphal car, I draw about with me. Gratitude for benefits received at the hand of one indifferent to me is a very mixed feeling, half pleasure, half pain, with a great desire to pay back and have done with it, but gratitude to a friend one loves with one's whole heart is, I think, the purest and most ennobling and least selfish feeling the soul has.'

This visit to Berlin was fated to exercise a great influence on his future life and career, laying as it did the foundation of his friendship with two men, Roggenbach<sup>1</sup> and Samwer,<sup>2</sup> both of whom, in their several ways, were later on so intimately to be associated with the struggles for German Unity. The former was destined ultimately to become one of the most prominent of German statesmen, the liberal Prime Minister of that most liberal of German Sovereigns, the Grand Duke of Baden, and as such to take a leading part in many of the subsequent events. The latter, an eminent Schleswig-Holstein jurist and strong upholder of the Augustenburg rights of succession, had taken a great and active share in the efforts of the Duchies to maintain their old established liberties. Both men, enthusiastic adherents of the cause of Schleswig-Holstein, soon communicated their enthusiasm to Morier who, with impetuous zeal and all the ardour of youth, threw himself heart and soul into a movement of whose justice he had become passionately convinced.

The question of Schleswig-Holstein was eventually to become so all-important, and to be fraught with such far-reaching consequences, that a slight sketch of its historical aspect may here not be out of place; for, strange as it may appear, the political state of Europe, as at present constituted, has its roots in the rights and wrongs of two obscure Duchies on the North Sea, and it may with truth be added,

<sup>1</sup> Roggenbach, Franz Freiherr von, b. 1825, d. 1907, Prime Minister of Baden, 1861-1865.

<sup>2</sup> Samwer, Karl Friedrich Lucian, b. 1819, d. 1882, jurist. Took a prominent part in the Schleswig-Holstein question advises to Duke Frederick.

that few questions have been so much discussed and written about, and so little understood.

At one time, represented as the work of democratic sympathisers with the German Revolution; at another, as an aristocratic conspiracy to resist the march of liberal ideas; again, as the ambitious schemes of an intriguing Duke; seized upon finally, as a link in the general plan of Prussian aggrandisement, the cause which the Duchies rose to defend in 1848 has rarely been judged upon its own merits. Nor has it been often realised, that the Charter of Liberties, which they sought to maintain against tremendous odds, dated four hundred years back, and that the war they engaged in was as pre-eminently defensive in its nature as it was conservative in its principles. Like our own Revolution of 1688, it was a rise *en masse* of an essentially loyal and conservative people, Princes of the Blood, nobles, clergy, and commonalty, to prevent the illegal infringement of an old constitution, which the energies of a whole people were called upon to maintain.

For the better understanding of the situation an historical retrospect is necessary.

About the middle of the fifteenth century, by the death of Count Adolf of Holstein, the Sovereignty of the Duchies became vacant. At that time the right of election was vested in the Diet of Schleswig-Holstein; though such right was not exercised arbitrarily, but generally confined to the members of particular families. Two candidates offered themselves for their choice—Count Otho III. of Schauenburg and Christian I., at the time King of Denmark. The former had a better claim as agnatic kinsman to the defunct Duke. The latter consequently offered higher terms. It was the great object of the Diet to secure on a firm basis the Union, which for several centuries had existed between the then County of Holstein and the Duchy of Schleswig. This union in respect to all their constitutional relations was perfect: it rested on a community of race, language, and institutions, and had been cemented by long years of warfare, waged in common against their Scandinavian neighbours of Denmark. The only obstacle to their complete political unity was one external to themselves,

and one they could not remove : the fact, that Schleswig was a fief of Denmark, whilst Holstein was the fief of Germany. Now, however, an opportunity was offered them of practically preventing any future ill consequences that might flow from this fact. By offering the joint Crown to Christian and to his descendants upon the *stipulation* that he and his descendants maintained the common constitution of the country, and that, under no circumstances whatever, a different succession should be introduced, their perfect Unity, so long as their Sovereigns kept their word, was secured. The choice of the King of Denmark was even a more politic stroke than this. As mentioned before, the Duchies had been at constant war with Denmark : by making the Crown of the Duchies hereditary in the Oldenburg family (of which Christian I. was founder), whilst in Denmark the Crown remained elective, they naturalised this family in the Duchies and forced them to identify with these their more lasting interest : thus securing a German Prince upon the Danish throne, *i.e.* inseparably binding up with their own interests those of the most influential personage in the State, hitherto the most hostile to them.

Such was the history of the union of Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark. The political wisdom displayed in framing it is sufficiently attested by the fact that this constitution was maintained in its integrity till the nineteenth century, and with it the independence of the Duchies. Not only was their union with Denmark a purely personal one, but the *Duke of Schleswig-Holstein* by being placed on the Danish throne became, so to speak, the safeguard of the Duchies against the encroachments of the *King of Denmark*. This unity, and at the same time this divisibility of person, was from the first intended and adopted from the political motive above mentioned. It is worthy of observation that as long as Schleswig remained a feudal tenure the King of Denmark, as Duke of Schleswig, had to pay homage to himself for it.

The relations existing respectively in the Duchies and in the Monarchy at the time of this union remained undisturbed for two centuries. During that period the inde-

pendence and liberties of the Duchies remained intact. The Kings of Denmark were powerfully interested in keeping them apart, and in precluding them from a share in the *unlimited right of election exercised in Denmark*. Supported by their hereditary claim on the Duchies, they had no difficulty in obtaining the suffrages of Denmark to their dynasty; and, in order to secure that support, they took care to preserve inviolate the privileges of Schleswig-Holstein.

‘This happy combination seems, according to all experience, to be the only condition under which a union of two unequal States can continue to exist. If the larger State possesses the more free institutions, the smaller State the less free, there is no pretext for attacks on the latter. If, on the other hand, the larger State has the more despotic power and the lesser State the freer institutions, the attempt will always be made to deprive the latter of its inconvenient liberties.’<sup>1</sup>

The former relation existed between Denmark and the Duchies during the first period of their connection. They exchanged relations in 1660 when the celebrated Copenhagen Revolution established the Oldenburg dynasty firmly upon the Danish throne, and changed the hitherto aristocratic Government into the most absolute Monarchy in Europe. In addition, the right of female succession was introduced.

As all the blessings which the Duchies had enjoyed dated from the constitution of 1460, so all the evils from which they subsequently suffered dated from the Revolution of 1660. By it, the two great causes of all their troubles were brought into existence: first, the anomaly of a purely constitutional country and a purely absolute country being yoked together under the same Sovereign; secondly, a difference of succession in the two countries.

From this time, it was but natural that the Kings of Denmark, domesticated at Copenhagen and surrounded by all the prestige of absolute authority, taught from their cradle that their will was Law, that there was none other Law but it, should look with jealousy upon the free

<sup>1</sup> *Vide Manifesto of the Stadtholderate, Kiel, 22nd July 1850.*

institutions of that country, of which they were only constitutional Sovereigns. One of the great objects of the union was by this means defeated. The interests of the reigning line of the Oldenburg family became identified with Denmark, and thus the barrier to the old antagonism between the peoples was removed ; but the other branches of the family, the Princes of Augustenburg and Glücksburg, had taken firm root in the Duchies, and they became the champions of their independence.

The history of the century and a half that succeeded the Revolution of 1660 is the history of a continual persecution of these branches and of their manly defence of the liberties committed to their charge, as for instance in 1806 and 1813 when it was mainly through the efforts of Duke Frederick Christian of Augustenburg<sup>1</sup> that the Danish efforts to incorporate the Duchies then were foiled. By their means, and by the support, which the connection of Holstein with the German Empire secured for the Duchies from that quarter, the constitution of the country was preserved in all its integrity, to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is true, however, that the absolute Kings of Denmark attempted, by various administrative reforms, to sap this constitution.

The separate administrations of Denmark and the Duchies began gradually to be merged and transplanted to Copenhagen. Since 1815, the intention had been harboured of giving a separate constitution to each of the Duchies, a breach of the ancient joint constitution, to which, however, no effect was given.

The first direct blow aimed at the independence of the Duchies were the Letters-Patent published by Christian VIII. in 1846.

Before this period, however, the relations of Denmark to the Duchies had entered upon a new stage. The Revolution of June 1830 had shaken the absolutism of Denmark to its foundations ; and the popular element had obtained a footing in the politics of Copenhagen. From this time, the strong national contrasts existing between the two peoples daily became more and more manifest ;

<sup>1</sup> Known for his friendship with Schiller.

the democratic elements, peculiar to a commercial and maritime population, daily came out in stronger relief against the essentially conservative character of the agricultural population of the Duchies. The politics of the people followed those of their Sovereigns, but with this difference, that for the subtle underground policy of a cabinet, was substituted the open defiance, the rough plain-spoken language of a mob. For awhile, this popular spirit was kept in check by the dexterous management of Christian VIII. During the whole of his reign, however, the breach between Denmark and the Duchies widened more and more. The conquest of Schleswig by the sword, if necessary, became the war-cry of the Radical party at Copenhagen. The recognition *in principle* and restitution *in fact* of the old joint constitution of the country was the moderate reply made by the Duchies. Christian VIII. used the passions of both parties for his own plan, and for the purpose of carrying out his own policy.

This policy had for its two main objects, internally opposition to, and if possible the suppression of, the growing Radicalism at Copenhagen; externally the incorporation of the Duchies into the Monarchy; or to use the expression now for the first time introduced, '*Establishment of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.*'

To obtain these two ends he kept playing off the conservatism of the Duchies against the radicalism of Copenhagen and *vice versa*. As regards the projects of annexation, which was the only point held in common by Christian VIII. and his Danish subjects, there existed this vital difference—the rendering asunder of the Duchies, and identification of Schleswig with Denmark, was the object of the Radical party. Every means of Radical propagandism had been used to democratise and to unconservatise the population. Holstein, according to their programme, was to be cut adrift altogether. They felt, and it was a true instinct which made them feel so, that so long as the latter duchy remained within the monarchy there would exist a conservative element in the State which would always be more than a match for their plans. It was this very reason which made Christian VIII. all the more anxious to preserve

it. He opposed the radical tendencies by recognising the union of the Duchies. The union of these two conservative Duchies, he looked upon as a bulwark against his own Danish subjects.

In his celebrated Letters-Patent of 1846, Christian VIII. declared that, after diligent investigation, he had made the remarkable discovery that, rather more than a century before Schleswig and the greater part of Holstein had been incorporated into Denmark; and that, for the territory thus incorporated, the succession of the female line, according to the Danish law, had been introduced. He further declared, that his efforts would be directed towards removing any difficulties that might be in the way of a similar incorporation and change of succession in the remaining portion of Holstein. As might be supposed, this declaration produced the deepest sensation, as well as the greatest astonishment in the Duchies. That a King of Denmark should have had the intention, a century before, of effecting such incorporation was sufficiently natural; but that it should have been effected without anybody's knowing anything about it, either in Denmark or the Duchies, was a staggering fact. That it had not, hitherto, been known in Denmark, was sufficiently proved, by repeated transactions, in which the agnatic claims of succession had been acknowledged in Schleswig as well as in Holstein, and in which the old joint constitution of the country, resting essentially upon sameness of succession, had been recognised.

However, granting that the transaction of 1721 bore the impress of fraud which Christian tried to fix upon it, the right of the Duchies to prevent its being put into execution was in no wise impaired; for the act which gave to the Kings of Denmark the Sovereignities of the Duchies was a constitutional compact, resting upon certain conditions, which no mere Royal Decree could possibly invalidate. The Letters-Patent of 1846 were an attempt to destroy a fundamental law by a Royal Decree; an attempt which failed. The quiet but determined resistance of the Duchies to its execution forced Christian VIII. to give up the plan. He did not, however, give up the project of



incorporation ; finding that the time was past when it was possible for Sovereigns to carry out such plans by the mere expression of their will, he determined, though detesting Liberal institutions, on a last attempt at putting his project into execution, by the granting of a common free constitution to the whole monarchy. He thought that by means of such a boon, the wished-for centralisation might at last be brought about. This constitution of Christian VIII. was the last attempt made by king-craft on the independence of the Duchies. Christian died before its completion, and with Christian's death the entire system which he had so carefully and with such consummate art built up fell to the ground. The vigilance, by which the balance had been hitherto maintained, between the antagonistic forces, arrayed against each other with such selfish skill by the King's hand, was now withdrawn ; the barriers, which he had set up, against the increasing Radicalism of Copenhagen broke down, the moment he was no longer there to watch them ; all the purpose they had served had been to accumulate the water. On Frederick VII.'s accession, the full tide of democracy set in. A feeble attempt was made to carry out the constitution of Christian ; hateful as was the project to the Duchies, they still consented to the preliminary steps of sending notables to Copenhagen to discuss it. The project, however, was one which never had the approval of the party whose hour was now come ; the impulse given to the entire revolutionary party of Europe by the Revolution of 1848 brought the ultra-democratic party at Copenhagen into power. At the head of 15,000 men, the committee of a revolutionary club ordered the King to change his ministers, and to call to power the leaders of the movement—the same men whose motto had been for the last six years, 'Denmark to the Eider,' the meaning of which was more significantly expressed by the words of Orla Lehmann : 'Let us write our Laws with bloody swords on the Schleswig - Holsteiners' backs.'<sup>1</sup>

This, the language of the leading member of the new ministry, left the King no choice but that of breaking his

<sup>1</sup> At the May festival of 1842.

Coronation Oath or of losing his Crown. He preferred the former alternative.

The Duchies, thus wantonly attacked by the Power to whom they had a right to look for protection, were driven to the only resource left them—the armed defence of their rights.

The motives of this measure adopted by them in the name of their legitimate sovereign, Frederick VII., Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, against the tyranny of a revolutionary party claiming the name of the King of Denmark, the tool of the Copenhagen rabble, could not be more touchingly expressed than in the concluding sentence, put forth two years later, just before the battle of Idstedt, by the Stadtholderate of the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein :—

‘It is with a view to shield our people from this fate, to save the domestic hearth from violation, to preserve our rights, and with them our Country, that we are in arms against the hostile plans of Denmark. We know that the event of battles is in the hand of God, and that we may be vanquished, but we are not to be intimidated by a single defeat, nor are we to be bowed down by repeated disaster ; it shall not be an easy task to conquer us, and, if conquered, it will be impossible to keep us down for ever.

‘It is only those few men, whom necessity has forced to the helm of this little State, who speak these confident words in the name of their fellow-countrymen ; they know that of themselves they have no power to give effect to these words. But they also know that by them stand the people, who, with the simplicity of ancient manners, have retained the strength and truthfulness which gives them confidence in themselves : a people slow to begin, but slower to abandon what they have once begun ; a people not made to gratify the expectations of those who fancy them to be carried away with the excitement of revolt, and look out for its natural consequences, lassitude and depression ; by a people endowed with that reflective courage which, when there was need of moderation, prevented them from urging on their leaders ;—but who, now that the moment of action has arrived, are so much the less disposed to hang back through fear. We here solemnly appeal to God and to the sentence of all unprejudiced men, as well as to the impartial judgment of future history, calling them to witness that this land, having suffered grievances the most galling, repressed passions the most excusable, submitted to the greatest sacrifices, employed every means of conciliation, has at length exhausted the full measure of patience and endurance.

'Now that Denmark is for the third time endeavouring to force upon us by the sword her interpretation of our rights, for the purpose of trampling them underfoot, we march onwards to the holiest of conflicts with the calmest resolution, fervently breathing that same prayer which our forefathers put up before the battle of Himmingstede: "If we are wrong, may God let us fall; if right, let Him not destroy us."

As soon as the news of the Revolution at Copenhagen reached the Assembly at Rendsburg a provisional Government was formed, with the unanimous consent of the people, to direct the armed resistance, a step which evoked the greatest enthusiasm throughout Germany, where the tide of feeling for National Unity was then at its flood, and the rights of Schleswig-Holstein were looked upon as a sacred trust. Volunteers flocked from all parts to enrol themselves in the Schleswig-Holstein army, and many names afterwards to become famous first attained to prominence during this campaign; amongst others, General Bonin,<sup>1</sup> the Commander-in-Chief of the Schleswig-Holstein forces, later Prussian Minister for War; and Blumenthal<sup>2</sup> and the Bavarian Von der Tann,<sup>3</sup> both later on to be so well known in the wars of '66 and '70.

On 24th March 1848 King Frederick William IV. recognised the rights of the Duchies in a letter to Duke Christian August of Augustenburg; German troops crossed the frontier to their assistance, and the country was cleared of the Danes.

Under pressure of the Powers, however, and more especially owing to the threatening attitude of England and Russia, German help was soon withdrawn, and after repeated armistices the peace of Berlin was signed on 2nd July 1850, which, by recognising the former rights both of the German Diet and of Denmark, restored the *status quo ante*.

Schleswig-Holstein gallantly refused to give up the

<sup>1</sup> Bonin, Eduard von, b. 1793, d. 1865, Prussian General and Minister for War, 1852-1854 and 1858-1859.

<sup>2</sup> Blumenthal, Leonhard Graf von, b. 1810, d. 1900, Field-Marshal, Chief of the Staff to the Crown Prince's army during the wars of 1866 and 1870.

<sup>3</sup> Tann, Ludwig A. S. Freiherr von und zu der, d. 1815, d. 1881, Chief of the Staff to Prince Charles of Bavaria's army in 1866; Commander-in-Chief of Bavarian Army Corps in 1870.

struggle, and single-handed continued the fight against the overwhelming Danish forces, a fight which could have but one conclusion. Their troops, under the incapable leadership of General Willisen,<sup>1</sup> who had replaced Bonin, suffering defeat after defeat, and the war came to an end in the autumn of 1850, when the heroic people, betrayed by those on whose help they had relied, were delivered over to the mercy of their foes at Copenhagen, where the Eider-Dane party was holding full sway.

Fired with enthusiasm for the cause of Schleswig-Holstein, Morier returned to England, anxious to arouse the interest and to enlist the sympathies of his countrymen on behalf of the men then pouring out their blood for the defence of their country and for the maintenance of their old-established rights.

In August of the same year he started off himself for the theatre of war, where the last scenes of the conflict were being enacted.

In the following letters, addressed chiefly to his mother, he thus relates his experiences :—

23rd August—‘ . . . I have determined on the alternative, Privy Council or Law. Should the former be favourable, good. Should it not, then the 1st of November 1850 sees me setting to work on the latter. The meantime I intend to devote in the following manner. Since my first interview with Gervinus<sup>2</sup> I have had a most strong desire to see with my own eyes the persons who are now defending the freedom of the old Anglo-Saxon hearth. My doing so depended upon my feeling that it would be of any practical utility, as, unless it did serve some practical purpose, I did not consider myself for many reasons justified in so doing. My second interview with Gervinus to-day, from which I have just come, has settled that point. The means he has just put into my hands of making the acquaintance of Reventlow,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Willisen, Wilhelm von, Prussian General, author of works on strategy and tactics.

<sup>2</sup> Gervinus, Georg Gottfried, b. 1805, d. 1871, eminent historian and author, professor at Göttingen University; exiled for protesting against King Ernst Augustus of Hanover's overthrow of the constitution.

<sup>3</sup> Reventlow, Friedrich Graf, b. 1797, d. 1874, member of the Holstein Diet; Stadtholder from 1849-1851.

Beseler,<sup>1</sup> the Duke of Augustenburg,<sup>2</sup> the Prince of Noer,<sup>3</sup> Willisen, and Gagern<sup>4</sup> have convinced me that I shall have an opportunity of probing to the bottom the morale of the movement in a way which no one else can have. Such an opportunity, with the historical knowledge of the movement which I already have, should not be thrown away even in justice to the Duchies. The form which Meyr recommends, and which I should prefer, would be a series of letters descriptive in character, but interweaving the historical facts. These letters should form answers to others, which somebody quelconque should write to me. The somebody quelconque should embody the view which the public has in England on the subject. For this the leaders of *The Times* should be carefully studied, and the views in them reproduced. The answers would bowl all their positions over. This part of the task I wish you to undertake, and the sooner the better. The more real and colloquial they are the better. It will be all the more *angreifend*. I start to-night, there luckily being a boat for Hamburg at 11 p.m. I arrive at Hamburg Sunday morning and from thence proceed to Kiel, my headquarters. Here I shall remain for about a week or ten days, the Provisional Government being there. A week or ten days is all I can spare, as, on the seventh, I must be at John Ffolliott's, whither I shall proceed through Hull. A week, however, will be all I want, as a vivid impression is more than anything else what I want. I shall proceed writing the letter to you immediately on landing. I would like, if possible, to publish them first in the *Examiner*, and afterwards like Grote's letters on Switzerland. I will see if Meyr can manage it for me. The letters from you I wish you to write off directly to Poste Restante, Kiel, as I want to write real answers. You need not pretend to be my mother, but just anyone knowing me well; you chaff about German

<sup>1</sup> <sup>1</sup> Beseler, William Hartwig, b. 1806, d. 1884, President of the Schleswig Diet; Stadtholder, 1849-1851; exiled, and died as curator of Bonn University.

<sup>2</sup> Augustenburg, Christian August, Duke of, b. 1798, d. 1869.

<sup>3</sup> Noer, Prince of, b. 1800, d. 1865, brother of the above.

<sup>4</sup> Gagern, Heinrich von, b. 1797, d. 1880, German liberal statesman, President of National Assembly at Frankfort in 1848; took part in Schleswig-Holstein campaign.

enthusiasm, abuse radicals, say you thought me a conservative, though a new-fangled one, and no backer of Reds, etc., and then dish up your view.'

'*THE PRINCE ROYAL*, STEAM PACKET  
(50 miles up the Elbe),  
8 p.m., *Sunday, August 25th*, 1850.

'... It was with real joy and exuberance of spirits that I entered my hansom forty-eight hours since. Nature, I believe, intended me for a wanderer, and it was by one of her unaccountable mistakes that it was the Rue des Champs Élysées, and not a gipsy tent, that saw me emerge into light. Then, also the feeling that my eventful letter scribbled off at the Alfred had settled my fate and bound me 'prentice to that grim corpse Law, and that perhaps now, for the last time for years, I could freely and with whole soul mingle with living men, made me feel every minute to be pulsing out a whole flood tide of life in a way the minutes had not done for weeks past. So, by a bright moonlight away we went, gee-up down Oxford Street, and through the endless labyrinth of the City streets, till, in the open "Place" that surrounds it, the Tower stood beaming out in the moonlight, side by side with its great shadow, which seemed to lie there to testify to the huge solidity of the aerial spectre-coloured building, which from a thousand glittering points was reflecting the rays of the moon.

'At St. Catherine's Wharf I exchanged my hansom for a wherry, which took me out to the steamer lying some way down the river. On emerging from the streets upon the river as beautiful a view presented itself to the eye as the latter, so long accustomed to no more beauty than the perspective of Argyle Street, could wish to feed upon. Such a fairyland of beauty I little expected to meet with in the very heart of our smoke-skinned metropolis; but some kinds of light, like certain serene minds, can endue any object with their own beauty. It was high tide, and in consequence the river was very full. There was not so much as a ripple or undulation on the face of the water, but only great basins plated over with sheets of silver by the moonlight, and now and then slightly heaving, as if

there were a soul beneath it. The basins were separated from each other by huge groups of dark ships, whose mast-forests occasionally intercepted and broke the moon rays. Their perfect forms were mirrored with every detail of rope and tackle in the surrounding smoothness, the deep shadow they cast was here and there relieved and set off by the bright glare of some cabin light, which flared away in radii of earthy carnal light, contrasting strangely with the spiritual silveriness of Nature's lamp. Indeed, the cabin light had a very remarkable effect. The grim ships seemed to be grinning and glaring out at each other through these great meteor lights like wicked genii, I uneasily abiding amidst so much calm beauty. The buildings on either bank grouped themselves into picturesque masses of light and shade, culminating on the left bank in the four turrets of the Tower. Everything was hushed in silence, except here and there the heaving up of some distant anchor, or the bells on board some ship, or the bark of some solitary watch-dog, till all at once from a thousand church steeples rang out a carillon of bells to announce eleven. And then the engines hissed, the paddles began to revolve, and we started for Anglia, . . . Hamburg on Monday.'

'KIEL, *August 26th*, 1850.

'I have just time to dispatch another few lines to let you know of my arrival. All that I had been led to expect is fully, and more than fully, verified. They are veritably a most strange and admirable people. The serene kind of *sang-froid* with which everything goes on exactly as usual, though within earshot of the sound of war, is truly marvellous. There is not the slightest sign of enthusiasm of any sort, without, however, which is strange enough, the least appearance of indifference. Anyone you may chance to talk to will evidently from preference enter upon the subject of the war, but it is to talk of it in the most calculating and rational of ways. There is no sort of self-glorification; they seem to expect their troops (composed altogether of their brothers or sons) to fight it out as if it was a matter of loading or unloading a ship. It is a piece of business which duty to the Fatherland

requires, and the more business-like the way it is done the better the chance of success. I feel convinced that the only light in which the question has presented itself to the bulk of the inhabitants is that of defence against foreign aggression, and that the fact of the Duke being also the King of Denmark never the least before, to their somewhat slow imagination, conveyed with it the idea of their standing in any sort of relation to Denmark. As far as I have yet been able to judge, there does not seem to be the slightest animosity against the Danes personally. Of the men they talk in a most dispassionate way as good soldiers, very fond of beef when they can get it, which, with a true kind of John Bull commiseration, they say is not often, as subservient and rather cringing in manner to their superiors, which, to the sturdy yeomen of Holstein, one of whose most marked characteristics is a strong sense of self-respect, seems a great fault. On the whole, I should say their feeling towards the Danes seems to be much the same as that of John Bull about a Frenchman—a sort of fellow whom it would do one good to see having a good tuck-in. Of the young Danish officers, of their arrogance and “Willkühr,” they complain most bitterly. The prisoners are treated with the greatest kindness. There are only about three companies of Jägers in this place, the army being concentrated at Rendsburg; the Russian fleet is visible in the distance.’

*To his Sister*

*‘August 26th, 1850.*

‘ . . . I have just returned from a visit to the German Fleet and a cruise within safe distance of the united Danish and Russian dittoes. If you have a map of Schleswig-Holstein take it out and look at it whilst I give the following description. Kiel lies at the bottom of a deep winding bay running nearly north and south. At the mouth of this bay, about 8 miles from the town, is situated a strong fortress, Friedrichsort by name, now manned by about one thousand men and with 40 guns to sweep the decks of any adventurous vessel that might wish to make better acquaintance with the interior of the bay. About



five or six English miles beyond lies the Russo-Danish Fleet. I started about 5 p.m. ; a morning of pouring rain had been succeeded by a bright afternoon, that kind of brightness which succeeds rain so well described in Tennyson's Poet's Song :—

“When a light breeze blows from the gates of the sun,  
And waves of shadow go over the wheat.”

Very deep blue sky with very large bright white clouds sweeping with great speed over the horizon. Well, conceive yourself with these advantages in a brisk little cutter dashing gallantly through the very bluest of waves, with the most exhilarating and champagne spray jet d'eau-ing over you, and you will allow that the circumstances were such as to allow one to be jolly without exactly the right of claiming great credit for so being. But add to all this the fact of the *entourage* of the very best kind of pretty scenery, the gay little town of Kiel with its garniture of humble shipping behind you, and on either side beautifully sloping hills covered for the most part with beech woods, the trees a magnificent size, actually with their roots in the water (*N.B.*, there are no tides in the Ostsee), put in by way of seasoning, the excitement of going to look at real fighting men ; and that the acoustic part should be provided for, know that there be the bugles of a rifle brigade re-echoing through the woods, and then I think you will confess that the sight was decidedly to be preferred to that of the old white stone three-pair-up at Berlin, afforded more variety than the Blue Room at Bath, and was more calculated to suggest and set going, etc., than even the garrison Argyle Street.

‘The first place my Allemanee tritons took me to was that everlasting resort of every German town, æsthetically yclept a Belle Vue, which being interpreted, however, into grosser language means *ein Café und Bier Wirthshaus*. In this case, however, the appellation was well deserved. A little circular temple, cocked up on a height about half-way to Friedrichsort, it commands the whole length and breadth of the bay on either side, and looks out into the open sea beyond. In addition to the more sensu-

advantages of good beer and good coffee, it possesses a most excellent telescope, by which I was enabled to take an accurate survey of the Cossack monsters who, thanks to Palmerstonian policy, are having it all their own way in these northern seas. There were five Line of battleships and some steam frigates; two of the former were Danish and, as far as my unnautical eye would allow me to judge, very smart-looking craft. One of the Russians was a huge beast indeed, with no less than one hundred and twenty distinct sets of salamander bowels. I must confess it made my Teutonic blood boil within me to see these Siberian barbarians thus threatening our old Anglo-Saxon hearth. However, it is no use either biling or boiling. I console myself with the idea of a universal justice turning the tables in the long run. As far as a mere picture goes, it was a gallant sight. "Lordly" is a right well-chosen appellation, for a ship and a fleet of Line of battleships has a most aristocratic appearance. By lowering the glass an inch a very different sight presents itself, viz. the German Fleet. But we must not anticipate. The tritons having beer-ed me descended the hillside and reascended our ship. I lit one end of a yard of 'baccy, wrapped myself up in my plaid, and felt, as you may suppose, consummately happy. It was now about sunset, a bright golden cloud was lashed up into a fit of angry crying by a rather violent squall which now came on. The blue waves curled themselves up into white foam, and a triple rainbow, more beautiful than anything I ever beheld, spanned the bay of Kiel. Scudding at the rate of any number of knots an hour, we arrived in about half that time at the anchoring ground of Holstein's gallant little squadron. It was anchored immediately off the mouth of the canal which joins the Ostsee with the Eider, and so forms the boundary line between the two Duchies. Nothing could be more picturesque than the position, a snug little wooded bay quite sheltered from every wind. Having reported myself to the Commodore I was most courteously taken over the squadron by the great man in person. It consists of two steamers, the *Bonin* mounting four large guns, and the *Löwe* mounting two and about half-a-dozen

gunboats, each manned by fifty men, and mounting two huge sixty-pounders and eight swivels. With this force, plus one more small steamer, the *Von der Tann*, they had twice taken the offensive against the Danes since the first breaking out of hostilities. On the first occasion, about a month ago, the *Von der Tann* managed to slip out between the Danish ships in a dense fog, and made its way to the Gulf of Travemünde to intercept the Danish mails from Lübeck. In this gulf they captured a Danish merchantman, and towed her under the fire of the Danish men-of-war, who were now in full chase, into the harbour of Lübeck. The authorities here civilly requested them to go to the devil. They were obliged to comply, and out they dashed, still keeping fast hold of the prize, and attempted to cut their way through. You must bear in mind that this steamer was not bigger than one of our Thames heavy boats, and only mounted two guns. The game, of course, was a desperate one, but still for some time they answered the Danish broadside from the lipping lips of their two poor little guns. A Danish steamer then bore down upon her. In another minute she would have been blown out of the water. To give in was out of the question, so her captain ran her upon a sandbank and blew her up, which was a sell for King Darius. The whole was done with such consummate coolness that every man succeeded in escaping in the boats and had the satisfaction of taking sights at the Danes from the shore. The second engagement took place about a week ago, and only about a couple of miles off the place where we now were. One of the largest of the Danish steam frigates, a 40-gun ship, the *Heckla*, moved in towards Friedrichsort to reconnoitre. Out went the gunboats and the two steamers, and a very brisk cannonade took place, which lasted a couple of hours. The gunboats were a good bit knocked about, and one lost several men. The steamers were shot through and through, the new paint showed plainly where the scars were. However, the men remained perfectly steady, and only retired after two hours, when some more steam frigates came to the assistance of the *Heckla*. To their great delight they had just learned by the Copenhagen papers that the *Heckla* had

been considerably peppered. Considering that the men have been hastily gathered together from the Merchant Service, and have only had a couple of months' practising in gunnery, it speaks very well for them. The distance was about 1800 yards, and they were far beyond reach of any assistance from the batteries of Friedrichsort. They seemed all, both officers and men, very keen for another tussle.

'P.S. Rendsburg, 27th August 1850.—This was continued and ended here. For further news apply to David, Anna, and Co., Newsvendors, Bath.'

*To his Mother*

'HEADQUARTERS OF THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN  
ARMY, RENDSBURG, *August 28th, 1850.*

' . . . The attitude of the people is one of the noblest moral phenomena I have ever seen. It is strengthening and faith-giving to a most extraordinary degree . . . the Duke is a most glorious old fellow. Heinrich von Gagern has put a horse at my disposal.'

'REDSBURG, *August 29th, 1850.*

' . . . Starting to the outposts with Gagern. Returning to dine with Willisen.'

'REDSBURG, *September 2nd, 1850.*

' . . . I left off with the Fleet. You must now suppose me to have had a good sleep at Kiel, to have spent a couple of hours on the railroad between Kiel and Rendsburg, and to be in an omnibus leaving the station. The said station lies about half-a-mile from the town, clear of the fortifications, the old entrée within the fortress, by which the Prince of Noer effected his famous surprise, having been discontinued since the beginning of the war. To get a correct picture of the scene, you must fill the station and its *alentours* with volunteers just landed from Altona. They are all Germans, soldiers who have finished their three years' service, have good certificates of conduct, and leave from their respective Governments, consequently men in the best state of discipline perfectly drilled, soldier-like looking. They have received their uniforms, though no arms, at Altona, are all in the highest spirits, singing Vater-

land songs and such-like, their new uniforms and jolly fresh faces form a striking contrast to the men returning from the hospitals in the sailor jackets which they wore at Idstedt, some with their arms still in the sling, others with only half-healed scars. The volunteers are received by expectant sergeants, formed into bodies and marched off. Your humble servant enters a rickety bus and delivers his *permis d'entrée*, and in the course of a few minutes enters the interminable outworks, *têtes de pont*, etc., of the fortress. Rendsburg is properly composed of three distinct fortifications, each of which is capable of being separately defended. Entering the south, as you do if you arrive by railroad, you come to the first fortification on the left bank of the Eider. This is the largest of the three, and in it is the great "place," containing a huge military dépôt of stores, etc., the Hauptwache, the Governor's house, and the Treasury and all those Government offices which in a foreign country it was thought better to include in the fortress. . . . You turn still more to your right, and you see a battalion numbering about eleven hundred men marching and take up a position in the Square. They have just arrived from outpost duty and are going to relieve the garrison of the town who take their place. You now have an opportunity of comparing a soldier in time of war with one at a Hyde Park Review. The contrast is great, and to one looking deeper into the nature of things (as Aristotle has it) by no means to the advantage of the latter. No glitter and tinsel here, but a thoroughly efficient look about everything which tells what a regular business affair war is. Their *Wappen fracks* are rather white at the elbows and evidently in thorough good repair and carefully brushed. All the brass about their helmets is painted black to prevent their being seen at a distance. They are very muddy about the legs, but their boots are of sound thick leather and well hobnailed. They had each a musket and short sword like those in the French Army—a cartouche box worn in front attached to a belt that goes round the body, forming an excellent support to the loins instead of our absurdly heavy antediluvian crossbelt in addition to a knapsack and a cloak twisted into a kind of thick rope and slung round the body obliquely

over the right shoulder and under the left arm. They have been bivouacking under canvas for about three weeks, been doing patrol duty and having nightly skirmishes with the enemy, in which they have been invariably successful. They are in the best of spirits, have been well fed, and look thoroughly healthy. They are now ranged in companies and inspected by some of the officers of the staff, whose headquarters are the Government House immediately on your right, in front of which are being walked up and down various chargers, from the gaily caparisoned blood mare of the General to the muddy foam-flaked troop horse of the orderly just ridden in with the bulletin of last night's proceedings from some distant part of the camp. Fortification No. 2 is nothing but a conglomeration of infernally ill-paved narrow streets, stinks too very much, and is garrisoned by fleas. From this you emerge over two narrow bridges to Fort No. 3, in which there are hardly any houses except a few store warehouses for the merchantmen who come up the Eider from the west and from the Holstein Canal from the east. The fortifications are, however, immensely strong, and in the present position of affairs the most important, as just in front of the outermost gate, on this side, branch off the two roads to Schleswig and Eckernförde. Everywhere the town bears the mark of the fatal explosion. In the immediate neighbourhood are still numerous ruins. My inn, for the first day or two I was here, was minus doors and windows, every ceiling and wall intersected with huge cracks. Every roof in the town is spotted with new tiles marking the place where some friendly bomb effected an entrance. As to its moral effects, all trace of depression is gone, and the inhabitants, as well as the soldiers, seem to have forgotten all about it.'

'HAMBURG, *September 22nd.*

' . . . I have again put off my departure for twenty-four hours on the pressing invitation on the part of the Duchess of Augustenburg to spend the day with them and celebrate her birthday. This look into the *intérieur* of the Duke of Augustenburg's family was all that was wanting to complete the picture of Schleswig-Holstein's men and manners.

Anything more perfectly simple, unaffected, and lovable than this *ménage* cannot be imagined. This is the family, the head of which has been by the intrigues of Danish diplomacy represented as infamous in the very worst sense of the word, and that with such consummate skill as before '48 to have in a great measure alienated the affection of his fellow-citizens of the Duchies. You have only to picture to yourself one of our great country noblemen's families, where domestic peace within and hospitality without have been looked upon and acted upon as the most real ideal of human happiness, and with the exception of a difference of language you have the exact notion of the family at Neu-Stettin. The intense kindness with which I was received I shall never forget. The sons I already knew in the bivouac, the daughters are perfectly charming. . . . I may mention that the Duke was declared by the King of Denmark, his nephew, *vogelfrei*, that is that any one might put him to death with impunity.'

'YORK, September 27th, 1850.

' . . . Here I am safe and sound in Yorkshire. I stay a day or two at Escrick . . . after this I go to meet John [Ffolliott] and Jowett in Wales.'

'October 3rd, 1850.

' . . . I could not conceive your being in such a state of anxiety about me as (though I do not deny having been in various scimmages) I wrote the moment they were over, and as soon as you could hear from others about them. . . . About the said scimmages, I dare say it was very wrong to be there. At the same time I could not possibly have attained my object of being able to testify as an eye-witness to the moral worth of the Schleswig-Holsteiners without having seen them myself under fire.'

[No date.]

'Nothing can be falser or more perfectly "party" than *The Times* on the Duchies. There have been great faults on both sides, especially in '48. There are also great interests at stake on both sides and rights of equal value, and equally to be respected by a foreigner. And yet *The Times* tries to make us believe that the question is a simple one and the right all on one side.'

## CHAPTER VII

LONDON. PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE. VIENNA

EVER since he had left Oxford, Morier's future had been a subject of anxious consideration to himself, his parents, and his friends; for though destined from his cradle for diplomacy, to which both heredity and disposition seemed to point as his natural career, the unfair treatment his father had received at the hands of Lord Palmerston and the Foreign Office prevented any such plans being carried out. Never, so long as Lord Palmerston continued in office, would David Morier have consented to ask him, in whose hands as Foreign Secretary the patronage lay, for a nomination for his son.

Under these circumstances the Law, the Colonial Office, and various other alternatives were in turn considered. Writing to his son, on 15th April 1850, of an interview with Sir Robert Adair,<sup>1</sup> his old chief, David Morier says:—

' . . . You were the principal topic of our conversation. His advice was that you have patience, bide your time, make yourself well informed on every subject connected with public business, for it will surely tell in the end, "and above all," added he, "let him keep this," touching his own warm old heart as he spoke, "let him keep this independent as you yourself have done." We had been talking of foreign politics and I had referred to the circumstances which made it impossible for me to ask the slightest favour of Lord Palmerston. This will explain his last words.'

Chiefly through the good offices of Sir Robert Adair, who actively bestirred himself on behalf of the son of his old friend and colleague, Burnet Morier was eventually

<sup>1</sup> Adair, Sir Robert, b. 1763, d. 1855, diplomatist, friend of Charles James Fox.



successful in obtaining a clerkship in the Educational Department of the Privy Council Office. How high the opinion formed of him at Oxford had been, is evidenced by the testimonials which Temple, Jowett, Stanley, and others wrote for him on this occasion. Temple testified that—

‘ I have been acquainted with him from the time that he first entered Balliol College, and had better than ordinary opportunities of knowing both his talents and his character. He made himself remarkable at College for the steady perseverance with which he devoted himself to his academical studies, in spite of his previous education not having been adapted to the requirements of the Oxford system. He showed thorough good sense and a very quick appreciation of the work : and I am sure that very few men who commenced at the point he did, when he first came up, would have been able as he did to secure a Second Class in the Schools. . . . ’

Jowett, that—

‘ I have a very high opinion both of his abilities and good principles. As a proof of the first I may mention the fact of his obtaining a Second Class in *Literis Humanioribus* at Oxford under the greatest disadvantages of early education. He is also an excellent French and German scholar, both of which languages he speaks with fluency. I think him possessed of a good deal of original ability. No one can have been much with him without being aware of his good sense and thorough good-nature and right feeling. He has a knowledge of the world and tact in dealing with others rarely found in persons of his age.’

And Stanley—

‘ . . . He has great energy and knowledge of the world, and his abilities and principles are such as would enable him to turn them to great account in any work connected with the cause of general education.’

And, lastly, the testimony of Dr. Jenkyns, the Master of Balliol, that—

‘ . . . during his residence in the College he merited approbation no less for his general good conduct

and attention to his studies, than on account of his excellent disposition and pleasing manners. . . .'

'ALFRED CLUB, *January 21st, 1851.*

'MY DEAR FATHER,—You will doubtless be as glad as myself to hear that my fate for better or for worse is settled. I have the honour of being a Clerk in H.M.'s Privy Council, with a salary of a hundred and twenty pounds per annum.'

Inferior as was the situation, and, from the routine of its commonplace, official duties, little suited to his active mind and disposition, it still appeared to him preferable to a life of idleness without an object in London. Moreover, he hoped that there might be some chance of its leading to promotion in a higher range of intellectual employment; a hope, however, soon to be disappointed. 'I loathe and detest my present occupation,' he writes, after some experience of the office, 'which takes up too much of my time to enable me to work to any good to myself, while it is not of a nature which any human being with a soul in him can possibly take an interest in. It is not a profession, and it does not, on the other hand, leave one's hands free.'

In the meanwhile he entered with his usual zest into all the pleasures and interests of English society, literary and otherwise, and with his remarkable capacity of attracting to himself all that was distinguished and superior, he soon gathered around him a host of friends.

His time was chiefly divided between Kneller Hall with Temple, Jowett and Palgrave, and London, where he had rooms in 49 New Bond Street; and it was here that the bi-weekly meetings took place which afterwards developed into the celebrated Cosmopolitan Club, of which he was the founder. These meetings, originally arranged to enable Prince Nicholas of Nassau, who had come over with letters of recommendation to Morier from Roggenbach, to meet some of the more literary and intellectual Englishmen of the day, were at first chiefly composed of Morier's more intimate friends, such as Temple, Palgrave, Chichester

Fortescue, Lingen, Arthur Russell, Cartwright, and others, but eventually grew so much in numbers, popularity, and importance that want of space caused this brilliant society to migrate to more spacious quarters, which were found in the studio of Watts, another of their members.

But never did he allow either his occupations or his amusements to interfere with the constant flow of correspondence which he kept up with his family, more especially his mother, whom he never failed to supply with graphic accounts of all his doings.

Describing, on one occasion, a week-end spent at a place on the Thames close to Runnymede, ‘. . . where, I believe, the first great Chartist Demonstration took place in the reign of King John,’ he says of his host, whom he knew but little, that ‘he goes up every day per rail to suckle a golden calf, which is stabled somewhere about Lombard Street, and then returns to his wife and little place in Berks. The precise breed of the calf I know not, but, being periodically shorn, the golden egg, which is the result (confound it! this is a confusion of metaphors, too late to help it now, I was smoking with an Irishman last night), furnishes this place with all the luxuries which not only the heart of man, but also his stomach and remaining senses, can desire.’

On this occasion he went over to Windsor :—

‘More glorious and kinglike I never saw the old Castle look. A bright, spring day with almost summer heat, and the green in all its un-biaséd freshness cushioning the pedestal from which rises that grand, burly, hit-me-if-you-dare Round Tower. The Terrace was brilliant in the extreme; the band playing, and every sort of promenader promenading—great horse-haired grenadiers with their sweethearts, tightest little ensigns chaffing Windsor belles, Eton boys in white ties rollicking, gentlemanlike and devil-may-care, shopkeepers and gents—all mingling in one stream, as if they were all actually “men and brothers,” as we used to be taught to call little nigger boys, people of like flesh and blood. It is the only place in England in which I have seen this sort of Happy Family co-existence

between different classes of the community, and this under the shadow of Royalty. . . .'

He records his return to London from ' . . . a most pleasant stay at Nuneham, prolonged beyond the limit I had fixed in consequence of the attraction of the place, and the peculiar susceptibility to attraction which I presume that I possess in common with all large bodies. . . . The party consisted of the Bulteels, Lord and Lady Norreys, William Harcourt, Julian Fane, Henry Greville, Chichester Fortescue, Mr. Wayland and Lady Catherine, two brothers of Mr. Harcourt's and myself ; Lady Waldegrave<sup>1</sup> and Mr. George Harcourt being part of the fixtures of the place. The latter two personages were far the most entertaining of the whole lot. I can only describe them, their ways and their *entourage*, by saying that they seem to have been intended by Nature as the principal characters in a *vaudiville à la Louis XV.* ; he, the old Marquis, heir to palaces and broad acres, a genealogy "as long as my tail," and an ungovernable temper, who has all his life ruled supreme over an obedient household of former wives and younger brothers, all drilled to watch and administer to his every whim, and at last in his old age, with all his despotic habits and selfishness ingrained into him, like dirt into the mechanic's palm, marrying a young wife with a wit and will a thousand times stronger than his own, and no disinclination to use both to the best advantage. She, the young wife aforesaid, a widowed "Duchesse" with immense fortune, beauty, accomplishments, whims without end, gigantic animal spirits, the world-spoiled child, with every denomination of admirer flitting about her, really fond of the old "Marquis," but determined to stand no humbug and possessed of a laudable ambition to prove to him that his temper is not so bad as it appears. Place your scene in a splendid château surrounded by magnificent gardens with terraces sentinelled by grand flower vases overlooking a majestic river, throw in a handful of subordinate characters, admirers, cowed

<sup>1</sup> Frances Braham, m. 1. John James Waldegrave ; m. 2. George E., 7th Earl Waldegrave ; m. 3. George Harcourt ; m. 4. Chichester Fortescue, afterwards created Baron Carlinford.

younger brothers taking courage since the advent of Madame, wits, a poet, a fat philosopher, some agreeable and *espigle* women of various ages. Now imagine the thousand and one freaks which, with such an *entourage*, would suggest themselves to Madame la Duchesse, and the way in which they would be received by Monsieur le Marquis, and you will really have some idea of the *plaisanteries* of Nuneham during the last week. The piece might be entitled "The Taming of the Screw" !

On the eve of the general election in July 1852 he was coaching Robert Boyle<sup>1</sup> in politics, and says :—

' This insight into the little world of an English borough through the magnifying lens of an M.P. expecting a possible ejection is highly instructive, not to say amusing. To see the terrible passions which agitate the breasts of 40 householders, the feuds and the infinitesimal divisions into which a matter of five hundred or so electors can be parcelled out in as apparently dull and quiet a little town as you would wish to see, leaves much the same impression on the mind which a look through a solar microscope does at a drop of water which one is told is identical with the clear tasteless stuff one is in the habit of drinking. Big monsters eating little monsters. Little monsters cutting away from big monsters. Terrible evolutions, terrible expense of seemingly gigantic muscular power, but luckily all—pothor.'

To his father, on 12th October 1852, he speaks of a visit to his sister, ' . . . accomplished in company with Jowett. A great treat it was to all three, Jowett preaching the most beautiful sermon which has ever been produced since the invention of that machinery. . . . I returned to Kneller Hall on Tuesday in time to be present at the christening feast in honour of Tennyson's baby, who resides at Twickenham, and whose acquaintance I have had the enormous good fortune to make. (Tennyson's, I mean, not the baby's.) It was a right pleasant feast. There were poets there as thick as blackberries,—Brownings and Taylors and Tennysons and great historians, venerable Hallams, and radiant

<sup>1</sup> Hon. Robert Boyle, son of 8th Earl of Cork, Licut.-General, b. 1809, d. 1854, M.P.

visions of fair women. And then the Great Man himself, diffusing genial warmth all about him, all his usual shyness and reserve laid aside, and his whole being given up to honouring his guests and being honoured by them. After the mob of guests had separated, four choice spirits gathered themselves into an upper chamber—the Great Man himself, Browning (the male), Palgrave, and myself—and there till 1 a.m. was a brewing of whisky toddies, and *bons mots*, and epigrammatic sentences, and a sitting in judgment on the great works of past men's heads, and on the little works of present men's hands. Kings and Peoples weighed in the balance, and somehow all found wanting! Then came curses deep and strong on the splay-hoofed tyrant who is trampling the fair land of our neighbours into its native mud, and prophecies uttered at the coming struggle between Black and White, Light and Darkness, the Devil and St. Michael, and how Old England is the one champion left, and what work her sons are called on to do. And in fact, there was nothing left unsaid which ought to have been said, and nothing said which ought not to have been said. In a word, never four finer fellows got together, and, having got together, never made a better use of their time. Joking apart, however, this fellow Tennyson is a right noble creature, almost the noblest creature (Jowett always excepted, and he beats even him in physique) I ever saw. He is one of those beings from whom one gets an insight into that real Hero-World outside or inside the crust of this sham Valet-World (a Carlylean hit, by Jove!). But grin as you will, *Excellenz*, this is a real *bona-fide* bit of truth. Of God and the Divine we can know nothing whatever except what we catch reflected from God-like men. He is to us (I don't mean *you*), small earth-men, like the not-yet-risen sun, and we only become conscious of His being and existence by those taller Hero-Men whose higher tops already catch the rays from His glory.'

On the 23rd November 1852 he describes the lying-in-state of the Duke of Wellington :—

'Anything like the whirl and confusion into which we sober Englishmen have thought fit to throw our-

younger brothers taking courage since the advent of Madame, wits, a poet, a fat philosopher, some agreeable and *espiègle* women of various ages. Now imagine the thousand and one freaks which, with such an *entourage*, would suggest themselves to Madame la Duchesse, and the way in which they would be received by Monsieur le Marquis, and you will really have some idea of the *plaisanteries* of Nuneham during the last week. The piece might be entitled "The Taming of the Screw" !

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'Anything like the whirl and confusion into which we sober Englishmen have thought fit to throw our-



selves to testify our sense of respect for the great man we buried in state last Thursday I never witnessed. For days and nights previously there was nothing but running to and fro organising parties of spectators, securing tickets in bad places, and then changing them for better, and all the busy nothingnesses which precede the final settling down to a great ceremony of which one has no precedent. . . . First there was the lying-in-state. . . . We went early, and so were nowise crowded. The Hall in which the ceremony was celebrated (that of Chelsea Hospital) was too small for its purpose, and not the proper shape, being too narrow. The consequence was that, instead of being in the centre, the catafalque on which the coffin rested was at the end, giving it too much the look of a "buffet." Far the finest part of the show was the avenue leading up to the catafalque—this was lined on either side by picked men from the Foot Guards standing with their backs against the wall on a platform about one and a half feet high, giving them in the uncertain light of the wax candles a gigantic size. They stood with their arms reversed, the military expression for mourning, and expressive in the highest degree. . . . Parallel to the men on both sides of the Hall, forming thus a lane for the spectators to pass through, and leaving the middle of the Hall free, were two rows of gigantic (seemingly) silver candelabra about nine feet high with large tapers in them. They gave a proper light,—that is, a half sort of sombre light not quite victorious over the darkness. At the end of the Hall appeared a blaze of a far too theatrical footlight sort of light from the catafalque and its ornaments. Under a canopy magnificently ornamented with every kind of heraldic decoration on a *low* catafalque lay the coffin, the last thing almost amidst the blaze and splendour of the ornaments which the eye could catch. It was a rich sort of thing covered with crimson velvet with large silver-gilt handles to it. It said, however, nothing of Death, and nothing of the particular life of him whose earthly shell it contained. It was at most a very handsome piece of furniture. Officers in full uniform sat round it. Perfect order and a most decorous attitude

was maintained by the visitors, who passed around in silence, unpleasantly broken, however, now and then, by the "Please move on, gentlemen" of the officials. For four days and one night countless multitudes passed through to see this pageant. . . . At the end of the fourth day came the final preparation for the last scene, and such a sight as was presented by the whole line of march from Apsley House to St. Paul's for that last night will probably not soon again be witnessed in London. One large disciplined army of carpenters, got together heaven knows how, because I can never believe they were all furnished by London itself, plied willingly for hour after hour putting up huge black scaffolding, as if preparing for some terrible State execution, and worked by torchlight, as grim-looking workmen as you would wish to see, hammers plying, voices calling, great bands of navvies laying down cart-loads of sand in the streets, omnibuses and cabs racing with the cargoes just deposited by special train at each of the railway stations, black streams of badauds on the footpaths, excited by the mere presence of their numbers, idlers having nothing to do and only looking on and coarsely uttering their jests—confusion unutterable and babel sounds. I went to a very small party at Lady John Russell's in the evening. We came back through it all. I exchanged a few words with Lord John on the subject, and I could not but smile at the professional view in which the subject seemed to come before him, his principal observations being directed against the folly of the Ministers<sup>1</sup> in putting the ceremony off so long and dis-severing the pageant so much from the feelings called out immediately upon the death itself.'

On 2nd December 1852 he continues his description of the funeral, which he witnessed from Ellis's Hotel in St. James Street :—

' . . . Perfect stillness was observed throughout, people speaking only in whispers. At last guns were heard in the distance, giving notice that the procession had started. After about half an hour's expectation the stillness was

<sup>1</sup> Torv.

broken by the distant sound of military music. It was the band of the Rifle Brigade with which the procession opened, a beautiful band entirely composed of wind instruments. Certainly a more impressive opening to the great pageant could not have been hit upon. Like a choir of human voices, the distant trumpets and bugles chanted forth that beautiful *Sinfonia Eroica* of Beethoven. I never so keenly realised the effect of music. Not a sound or a voice could be heard but the clear, wailing notes of that noblest of dirges, at first very faint, then increasing in volume till at last the head of the advancing column could be seen and the measured footfalls in slowest funereal measure keeping solemn cadence to the music could be distinguished. Little by little the full burst of the grief melody filled the air, and the black (the Rifle uniform is almost black) disciplined mass with arms reversed and numbering within its ranks many a gallant weather-beaten old soldier, down whose cheeks the tears could be seen to run, filled up the streets. Slowly and silently they moved past, then, dying off by imperceptible degrees as it had first begun, before the last note had vanished from the ear, the first burst of the next band (that I think of the Marines) could already be heard in the distance. The clashing of the two, faint and distant as both were, had something in it inexpressively touching. It was not dis-harmony, because they seemed to make themselves heard alternately, like the rising and sinking of distant waves, and the impression left was that of angel choirs answering each other somewhere far above the heavens, and not at all the brazen language of the red-coated warriors who now poured on. This first part of the pageant was by far the most solemn, and indeed the only part of the whole that thoroughly appealed to the feelings I would have wished to have stirred within me upon the occasion. . . . When the soldiers had all passed the actual funeral pageant began. . . . It left no impression upon me but that of a confused ill-arranged mass of heraldry of the tenth century, with miserable mourning coaches of the nineteenth, landaus with deputations, ginger-bread carriages with Speakers and that sort of people, coroneted carriages with

Prime Ministers, etc. The car itself was an utter failure. The design originally was, I believe, good, but the execution miserable and the actual arrangement at the last of the drapery, laurels, etc., vile. The great horses decked down to their fetlocks in velvet were the only good part about it. So little had they calculated the weight and power of resistance downhill which the horses could present, that at the last moment a huge rope, to which were attached forty policemen, had to be fastened to it behind to prevent its rolling forward and crushing the team. The only touching incident left was the old war-horse and the old groom, both apparently most deeply affected, but particularly the old horse, who, I can swear, had tears in his eyes. In two hours everything had passed. The attitude of the people during the whole time was admirable.'

Ever since Morier had entered the Privy Council Office he had been seeking some means of escape from its hated drudgery, and had been looking about for more congenial employment, in which course he was much encouraged by his friends, who thoroughly realised how his talents were being wasted.

As early as the spring of '52 an opening had seemed to present itself. Mr. Cook, the editor of the *Morning Chronicle*, had, on the suggestion of Gladstone, who knew Morier well, made him an offer to go to Australia on behalf of that paper to write a series of reports on those Colonies. Temple, Jowett, and others, in whose judgment he placed great reliance, urged him to consider a proposal which he himself was only too anxious to accept, hoping as he did that it might fit him by personal observation and by the acquirement of information on the spot to become a useful public servant in the Colonial Administration. He had therefore characteristically employed the summer in preparing his mind for the voyage.

At this time he writes :—

' . . . I am *en route* for Kneller Hall, where I propose to stay a month or so at hard work with a view to getting my intellectual powers into something like working condition previous to the labours which they have before them.'

I shall then most probably take a fustian-coat tour through Lancashire and Yorkshire, visiting the manufacturing districts, those great depôts of labour, and so on to Ireland to John Ffolliott and Fortescue, with the same object in view, and back by Bristol to Bath, where I presume you will have arrived.'

But if the approval which his Australian scheme had met with amongst his friends was great, greater still was the disapproval which it evoked from both his parents. His mother especially, whose failing health had obliged them to leave England in August for a prolonged stay at Wiesbaden, was miserable at the idea of such a separation from her only son and at the prospect of his journey to the Antipodes; whilst his father, added to the spectacle of his wife's grief, and his own sorrow at his son's departure, felt, as he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, 'no little mortification' at his entering into an engagement 'as the paid correspondent of a newspaper.'

In vain did Morier try to reconcile his parents to his plans.

'Whatever happens, however,' he writes, 'I do not want to give up my plan, and I do not think that Gladstone will, as he really is very much interested in it, and it was by his special interference that my appointment was settled upon. Whatever happens, then, on one thing I have made up my mind, that is to give up the next two years to uninterrupted hard work and to a life of the strictest economy, if not in Australia then in England, partly in a cottage near Kneller Hall, partly with you.'

In answer to a letter of his father's in September, depicting the misery which the idea of the Australian journey was causing his mother, he replies that the absence contemplated was—

'... eighteen months probably, two years at the most. . . . You cannot in any way realise to yourself, my dearest father, my keen sensitiveness on the subject of encouragement and discouragement. One word of encouragement from those I love is to me the strong meat and strong drink of the athlete.

'Many and many a time, when my work at Oxford had sunk me into a state of inactive despair, and neither prospect of defeat nor of glory seemed possible to rouse me into exertion, has one line of sympathy from my dear mother or yourself filled me with elasticity and life, and enabled me to surmount with joyousness difficulties whose summits before seemed to touch the clouds. Exactly proportional to this is the effect produced upon me by discouragement, whether implied or expressed, when coming from the same quarter . . . for with my peculiar constitution (more or less a poetic and creative one) the non-creative is the uttermost demoralisation.'

His parents having eventually concurred in his wishes, he expresses his deep gratitude to his father that—

'my dearest mother and yourself have reconciled yourselves to my notion about disposing of myself, and in the real spirit of Love, smoothed by a cheerful and hopeful way of looking at the whole thing the only painful feature in it, which is the temporary separation from those whom every year and every fresh experience both of *their love* and of the lovelessness of the rest of the world, makes me cling to more and more. . . . There are a thousand reasons which make me feel that a period of severe, even harsh, discipline is absolutely necessary for me—a throwing of myself on to myself, and upon my own resources, being forced to do with small means, a forming of habits of providence in small things. . . . I look forward on my return from Australia to two or three years' hard intellectual work under, or rather with, my old friends Jowett and Temple in some mean attic in Oxford or London, learning for the next two years how to be *parvo contentus* and how to rough it in a workman-like manner, and not with a dilettantism only of a Schleswig-Holstein campaigner.'

In October he resigned his clerkship in the Privy Council Office, and, his departure for Australia being fixed for the following February, he spent the intervening weeks in final preparation, and seeing the most of his friends.

In December he writes to Palgrave :—

‘ . . . You dine and sleep here on Sunday. It will be a Cosmopolitan and probably the last I preside over, though not the least, as it will surpass in brilliancy all former ones. Ruskin, Layard, Stirling, Fortescue, and others dine here to discuss the propriety of getting a Bill passed in Parliament to emancipate the Turners from Chancery, a bright suggestion of mine of which, if it eventually takes form, I shall not be a little proud. . . . I showed *Francesca* to Mary Boyle, who very highly approved of it, and has been very keen ever since to make your acquaintance. . . . I translated a thing from Jean Paul called the ‘Death of an Angel.’ . . . Froude approved of it. He dined with me yesterday. He is vastly humanised, and is altogether a grand fellow, and will become every day a grander.’

In December he started off for Wiesbaden on a parting visit to his family, but in the meantime political changes were taking place which seemed to hold out to him the hopes of possible employment in Europe. Lord Palmerston, the insuperable obstacle to his entering the Diplomatic Service, had ceased to be Foreign Minister since the preceding February, and in December, Lord Aberdeen, his father’s old chief and friend, took office as Prime Minister. David Morier, therefore, had no hesitation in writing to him—‘not as Prime Minister to the Crown, but simply to ask your counsel and assistance as an old friend in a matter which touches me deeply, the direction of my son’s career in life’—to ask him for a nomination for his son in the Diplomatic Service, for which he had originally been intended, pointing out that ‘his early familiarity with the French and German languages, his acquaintance with continental manners, and personal qualities, which my supposed partiality as a father forbids me to dwell upon, seemed to give him more than common aptitude for becoming a really valuable acquisition to one of our Continental Missions, and at this juncture more especially in Germany where he had, before his employment in the Council Office, opportunities of becoming personally ac-

quainted with several distinguished political characters and their opinions.'

Morier himself had begged his father when applying for an attachéship to ask for a distinct one, viz. one at Berlin.

'My reasons for this, and which I would have you state to My Lord, are that the fact of a University being there, enabling me to attend lectures on the Law of Nations, etc., added to my connections in the place, and my knowledge of German, would enable me in the course of a year or two to become a very useful public servant.'

His father's letter Morier himself carried to London, and nothing could have been kinder than Lord Aberdeen's answer; but not being Foreign Secretary he had scruples in interfering with the disposal of offices under the control of that department of the Government. The situation, moreover, was at that moment particularly delicate, owing to the fact of Lord John Russell, the then Foreign Secretary, having been a Prime Minister, and of Lord Aberdeen's being in consequence most particular in leaving the whole and entire administration of the Foreign Office in his hands, and of not interfering in any way whatever. Lord John was, however, almost immediately succeeded by Lord Clarendon, and Morier's name was placed on the list of candidates for an attachéship, with the hopes of getting an appointment should a vacancy occur.

'One difficulty in the way of my diplomatic prospects,' he wrote to his father at this period, 'is happily got over, that namely which might have arisen from my engagement with the *Morning Chronicle*.'

He had seen Cook, the editor, and had told him of his father's application to Lord Aberdeen. Cook at once said that he did not consider him bound by his engagement, and behaved indeed in a most friendly and liberal manner, promising to keep the offer open should his other aspirations not be fulfilled.

In the meantime there was nothing for him to do but to wait, an attitude irksome and galling in the extreme to a man of his energetic nature; and added thereto were the bad accounts he received from Wiesbaden of his



mother's health and the death of his old *nourrice*, whom he dearly loved. All this told upon his mercurial spirits, and he fell into a state of deep depression and despondency.

'I am most distressed at the news from home,' he writes to his father. '. . . You must all be in a weary, weary state. God knows I am. It's a hard world to live in, and I do from my heart envy you the sixty-nine years wiped off the score.'

Writing to his mother, 7th March 1853, he says of his nurse :—

'Poor dear old creature, most fondly I loved her, and most intimately is the memory of her intertwined with the first awakening within me of affection. It is a great blessing, however, to think that there is not one word or act of unkindness to reproach oneself with, and that her life was as happy a one as, with the capacities which God had given her, it could possibly have been. She loved much, and found an object to love, and was cherished in return. God bless her.'

Another thought which preyed on his mind, was that his friends, who had given themselves so much trouble on his behalf, might consider their efforts wasted, and he tells Palgrave that—

'It gives me very keen pleasure to think that you and Temple should be occupying yourselves about me and my plans, and that I have *some* friends in the world to whose mind I am present, when I am absent from their sight. I believe this friendship to be the one only plant to live on and flower in the harsh atmosphere of this working-day world, be damned to it. The world, I mean, not the plant. . . . I hope that the temporary derangement of my plans will not by Temple and Co. be accounted to me for vacillation. I know what a weak, red-haired, vacillating thing they all think me, but really in the present instance I have not been so. God knows it has been no wish of mine to cut the Australian plan, and that I only complied with the application to Lord Aberdeen in consequence of my mother's illness and my father's wishes.'

To bring this term of inactivity to an end, Morier started

on a tour through Germany, with the ulterior view of writing a series of letters on that country; at the same time, as an equivalent for the consideration with which the *Morning Chronicle* had treated him, undertaking, on the footing of a private and disinterested friend, a rather delicate mission on behalf of that paper. This was to find a successor for their Vienna correspondent, who had just been expelled from the country. In this he was entirely successful, and afterwards boasted of it as 'a diplomatic *chef d'œuvre*, but alas! there is no Blue Book into which it will ever find its way. Within a month of the *Morning Chronicle* calling Buol a liar and a blackguard, and their correspondent being obliged to leave ignominiously, I have established an uncommonly clever fellow, whom my 'cuteness succeeded in sifting out of this place, with privileges and facilities never before afforded by Government to any correspondent of a newspaper.'

Leaving England at Easter, he gives his plans to his mother.

'... I shall stay at Bonn a fortnight or so to see Roggenbach and Heinrich von Arnim,<sup>1</sup> then to Wiesbaden to you and to see Max Gagern,<sup>2</sup> then to Heidelberg for H. von Gagern and Meyer,<sup>3</sup> then to Berlin for Radowitz<sup>4</sup> and my Berlin acquaintance, then Saxe-Coburg, where I meet the Duke of Coburg and all the Court Party. I should take altogether about six weeks to collect material orally and from books, etc., and then come back *here*, where I shall take a room in the village and work out my letters with the help of Temple and the library here. The letters I propose to write are a résumé of Prussian policy since 1815. Such are in outline my plans.'

He was, however, disappointed in his hopes of finding Roggenbach at Bonn, but mentions meeting George Bunsen,

<sup>1</sup> Arnim, Heinrich von, b. 1798, d. 1861, German Liberal statesman and political economist.

<sup>2</sup> Gagern, Maximilian von, b. 1810, d. 1889, brother of Heinrich von Gagern, member of Frankfurt National Assembly, entered the Austrian service 1854.

<sup>3</sup> Meyer, Alexander, Liberal politician and journalist.

<sup>4</sup> Radowitz, Joseph Maria von, b. 1797, d. 1853, Prussian general and statesman, confidant and adviser of K. Fred. William IV.

'who gave me a very good dinner and called with me on the Princess of Wied,<sup>1</sup> who received me most kindly.'

His next letter, dated Vienna, 20th April 1853, is addressed to his father :—

' . . . I have as yet been nowhere except to the Legation, where I have been received with the greatest kindness and have already dined twice, the first time sitting next to Prince Leiningen, who spoke very pleasantly of you. Julian Fane is also here. . . . Lady William Russell is lodging in the same hotel with me, and is most civil and kind, having me to tea every night, when I meet the whole "Hiesige Gesellschaft" without having to go for it further than one pair of stairs and get back to my work by 9 p.m. Her son, Odo, knows more about Austria than any Englishman going.'

Replying to a letter of his mother's, in which she had alluded to the craze for table-turning, he says :—

'As regards the by-the-imposition-of-hands-to-dinner-tables-imparted-magnetic-rotary-motion, the mania here, I should have said, was at its height, if I did not know that a week ago I should have predicted the same thing, while it has been increasing every day since. From the moment I entered Prussia at the Belgian frontier to this very moment, within the walls of H.M. Legation at Vienna, have I heard no one other subject discussed. I have not yet seen the experiment tried, and am so sick of the whole thing that I hardly wish to. . . . Nothing can exceed the kindness of My Lord.<sup>2</sup> I dine at his table five days out of the seven, and have the entrée of his box at the Opera.'

Describing the appearance of the Magyar magnates at a State ceremony, he says :—

'They presented certainly the most splendid spectacle which can be yielded by man clothed. The peculiar characteristic which enables one thoroughly to admire the Hungarian dress without any feeling of compunction is the combination it affords of the utmost possible magnificence which gorgeous colour and the richest jewellery can produce,

<sup>1</sup> Sister of Prince Nicholas of Nassau

<sup>2</sup> Lord Westmorland

together with an essential and unmistakable manliness and knightliness. You see at a glance that it is the dress of a horseman, of men habitually in the saddle, hence it is not seen to advantage except on the mounted man—the tight leggings, the loose *attila* hanging from the left shoulder, leaving the sword arm free and ready for work,—these points come out only when man and beast are one. In most instances the *attila*, which is the loose jacket, which in a degenerate form you see in the Hussar uniform, is of velvet trimmed with fur, a magnificent chain of jewellery connecting the two.'

In a letter of this period he tells his mother he has just returned from Pesth, and 'Prince Esterhazy<sup>1</sup> (Paul as was when Ambassador in London, and before his father's death) sent me a very civil message to say that he desired better acquaintance with me as a son of my father, or rather of my mother (as it was *you* who had remained impressed on his memory, "that veery preetee ladee whom I remember at Paris") and the nephew of my uncles.' Esterhazy asked him to dinner, where he was introduced to Count Buol,<sup>2</sup> who said he was acquainted with you,' and the Duchesse de Sagan,<sup>3</sup> old Walmoden, Bourqueney,<sup>4</sup> and many others. ' . . . As far as externals go, a Hungarian dinner is distinguished from others by the presence of a Hussar, whose sword for the time being is changed into a carving knife, and who, despite the terrible national moustache, when looked at more closely, and when one has got more used to him, turns out to be very harmless and quite tame, bringing one dishes, and whatever you ask for, like any other serving man.'

He met Metternich at dinner soon afterwards, and thus describes him to Palgrave :—

'In the way of antiquities the most interesting specimen I have seen has been old Metternich, who received me

<sup>1</sup> Esterhazy, Prince Paul, b. 1786, d. 1866, Ambassador in London, 1814-1842; Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1848.

<sup>2</sup> Buol, Karl Friedrich Graf, b. 1797, d. 1865, Austrian Minister of State, 1852-1859.

<sup>3</sup> Sagan, Duchesse de, Dorothea Duchesse de Talleyrand Périgord.

<sup>4</sup> Bourqueney, French diplomatist and Minister at Vienna.

very civilly and hospitably, dining me once and receiving me often. He is certainly a wonderful old man, considering what a chronological curiosity he might be made into, and gives me an idea of the wreck of a great statesman. Every now and then he says things which, in their way, have a deal of wisdom about them, though rather out of date. . . . One fine bit of *à propos* irony, and characteristic of his pluck and *sang-froid*, I have on good authority, and is worth repeating. During the Revolution, when the mob, already hastily armed and after blood had been shed, came in countless masses yelling round the Chancery of State and crying for the dismissal, hanging, quartering, etc. of the hoary Minister, and executing what is called in this country a cat's music, a frightened Archduke turned to Metternich and asked in God's name what that fearful row was. The old fellow, with a grim and rather triumphant smile, observed, "Monseigneur, c'est ce que messieurs les Républicains appellent la voix de Dieu."

### *To the Same*

'They are a curious set of people, these rich burghers of Vienna; and it is a curious state of society which arbitrarily divides off a class like theirs, which, in point of wealth and education, stands higher certainly than any other in the Empire, from what chooses to call itself, *par excellence*, *Society*. For at Vienna Society is not an affair submitted to shifting rules, and coming under the sway of varying dynasties, each with its own set of whims and caprices as everywhere else, but a system subject to universal, immovable laws, and as easily changed as those of the sun and moon. It is just as necessary to have your passport, in order to be admitted to Court (this applies, of course, only to the Austrians), as it is to be admitted into the country at all; only, in the former case the passport is your genealogical tree and *malheur à vous* if the *soixante et onze quartiers* are in order, but *le reste de l'arbre perdu par l'injure du temps*, as in the case of Candide's father, which, as you remember, was also the cause of the former's incorrect entrance into the world. The to-the-Court-admitted *Hoffähige*, as they are called, form *the* Society, and round

them is drawn a Chinese wall of custom and prejudice, so that in the year 1853 are to be seen at Vienna the mediæval phenomena of two classes, an aristocratic class and a citizen class, co-existing side by side within the walls of the same city, utterly unknown to each other and with different manners, habits, and privileges,—the latter class including Rothschild and men of that stamp, many of them with fortunes amounting to a hundred thousand per annum, so you may suppose there is not much love lost between them. The most remarkable fact about the whole matter is that the whole of this should have been clean swept away for a couple of years, and as suddenly quickened back to life again. On my observing to Princess Metternich, who is by way of being a great stateswoman, how injudicious, to say the least of it, the raising of this wall of separation was, and the bitter feeling which I had observed amongst the excluded, of whose very existence she lived in total ignorance, when upon her own showing it was most necessary to rally round the Throne every conservative element that could be scraped together, her deeply philosophical answer was: “ Ah! Nos salons ne seraient pas assez grands pour admettre *la Finance*.” I have made a sort of vow not to write to Jowett or Temple till I could send them some batches of work as an earnest of my goodwill at least; but alas! the said batches are produced with much more difficulty than they are imagined, and so, in the case of Jowett, I have broken my vow and written, and shall probably do so in Temple’s case, though I still hope to send a few sheets by the same opportunity. But it is no joke, I can tell you, writing *sketchily* on the utterly complex phenomena which any modern State whatever presents; but when the State to be written about is in itself an aggregation of some twenty other States, each of which has just come through a little private revolution and war of its own, to say nothing of what they have gone through in the aggregate, the task is no easy one, I assure you. What I wish to do is to give, in a small octavo volume, a sketch of the political history of Austria from the time of the Congress (1815) up to 1848, which, though nothing is known of it in England, is rich in facts, and then through

the Revolution up to the *coup d'état* of August 1851, the rascaliest of all *coups d'état* that have been done since '48. Materials for what has been done since '48 are not wanting, but I should not have attempted, on account of the great scarcity of *published* material for the most interesting part of my opusculum, namely, the portion of it descriptive of the genesis of the Revolution, had I not become intimate with Andrian,<sup>1</sup> the well-known author of the well-known book, *Oestreich und dessen Zukunft*, who in '48 became the Archduke John's right-hand man, and was sent as Ambassador from the Frankfort Diet to England. He was one of the leading men in the movement for constitutional reform in the ten years preceding the Revolution, and possesses as such heaps of materials for the history of that time, much direct as well as verbal descriptions, which he has put at my service. God knows whether I shall succeed in what I am about, but *something* I am determined to bring forth in print before I return to England, or show my face to what I hardly dare to hope still continue my friends.'

Not only did he thoroughly enjoy his life in Vienna, but he made himself so popular at the Legation that both Lord and Lady Westmorland evinced a strong desire for him to be attached to the Mission. Of this he was quite aware, for he tells his father :—

' . . . *Entre nous*, and I don't want it to go further, Julian Fane and Lady Westmorland, who are predominant at the Legation here, are both very anxious to get me attached to this Mission ; but Lord Westmorland, it seems, is excessively difficult to move in the way of asking for appointments, and they want to wait a bit till Odo Russell leaves for a couple of months, probably in a fortnight, and another hand will be much wanted.'

And again on 2nd June :—

' . . . My Lord and my Lady here have been graciously pleased to express their appreciation of those many high

<sup>1</sup> Andrian Werburg, Victor Freiherr von, b. 1813, d. 1858, Austrian liberal statesman.

qualities both moral, intellectual, and physical, which seem to have been stamped upon me by Nature, with a view apparently to point me out as one of her own ready-made diplomats. The natural result of such appreciation with any one else would, I conceive, have been to have written to the great man who sits in Downing Street, and have bid him appoint me to the Mission, of which *they* (My Lord and My Lady, and the latter much more than the former) have the charge. However, it seems that My Lord has the greatest possible aversion to ever take any steps of this kind, but yet the desire to have me is very strong. . . . I have boldly avowed myself a radical, but also turned my fascinating side so as to titillate their desire to possess me, as I should very much indeed like to be appointed here, as there is a great field open for a diplomatist. . . . Julian Fane is the great engine who is anxious to have me here, and so undertook to work at My Lord, and to ask him to get me attached here. But I disclaimed anything of the sort, and only asked him to ask *this* of his Governor, viz., that when Odo Russell, the only man at the Mission here who really knows German, or is worth a damn, leaves on absence, which he is going to do soon, My Lord would employ me as Private Secretary, and if, after a month or so, I succeeded in realising the golden dreams respecting my diplomatic abilities, in which all who know me indulge, then that he should report me as such to the Foreign Office, and that you should apply, backed up with this good character, for my definite appointment. However, Julian Fane chose to have his own way, and urged My Lord to get me appointed here. The result of which was that My Lord sent for me, and told me how great pleasure it would give him to have me appointed here, and begged me to write to you, authorising you to tell Lord Clarendon so, to say that he knew me well, liked me well, and that it would be a great satisfaction to him to have me as his Attaché.'

In August he was informed by his father that his diplomatic appointment was assured, and he expresses his great satisfaction to his mother: 'At last my fate in life



for better for worse is settled, and the swaying to and fro, to which it has for so many years been exposed, is put an end to.'

On 6th September Lord Clarendon wrote to his father to tell him that he had meant to appoint his son unpaid Attaché at Stuttgart, but that by the resignation of Lord Boyle, a place of unpaid Attaché being vacant at Vienna, he would appoint him there.

*Morier to his Mother*

'September 11th, 1853

'I have just received my appointment from Lord Clarendon as Attaché here. The news, I most sincerely hope, must have caused you satisfaction and taken off your dear blessed heart a load of anxiety about my future prospects. . . . to *Lady Westmorland* altogether this appointment is due. She wrote twice most strongly to Lord Clarendon about me, and his letter announcing my appointment was addressed to *her*, and began, "Dear Lady Westmorland, I have done your *bidding*, and appointed Mr. Morier." To *her*, therefore, I wish you would write. . . .'

*Lord Westmorland to David Morier*

'September 15th, 1853

' . . . I am sure he (Burnet Morier) will do himself great credit. He is very clever, well informed, and, *ce qui est tout dire*, a perfect gentleman. I was very much obliged to Lord Clarendon for paying such immediate attention to Lady Westmorland's recommendation, as well as mine, and she will answer him this very day to express those feelings.'

*Lady Westmorland to Mrs. Morier*

'VIENNA, September 20th, 1853

' . . . We are all delighted to have him established here, and he is himself so happy that it really does one good to see the change in his spirits since his appointment. He is very useful to Lord Westmorland from his knowledge of German and his assiduity, and most agreeable to us all. His first thought on learning from me that he was appointed in Lord Boyle's place was the pleasure it would give his mother.'

## CHAPTER VIII

## VIENNA

MORIER was appointed unpaid Attaché at Vienna on 5th September 1853, thus entering diplomacy at the age of twenty-seven,—that is six years later than the usual age,—and with a considerable experience of life and the world behind him. He joined his chief, Lord Westmorland, at Olmütz, where a meeting was taking place between the Emperors of Austria and Russia.

*To his Father*

‘OLMÜTZ, September 26th, 1853

‘This nomad sort of diplomatising puts me marvellously in mind of the tales you used to regale my childhood with of your trans-European peregrinations with Lord Aberdeen. In fact, I am not sure whether this is not one of the very spots where you were for some time, and something or other happened.’

*To his Mother*

‘VIENNA, October 12th, 1853

‘At Olmütz I did little else but perpetually write dispatches, and drink bottles of champagne in the interval, H.M. paying my expenses. Twice only I was able to get to the camp.’ Amongst others he met there were Nesselrode,<sup>1</sup> James Rothschild, and the Ban of Croatia,<sup>2</sup> . . . ‘of the externals of Olmütz there was little to relate. It is, as you know, the small capital of a small country, and boasts upon ordinary occasions of little besides an Archbishop and a garrison; on the present occasion, however, it literally crawled alive with Emperors, Archdukes, Royal

<sup>1</sup> Nesselrode, Charles Robert Count, Russian Chancellor.

<sup>2</sup> Jellačić.

Princes, Imperial Chancellors and Ambassadors, Marshals, Jews, etc., etc. That great anakim, the Emperor of Russia, arrived the same day I did, and all the while he was there the whole town was illuminated in his honour. . . .

' *P.S.*—We are literally at work day and night, and all to no purpose, as hostilities<sup>1</sup> have begun in good earnest.'

The season in Vienna this winter was particularly brilliant, in spite of the apprehension caused by the impending Crimean War. Balls, dinners, and concerts followed one another in rapid succession, all of which amusements Morier entered into with vigour, passionately fond as he was of dancing and society. The only drawback from which he suffered was his health, for he had already begun to be subject to those fits of rheumatic gout to which he was all his life a victim.

His acquaintance was large and varied, and he had many friends everywhere, amongst others Baron Ward,<sup>2</sup> who, beginning life as a groom in Prince Lichtenstein's stable, became the famous minister of the Duke of Parma. The acquaintance commenced by their sitting next to each other at dinner one night, when Morier was surprised by his neighbour, covered with decorations and quite unknown to him, exclaiming "It's very 'ot!" From his frequent visits to his many friends in the various parts of the Austrian Empire he gained an insight into and a knowledge of national life rarely acquired by a foreigner.

On 26th March 1854 he writes to his mother from Vienna:—

' Here we have had the loss of poor Princess Metternich<sup>3</sup> to lament. I deeply regret her, not only on the old Prince's account, but also on my own; for though she certainly did not possess a reputation for general popularity, and her manners were none of the most conciliatory, she and I from the beginning were great friends, and though we

<sup>1</sup> Crimean War.

<sup>2</sup> Ward, Baron, b. 1809, d. 1858, groom, court favourite, and eventually Prime Minister of Parma.

<sup>3</sup> Metternich, Princess Mélanie, née Comtesse Zichy Ferraris, 3rd wife of Prince Metternich

constantly had great battles, in which no quarter was given on either side, yet we continued to the last time I saw her, some three weeks before her death, to be on the best possible terms. At the bottom she was a thoroughly good-hearted woman, with much strength of character, all the good side of which came out during the trials she underwent in '48 and since. At an earlier period of her career, her head had been turned by the extraordinary position which, as the beautiful wife of Metternich at the culminating point of the latter's power and influence, she continued for so long to maintain when she might well be said to have had kings of every kind, except the Anglo-Saxon, at her feet. This, however, had had its corrective in the events above referred to, and certainly nothing of it was perceivable since I was acquainted with her. She had a wonderful way of saying what came up first, especially if she was riled, an occupation which I used to find great pleasure in, from the tremendous "rises" to which it gave rise. On such occasions no expressions were too strong for her, as she would be ready, according to her own testimony, to *pendre*, *éventrer*, *égorger* anybody who, in however slight a degree, might have fallen under her displeasure, though no one who knew her ever gave her credit for the heart to hurt a fly that might have annoyed her. Her attention and devotion to her old husband to the last moment was touching in the extreme. The commonest details of his wardrobe, despite the dreadful state of her health, she would allow, to the last, none but herself to attend to. Her sufferings were frightful. It was computed that the excrescence of which she died (it was that, I believe, and not an abscess as at first supposed) towards the end of her life weighed 180 lb.'

On 7th April to Palgrave :—

' Could a used-up, marrowless, blasé old neo-philosopher like yourself feel with any portion of its body or soul one-hundredth or even one-thousandth part of the pleasure which receiving from it a letter, scrawl, or even a note, afforded to an unspoiled "Natur Kind" like myself, it

would not go six months without writing, and when it did write, it would not begin with the unsavoury description of the bore it was to engage upon such an undertaking. . . . The only privilege I have, as unpaid attaché to Her Majesty's Mission, is that the Queen (or rather more properly speaking you and your co-taxees) pays for my letters. The only way, therefore, in which my salary can be raised is for my friends to write to me often and to send letters as heavy as possible. . . . I am very little good, being laid up with rheumatic gout, as I told Temple in a letter written two days since, but on the whole somewhat better. I don't at all dislike my work (*mirabile dictu*), as you seem to insinuate must be the case, but am at times grievously tormented with an unclean spirit of "Heimweh." This is my one great cause of complaint. You little know what a pull you have over the rest of the world, you "cads of England that live at home at ease." "

Speaking of Vienna and its society he says :—

' Their palaces, and the fêtes given in them, exhibit the utmost possible *luxu* and display, but are singularly deficient in the nobler manifestations of wealth in the shape of works of art. Everywhere the presiding genius is the upholsterer and the cabinetmaker, nowhere the painter or the sculptor; even such as have fine collections of paintings, like Esterhazy and Liechtenstein, have banished them to some uninhabited and seldom-visited palace in the faubourgs. One State ball I attended, at which I was presented to the Emperor. His manner is immensely in his favour, combining with dignity and imperialness a certain boyish frankness and apparent high spirits. He chatted for five minutes just as any other young man of twenty-two might. *Du reste*, I am only talking of the manner and of the impressions left upon me. The ball was certainly a magnificent sight, the rooms splendid, the display of beauty great, and of precious stones, both on men and women (for the half-eastern costumes of Hungarians, Croats, etc., admit of more jewellery than even female apparel does), something quite dazzling. One curiosity worth noticing, though hardly tasting, was the

historical soup, for as nothing ever changes in Austria, the receipts of other days come down to the present. And so, as a certain soup was in the reign of Charles v. appointed to be drunk at balls, it is continued to be so till now, faithfully made after a receipt of that date. This is *bona fide* and no joke. I was made aware of this too late, but the way I came to inquire into the matter was by being nearly knocked over by a whiff sent forth by the decoction aforesaid, which I saw being handed about and dutifully partaken of by the great officers of State.'

On the 17th April of this year was celebrated with great pomp and magnificence the marriage of the young Emperor, but Morier's enjoyment of the attendant festivities was somewhat marred by a recent attack of rheumatic gout he was only just recovering from.

'The only one of the sights I should much have cared to see from its essentially Viennese character was the "Volks-fest" in the Prater, but as it was a matter of walking I could not of course be present at it. That splendid avenue, of which you have doubtless got a lively recollection, was magnificently illuminated, garlands of painted lamps twining themselves round the branches of every tree, and triumphal arches of fire spanning the road at short intervals the whole way down to the "Rondo." On either side brilliantly-lighted booths of every description yielded to the jolly citizen of this paternally-governed city every enjoyment which his soul lusteth after, such as dancing, little cakes, and beer. Something like two-thirds of the whole population were assembled together, and the only carriage allowed was that of the political parents of this large family, respectively aged twenty-two and sixteen, who drove unattended, except by an equerry, in an open barouche amid the deafening acclamation of their "lieber Wiener."'

In June he went to the baths of Baden, near Vienna, in hopes of curing his gout, and from there writes to his father:—

'... I am at work on the history of the sixteenth century, and interested in Robertson's *History of Charles v.*,

which, though written in vile English, somehow pleasantly enough runs on. I am likewise much engrossed in Guizot's *Histoire de la Civilisation de l'Europe*, which seems to me a masterpiece of historical writing. . . . I am glad that you have had the opportunity of seeing Stockmar,<sup>1</sup> who is no ordinary man, as well as the Princess of Prussia,<sup>2</sup> who is likewise a remarkable woman.'

To his mother from the same place—2nd July 1854—

'with deep lamentation on my gradually decaying intellect . . . I think I can partly account for my present state by the doctrine of infection. Could you see the heads with which I bathe in the morning you would tremble for your son. I say heads, because as yet I have no evidence that any bodies belong to them. We sit all of us in a public bath, immersed up to the ears (and such ears), the body is not seen, sometimes under very favourable combinations of light and refraction legs are perceivable that seem as if growing immediately out of the tracheæ. This abstraction of a museum of idiotic heads from all which we have from childhood been accustomed to associate with them, and the floating isolation of the same in infinite space has something, I assure you, awful about it. . . .'

Writing for his mother's birthday, on 4th December 1854, he tells her he has been 'employed in a real bit of business connected with those glorious fellows who are fighting out the fate of the world in very much worn-out coats and threadless stockings. We received Wednesday week a telegraph ordering us to buy 20,000 sheepskin coats for their bare backs.'

The history of the commission was as follows :—

'The telegraph arrived at 2 a.m., just as we were finishing the courier. All it said was, "Employ agents to buy 20,000 sheepskin coats." I take it up to My Lord, who is half asleep, and whom it dreadfully bothers. I say I shall be up the first thing in the morning to make inquiries.

<sup>1</sup> Stockmar, Christian Friedrich Baron, b. 1787, d. 1863, friend and adviser of K. Leopold of Belgium and the Prince Consort.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Empress Augusta.



*Anna, wife of David Richard Mosier.*

EDITH D. STODOLSKY, ARTIST.





Colleagues, also half asleep, don't think much about the matter. I, up at 6 a.m. in the morning, make inquiries, and get the result which I want to get, viz. that there is nothing to be done at Vienna itself. I report accordingly that the only way to make *effectual* inquiries is to go to Pesth and Brünn. I accordingly get leave to go down immediately *to make inquiries*. These were all my instructions. Once in the railway, however, I feel that I am my own master. I have the telegraph in my pocket, and look upon it as my instructions. Before the next evening I had made contracts at Brünn for 5000 and at Pesth for 10,000 to 12,000. I had distributed about 50 agents, like peas out of a shovel, into every corner of Moravia, Bohemia, Hungary, and Galicia, drawn for £2000, or rather 20,000 florins, in my own name and on my own bankers, which I knew they would not have the pluck to refuse, though it astonished them a bit. I was entirely successful, and have got an official Despatch of approval from the F.O. ! In all, I have bought 25,000 coats, beautifullest coats, to the tune of £50,000, which is cheap.'

Notwithstanding all the interests, occupations, and amusements into which he had thrown himself with his whole heart, Morier of late had been haunted by a great dread. His mother's health, failing for a long time, had grown steadily worse. Already on 13th July 1853 he had written to Palgrave :—

' . . . My mother, I grieve deeply to say, is in no way better, as we all hoped she would be when the summer returned. I more than fear that for the rest of her life she is doomed to become yearly a more hopeless cripple. With great difficulties she has been moved to Baden-Baden to try what its waters may do. It is a most painful state to contemplate, especially when you know that death lurks in the more aggravated forms of the disease.'

Protracted cures at various German baths not having produced any beneficial results, she and his father had returned to Bath, and her condition was now giving rise to considerable anxiety.

On 3rd February 1855, Morier writes from Vienna to her:—

‘DEAREST MOTHER,—God be praised for your recovery from that state of intense prostration to which you had been reduced, and the account of which in my dear father’s various letters filled me with an agony I cannot describe to you. I fear, however, that you are still in a lamentable state of weakness, and I cannot tell you how I yearn again to see you. . . . I hope to be starting in a fortnight.’

His departure, however, was delayed, and he was fated not to see his mother again. On 12th March 1855, David Morier wrote from Bath:—

‘MY DEAREST SISTERS,—You will at once perceive that the hopes held out yesterday were illusory, and that I am now bereaved of my dearest Annie, the faithful friend and counsellor, the affectionate wife that ever man was blessed with. You too lose in her a most tender, loving sister, for every one that belonged to me she loved as her own kindred. It is for my dearest Burnet that my heart grieves beyond expression. He will be just twenty-four hours too late. I have telegraphed for dear Bill<sup>1</sup> to break the sad news to my poor boy at his landing at Dover. Burnet may possibly call in Osnaburgh Street on his way through London to come here. Tell him that the peaceful passage of his darling mother *into life* was so like the quiet sleep of an infant that it would be difficult to fix the precise moment, but it was between half-past one and three-quarters this afternoon, hardly more than two hours ago. All traces of former suffering have passed away from that dear face, and it is with difficulty I can persuade myself that what I see is no more than the empty shrine which contained the pure, righteous redeemed soul of her who was the joy of my heart, the light of my eyes, and the example of all that was excellent to our dear children from the moment they could appreciate, for more than forty years.’

The shock of his mother’s death completely overwhelmed Morier, for not only had the ties of affection which united mother and son been exceptionally close, but in her he

<sup>1</sup> A. d. m. i. Morier.

lost one whose sympathy in all his interests, grave and gay, moral and intellectual, had been unfailing.

On the eve of his mother's birthday, 4th December 1855, he wrote :—

' DEAREST FATHER,—I cannot let this anniversary pass by without, in thought at least, and faintly on paper, communing with you in the remembrance of that blessed creature whose birthday this was. For many years I believe I can say that this was the only anniversary that I never forgot or omitted to hallow, and it was at this very desk, and by this very light, and in this same room that I remember last year writing to her my last lines of congratulation. I feel sure that this day your thoughts, when they at times fly back earthward from the object to which they are doubtless, if possible, clinging, return towards me, and in the sure belief that *hers* will do so too, I can hardly feel as if the distance that parted us were increased, almost perhaps less, than this time twelvemonth.'

A few months later, writing for the anniversary of his parents' wedding-day, he says :—

' DEAREST FATHER,—This letter should reach you upon an anniversary which must necessarily recall to your mind, more keenly perhaps than ever before, the greatness of the loss with which it has pleased God to afflict us. It is not in my power, by any words of mine, to mitigate the sense of that loss, but I would fain have you feel how deeply I feel for you and share your grief on this day. I would have you think of me as close at hand to minister to your grief. I would have you lean on me and communicate to me your sorrow and also your *hopes*. I would wish you to realise how intensely I wish that I could, in how infinitesimally small a degree whatever, by my sympathy and love, supply that communion and interchange of love which is taken from you but for a season.'

After a long stay in England Morier returned to his duties at Vienna, where, in December 1855, Lord Westmorland was succeeded by Sir Hamilton Seymour.

'Nothing can exceed the pleasantness of my relation with our new Chief,' he writes. ' . . . He is good-nature personified, and, what is more to the purpose, is good sense personified, that is as regards the work of his Chancery, not plaguing one about details, but leaving the work to be done by the workmen, the greatest of all blessings in a large machine like this. . . . *She* has already won golden opinions here, and the whole family are essentially to the backbone British, so that of an evening one almost fancies oneself back in that dear, blessed, foolish, ignorant, hot-headed, led-by-the-nose, bawling, brawling, but good-at-the-bottom old England.'

The Crimean War then raging was the cause of all the Chancelleries of Europe being worked at high pressure, none more so than the English Embassy at Vienna.

'I am quite well,' he writes to his father, on 17th January 1856, 'though overworked to a degree that even the annals of the Vienna Chancery would find difficult to equal. We are only three to do the work of at least six, and the *galimatias*, such as we have been up to our necks in for the last three weeks, might astonish the oldest diplomatist.' Speaking of the ignorant public at home—'If they go on with their stupid brawling, we may have a fair chance of finding ourselves single-handed at war against Europe and America.' And three weeks later—'Thank God, Buol leaves to-morrow. Bourqueney left two days since, and so the stream of protocols, *notes verbales*, and treaties will set for the first time away from this capital.'

*To the Same*

'July 5th, 1856.

' . . . I have had a visit from my brother cosmopolitan Layard just fresh from that pepper plantation, H.M. Embassy at Constantinople. The account he gives of the state of things there is dreadful, Lord Stratford having bellowed himself out—no one caring any more for his bark, which they have found out is far worse than his bite—and our whole influence lying prostrate under that of our blessed French Allies. All this, however,

*sub sigillo diplomatico*. A most interesting acquaintance has been here for the last three days, and dines with me to-night, Sir Hugh Rose.<sup>1</sup> His accounts are interesting in a degree far surpassing all other Crimeans I have seen from his having had the luck, as commissary to the French camp, of always being equally *au fait* of all that happened in one camp as well as in the other.'

In October 1856 he started on a journey to Agram, the origin of which he tells his father in a letter of 2nd October. 'Our Government want information with regard to the Austrian military frontier, in order to obtain hints for the proposed military colonies in the Cape. I have proposed to Sir Hamilton Seymour to let me make a tour down and up through the frontier and draw up a report thereon. He has good-naturedly agreed, and now I only await the facilities required from the K.K. Government.'

On the 5th he left Vienna by rail for Szegedin, and from thence travelled over Temesvar, Orsova, Semlin, up the Saave to Agram, where he arrived on 4th November, a journey from Transylvania to the Adriatic which had never before been made by any British official. At the end of November he was back in Vienna, safe but not sound, having been detained by a terribly blistered foot in a wild part of Hungary. The material collected during those three weeks was immense, and he worked hard during the whole winter at his report, which, when it appeared, attracted considerable attention, giving as it did with admirable lucidity a complete description, social, political, and military of the Organisation of the Military Frontier of Austria-Hungary, which, till then, had never been specially described, even in Austria. The King of Sweden, who at that time was contemplating the formation of military colonies, applied for a copy, sent him a warm acknowledgment, and, as he knew he could not offer him a decoration, requested his acceptance of a gold medal, which Morier, as he himself wrote later in life, 'foolishly declined.'

This tour all through the Banat and South-east Hungary, a country forming a perfect mosaic of Slav, Magyar,

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards created Baron Strathnairn.

Roumanian, and German villages, settled there not a hundred years ago to repopulate the country wasted by the Turks, awakened his interest in the highest degree, for it was there that the great jousting matches of nationalities, of which the Austrian Empire had been the theatre in the years '48 and '49, had commenced. Suddenly, and apparently at a word of command in 1848, nationality had risen against nationality, and the war had continued for weeks and weeks without anyone having been able to attend to it, as Vienna and every other capital of the Empire had been in a state of revolution at the same time. As he passed through village after village eight years after these events, the houses still in ruins,—most of them were blackened walls,—Morier heard everywhere the same story: how Slavs had risen in the night against Magyar or German, or Magyar against Slav or German, and that without rhyme or reason the work of butchery and massacre had begun. The war between Hungary and Croatia had been going on at the same time as these massacres, which were merely a byplay, and a colonel of Hussars whom Morier met told him 'that, being on picket duty a mile away from one of these villages at this time, he had heard sharp musketry fire in the middle of the night in the direction of the village, and going up to reconnoitre had found that the Servian half of the villagers had risen up by stealth in the night and seized the Roumanian half, and been employed in shooting down all the able-bodied men, whom they had fastened in batches to the lime trees under which we were standing when he told me the story. Count Nugent, a son of the Field-Marshal, who was an A. de C. on the staff of Jellačić (the Ban of Croatia), told me that the first thing he saw on crossing the Croatian frontier, in the celebrated march on Vienna in 1848, was the body of a child about eight years old, hung on the arm of a large chandelier in a church, the other arm having a dead dog hanging from it as a pendant.'

Numberless anecdotes of this description, recounted to Morier by eye-witnesses, impressed him with a profound conviction that a general Slav rising would be a matter of life and death to the Austrian Empire.

But he was equally impressed with the extreme ingratitude with which the Croats and South Slavonians had been treated after the part they had taken in the events of 1848, when under Ban Jellačić they had marched against the Hungarians and greatly contributed by their timely action to the maintenance of the Hapsburg dynasty.

Jellačić was in many respects a most remarkable man. Son of a former Ban, who had taken a great part in the Napoleonic Wars, he had fought in his youth with much success against the Bosnians, and had gained such influence and popularity among his countrymen that at the beginning of the stormy times of '48 he had, at the general request of the Croats, been named Ban by the Emperor, and at the same time appointed Commander-in-Chief of the military frontier. He then developed great political activity, and by his personal influence succeeded in opposing the Slav to the Magyar element to such an extent that the Hungarians did all in their power to get rid of this recalcitrant governor, and with some apparent success, for in June '48 he was, by an imperial proclamation, superseded in his high office. Not for long, however, for very shortly afterwards he was received with much distinction at the Imperial Court, and reappointed. In the open breach which occurred between Hungary and the remainder of the Empire he took a most active part in rousing the Croats against the Magyars, and in September crossed into Hungary with 40,000 of his frontier troops, marched to the relief of Vienna (then held by the rebel citizens), and, joining the imperial forces, materially assisted in the reduction of that city. He took part in the ensuing Hungarian campaign with varying success, and at the end of the war returned to Agram, where he resumed his functions of Ban and Military Governor.

It was here that Morier, who had first met him at Olmütz in 1853, found him smarting under the feelings of mortification engendered by the non-recognition of his many services to the imperial cause, and wrought into a state of susceptibility and misanthropy by the destruction of all his hopes.

The acquaintance ripened into friendship during the



somewhat prolonged stay which Morier made at Agram in the summer of 1857, with a view of learning the language previous to undertaking a journey into the Turkish provinces south of the Saave and Danube.

Writing to his father from Agram, on 15th July '57, he says :—

' . . . It is no joke learning a new language in three weeks, and so I set to with clenched teeth and shut myself up with old Babukié, the father of Illyrian-Servo-Croatian, or by whatever name the South Slavic languages will in future be called, and went at it with a will. I have already got far enough to be able to translate tolerably correctly with the assistance of grammar and dictionary. Another ten days will give me far greater facilities, and for the talking part of the matter I must learn that on the road. Old Babukié is a sort of Slavonic Samuel Johnson, broad shouldered, massive, adoring the language, and now in the thirtieth year of parturition of a dictionary which may some day see the light. *Du reste*, there is no vice in him, and a child may ride him with a worsted bridle. He is proud of my progress, and of the fact that the mad Englishman should come all the way from England to learn Illyrian. I work ten or twelve hours a day.'

Not only did he acquire the language, but he also obtained such an insight into the political and social condition of the country that he was enabled to write a series of admirable letters to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the subject, of which the following gives a clear view of the situation of Croatia and the Ban at the time :—

' I cannot but entertain the conviction that the future historian, in testing the various causes which rendered it possible for the House of Hapsburg once more to find an anchoring ground for itself amidst the breakers, which at that time seemed to threaten it with inevitable destruction, will come to the conclusion that the main cause, more efficient a great deal than the ascendancy of the German element, more so even than the Russian intervention, was the attitude assumed at the commencement

of the struggle by the South Slavic element, and that he will further have to *constater* that this attitude was in a very great measure impressed upon it by the Ban Jellačić. Not that any *positive* results of extraordinary value were obtained by the Croatian arms against those of the Hungarians; indeed, they were as against the latter rarely in the ascendant, but that the service *negatively* rendered by paralysing at the outset that unity of action amidst the component parts of the Hungarian monarchy, which would otherwise have carried everything before it, was beyond all calculation important. Thus much for the services rendered *intra muros*. To these must be added those rendered *extra muros* by the keeping true to their allegiance the army of Italy, a point gained solely by the personal influence of the Ban. By the side of these great results the suppression of the revolution at Prague by Prince Windischgrätz falls far back into the shade. That the crew so saved well know *who* saved them I entertain no manner of doubt, and that it is this knowledge which has in a great measure coloured the policy observed personally towards the Ban, and that observed generally towards the nation, I feel likewise convinced of. It brings out in no very favourable light either the character of the chivalrous monarch who at present wears the Crown of Hapsburg, or that of the Ministers and the public opinion which from the "bureaus" of centralised Austria rule the fate of the various nations committed to their charge.

'To a certain class of organisations there are few things more thoroughly distasteful than the receiving a benefit at the hands of those they consider their inferiors. To such, a benefit thus received is almost synonymous with an insult. Now, in the large but anything rather than "happy" family of which the Austrian Empire is composed, Croatia has from time immemorial been the sort of "Cinderella." The haughty Magyar looked upon all nationalities not Magyar settled on Hungarian soil or on that of the various countries appendant to the Hungarian Crown as vassals, not to say "Rayahs." The German element in Austria, by a strange incongruity, after carefully barricading itself against all access of that intellectual

cultivation and free development of thought by which, spite its political fiascos, Protestant Germany has vindicated its high position in Europe, is perpetually, as against all other races its brother citizens in Austria, riding the high horse of intellectual superiority. It has been more particularly as against the Slav element that this "odious" comparison has been most frequently made, and the literary efforts of the Illyrian party at Agram had, as representing the main factor in the Slav movement previous to 1848, been a special object of ridicule to the narrow and self-sufficient pedantry of the German bureaucracy. Add to this that the contempt which the Austrian German affects for the Austrian Slav is combined with the very real fear with which the numerical superiority of the latter inspires him (the proportion is as 2 to 1—there being in rough numbers about sixteen millions of Slavs in Austria, and eight millions of Germans); and lastly, take into consideration the democratic character which is inherent in Slav institutions, and which even with *their* obtuseness the higher aristocracy in Austria cannot but be uneasily conscious of, and then some sort of appreciation can be arrived at of the kind of feeling with which the great services rendered by the geographical *remplacants* of the old Pannonians were acknowledged amongst the ruling classes at Vienna.

'To give a history of the various slights put personally on the Ban would be foreign to my purpose. I shall therefore advert only to one or two circumstances.

'If ever, since the foundation of the Order of Maria Theresa, an Austrian subject deserved the Grand Cross of the Order by the fulfilment on the largest scale of the conditions originally stipulated by the rules of the Order, it was the Ban. Those rules, as is well known, recognise by preference the claims of those who have *successfully* achieved some great exploit either *without* or in *contradiction to* orders received from their superiors. Now, this latter was achieved by the Ban upon a scale rarely seen in history. As an outlaw he places himself at the head of an entire nation, declares war on his own responsibility, marches successfully into the very heart of the enemy's country, and

then by a brilliant manœuvre, after a doubtful battle, comes to the rescue of the capital of the Empire. Nevertheless, the Chapter of the Order (on the very same day, if I am not mistaken) awarded to Prince Windischgrätz, for his successful putting down of the émeute at Prague, the Grand Cross of the Order; and to the Ban, for the services by him rendered, the Commander's Cross only. Again, Prince Windischgrätz was named Field-Marshal, the Ban General; but two years later it was retrospectively stipulated that he should not advance towards the grade of Field-Marshal, otherwise than if he had become General by seniority.

'Many more instances might be adduced of this endeavour to give the prominent place to the Generals actuated only by military and absolutist sentiments, at the cheap cost of snubbing and putting into the background those whose undoubted loyalty was yet tainted by popular and constitutional principles. True it is, that at the moment of the crisis the latter were those who could render the most effectual assistance, for they alone were enabled to oppose a living principle in the first moment of its exuberant life by one of equal vitality. The assistance was accepted,—it could indeed not well be refused,—but it was accepted *à contre cœur*.

'We now proceed to the far more important consideration of the treatment with which the nation met at the hands of the family to the rescue of whose throne, at an immense cost of life and treasure, it rushed when all else fled from the apparent wreck. And here I must confess that, with every wish to make allowance for the difficulties of the situation, it yet seems to me that a more wholesale act of injustice, ingratitude, and bad faith, a display on a larger scale of a mean and paltry spirit, grosser fraud, more clumsily veiled, it would be difficult to meet with in all the pages of history.

'For years previous to '48 the Imperial Government had fostered the growing national spirit amongst the Southern Slavs to oppose it to the Hungarian nationality. The object of the party so fostered was in the main a conservative one: it was the vindication of the right to

self-government, and to national development within the framework of the united Hungarian kingdom, in accordance with the principles embodied in the compact solemnly entered into by Koloman on behalf of himself and his successors. In '48 the "Petition of Rights" granted to Croatia by the Emperor Ferdinand did little more than give additional sanction to these principles, and fence them round with additional guarantees. In return for the guarantees thus given, the people of Croatia, both civil and military, rallied round the imperial throne, and poured forth their blood like water on behalf of the imperial cause. Of military Croatia alone, with a population little above half a million, official returns show that 11,000 corpses fatten the Italian and Hungarian plains.

'What was their reward? and how was the engagement kept on the other side?

'Not only has there been taken from them those additional guarantees of their old liberties granted in '48, the field works as it were hastily thrown up in a moment of danger to cover the approaches of the citadel, but the ancient liberties themselves have been cut down root and branch, the proud old citadel itself which the Magyars, in the wildest moments of their national fever, would never have laid hands on, was razed to the ground after having been treacherously entered into by the supposed allies, themselves saved from utter ruin by the desperate sortie of the garrisons. The independent Diet, the municipal rights, the self-administration of the counties have been one and all ruthlessly swept away, and in their stead has been introduced the centralised organisation of the Vienna bureaux,—if, indeed, something so chaotic as the confused attempt to rule a people accustomed to the forms of self-government by the wholly undrilled army of officials let loose upon Croatia can be allowed the dignified appellation of organisation.

'The manner in which the change was brought about was not wanting in a certain machiavellian craftiness deserving of eulogium. A form of constitutional government, with very extensive popular liberties, was, as is

well known, *octroyéd* in March 1849, for the whole Empire, and, of course, duly sworn to by His Imperial Majesty. The very real advantages secured by this constitution, and the two leading ideas supposed to lie at the bottom of it, viz. as regards the administration, the autonomy of the commune, and as regards the national question, the free development of the nationality on the basis of popular representation in an Imperial Diet, satisfied all the more enlightened amongst the Slav patriots, and made them willingly forego the more extended concessions, necessarily of a separatist tendency, which had been granted in '48. The continuance of the provisional dictatorship of the Ban prevented the masses, the pith and marrow of whom it must be remembered were with arms in their hands defending the Imperial cause in Hungary and Italy, from too closely scrutinising the thimble-rigging practised upon them. Into the merits or demerits of the general constitution, granted to the Empire in '49, it is not my purpose now to enter. That it was intended to be seriously tested by those who put it forward, I fancy no one would now venture to assert. The function it had to fulfil was that of a decoy to lure back to the Imperial standard all the sober-minded of the liberal party, far the largest portion of the population of the Empire, at a moment when the fortune of the Imperial arms both in the east and south was far from assured. The success of the Austrian Army in Italy and of the Russo-Austrian arms in Hungary, was the signal for throwing off the mask, and by the Imperial rescript of December 1851 were abolished at one sweep every vestige of modern constitutionalism as embodied in the constitution of '49, the shadows of medieval constitutions which under the form of Provisional States had continued to exist up to '48 in the Hereditary Provinces of Austria, and the *bona fide* historical constitutions which up to the same period Hungary and its appendent Croato-Slavonian Kingdom had for eight centuries enjoyed. Amidst the ruins there rose up, in all the meagreness of its modern outlines, the huge fabric of absolutism supported on bayonets and administered by bureaux, which now for the first time

established its intricate uniformity over every portion of the Austrian Empire alike.

'One of the most ingenious features in this double operation was the avoidance of the individual homicides which would otherwise have had to be perpetrated upon the various corporate bodies whose liberties it was intended to destroy, and which, especially in the case of the Southern Slavs, could not, even at that time of universal reaction, but have called forth one general cry of indignation throughout Europe. By collecting, however, the hundred heads of the constitutional hydra into one in '49, there was but one neck to submit to the headsman's axe in '51. It is extraordinary with what complete success people were imposed upon by this manœuvre. Nobody out of Austria and very few people in Austria have, as yet, fully understood the *portée* of the *coup d'état* of '51. Both in the country and out of it, it has been considered simply as the annulling of the constitution of '49, and inasmuch as every offspring of the revolutionary years was, not without some fairness, looked upon with a very considerable degree of mistrust, and with more or less of the feeling of loathing with which political as well as other revellers regard on the morrow the scene of their previous night's debauch, very little regret was in general felt at the act of cancelment. It was assumed by Europe that the *status quo ante* had been returned to. Had not Austria all along been an absolute monarchy? What else was it now? Hungary, it is true, formed an exception, but then it had rebelled, and Austria had obtained over it the rights of a conqueror, and so the act of '51 passed off in almost perfect silence. Those few, however, who with calm eyes had watched the stream of Austrian history from its fountain-head, and the parallel courses followed by the histories of the other States of Europe, regarded it with very different feelings. To them it was in its very essence the most revolutionary phenomenon that had glared out upon Europe since '89, it was the installation *en permanence* of the revolution invested with the dangerous respectability of the imperial ermine. These men perceived with the unerring instinct of kingcraft that the right

moment had been seized for occupying by a single movement the entire ground which inch by inch had been sought to be acquired by Ferdinand II. at the battle of the "Weisser Berg," by Maria Theresia, by Joseph II., by Francis—that at one stroke had been attained that universal *levelling* of all inequalities beneath the canopy of the throne, which according to continental precedent is the first *sine qua non* step in the inauguration of the principles commonly known as those of the French Revolution.

'In one day, as it were, Francis Joseph obtained the results which Louis XIV. laboured unceasingly throughout his long reign to arrive at, and even many of those which the logical though unconscious disciples of the great monarch's policy wrung out in '89. In one day *the past* was once for all broken with, the old corporate liberties were all abolished, the old prescriptive rights all violently trodden under foot, the spontaneous growth of centuries, the rich vari-formed institutions that had germed out of nations' hearts, and moulded themselves in accordance with nations' habits, were imperiously torn out by the roots, and in their stead were arbitrarily introduced not new forms only, but new substances also.

'To use a perhaps somewhat far-fetched illustration: the old familiar home landscape with its endless variety of features, its moated castles, its manor houses, and its homesteads, not one stone of which but was mossed over with some historical association, was, pantomime fashion, and as if by the stroke of a wand, made to disappear, and in its stead the dull eyes of dull officials are enabled to glad themselves with the symmetrical red-brick buildings and the mathematically parcelled-out enclosures of a model penal colony.

'It is this heartless and unstatesmanlike breaking with the past, this attempt to substitute machinery for organic growth, to govern from *a priori* principles instead of from *a posteriori* experiences, which, whether the initiative be taken by an absolute sovereign or a constitutional assembly, marks the difference between revolution and reform. It is this which has justly earned for Louis XIV.



the title of the first *sans culotte*, and which justifies the description of the Austrian *coup d'état* as the installation *en permanence* of the revolution.

'It is, however, only as regards Croatia that I am at present concerned with this *coup d'état*. The wholesale juggling used with reference to the Empire was applied with even an additional employment of the resources of the art to this kingdom. Ignoring alike the concessions made in '48 and the old forms of the Koloman Constitution, the defenders of the *coup d'état* adopt the modern phraseology of the Hungarian propagandists, and represent Croatia as having formed an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom, and its constitution as having formed an integral portion of the Hungarian constitution. They then infer that as the latter had been just forfeited the *whole* was necessarily lost, and if the Croats were involved in the common ruin, *tant pis pour eux* !'

Having left Agram, Morier proceeded *via* Glina and Dvor to Novi, where he crossed the frontier over the Una, then up the right bank of the Sanna to Pridore, Banjalukee, and Bosni Serai, where he stayed 'under the hospitable roof of our consul, Churchill, great in the annals of Kars,' and from whence he writes to his father on 15th September 1857 :—

'I start in a day or two from here for Mostar, and thence to Ragusa and Montenegro. I hope to be back at Vienna about the end of October. The old Pasha here, the embodied picture of Punch, has been of the greatest civility to me. He put, in the language of the country, himself and all the resources of the Province at my disposition. I was modest and told him I should be quite satisfied if he would let me have the use of the best horse in the stable and would organise me a mighty great hunting. The most perfect beast I ever rode on was, in consequence, placed at my disposal, and a great expedition after roe-deer and savage pig, a day's journey off on the road to Constantinople, was arranged. His son took the command of the battue, and, though little sport was the result, still, as a study of Oriental life, I could not have wished to have seen anything more

picturesque or worthy of pen or pencil. The country is perfectly magnificent. Bosni Serai stands at the mouth of a deep gorge, against which it leans, looking out on to a beautiful and richly-cultivated plain. The road to Constantinople lies through the gorge as precipitate and break-neck as you may well wish to see. We started in the early morning about ninety horsemen, all the great Beys of the country having been invited to be of the party, splendid looking fellows, magnificently horsed with their mounted Bashibazouks and other retainers, besides these a large number of pedestrians with dogs. The cavalcade was headed by a number of Chaouches, most of them Albanian, in their white kilts, and splendidly armed. There was besides a most wonderful band of music, the music of the country, consisting of three gipsies, one of whom played on two immense drums, balanced on a horse's neck, between which he and a little dog sat. The second played a kind of flageolet, which emitted sounds the exact counterpart of a very bad bagpipe. The time consisted of a repetition of bigger thumps at regular intervals on the bigger drum, and lesser thumps at regular intervals on the lesser drum. The flageolet broke in now and then with a voluntary, which, however, did not seem to have any connection with the drumming. The third gipsy acted as buffoon. He had on a diabolical kind of black mask with a white beard. His pleasantries, which were performed at our various halts, were not of the choicest or most delicate kinds. He had a wonderful way of apparently dislocating himself and imitating the habits and noises of various animals. Just behind Bosni Serai the road dips precipitately down and crosses two torrents over one of your picturesque Turkish bridges, then twisting suddenly up the yonder side of the valley. The defiling of the cavalcade along this bit in the morning sun, with the breaking fog rolling just off the craggy summits of the enclosing mountains, was one of the most picturesque sights I ever remember seeing. We reached our camping ground in the evening; the place selected was the castle, a very diminutive castle, consisting of a single tower, of a Bey *quelconque*, high up amongst the mountains. Immediately in front of it was pitched

ours, that is the swell tent, in an adjoining field the remaining tents, six or seven in number. A very few touches, with your knowledge of Eastern scenery, are enough to make you realise the scene.

'Time, night, nearly full moon. Four huge fires. Four whole sheep being roasted.

'*Dramatis personæ* : Beys, Chaouches, Rayas. Tethered horses snorting and kicking. Cross-legged turbaned old Turks quietly chibouk-smoking and ruminating. Scullions running to and fro, brandishing entire lambs on spits, servants unpacking pack-horses, etc., grand jagged mountains all round, with stupendous forests in immediate foreground.

'An hour after sunset we kneel down to dinner, a regular Turkish dinner on a huge circle of bright copper, eight of us sitting round, and hungry outposts of less swell guests dotted about behind us. We are seated on a little plot of very green grass, through the middle of which runs a little rill of water, ending in a sort of fountain at our feet. First comes lamb, roasted whole, from which each tears what he can. I enter into the spirit of the thing, and with great muscular effort pull off a shoulder, securing at the same time a handful of fat and kidney—him with bread very good. Then a succession of all sorts of queer little dishes. Cucumber with chopped-up meats and rich gravies, and for the last an immense pillaf. I ought to have mentioned, however, that there was a preface of a good hour in which were eaten little bits of cheese and apples about the size of pins' heads, and in which had been drunk by messieurs the Turks in huge libations, and by ourselves in much smaller quantities, tremendously strong raki. At dinner a red wine of the country was also copiously imbibed, so that when we got up from the table our Ottoman friends were all more or less screwed, and some of them, particularly a great huge Mudir, lately *destitué* for shooting somebody when drunk, in a state of most complete inebriety. A more grotesque sight than those groggy old Turks, fraternising and swearing by the Ingliz, rollicking and affectionate, it will not soon again be my good fortune to see. At two next morning we broke up for the shooting ground. The arrangements were bad, and only three roe-

deer were shot, but we got up amongst scenery which, for a combination of high mountains and large timber, I never saw the like of. The return was of the same kind as the journey thither.'

After a most interesting tour through Herzegovina and Montenegro, he announced to his father, on 10th October, from on board a steamer off Zara, his safe return into civilised parts. 'I have had in every way a most interesting journey, and never was better in my life, though some of it was tremendously hard work.'

This expedition always remained in Morier's recollection as not only one of the most interesting, but also one of the pleasantest episodes of his youth. 'Happy, careless days,' of which he was reminded in later years by one of his then companions, Consul Zohrab, who, when congratulating him on the attainment of ambassadorial dignity in 1885, writes, recalling—

' . . . Old, old times, which will come back to memory, and you will think of the old days when we were both young, and which you said were so delightful. Do you remember Mostar and Bona, the house with Zohrab in it, in which you passed some days? Do you remember how after meals you would go to sleep, and when I asked you something you would give most out-of-the-way replies, and insist that you were wide awake? Do you remember how difficult it used to be for me to get you out of my big fruit garden to come to those meals? How you used to tell me you were in Elysium picking grapes and peaches, and could not tear yourself away? Do you remember our trip to Kleck, and the chaff we had as we went along the road? How often I think of those days, and how bright they appear to me. But I always say, "He must be the same, though he has gone so far above me." '

In November, Morier was back again in Vienna and doing double work, not only in the Chancery, but also writing reports, as, owing to the special knowledge now acquired, the Foreign Office had instructed him to draw up a secret Memorandum on Kleck and Sutorina, points

at that time in dispute between Austria and Turkey, or rather on the claims put forward by the former to restrict the latter in the free use of those portions of her territory abutting on the Adriatic. This was a matter of so intricate and delicate a nature, touching on questions of such far-reaching consequences as the principle of maritime supremacy in the Adriatic, then claimed by Austria as heir to the Republic of Venice, that Morier himself, as he wrote<sup>1</sup> at the time, had a strong feeling that 'a State Paper of so wide a *portée* should not be the maiden effort of an unpaid attaché, but the matured labour of "an old hand," involving, as it did, "the interests and *points d'honneur* of all maritime nations, and therefore touching us as the cock in that walk more nearly."'

He acquitted himself, however, of the task imposed upon him in so satisfactory a manner that he was able to tell his father 'as a profound secret, not to be breathed to any living soul' that 'my Kleck and Sutorina letters have met with a degree of success far greater than anything that has fallen to my share yet.'

The two journeys Morier had undertaken through the South Slav Provinces of Austria, and through Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro had strongly impressed upon his mind the radical mistake committed by the English Government, of exclusively employing as consuls, in that part of the world, men brought up entirely in Asiatic Turkey and the Eastern school of Diplomacy, in all the traditions of the Constantinople Embassy, thoroughly good Turkish scholars, but not knowing a word of any Slav language or anything of the people amongst whom they lived: on the best of terms with the Turkish officials, but holding the Christian populations in supreme contempt—with the result that their Russian colleagues, knowing the language and being of the same religion, had everything their own way.

Although but a very few weeks in those countries, Morier had seen quite enough to convince him, that had they been men capable of sympathising with the Slavs, and understanding their language, there would be an immense field for useful work and unrivalled opportunities of

<sup>1</sup> To Mr. Hammond, U.S. of the F.O., 18th November 1857.

acquiring influence, for many of the cleverer Slavs were imbued with a deep distrust of Russia, and had no greater desire than to find some fair-dealing Power like England to lean against.

Here indeed, he realised, was a splendid opening for a policy, as, after all the blood and treasure spent in the Crimea, we had bought the right of actively intervening as it could be done by an able ambassador, a first-rate set of subordinates, and a clear policy directing the whole.

On his return to England he strongly urged these views on Lord Clarendon, then Foreign Minister, and, though meeting with no response, never lost sight of them.

Many years later, in 1875, when affairs in the East were assuming a threatening aspect, it was entirely owing to Morier—who, as he said, 'moved heaven and earth on his behalf'—that Mr. White,<sup>1</sup> then Consul at Danzig, whom he knew to be not only one of the first Slav scholars in Europe, but intimately acquainted with Slav politics, was appointed Consul-General at Belgrade, a result only obtained after eighteen months of the most strenuous efforts, by employing every influence official, private, and personal he could command, and by pleading his cause in season and out of season, even at the risk, as he himself wrote, of doing harm by 'the importunity of my advocacy.'

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Sir W. White, H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople.

## CHAPTER IX

## BERLIN

IN 1858 Morier was transferred to Berlin as paid Attaché, at the instance of the Prince Consort.

Ever since his first visit in 1850 he had kept up the most cordial and intimate relations with his many friends in Germany, and spent much time there, chiefly at Coburg and Gotha, which under Duke Ernst, Prince Albert's elder brother, had become centres of German liberalism and a refuge for many Schleswig-Holsteiners like the Duke of Augustenburg, Samwer, and others, who had been forced to leave their country on the unhappy termination of the campaign of 1848-1850, a campaign in which Duke Ernst himself had taken a prominent part.

It was there, on one of these visits, that Morier first met old Baron Stockmar, then settled at Coburg, who, as the former afterwards wrote, 'at seventy had retained all the warmth and enthusiasm of youth, and who could not abide the society of the old *frondeurs* and fogies, his contemporaries, and attached himself exclusively to young men; he took an extraordinary fancy to me, and for the last seven or eight years of his life I was his most trusted and intimate friend.'

Stockmar ever after spoke of Morier as his 'adopted son,' whilst Morier looked up to 'the Baron' as 'the noblest and most beautiful political life which this (nineteenth) century has seen.'

Both shared the belief in the high destinies to which Germany was called, and the conviction that she would eventually prove 'a light to lighten the Gentiles, and to have a future more beautiful than any other nation's past.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Morier to R. v. Stockmar.

To bring about a political and intellectual union between England and Germany was therefore as much the ideal of the younger man's diplomatic youth as it had been the earnest object to which the older man had dedicated his life, and the latter soon had no greater desire than that Morier should devote himself to carry on a task the fulfilment of which he feared he himself might not live to see.

With this aim in view Stockmar insisted on his making the personal acquaintance of Prince Albert, to whom he presented him in the spring of 1855 at Buckingham Palace. The Prince, who always afterwards took a warm personal interest in Morier's career, soon gave him to understand it was his wish that he should in every way endeavour to fit himself for diplomatic work in Germany, with particular reference to the relations between Prussia and England, designating Berlin as his future sphere of activity. When, therefore, in January 1858, the marriage of Prince Frederick William of Prussia with the Princess Royal took place, a union which fulfilled as much Prince Albert's as Stockmar's keenest political wishes, and which for years the latter had striven to bring about, it was in the natural sequence of events that Morier should, shortly afterwards (20th February), be appointed there, desirous as Prince Albert was, to have a man—who not only possessed his confidence, but was credited with a special knowledge of German affairs—within reach of the newly married couple; an appointment, moreover, warmly backed by the Princess of Prussia, who had known and liked not only Morier, but his father for many years, and had expressed to Lord Clarendon her earnest wish that he should be named to Berlin in order to be thrown into the way of Prince Frederick William.

It was accordingly under very favourable circumstances that Morier joined his new post, being placed from the first on a footing of far greater intimacy than his official status of Attaché warranted, with the future heir to the Prussian throne, in whose immediate circle he found not only Roggenbach, often credited with having been Prince Frederick William's political mentor, and Ernst von



Stockmar, old Baron Stockmar's son, just appointed private secretary to the Princess Royal, but many others of those whom he had for years been intimately acquainted with, and whose political views he shared.

His intercourse with Prince Frederick William and the Princess Royal was destined to ripen into deep and lasting friendship based on mutual sympathy and esteem, and he soon succeeded in gaining their confidence and affection to such an extent as to become one of their most trusted friends and advisers.

At that early period he already formed the high estimate of the future Emperor Frederick's character which every succeeding year confirmed more and more, and which on the latter's untimely death led him to write—

'that having had the great privilege of personal intercourse with His late Majesty during the long period of thirty years, and been treated by him during all that time with a kindness for which I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude, I would fain, if I could but find adequate language to do so, bear my humble testimony to the character of a man so great, where the greatest have proved themselves so small, so valiant a soldier yet so filled with the horror of war, so conscientious a workman in the task of building up his country's glory, yet so callous to all personal sense of glory, so conspicuous a figure in all the great battles of the age, yet of so steadfast a faith in those higher national tasks which cannot be realised on the field of battle. So fearless, patient, gentle, and cheerful in his long death agony,—in a word, so pre-eminently human in an age so pre-eminently one of blood and iron—that the like of him may be sought for in vain in all the pages of the world's history. . . .

'Whatever the future may bring forth, the grave at Potsdam has just closed upon one who seemed as none other called upon to dispel the war-clouds which darken the earth, and towards the dispersion of which he yearned with all his heart and soul.'

That the exceptional position Morier enjoyed at Court should make him the object of jealousies and dislike

was as much to be foreseen as that his unconcealed liberalism would excite the animosity of those who held different political opinions. It was this which laid the foundations of Bismarck's enmity with all its consequences, and of which even in those days he was to have proof.

In the early years of King William's reign, when a liberal and constitutional régime was being tried, and the feudal party was in violent opposition and intriguing to detach the King from his liberal Ministers, Bismarck, then Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, declared, on his return from a visit to Berlin, that he had satisfied himself that one of the most dangerous persons there was Morier, and that the party ought to do their best to get rid of him. It may be remarked here that it was at that time the King that Morier had the credit of influencing in a constitutional sense, through the Queen of Prussia, as later the Crown Prince through the Crown Princess.

Not long afterwards there appeared in a number of feudal papers all manner of dark hints and mysterious insinuations respecting him, which were only put a stop to by the then *official* organ challenging these papers to say out boldly what it was they meant, upon which they all held their peace.

A similar episode may be related in his own words :—

' In the year 1858, when I first went to Berlin and was a total stranger there, I chanced to meet a man who many years before had given me German lessons, and who was then a literary man only, unconnected with politics, and went with him to a restaurant to taste a particular wine which I was wishing to buy. At this restaurant there were supping five or six noted political characters, two of them well-known editors of liberal newspapers, the rest likewise political celebrities. They were all known to my German master, and I naturally enough made their acquaintance and sat up most part of the night with them, listening to what was political conversation of the highest interest to me. I should note that this being still during the Regency, every one of these men was giving his enthusiastic

support to the Regent's then liberal Ministers. *From that day to the present I have never again seen one of the individuals in question.*<sup>1</sup>

'In the year 1865 a friend of mine came to me in a most perturbed state, and begged me for God's sake to take care what I was about, for he had heard in the Bismarck salon that it was an ascertained fact that I was in the nightly habit of drinking at pot houses with the most virulent members of the opposition, naming some of the above, and there could be no doubt about it, as the information was derived from police reports !'

Experiences of this kind tended to render his stay at Berlin even less congenial than he already found it from the very first. 'Berlin is the most insupportable place I ever was in,' he writes to his father soon after his arrival there, 'after a very pleasant ten days at Gotha, and in the Thuringian Forest,' where he had gone to shoot with the Duke of Coburg; and in a subsequent letter to the same, after describing 'the ceremonies here about the King of Portugal,<sup>2</sup> who has been married, or rather, his wife<sup>3</sup> has. She is a pretty, nice little woman, whom I sat next to at dinner last year at the Princess of Prussia's at Coblenz, a little, shy, winning mannered, fair-haired creature, lisping out pretty English, and now I am presented to her as Queen of Portugal and wife of a man she has never seen'; he goes on: 'Berlin is a dismal flat, sandy, with-many-evil-smells-abounding capital; as compared with Vienna, I had growled much and often at the miseries of the latter place, and up to three weeks before my departure thought I did not like it. It was only when I announced my departure that I found how many friends I had, and how very much I had struck root into the place. The Austrians are not demonstrative, but when they like you they really do it, and I had numerous proofs of what very good friends I had made there without knowing it. I am well off here, as far as my chief and colleagues are concerned.'

<sup>1</sup> This was written in 1867.

<sup>2</sup> King Dom Pedro.

<sup>3</sup> Queen Stephanie, b. 1837, d. 1859, daughter of Prince Karl Anton of Hohenzollern.

With Mr. Augustus Paget, the First Secretary of Legation, he soon struck up a warm friendship. Strangely enough, Morier's father had begun his diplomatic career under Sir Arthur Paget, Augustus Paget's father, whom he accompanied on his mission to the Dardanelles in 1807, so that by a curious coincidence the two sons of the two fathers were put, after a lapse of fifty years, in the same relation to one another.

In July 1858 the visit of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort to Babelsberg took place, for which Morier had to hurry back from Aix-la-Chapelle, where he had gone to cure a bad attack of rheumatic gout.

'The royal visit is to last about a fortnight, and probably all that time I shall have to dance attendance, and be kept at work in the Chancery, as Lord Malmesbury is coming over too, and we shall in consequence be probably turned into a miniature F.O.'

After a short stay in England, where he had gone to pass the usual diplomatic examination by the Civil Service Commissioners, of which he says, 'the whole thing is a farce, and to a man at my time of life an insult,' he was back again at Berlin, telling his father about 'a great concert we gave to the Princess Royal and the rest of the Prussian Royal Family. It went off very well, but was an intolerable nuisance, as all such things are, when one is obliged to be civil for four hours together and *do honours*. Oh! how I hate this life in perpetual "évidence." The only change from mechanical work is mechanical civility.'

In a doleful letter to the same, dated Christmas Day, 1858, he talks of having had 'one disappointment after another: the first, Rome, which I fancied myself all but sure of; then Paget's move, which leaves me quite alone here without a friend, after the enjoyment of such a friendship as his; then, Vienna has been filled up. This is a cheerful way of commencing a new year.'

In the early spring of 1859 the 'monotony and humdrum of our existence here, which seems to daily deepen deeper into a Dutch mud canal of a life, without even the tulip beds on the banks,' . . . was

pleasantly broken by a visit he paid to his friend Paget at Dresden :—

‘Of old acquaintances here I found first and foremost the Madonna del Sisto, the Richard Metternichs, Austrian Minister, Prince Wolkonsky and wife, ditto Russian, Count and Countess Moltke, respectively father and mother to my friend Leon Moltke, whom I lived with in one house, and as with a brother at Vienna, but now, alas ! Danish Minister at Madrid. The Madonna is in good preservation, and is certainly a most wonderful picture. . . . Do you know, seeing these beautiful pictures, I almost felt as though I still had a soul, and as if the infernal cypher-telegraphing had not quite succeeded in “abrutising” me, though very nearly.’<sup>1</sup>

In May he was enabled to return to England for a short while, having been attached to Mr. (later Sir Henry) Elliot’s mission to Naples.’

‘When I awoke at Paris this morning I had a very confused notion in my mind as to what the deuce had brought me there. I have recovered, however, and am aware that I left you yesterday with the intention of going to congratulate the new King of the two Sicilies. Why I should congratulate him I have not yet found out, but I suppose we ought to be doing something in Italy, as the others are doing so much.’<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding the terrific heat, which drove them to take refuge at Castellamare, Morier much enjoyed this journey, and ‘from all the glories of his Chancery—a splendid tessellated room with very good paintings of Magdalens and Archdukes on the walls, and looking out on the beautiful Naples Bay’—tells his father : ‘I stopped two days at Rome, to have one glimpse of the Eternal City before it is “mediatized.” . . . I succeeded the day before yesterday in getting down to Paestum, and the exquisite beauty and simplicity of those temples, after the tawdry renaissance style of Pompeii, was the most glorious that you can imagine. . . .’

<sup>1</sup> Morier to his father, 27th March 1859.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 1859.

The mission to Naples served to draw him closer to Mr. Odo Russell, one of his colleagues—and who since that time became one of his most intimate friends ; his mother, Lady William Russell, and brother, Mr. Arthur Russell, had long been on very friendly terms with Morier, who in his London days had much frequented Lady William's salon in Audley Square.

Whilst at Naples, he had been appointed first paid attaché at Berlin, where, as soon as Mr. Elliot's mission terminated, he returned, but under very altered circumstances—for in the meanwhile Lord Malmesbury had been succeeded<sup>1</sup> as Foreign Secretary by Lord John Russell, who had known Morier personally for a long while, and fully appreciated his brilliant capacities and unrivalled knowledge of German affairs. From henceforth he was to be continually employed in business of the most important, confidential, and delicate kind, Lord John never failing to consult him on all the most complicated questions of German politics, even when they did not properly belong to the post he held at the moment. He was thus enabled to give the full measure of his ability, and soon was regarded as one of the first authorities on all matters pertaining to Germany, whilst of two burning questions, one, as it turned out, of vital importance to the peace of Europe—the Hessian and the Schleswig-Holstein questions—he, as he said himself, obtained a kind of monopoly.

At that time, Germany had reached one of the turning points of her history.

When, after the events of 1848, the first German Parliament, elected by universal suffrage and sitting in the St. Paul's Church at Frankfurt, had offered the Imperial crown to King Frederick William IV. of Prussia, it had been rejected with scorn. Willing as the King would have been to receive it from the Princes, who, according to him, alone had the right to offer it, to accept a crown from such revolutionary hands appeared to him as nothing less than a disgrace to a Hohenzollern.

The Congress of Princes, the Union of the three Kings,

<sup>1</sup> 18th June 1859.

the Assembly at Erfurt, had led to no result, and when Prussia, yielding to the pressure of Austria backed by Russia, had ignominiously capitulated at Olmütz, on the questions of Federal Reform, Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse, all peculiarly identified with national aspirations, German Unity, which a short while before had appeared almost within reach, seemed further off than ever. The Diet was reconstituted at Frankfurt, the German fleet, the object of so much national enthusiasm, put up to auction, and the full tide of reaction set in all over Germany, where at that period the Emperor Nicholas was regarded as called upon by Divine will to be the leader of monarchical resistance against revolution, whilst the German national movement, owing to the extravagance of the political views of some of its leaders, inspired no little distrust.

‘The Emperor Nicholas is at present complete master of Europe,’ Prince Albert wrote to his brother on 18th January 1851. ‘Austria is only an instrument, Prussia a dupe, France a nonentity, whilst England, whose foreign affairs are directed by a statesman<sup>1</sup> devoid of all public morality, is less than nothing.’<sup>2</sup>

A few years later, the Crimean War was to bring about a complete change in the grouping of the European Powers, leading first and foremost to the break up of the Holy Alliance so laboriously re-established after the Revolution, for bitterly had Russia resented the attitude of Austria, who owed her so much, and had proved so faithless.

‘Who are the two stupidest kings of Poland?’ the Emperor Nicholas is supposed to have asked the embarrassed Austrian Envoy,<sup>3</sup> and, on being met with a constrained silence, to have added, ‘Sobieski and I’—an allusion to their both having saved Austria, and both being rewarded with ingratitude.

After the termination of the war, France had shown more and more signs of gravitating towards Russia—a *rapprochement* viewed with much disfavour by the Cabinet of

<sup>1</sup> Lord Palmerston.

<sup>2</sup> Herzog E. v. Coburg, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Comte Georges Esterhazy.

St. James, whilst the Emperor Napoleon on his side, after the discovery of the Orsini conspiracy hatched on English soil, was inclined to consider that his ally placed far too liberal an interpretation on the rights of asylum and the laws of hospitality.

It was thus, that when the Prince of Prussia, who, since the autumn of 1857, had provisionally replaced his brother, King Frederick William IV., whose mind had given way, was appointed Regent of Prussia in October 1858, he was confronted by an absolutely altered political situation. The Prince Regent who, since the days of the Revolution at Berlin in 1849, had been estranged from his brother, and under the influence of the Princess, had developed leanings towards liberalism, dismissed the reactionary Manteuffel Ministry on assuming office, and called upon the Prince of Hohenzollern,<sup>1</sup> known for his broad-minded, patriotic views, to form a Cabinet, a decision enthusiastically ratified by the people, who, at the elections shortly afterwards, returned an overwhelming ministerial majority. For the first time in Germany's constitutional history had liberal electors and representatives taken a pride in belonging to the Ministerial party.

This Cabinet, known as the Ministry of the New Era, comprised, besides Auerswald,<sup>2</sup>—a moderate liberal and personal friend of the Prince's, and General Bonin, who had shared his disgrace in 1854,—such well-known names as Bethmann-Hollweg,<sup>3</sup> Schleinitz,<sup>4</sup> Patow,<sup>5</sup> and a few months later Count Schwerin<sup>6</sup>—while two of the members of the late Ministry, Van der Heydt and Simons, were retained in office.

In a sketch Morier drew up of the Parliamentary situation some time later, he thus described the various groups or 'fractions' into which the parties of the Government and Opposition were at that time divided.

<sup>1</sup> Hohenzollern, Prince Karl Anton.

<sup>2</sup> Auerswald, Rudolf von, b. 1795, d. 1866, Prussian statesman.

<sup>3</sup> Bethmann-Hollweg, Moritz August von, b. 1795, d. 1877, Prussian statesman, author of works on jurisprudence.

<sup>4</sup> Schleinitz, Alexander Graf von, b. 1807, d. 1885, Prussian statesman.

<sup>5</sup> Patow, Erasmus Robert Freiherr von, Prussian statesman.

<sup>6</sup> Schwerin, Maximilian Graf von S. Putzar, b. 1804, d. 1872, Prussian statesman.



'The two fractions of which the present Right, *i.e.* the Ministerial Majority, is composed, are those of Vincke and Mathis. Though yielding an equal support to the Government, there is, nevertheless, a very radical difference in the historical genesis of these two parties—a difference which in a very marked manner is noted by the names they have adopted.

'The fraction Vincke or that of the old Liberals (Alt Liberalen) represents, as their name denotes, the Liberals *de la veille*, the party, namely, who before the Revolution of '48 had been steadily endeavouring to change the old military absolutism of Prussia into a modern Constitutional State. By a happy coincidence this party is headed by what may be termed the nearest approach in Prussia to a great Whig family. As far back as the close of the last and beginning of the present century we find a Vincke (the father of the present leader of the party), a man of good family, and of considerable landed property, energetically supporting the cause of reform in Prussia, and later on one of the most strenuous supporters of Stein, in the war to the knife waged by that great statesman against the feudal institutions to which, more than to any other cause, the catastrophe of Jena was to be attributed. During the great period of the reorganisation of the Prussian State, from 1810 to 1815, he stands out as one of the most remarkable of the groups of practical politicians to whom that work owed its success, and at the same time, we find him as a theorist contributing one of the earliest, and to this day one of the most classical, of the Works on Constitutional History published in Germany, viz. *On the System of Administration in Great Britain*, edited by Niebuhr. Taken in conjunction with a later work, *On the Dismemberment of Small Freeholds* (*Zerstückler der Bauernhöfe*), in which the Conservative elements of his system are brought prominently forward, we obtain a picture of as complete a conservative Liberal as *mutatis mutandis* can be found in the political *répertoire* of continental Europe.

'The party he, and later on his son, the present Baron von Vincke,<sup>1</sup> represented up to 1848 was that of the logical

<sup>1</sup> Vincke, Georg Freiherr v., b. 1811, d. 1875.

carriers out of the policy of Stein, viz. the raising up out of the pulverised remains of the old feudal State of a free representative modern policy. Triumphant up to 1815, as long as the national idealistic tendencies were wanted as a weapon against Napoleon I., afterwards, in a much-maligned minority under the bureaucratic reaction of the latter part of Frederick William III.'s reign, the present party in question, and the present Baron von Vincke continuously at their head, reappear in greater force on the political stage at the convocation of the States-General in 1847, bravely doing battle in the sense of a *bona fide* Parliamentary representative against the feudal revival attempted to be passed off in lieu thereof, in the States-General aforesaid. During the revolutionary years of '48 and '49, Baron Vincke, true to his programme, uses the whole force of his personal influence and his splendid talents as a debater against the anarchical tendencies of the revolutionary party, and then again in 1850, when the reactionary element under the Minister Manteuffel had fairly set in, we see him with equal manliness fighting the battle of the Constitution, and taking his stand on the "piece of parchment" sworn to by the King, and the two Houses created in virtue of its attempts, against hopeless odds, to prevent the fraudulent evasion of the principles laid down in it by the omnipotent coalition between the feudal and bureaucratic elements—represented by the Manteuffel-Westfalen Ministry.

'During the Russian War the splendid philippics of Baron Vincke against the policy of the Manteuffel Ministry resounded throughout Europe. The principle, however, that inspired his eloquence was not so much a regard for the humiliating secondary part in European politics to which Prussia was condemned by that policy, as the sense of the impossibility of any free development of her internal policy, as long as she lay within the blighting influence of the Holy Alliance.

'To describe the party in a few words. They are Constitutionalists from principle, firmly believing (and that not from any prior doctrinairism, but from, amongst the leaders at least, a very practical knowledge of the requirements and capacities of their country) that with due allow-

ance made for difference of historical antecedents and the like, the system of self-government as regards the administrative, and that of Parliamentary representation as regards the organic, life of the nation at large are the best adapted to the wants of a race of Teutonic origin.

'The English Constitution, "not copied servilely, but studied as the best specimen of the political forms into which, under favourable circumstances, a race of German origin will mould itself into," is the working model which this party has adopted in opposition on one side to the doctrinaire dogmatism of the French Constitutionalism paid homage to by some of the so-called more advanced political schools in Prussia, and on the other side to the centralised perfect system of Imperial France as specially patronised by the bureaucratic reaction.

'Very different from this is the historical origin of the fraction Mathis. Not dating back further than the year 1850 (though the elements out of which it is composed are to be traced back to a more remote period amongst the rank of the liberal and enlightened bureaucracy in anti-reactionary times) it grew up out of the entourage of the present Prince Regent at the time when the anti-national policy of the Government, and the surrender at Olmütz of Prussia's birthright as the defender of national interests in Germany, had driven H.R.H. into indignant opposition. The title adopted by them of the "Old Prussian party" denotes their opposition to the "New Prussian party," *alias* party of the Kreuz-Zeitung, *alias* the Junker party, or party of the Squirearchy. This opposition, however, differs from that of the old Liberal party, not indeed in the matter of intensity, but in the kind of force they would desire to oppose to the "caste" and therefore anti-national tendencies of the latter. Going back to the old days of Prussian history, and to the Prussia of Frederick the Great, a strong self-trusting policy on the part of the Crown, not based on the Divine Right principle, but on the historical relation of the Hohenzollern Dynasty to the nation, is more than any other the goal aimed at in their programme. As results to be obtained from this policy are in the first place a total enfranchisement from the principles of the

Holy Alliance, the assumption of a strong military position in Germany, and the using the power thus obtained for the furtherance of protection of the national interests of Germany at large.

'As a means to this end in the present state of the world's history, they frankly admit the necessity of representative institutions. But they have shown themselves inimical to what they term *Parliamentarism*, and to the logical consequences of the system which the old Liberals have obstinately kept in view, viz. a Government responsible to Parliament majorities. Going quite as far as that party in respect of the right with which they would invest the Chambers of granting or withholding supplies, in other matters and especially in matters of foreign policy, they are inclined to regard the representative assembly rather as an august forum for the record of public opinion, and entrusted with the high privilege of giving its advice to the Crown, than as the real depositary of the supreme powers in the State. The theory of ministerial responsibilities, and the necessary connection of the Ministry for the time being with a Parliamentary majority, has ever been a special bugbear to them.

'In the present Government, the fraction of Vincke, or the old Liberal party, is represented by Count Schwerin and Monsieur de Patow ; the Mathis fraction is represented by Schleinitz, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Auerswald. The more prominent names out of the Ministry, are those of Camphausen, Albert Pourtales, Usedom, Grüner, etc. The extreme Left, consisting of the remains of the Junker majority in the last Chamber, is composed of three fractions, respectively under the leadership of Von Blankenburg, Von Arnim, Count Pückler (the first numbering ten members who keep up the tradition of the once powerful party headed by Gerlach), separated from each other by totally unimportant shades of opinion, but united by the common desire to get rid not of the Constitution only, but of the reforms of the great Stein period, by which the road to the present Constitution was so massively paved, and to set up instead a sort of modern Gothic edifice, in which the castes and hierarchic gradations of medieval societies should

be revived. Having arrogated to themselves of late the exclusive title of Conservative, the name they had at first assumed of the New Prussian Party much more correctly describes the principles by which they are actuated, inasmuch as the Prussia which they are desirous of calling into existence would be composed of those elements which the Hohenzollern Dynasty (with the one exception of the present King)<sup>1</sup> has so perseveringly combated, and which the Reform of 1806 never supposed to have finally dissolved. The manner in which they succeeded in throwing the respectable cloak of Conservatism over the very radical character of the changes aimed at by them, is only to be accounted for by the total confusion of political ideas resulting from the events of 1848, and by the great casuistical skill displayed in the conduct of the party by its able leaders. Totally without influence in the Lower Chamber, as they are destitute of any programme of practical legislation which could under present circumstances be possibly adopted, the public to which they addressed themselves is to be found in the political coteries of so-called "good society" of the capital, in the Squirearchy of the provinces, and above all in that which is their familiar *point d'appui*, the large majority of the Upper House,—all of them most important factors in the political life of Prussia, and all the more difficult to make head against, from the less tangible form in which they appear in the Lower House, which is after all the real arena for political discussion, in which a more equal distribution of parties might ensure to victories, if gained, a more positive result.

'Between the Right and the Left, sits the Roman Catholic fraction,—or as they, carefully repudiating this denomination, call themselves, the party of the Centre. They acknowledge the leadership of the two brothers Reichen-sperger, and surpass all the other fractions in compactness of organisation, and unity of purpose. Faithful to the policy of Roman Catholic minorities in Protestant countries, their great aim is to secure the largest amount of autonomy, not in their religious concerns alone (which in the perfect parity in Prussia between Catholic and Pro-

<sup>1</sup> King Frederick William IV.

testant churches they could hardly hope to increase), but in their political and social relations. To shake off all the inconvenient supervision of the administrative organs of a Protestant Government over their communal municipal relations, and to secure into their own hands the temporal as well as the spiritual power of the purely Catholic portions of the monarchy, and an independent political position in the districts where the religions are mixed, such has been, as regards the internal affairs of the country, their consistent aim. With this object in view they naturally supported the Liberal minority in their opposition to the bureaucratic centralisation of that administration, and as a general rule have voted in the same ranks as the parties now forming the majority, and in opposition to the feudal and bureaucratic party. The Italian question, however, has here, as elsewhere, thrown the apple of discord amongst such and similar unnatural coalitions, and the fanatical sympathy of the party for the Papal and Austrian cause in Italy has estranged them in a great degree from the Liberal fractions who naturally sympathise with the cause of national independence in Italy, and have brought them on this point into close contact with the Divine Right champions of the so-called Conservative party.

'Standing aloof from all other fractions, and abstaining from all questions touching the general internal policy of the country which they describe under the general term of "German" questions, but when voting always doing so in opposition, is the Polish fraction.

'The impracticable assertion of an independent national existence, a "*quasi*-repeal of the Union," and the creation of a Polish imperium in a Prussian imperio are the objects of this party.

'These fractions, with the independent members, termed in Prussia "wild men" (*Wilde*), make up the elements of which the Lower Chamber is composed.

'I should add, in conclusion, that the few members of the more advanced Liberal schools who have found admission into the present Chambers vote, as a rule, with the fraction Vincke.

'As regards the bureaucratic reactionaries, who played so important a part in the Chamber under the Manteuffel Ministry, they are hardly represented in the present Chamber, but they go on lurking in the far more dangerous positions in the subordinate offices of the central administration and in the higher posts of the provincial Government, from which they have but very sparingly been cleared out.'

## CHAPTER X

AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONDITION  
OF THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA, WITH SPECIAL  
REFERENCE TO THE HISTORY OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>

THE youngest and, in the matter of square mileage, the least of the so-called Great European Powers, Prussia, claims nevertheless no small share of attention from the student of European politics. For although the hopes which, both in Germany and out of it, were built upon her future have been for a while shaken by the ingloriousness which has marked her history for the last ten years, and by her total failure to act a part worthy of the great opportunities afforded her by the convulsion of '48, yet, as the waters of that revolutionary flood begin to subside, the foundations upon which those hopes were built are seen not only to have received no damage, but to have been extended as well as strengthened.

The foundations are there : are the materials and the workmen forthcoming for a superstructure that will be in harmony with them ? It is not, we believe, asserting too much to say, that upon the practical answer to this question, which the history of the next half-century may give, depends in a great measure the future political freedom of Continental Europe.

For indelibly engraved upon the substratum of Prussian history (and, of the great Continental Powers, upon that of hers alone) are the principles of religious and intellectual liberty ; and if those of civil liberty, in the full sense of the term which we in England are used to attach to it, are less distinctly legible, that respect for law, which is the first

<sup>1</sup> *N.B.*—This Essay was written in 1859, when everything seemed to promise well for the cause of Constitutional Government in Prussia.



*sine qua non* condition of civil liberty, is not the less clearly noted.

The reception by Frederick William I. of the Salzburg emigrants, and the episode of the Potsdam windmill under Frederick II., have lived on as household words in the European story, not because they formed exceptions to a general rule, but because they were, in an eminent degree, typical and representative of certain organic principles constituting the very life of the State where those events occurred.

Yet, strange to say, the process towards the development of free institutions in Prussia has been watched with less interest and sympathy in England than have been accorded to similar phenomena exhibited on the far less congenial soil occupied by the Latin races of Southern Europe.

This is doubtless in a great measure owing to the less melodramatic character which attaches to the political development of Teutonic nations, as compared with that manifested by the races above adverted to.

To the Englishman, in the happy enjoyment of the privileges secured to him by his insular position, the study of foreign politics has always been (except where his own immediate interests, fancied or real, are concerned) more or less of a *dilettante* kind. It is as a recreation rather than as an earnest part of the day's work that he turns to the columns of the newspaper recording the 'foreign intelligence.' From his point of view the proclamation, for instance, by a Spanish Junta of the Rights of Man has more of picturesque circumstance connected with it than can ever enliven a debate respecting the right of an individual Israelite to sit at quarter sessions in the province of Brandenburg, or a discussion of the title by which an individual clergyman in Back Pomerania refuses to marry parties legally divorced by the civil tribunal. And yet it is from materials like these, rather than from such as the former, that the Constitutional metal which passes current in England has been wrought out.

Another and perhaps principal cause of this indifference is, that the course taken by the development of Prussian institutions does not exactly coincide with the ideal of any

of the great political parties into which the mass of the English public is divided.

The intertexture, in those institutions, of the democratic element on the one hand, and of the monarchical element on the other, is not such as to suit the taste or the prejudices either of our 'King, Church and State' Constitutionalist or of our more advanced Liberals.

Thus it happens that Prussia, while weaving her Constitutional woof after a pattern of her own, not copied from that of any of our schools of political design, appears to us in so far to be guilty of a political heresy, as being orthodox neither in her dogmas nor in her dissent from those dogmas,—for an Englishman, in politics no less than in religion, likes his very heterodoxy to be orthodox.

It is, however, this feature in the Constitutional history of Prussia which, if looked at more closely, affords good ground for hope, suggesting the notion of autonomous growth instead of an imported fabrication. It gives evidence of a living process derived from *a posteriori* experiences instead of from *a priori* doctrines—the only method by which any political fruits of a permanent kind have ever been matured.

A natural growing upwards of a living organism in obedience to laws written in the history of the past and in the character of the people, instead of an artificial and inorganic mechanism imposed from above, and obeying no impulse but that given to it by the caprices of an individual or the stereotype traditions of a dynastic policy: such is the contrast presented by Prussian institutions as compared with those of the three gigantic neighbours on whose frontiers her own abut.

To elucidate this position by tracing the connection between the present institutions of Prussia and the great organic changes that have preceded them is the object of this Essay.

For this purpose the Constitutional history of Prussia may be divided into five completed epochs, and a sixth just entered upon and in process of elaboration.

I. Of these, the first would include the period during which, in the hands of such rulers as the Great Elector,

Frederick William I., and Frederick II., the sovereign authority was, in the highest sense of the term, a creating power, and that to the exclusion of every other creative element in the State.

II. The second is that in which the nation, hitherto passively receptive of the forms impressed upon it by this plastic skill, becomes suddenly conscious of the life within it, and begins to move and think and act for itself. The initiation no longer comes from above, but from below, and the work of regeneration is commenced. Deep convictions evolved out of the heart and brain of the people became articulate in such men as the Steins,<sup>1</sup> the Hardenbergs,<sup>2</sup> the Niebuhrs,<sup>3</sup> the Wilhelm Humboldts,<sup>4</sup> the Vinckes, the Scharnhorsts,<sup>5</sup> and the Gneisenaus.<sup>6</sup> The sovereign follows the impulse, but timidly and falteringly. The great reforms of Stein are extorted from him by an overwhelming necessity; but that necessity once removed the spirit of concession ceases with it, leaving the work unfinished—a grand constitutional *torso* for future generations to complete.

The foundations, however, in all their length and breadth are laid, and the radical transition from the feudal to the modern State is fully accomplished between the years 1806 and 1812. It is a fact incalculably important both to Prussia and the rest of Germany that this transition, which it required a revolution like that of '89 to bring about in France, which in Austria was painfully and most unsatisfactorily begun upon by the revolution of '48, and which in Russia is being but slowly prepared at the present day, was effected in Prussia by the nation itself at the moment of its greatest prostration, and whilst under the demoralising

<sup>1</sup> Stein, Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Freiherr von, b. 1757, d. 1831, Prussian statesman and reformer; Minister of State, 1804-1807, 1807-1808; exiled and called to St. Petersburg by the Emperor Alexander I.

<sup>2</sup> Hardenberg, Prince, b. 1750, d. 1822, Prussian statesman; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1803-1806; Chancellor, 1810-1822.

<sup>3</sup> Niebuhr, Bartold Georg, b. 1776, d. 1831, Prussian statesman and historian.

<sup>4</sup> Humboldt, Wilhelm von, b. 1767, d. 1835, Prussian statesman and scientist.

<sup>5</sup> Scharnhorst, Gebhard David, b. 1755, d. 1813, Prussian general, organiser of the Landwehr.

<sup>6</sup> Gneisenau, Graf Neidhart von, b. 1760, d. 1831, Prussian field-marshal, hero of the wars of liberation.

influence of the defeat of Jena and the consequent foreign occupation.

III. The third epoch is that of the dynastic reaction against the popular movement, from which the above reforms had sprung. This reaction, however, assumes a very different character under the two sovereigns, Frederick Wilhelm III. and Frederick Wilhelm IV., during whose reigns it lasted. Under the first of these the reaction, though apparently exhibiting much greater hostility to the spirit of reform, was in reality of a very negative character. It is true that the further logical development of the Stein reforms was systematically opposed; but that portion of them which had been already conceded was conscientiously carried out—their distinguishing characteristic, namely, their anti-feudal animus, was faithfully adhered to; and, if nothing was done to win the applause of mere *doctrinaire* Constitutionalism, immense practical improvements in the administration were everywhere achieved.

Under the latter sovereign, while the most plausible protestations of homage to liberal opinions were abundantly made, the very foundations of the edifice of 1806–1812 were threatened to be undermined by the attempt, under the banner of liberal reforms, to return, *mutatis mutandis*, to the institutions of the Middle Ages.

IV. The fourth period is that of the paroxysm of 1848, and closes with the proclamation of the present Constitution by Royal Patent on the 5th of February 1850.

V. The fifth period is that of the machiavellian working, under the Ministry Manteuffel-Westfalen, of the Constitution thus patented, with the purpose of establishing, beneath the cloak of Constitutional forms, a centralised police State, upon the model of the French *préfet* system, here and there curiously interwoven with the medievalism above alluded to.

VI. The sixth period has been but lately entered upon.

Auspiciously commencing with the fall of the Ministry Manteuffel-Westfalen, and with the advent to power of the leaders of the Constitutional Party, it holds out the prospect of a fair trial being at length made of Constitutional institutions in one, at least, of the leading Continental States of Europe.

To enter fully into the history of these six periods would lead far beyond the limits of this present essay, which must be confined to a rough sketch of the features of each as they more immediately bear upon the present political configuration of Prussia.

I. Of the first period, it is enough to say that everything which could then be done to diminish the abuses of the feudal régime, by substituting for the action of an irresponsible land-owning class possessed of very extensive prescriptive rights of administration, that of an official class directly responsible to the Head of the State, was effected by the absolute rulers of Prussia, from the great Elector down to Frederick II. The power of the provincial States, as independent organs, was once for all broken by the former; while serfdom in its crudest form of personal servitude had in a great measure ceased when the latter came to the throne. To substitute free colonists for a peasantry in a state of prædial slavery was one of the favourite objects of Frederick the Great's administration, and wherever he could, he carried this plan into effect. The condition of the peasantry on the domains of the Crown was everywhere ameliorated, and one Cabinet order followed another to regulate in other parts of the monarchy the relations between the owners of the soil and those adstricted to it. The *radical* reform of these relations, however, namely, the enfranchisement of the soil itself, and the admission of its occupiers to their rights of free citizenship, did not belong to the age in which he lived, nor did it coincide with the task pre-eminently allotted to him in the history of Prussia: that task was the assertion of Prussia's *external* position in the European family, and for this purpose an army was the indispensable requisite.

For the creation, therefore, and, when created, for the maintenance, of the largest and most efficient fighting machine, the natural order of things may be said to have been inverted, the functions of the State having become ancillary to the army, instead of the army being subordinate to the State.

During the second half of the last century the human unit owing allegiance to the Prussian Crown was viewed

only as the raw material out of which the soldier was to be fashioned, and not till it had assumed that shape was the final cause of its existence accounted for.

The reforms of Frederick II., great though they undoubtedly were, were mainly directed to the accumulation of this material with a view to its manufactured state.

No wonder, then, that they stopped far short of anything like the assertion of abstract rights of citizenship.

After the death of Frederick the Great, the huge machinery of which his individual genius had been the sole motive power, and which during the last years of his reign had been strained far beyond what the State could bear, becoming suddenly deprived of this momentum, collapsed, and within a very short period its function, so far as any good results were concerned, altogether ceased, and in their working became wholly obstructive.

During the reign of Frederick's immediate successor, and up to the battle of Jena, Prussia apparently moved on, or rather stood still, in the old tracks, living upon the capital and credit acquired under the great King, whilst in reality the old forms were undergoing a process of rapid decomposition.

II. To understand the second period, that of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, a sketch of the internal state of Prussia during this interval will be necessary.

The provincial States long since deprived, as before stated, of any power of self-government, had, during Frederick II.'s reign ceased their functions altogether, or where these in any way continued, they were reduced to the mere administration of certain institutions of credit peculiar to the different provinces, but wholly unconnected with the exercise of any political rights.

From the exercise of such rights Frederick had, on grounds of policy, carefully excluded them. To substitute his authority for theirs was the object steadily pursued, and this could only be effected by such drastic measures as the total withdrawal of administrative functions from their hands, and the substitution of what in modern phraseology would be termed a centralized bureaucracy in their stead.

Though successful in his endeavours as regards the administration proper, as well as the upper branches of the

judicial administration, he had had neither the means nor the time to effect this reform in the *lower* branches of the latter, and the Courts of first instance were still everywhere identified, under the name of 'Patrimonial Gerichte,' with the Lordship of the Manor. Bound up with these was likewise the whole of the internal police administration of the country—of the country, that is, in opposition to the towns.

This localising of justice and identification of it with the manor (*Rittergut*) was an essential feature of the feudal system, which, it must be remembered, was in *all* its essential features still in force. For although during the lifetime of Frederick II. the *de facto* exercise of feudal rights had been greatly modified by his continual supervision and personal interference with individual abuses, yet the *de jure* modification upon any large scale of those rights would, in that age, have been deemed an attack upon the rights of property.

Inequality before the law of the various classes of the community, and the sharp delimitation into distinct but interdependent castes of the noble, the peasant, and the burgess, and the further subdivision of these into numerous more or less privileged bodies,—such was the *de jure* state of society in Prussia at the close of the eighteenth and at the commencement of the nineteenth century.

The first of these classes, besides their special prerogatives over the second class, enjoyed great privileges as regards the community at large. Almost entirely freed from taxation, they were further exempted from the forced military service of the country, while on the other hand they had the exclusive monopoly, from cornetries and ensigncies, of all the upper branches of the military hierarchy. As might be expected, this exemption and this monopoly, in a State where the army was so out of proportion to the size of the country, were peculiarly odious. (At Frederick's death the army was upwards of 200,000 men strong, while the population of the then Prussia was under six millions.)

The nature of their rights and prerogatives, as regards

the second class, will best be seen by noting the condition of the peasantry.

With the exception of the free colonies introduced by Frederick William I. and Frederick the Great, the whole land of Prussia (as distinct from towns and boroughs) was owned either immediately by the Crown, as domain, or by the nobles (*i.e.*, *Standes Herren*) and Gentry (*Ritterschaft*) or by ecclesiastical corporations.

The condition of the non-owning classes on the land thus owned was very different in the different provinces of the monarchy, according as the historical antecedents differed in each. It was best in that of Brandenburg, and worst in the newly acquired fragments of the kingdom of Poland.

The following were the features peculiar to the former province.

The peasant, whether holding upon an hereditary tenure (*Lassitische Bauerngüter*, our copyhold) or on a mere life tenure, equally paid his rent, if such it may be termed, in kind, *i.e.* in tithes and labour, of which the former were more or less well regulated, there being less room for abuse in the mode of their collection.

The latter, though the amount to be yielded was also placed under formal regulations, was practically extorted at the arbitrary will of the Lord of the Manor.

The children of such copyholders were bound to serve for a certain number of years, three at the least (*Gesinde Dienst*) on the land cultivated by the landlord. Even after the expiration of that term the latter's permission was required before they could take service elsewhere. For neglect of work corporal punishment could be lawfully inflicted, and the landlord's consent was required to enable them to marry. When such copyholders died intestate the landlord could bestow the copyhold on which of the sons of the late occupier he pleased.

Such was the legal condition of the *most* favoured in the peasant class—the so-called whole and half peasants (*ganze and halbe Bauern*) according to the size of their copyholds, whole copyholds running from 45 to 180 English acres (30 to 120 Morgen) and half copyholds from 22 to 90.



The next class, that of *Cottiers* and 'Boothmen' (*Kossäthen*, *Kot-sati* in Domesday Book, and Budner, also found in Domesday Book), who held but a few acres, were naturally still more at the mercy of the owner of the soil.

Last and lowest were those who held no land, and who, without the power to take their labour to the best market, were forced to live on daily hire. They were variously termed *Einlieger* and *Altsitzer*. Of the 88,000 male inhabitants of the province of Brandenburg (of course exclusive of the towns) in the year 1804 there were :—

- 334 Proprietors of Manors (necessarily of noble families).
- 14,202 Peasant copyholders of *whole* copyholds.
- 2,991 Peasant copyholders of *half* copyholds.
- 8,593 *Whole* Kossäthen.
- 1,022 *Half* Kossäthen.
- 10,860 Budner (they held less land than that held by a half *Cottier*).
- 27,381 Altsitzer and Einlieger (day labourers).

When it is recollected that in addition to the power thus legally conferred on the Lord of the Manor, the only Court of Justice to which the peasant had access for the redress of wrongs done him in excess of those legal powers was attached to the manor and was presided over by the proprietor himself or by his immediate representative, usually a hybrid personage, half-bailiff, half-attorney, the condition of this class of the community, even under the most favourable conditions, will be seen to have been no enviable one.

In the less favourably circumstanced provinces the Lord of the Manor could, at the death of a peasant, appropriate half his movable property, and during his lifetime lay an unlimited claim on the whole of his labour 'from sunrise to sunset,' the whole year round. He could also at pleasure take away the land held by a peasant, and give him other less fertile in exchange.

Thus much for the owners and tillers of the soil.

The Burgess class were, on their side, fettered by the system, in its worst forms, of guilds and corporations, and the industry of the country was deprived of any chance

of free development by the adoption, in its most rigorous form, of the mercantile system. As was to be expected, prohibitive duties and the most absolute monopolies wrought their accustomed work of stunted and unhealthy native manufactures paid for at the price of general impoverishment.

The never-tiring personal superintendence by which Frederick the Great had, to a certain extent, mitigated some of the evils of systems so radically vicious degenerated, under his two immediate successors, into a system of government emanating from the private Cabinet of the King, collateral with, or rather having a controlling action over, the ostensible Government through the Ministers of State. Of the results of this 'Camarilla' system a lively picture has been preserved in the Diary kept by Gentz of his visit to the headquarters of the Prussian Army and Court at the commencement of the campaign of 1806. The hopeless confusion into which the diplomatic negotiations, as well as military plans, were thrown by the reversal, through the instrumentality of such men as the two Lombards and Beyme, in the King's private closet, of determinations formally arrived at by the responsible public servants of the Crown, and the consequent total demoralisation of the latter, are graphically presented to us. Other contemporary evidence testifies to the like results in the departments connected with the internal administration. No wonder that men who possessed any degree of self-respect refused to take office under such conditions.

Such, in very imperfect outline, is a sketch of the internal state of Prussia when the catastrophe of Jena at last opened the eyes of the most obstinately blind, and convinced even the King and Court that the only chance of salvation lay in calling Stein and his friends into office.

To appreciate the true character of what was done by Stein and the school of statesmen whom he inspired and disciplined, we must consider not only what he actually effected, but what he wished to effect. What he aimed at was to substitute an organic whole, in its entirety, for the inorganic machinery that had been gradually rotting ever

since the death of Frederick the Great, and was now happily once for all broken to pieces.

Two great principles may be traced out as those upon which the reforms were based.

The first involved an organic change in the substance to be administered. It may be concisely defined as substitution of free, uniform citizenship in lieu of unfree, multifarious 'caste-ship.'

Only from the citizens settled upon a free soil could emancipation from the foreign oppression be hoped for, and before the nation could be appealed to, to make the immense sacrifices of blood and treasures required of it, it was necessary the freedom it was called upon to assert should be felt by each individual member to be an inalienable right and possession of his own, and not a mere diplomatic or geographical abstraction.

The second principle involved an organic change in the administration itself. By it was to be substituted for the hierarchic exclusiveness of a bureaucracy the free admission of the governed to a share and responsibility in the Government. It was in the body politic the correlative of the great principle asserted by Protestantism, of the solidarity of the clergy and laity in the body ecclesiastic.

By the carrying out of the first of these principles, the social—by the carrying out of the latter, the political—enfranchisement of the nation was to be attained.

The former object was fully effected—more completely, indeed, than in any other State of modern Europe. The latter was but partially accomplished, and it is the task which the present Constitution, if it obtains fair play, will have to accomplish.

By the edict of the 9th October 1807, under the modest title of 'Statute to Facilitate the Holding and Free Use of Real Property,' the first step towards the vindication of the former of these principles was made; by the various ordinances of 1811 the work was finally completed.

According to the provisions of this body of legislation, the soil was once for all enfranchised, and the castes into which the society had been hitherto divided were

abolished. Every inhabitant of the States, no matter to what class of society he belonged, became entitled to acquire and hold real property. Individuals of the peasant class could at their pleasure pursue the industrial callings hitherto monopolised by the burgess class, and *vice versa*; nor was the possession of armorial bearings to be any longer a legal disqualification for the pursuit of mercantile avocations. The barriers between town and country were thrown open. Industrial pursuits which had strictly been limited to the walls of the former could now be anywhere followed, and the labour which till then had been strictly localised could now freely migrate from town to country and from country to town, in search of the best market. Entails could be cut off by arrangements come to within the family. Perpetual servitude in shape of tithe or labour was made compulsorily redeemable. Interference with the personal liberty of the peasant by the landlord in the shape of forced farm labour imposed upon the children of the former, and of the latter's previous consent for their marriage, was abolished, and the relations between the owner and the tiller of the soil were placed, once for all, upon the footing of free contract between labour and capital.

Nor did reforms on this head stop here. By the Edict of the 11th September 1811 a sweeping revolution was effected in a large portion of the property of the country. On ceding one-half or one-third of the lands occupied by them, the hereditary holders of copyhold and other property burdened with perpetual servitudes became freehold proprietors of the remaining half or two-thirds.

Dangerous and revolutionary as this extreme measure seemed even to some of the most liberal reformers, it turned out eminently beneficial and conservative in its effects, by providing the country with one of the most eminently conservative elements of modern society,—an independent agricultural middle class. It was, moreover, eminently promotive of the special object then in view, that of increasing the number of those who had a real stake in the country to defend, and consequently of those from whom, in return for great benefits acquired, great sacrifices could be conscientiously demanded.

The perpetual servitudes to the State were no less sweepingly done away with than those to private individuals. Among these the most burdensome had been the supplying, even during peace time, of the whole transport service of the army, and the necessary forage for the cavalry and artillery. These burdens likewise had exclusively fallen on the land held by the peasant.

The personal status of the industrial classes was submitted to a no less searching reform than that of the agricultural class, and by an ordinance of 1811 all restrictions on the free exercise of trades, in regard to the laws previously in force as to guilds, apprenticeships, and the like, were removed.

With the passing of these measures the first of the two principles above noted was fully vindicated.

With regard to the second, as before stated, Stein was less successful, for he was here opposed by the traditional tenacity with which the Hohenzollern dynasty have ever clung to the assertion of their rights of absolute power.

Moreover, of those who most heartily co-operated with him in the first of these reforms, but few had views sufficiently comprehensive to take in the latter. Nor, on the other hand, was he supported to the same extent by public opinion on this ground as he had been on the other.

Self-government is essentially a matter of habit, and the Prussian nation had contracted the habit of having their government done for them. *Good government* and not self-government had been the boon so earnestly invoked, and in giving them the former Stein found that what demand there had been for the latter was materially diminished.

To obtain payment in hard cash for the promissory notes with reference to Provincial States, States General, etc., issued by Frederick William III., under the war pressure, would have required the continuance in office of Stein for several years. His forced exile, so early as 1808, deadened the whole movement, and the inferior capacities whom the jealousy of Napoleon allowed to fill his place had enough to do to carry out practically the earlier portions of the work begun by him.

In his voluminous remains, however, we find not only the rough sketch, but, so to say, the working models of the edifice he had desired to raise, and, by comparing these with those portions of the work which he actually completed, we are enabled to estimate very correctly the character which the whole would have borne.

As a practical statesman, and not a 'doctrinaire' Constitutionalist, his method of proceeding was from the foundations upwards towards the roof, and not from the roof downwards, as is the fashion of the latter.

Accordingly the basis on which his whole fabric was to rest, was communal form. The Commune (*Gemeinde*) autonomously administered by its self-elected officers, with power of self-taxation for communal purposes, and with the free right to dispose of its property, was to be the political unit in the State. In direct opposition to the advocates of feudal forms (as well as the high and dry Tories, his contemporaries, as the romantic Medievalists of the present school) instead of a graduated social scale (*Ständische Gliederung*) fantastically parcelled out within the limits of such communes, he was desirous of having the basis of his communal organisation as simple and broad as possible, and, by a minimum of qualification, of admitting as participators both of its rights and its obligations the largest possible number of members.

Next in order above the Commune, as an administrative district, stood the Circle. It was also to be in the main a self-governing institution. The 'Landrath' who presided over its administration was to be a resident landed proprietor chosen by the Crown from among three names submitted to it by the 'Estates' of the Circle. The guarantee to the Crown of his efficiency was to consist in his having passed the State examination required, in another portion of the Stein system, of all public servants of the Crown.

For the institution of the 'Landrath' which still forms the keystone of the internal administration of Prussia, we have no equivalent in English. But of the sphere of his activity we can form some idea by combining into one the functions of a Justice of the Peace with those of a Chairman of Quarter Sessions, of a Chairman of a Poor Law Board, of a

Commissioner of Taxes, and a Commissioner of Lunacy in a district averaging about 40,000 souls. He was to receive but a small salary (the present salary of a 'Landrath' varies in different Circles from about £150 to £200 a year), and the post was to be essentially one of honour.

The 'Landrath' was a sort of middle person between the organs of the Central and those of the Municipal Government, responsible to the former for the proper administration of his district, and to the latter for the maintenance of their rights and privileges.

The levying of rates for local purposes, the nomination of the various administrative officers subordinate to the 'Landrath,' the selection of candidates for that office, and the discussion of all matters connected with the administration of the Circle were to be vested in the 'Estates' of the Circle—not the old exclusive Corporations he had been at such pains to destroy—but bodies to be composed in equal proportions of the resident gentry, and of representatives named by the rural Communes and the towns. The Circle was to include promiscuously both town and country, the large towns only having the privilege of forming a separate Circle.

Lastly came the Province. The Provincial Government was to be essentially an organ of the Central Government, and was in fact a miniature copy of the latter. The President (Ober-Präsident) was surrounded by a number of departments, each under a Regierungsrath, corresponding to the central organs of police, of justice, of education, of public works, of woods and forests and ecclesiastical affairs; and was to exercise a sort of vice-royalty, being the organ by whom the commands of the Central Executive were to be carried out in the Province. On the other hand, he was to stand in constant communication with the 'Landräthe,' who had to report to him on the state of their Circle, and, by means of the departments above named, to exercise a constant inspection and general control over every part of the Province. According to the principle on which Stein's whole plan was formed, however, the sphere of the Provincial Government was to be strictly *executive*. For the passing of any *legislative* enactments specially

relating to the Province, or for giving validity to any enactments other than strictly executive, emanating from the central authority, Provincial Estates were to be provided, composed upon the same principles as those which obtained in the 'Estates' of the 'Circle' above described. The whole taxation of the Province for provincial purposes was to be imposed by this body, it being Stein's intention that their legislative powers, as far as they went, should be thoroughly *bona fide*. He repudiated as a most dangerous mockery the creation of mere '*consultative*' States with no powers to enforce the resolutions come to by them.

It was, moreover, part of his plan, in order as much as possible to guard the interests of the governed against the ignorance or caprice of the executive organs, to establish by the side of the Provincial Government a sort of administrative Council, composed of nine members elected out of their own number, by the Provincial States.

The personal and local knowledge of this body was to modify the application of general measures to the peculiar circumstances of the Province, while it would have considerably facilitated, on the other hand, the labours of the responsible executive.

Such was the living organism with which Stein was desirous of replacing the old centralized bureaucratic machinery, where nothing was left to the judgment or initiation of the local organs, but everything was heaped up in hopeless arrears and confusion in the Chancelleries of the Berlin Bureaux. Reforms like these would have been impossible without, at the same time, a total reorganisation of the official machinery itself in the upper branches. This reorganisation was the first thing he set about, and with it he was completely successful.

The crowning work to this edifice was to be supplied by States General, in which the whole nation was to take its share in the imperial legislation, in a manner analogous to that, which in the Provincial States, the eight fragments of the nation shared in the provincial legislation.

This portion of his plan, however, he evidently conceived as something distinct from the other, and only to be carried



out, when the first portion had been fairly organised, and for some time in working order.

It will not be without some interest, and it will save repetition later, if we examine what parts of this system Stein actually carried out, and what parts remained undone. We shall arrive, moreover, by this examination at a knowledge of the forms into which Prussian institutions finally moulded themselves in the period between 1806 and 1815, and in which, with little real modification, they remained, till the proclamation of the present Constitution.

With the remodelling of the Town and Borough Corporations or, in other words, with the reconstruction of the Town Commune, he was perfectly successful.

It would probably be difficult to find in any other branch of the Teutonic race, a more perfect specimen of the self-government supposed to be peculiar to the race, than is afforded by the corporation of Prussian towns posterior to the Edict of the 19th November 1808.

Previous to that date, the corporate bodies both of the larger towns, not excepting the capital, and of the smaller boroughs exhibited all the worst features, both of the evils peculiar to the traditions handed down from feudal times, and of those of the centralized bureaucracy introduced by Frederick II. to correct the former.

The burgesses, who formed a very small minority of the inhabitants, were divided into guilds, ruled by such exclusive laws and regulations as wholly to hamper all individual action and movement, and to render illusory any hopes of self-reform. The Magistrates elected by these, on the other hand, had become wholly dependent upon the organs of the Central Government, who under various names such as Collectors of Taxes, Officials of the General Directory, Officers of the Exchequer, etc., had been permanently established in the towns with, originally, powers of supervision only. These functions, however, soon absorbed those of the Magistracy, and in a very short time the latter became a dead letter. When, after the death of Frederick, the central machinery became, as before described, paralysed, this portion of it shared the fate of the rest, and even in a worse degree, inasmuch as towards the

close of the century it had become the custom to fill up these places, from motives of economy, with invalided officers.

By the Edict in question, the guilds were one and all abolished, and in their stead was introduced one equal right of citizenship, from which no domiciled inhabitant of the town could be excluded, except upon the ground of moral disqualification. The mass of citizens thus composed formed the constituency out of whose members and by whose suffrages were elected a representative body, who, in their turn, elected the Magistrates. The members who composed the representative body received no salary, and those only of the Magistrates (a very limited number), whose whole time had to be devoted to their magisterial functions, were remunerated. These functions were strictly restricted to the Executive. In all matters requiring permanent administration, such as those connected with the Church, the School, the Poor, Public Buildings, etc., permanent committees chosen partly from the Magistrates, partly from the representatives, and partly from the great body of the citizens, were the responsible administrative organs. The members composing these committees were chosen by the representative body and confirmed by the Magistracy.

To encourage and diffuse habits of self-government and a knowledge of its practical details, stringent regulations were made, to prevent shirking the responsibility or trouble of filling these municipal offices, and the most valid excuses were required to procure exemption; obstinate refusal without such valid excuse was punished by loss of the suffrage and a levy of additional rates.

The only control over this machinery accorded to the Government was the confirmation in their offices by the 'Landräthe' of the Magistrates after their election by the representatives and the selection by the Crown of the Chief Magistrates (Ober-Bürgermeister) out of three candidates submitted to it by the magisterial body. For many years, however, in fact till the advent of the Manteuffel Ministry, this was a mere formal process.

With the remodelling of the rural Commune, Stein was

not equally successful. He was exiled before he had had time to overcome the immense difficulties which this reform presented and which to this day have not been solved. As a rule, the town corporations had all been more or less constructed upon the same type, and the same vices being common to all, general measures of reform could not be applied. On the other hand, the immense differences of every kind in the circumstances of rural communes, according as they were situated in one or the other province, made general legislation respecting them almost impossible, and necessitated at all events preparatory labours of a vast kind.

Moreover, Stein had against him the whole of the country interest, for the admission of their former serfs to equal political rights with themselves was a concession which the latter were not likely to yield without a struggle. Using, then, what gear he found at hand, until such a time as his own could be got ready, he proceeded to the reform in the sense above given of the institution of the Landrätthe, whom he assisted in their work of administration by provisional Estates of the 'Circle,' composed as well as circumstances would permit of the gentry of the district, with deputies to represent the towns and the smaller proprietors and farmers of the soil. With respect to the Provincial States, he could not get the consent of the King to call them into existence, and he was obliged to content himself with a promise that sooner or later they should be organised. Moreover, until he had his basis in the reformed rural Commune, he could not proceed to their definite organisation.

He was quite otherwise successful with his reorganisation of the official machinery. Simplification of the machine and a total reform of the 'Status' of the official were the two objects he had in view. In carrying out the former, he totally suppressed the secret cabinet system. The Ministers, personally responsible to the King, deliberated *in pleno* respecting general measures, under the presidency of the Sovereign. The business they had to transact was diminished to a minimum and divested of all superfluous detail by the large sphere of action ascribed to the Provincial Government. As a rule, only matters of principle

were to occupy the attention of the Ministers. The principle once laid down, the local organs were responsible for the practical application of it. For this purpose, Stein was, of course, careful to pick out the best men he could find, to fill the posts of Provincial Presidents.

His reform of the personal status of the official was not less complete—instead of a dependent class, subject to every whim and caprice of an irresponsible camarilla, resting upon a precarious pedestal above the rest of the community, Stein established an independent class of public servants, on whom he inculcated in the most earnest manner that in becoming officials, they did not cease to be citizens, but on the contrary formed part of the pith and marrow of the nation, to whom they were just as responsible for their actions, as to the Sovereign, whose livery they wore.

Their independence was secured by the principle of immovability most rigidly enforced. According to the organic statute regulating the public service, no servant of the Crown could be removed from his place, except upon the passing of a criminal sentence against him, on the finding of a verdict in the so-called Court of Discipline (Disciplinar Hof) instituted especially for this purpose, and in which breach of public duty had to be established by ordinary rules of evidence.

Admission into the official ranks was open to the whole nation—merit, as proved by public examination, being with certificates of moral qualification, the only test applied.

With this our sketch of Stein's reforms must close.

III. We next come to the third epoch, that namely posterior to the successful *Levée de bouclier* of 1813, '14, and '15, and which has been described as the period of reaction. It lasts down to the Revolution of 1848, but passes through two distinct phases, according as each was more immediately influenced by the different characters of the two Sovereigns under whom it lasted.

A true picture of the first of these periods could only be obtained by entering into the history of the German national movement which preceded, and was instrumental to the successive overthrows of Napoleon in the years 1814 and '15

—a task not within the limits of this essay, but the principal features of which must nevertheless be adverted to.

It was only as a last resource and a supreme measure of self-preservation that the Dynasties appealed to the national feeling, to rid the common fatherland of the miseries of foreign occupation. The spirit so evoked wrought the deliverance of the German soil, but it elicited at the same time a craving for national union which, to borrow a term from mechanics, by acting in a centripetal direction found itself in direct antagonism to the centrifugal action of the Dynastic principle, represented by the several Sovereignities, into which Germany was divided, many of whom, be it remembered, were the creations of Napoleon for the very purpose of perpetuating that centrifugal action.

At the Congress, which was to settle accounts, not only between the Conquerors and the Conquered, but also those between the former themselves, which was, in a word, to readjust the whole of the forces called into play by the events of the preceding years, the German Dynasties were, the German nation was *not*, represented. Acting logically upon the principle of self-preservation, the former took the only course compatible with that principle—they refused to ratify the engagements they had entered into towards the latter. Naturally enough, incurring the odium of the national party for this breach of promise, it has, I think, not been sufficiently borne in mind that any other course would have been equivalent to the signature of their death-warrant. A centripetal and a centrifugal force cannot actively coexist in the same body, and where they are both present, two alternatives only offer themselves, either they neutralise each other, or the one getting the upper hand, the other is destroyed. At Leipzig and during the invasion of France the centripetal national force had been predominant—at the Congress of Vienna, the Dynastic centrifugal force *had it all its own way*.

And so it came to pass, that when the curtain that hung over the diplomatic transactions of the Vienna Congress, came to be drawn up, instead of the fulfilment of the

promises made to it of free institutions and an organic union, the German nation beheld the stage occupied by the *dramatis personæ* of the Holy Alliance, and by the machinery of the German Confederation, as remodelled by the final Act of Congress. Under the sacred vestments of the former, it soon recognised a mutual Insurance Society of the Dynasties as against itself, under the intricacies of the latter, a machine cunningly contrived, so to poise the various forces within the frontiers of the Confederation against each other, as permanently to neutralise all possibility of the development of any of them in a national direction.

That this policy was the natural one for the House of Hapsburg, on the one side, and for the small Dynasties on the other (for the latter, indeed, the only one compatible with their continued existence) is self-evident. That it should have been acceded to, and have found one of its warmest advocates in the Prussian Cabinet, is one of those inconceivable instances, not however unfrequent in history, where the fancied interests of Caste wholly supersedes the real interest of nationality. By the whole of her history, as well as by that of Germany for a century past, but more especially by the antecedents of the previous ten years, both Prussia as a State, and the House of Hohenzollern as a Dynasty, had been placed, to the exclusion of all other competition, at the head of the national and Liberal movement in Germany, with everything to gain by the success of those principles, and everything to lose by departure from them.

That the internal development of Prussia became immediately affected by her adherence to the principles of the Holy Alliance need hardly be stated. But the history of the reaction, its positive history, is to be read rather in her diplomatic transactions with the other Cabinets of Europe and Germany, at the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Laybach, and Verona, and at the Carlsbad Conferences than in her acts at home. Here, during Frederick William III.'s lifetime, at least, the reaction was mainly of a negative character. He left undone what he had pledged himself to do, but he did not take away what he had given.

The natural result of this, on the internal administration of Prussia, was the development and consolidation of the bureaucratic element, but, as we have already seen, the bureaucracy thus developed and consolidated presented a very different organism from the old machinery, condemned as unfit for work in the memorable year 1806, and, different also, both in the principles which gave it life and in the practical adaptation of those principles, from any similar institution of either ancient or modern days.

We have seen, that it was one of Stein's first cares, to absorb into the administration of the country all the best and healthiest elements which he could lay his hands upon. The body of men thus collected he succeeded in thoroughly imbuing with his own exalted views of public duty and self-sacrifice. The years of their apprenticeship coincided with those of the terrible crises 1807-1812. The first years of their activity as master workmen were identical with the glorious period of the War of Liberation. In the reorganisation of the State, during the first of these two periods by which the efforts made in the second became possible, as well as in the direction and impulse given to those efforts, they had become the principal part.

With such traditions as these, then, and with tempers thus steeled, they found themselves drifted into the reactionary period and became, as against that reaction and such unprincipled reactionists as Wittgenstein and his school, the guardians and defenders of one portion, at least, of the traditions of the Reform period. It has been very much the fashion, as well with the so-called Conservative writers of the Romantic reactionary school as with the Constitution-mongers of 1848, to heap abuse of every kind upon the bureaucratic institutions which flourished in Prussia between the years 1815 and 1848, and to ascribe to them all the evils of the revolutionary years. Nothing can be more unjust or show greater ignorance of the historical facts of the case. That the free institutions promised by the King were not granted was in no way their fault—their functions were administrative not legislative. For this breach of contract, the King and

his engagements to the Dynastic Insurance Society were alone to blame. For the evils that followed from these unfulfilled engagements, they could therefore in no way be held accountable, whereas, on the other hand, all the good that was wrought in Prussia came wholly from them. The barest enumeration of what was thus practically accomplished would suffice to refute the above position. The organisation of the Public Education, the marvellous ordering of the Finances, the development of the material resources of the country, the even-handed administration of Justice, and the simplification of its machinery—all these and endless other good works proceeded from the public spirit and self-denying labour of this ill-paid body of public officials, who, though consolidated into a hierarchy in the sense that Stein was anxious to avoid, yet, to their glory be it spoken, kept up a sense of responsibility towards their fellow-citizens at large, rather than towards their own order, and who, as before stated, offered the only effective barrier to the retrograde tendencies of the narrow-minded clique, who succeeded to office upon Hardenberg's retirement. That their day is gone by, and that with free institutions a centralised bureaucracy would be a mischievous anachronism, I should be the last to deny; but, nevertheless, no account of the Constitutional history of Prussia would be correct that did not assign a fair and honourable place to the official hierarchy that carried the ark of the Stein and Hardenberg reforms in comparative safety through the waters of the reactionary flood from 1815 to 1848.

Before leaving this period it is but fair to remark that Frederick William III., when his dynastic crotchets were not touched, was eminently a just and conscientious ruler. His ideal, if so prosaic a character ever indulged in an ideal, would certainly have been something like what was really effected during the twenty-five years of his reign subsequent to 1815: an absolute government kept from capricious exercise of power by the harmonious action of a well-regulated official machinery working upon the principles of justice and equity. Frederick William III. is as eminently a type of the positive and prosaic



bureaucratic reformer, as his successor afterwards became of the ideological and romantic reactionary.

To the other phase of the reaction we must now turn our attention.

We have hitherto left unnoticed the opposition to the reforms in question, and adverted only to the reactionary policy of the King and his *entourage*, as it displayed itself in the negative form of not carrying these out to their logical consequences. Such opposition as there had been was overborne by the evident necessity of the case and the general feeling of the nation. The privileged sufferers had had nothing better to plead than the prescriptive character of the rights taken from them, and under a political sky like that which then hung over Prussia, such a plea was not likely to be admitted to much consideration. At the conclusion of the war, however, when men suddenly had leisure to look about them and to ponder over and generalise the results of the generation of convulsions that had just come to a close, it occurred to a certain class of minds, amidst the seeming chaos of all things around them, to be violently struck by what seemed the unfavourable contrast between the picturesque ruins of the past and the bare scaffolding of the new fabric in the course of construction. The generation that was rising had had no practical knowledge of this old state of things, and consequently the feeling which took possession of them was not so much a craving after a reality which had been actually experienced, as a stretching forth of hands after a fantastic mirage, in which the past was reflected through the media of modern feeling and of unconsciously contracted modern habits. In the beginning of the century poetry and imagination had all been on the other side, arrayed, with such a standard-bearer as J. J. Rousseau, under the banner of the Rights of Man and the like, but of these, that which could be put to practical use had long since assumed the unpoetic shape of legislative enactment, and what could not be so appropriated had long since fallen into discredit. The old Deities could now boast of having the 'prestige' of poetry and imagination back to their side, and beheld their images raked up from beneath the ashes of

the past, and the attempt made to reinstate them on their ancient pedestals. This phase, which in some shape or another accompanies the establishment of every new creed, has been generalised in Germany under the name of Romanticism. Making its first appearance on the fields of theology and literature, where, with such apostles as the Schlegels, it soon became master of the ground, it next turned to that of politics.

The true historical meaning of Romanticism has been admirably defined in the following passage from the remarkable essay, entitled 'Julian the Apostate, or the Romanticist of the Throne of the Cæsars,' written with special reference to this phase of German and Prussian History, and the relation to it of Frederick William IV.

'The historical moments at which it is possible for Romanticism and Romanticists to make their appearance are those epochs in which a new form of civilisation, as yet incomplete and undeveloped, finds itself face to face with one that has become antiquated, and in comparison with the developed positions of which its own necessarily appeared stamped with a negative character. At such boundary lines of the world's history, men, in whom sensitiveness and imagination outweigh clear reason, characters with more of warmth than of lucidity in their composition, will always retrace their steps towards the old ; and, turning from the prosaic scepticism which they see everywhere gaining ground around them, will yearn after the familiar forms of their ancient faith and seek both for themselves and for others to restore life to them. As children of the age in which they live, however, being more imbued with the new principles hateful to them than they themselves are aware of, the Past, as it reproduces itself in them and through them, is no longer the Past in its pure and original form, but is considerably mixed up with the new, and, consequently, beforehand, betrayed to the latter. The faith of such persons is no longer the genuine spontaneous faith that exercises complete mastery over the believer, but such an one as he holds on by, consciously and intentionally. The contradiction and untruth which lie herein, though conscious of them, he

endeavours to hide from himself by the fantastic obscurity wherein he wraps them up. Romanticism is essentially mystical, and mystical temperaments, only, can become Romanticists.'

With the predominance of sensitiveness and imagination peculiar to the German character, no wonder that the romantic phase took so portentous a development in Germany and particularly that it should have reaped some of its most enduring fruits on the ground of politics. We in England have had our medieval revival also, but its attempt, in the form of Young Englandism, to take up a permanent political position met with a very complete failure, and it was soon banished to its natural sphere of theology and art.

The reverse was the case among our Teutonic kinsmen—not that there was any affinity between the Boeotian Squirearchy of Westphalia and Back Pomerania and the blasé over-refined disciples of the new school, but that by a happy historical coincidence the former were in a position to afford to the abstractions of the latter a concrete body of grievances which opened up a most desirable field for the propagandism of the new sect.

It was the union between these two elements which resulted in the formation of the so-called '*Junker Partei*.'

On the one side, the realism of the grumbling old squires of the provinces, who regarded with daily increasing jealousy the *fellow-citizens*, whose ancestors their own had all but owned as serfs, who at Quarter Sessions would whisper regretfully to each other of the whipping posts and parish stocks of the days that were gone by—of the high rate of wages—of the decrease of game, and the consequent ruin of the country. On the other side, the idealism of men who had never owned an acre of land in their lives, but whose imaginations, stored with the lore of the Middle Ages, dressed up the very prosaic grievances of the former in the picturesque drapery of those days.

In alliance with both, stood the high and dry Theologians of the High Church Lutheran School, who welcomed the new sect as the only means of luring back to the fold of orthodoxy the strayed flocks who had so long pastured

amidst the dangerous luxuriance of the schools of philosophy.

The positive political positions held at the present day by this party were only later developed, but its origin requires being preadverted to, and its real nature analysed, as its influence began to be already sensibly felt during the organisation of the Provincial States.

In fact, the whole political tendency of the party may be epitomised in the States that were then constructed, a tendency that may be described as the substitute of the institution of 'States' for the Parliamentary institutions which the nation conceived had been promised to it.

There is a radical antagonism between Parliamentary institutions and the institutions of 'States' which was probably not so clearly apparent to Stein and the reformers of his school, as it has since become to those who have had ten years' experience of Parliamentary life in Prussia.

This antagonism is easily deduced from the historical origin of the two institutions.

A Parliament is the representation, for the purposes of Imperial legislation, of a nation in its entirety. It stands (theoretically, at least) on ground high above that occupied by personal and corporate interests. The 'common weal' is essentially that which it is to safeguard, and the interests of which it is to legislate for. A *normal* state of antagonism between a Parliament and the Sovereign authority would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole institution. Where such an antagonism has existed in history, it has necessarily led to the suppression of Parliamentary institutions, as in France, or to their triumph, as in England. In a word, a Parliament is in its very essence a *national* institution, it is the depository of the national conscience, and the organ of the national will.

Exactly the reverse of all this, on the other hand, applies to the institution of 'States.' Traced back to its historical origin, it is found to have been in its essence of a particularistic and exclusive character, and to have in each case originated as a defensive association amongst any given body of vassals owing allegiance to the same feudal lord for the preservation intact of the privileges conceded to

the individual members of such association by such feudal superior. This *defensive* character it in most cases changed to an offensive one for the purpose of extorting more enlarged privileges. Each time that the feudal lord wanted subsidies, the terms were raised and harder conditions struck. At first, limited to the holders of knightly and ecclesiastical fiefs, another 'Estate,' that of the Town Corporation, soon came to be added. From them, no less than from the others, subsidies were required and privileges given them in return. Moreover, the feudal lord was in most cases glad to get this support against the other 'States' and to get better terms by putting one Estate against the other.

The privileges granted were in every case delegations of authority, each fresh concession rendering the parties to whom it was made more absolutely masters over the internal economy of the territory held by them.<sup>1</sup> The identification of the Courts of Justice with the ownership of the soil—the complete loss of all the rights of freemen by the peasantry—and all that we saw Stein successfully removing, was acquired in this way.

The largest field upon which this process was exhibited was the German Empire itself,—the great vassals of whom the 'States' of the Empire were originally composed, there gradually developing into the independent Sovereignities of which the German Confederation is at present composed. In what direct opposition to the national tendencies this development stands, has been before alluded to in this essay. *A fortiori* the smaller association of States we have specially referred to were destitute of all national character. They were there to defend their privileges in the first place against their feudal superiors, in the next place, against each other. Antagonism, therefore, between them and this feudal superior (later the independent Sovereign) was the normal condition in which they stood. It was *his* business to look after the interests of the 'common weal,' theirs to look after their own.

<sup>1</sup> *Note*.—Compare 'Territorial Herrschaft,' 'Landes Hoheit,' 'Souverainität,' the various steps by which the great vassals of the Empire gradually developed into the independent Sovereignities of modern Germany.

The breaking to pieces of the powers of the States was, as we have seen, the first step taken by the great Elector towards establishing a Prussian nationality. The pulverising of the fragments that remained was the means by which Stein evoked the national movement that eventually freed Prussia and Germany from French domination. All this, however, was not so clearly apprehended thirty years ago as it is now, and when the Crown Prince of Prussia, the present King, known for his great intellectual capacities, for his patronage of science and the arts, and his dislike to the bureaucracy, set to work to remodel the institutions of the Provincial States (as it was generally supposed upon the Stein pattern) as a preparatory step to what was so keenly desired,—a general representation of the whole nation,—he had the good wishes of the great body of the Liberal Party with him.

The decade between 1820 and 1830 was employed upon the work of reorganising the Provincial States for the eight provinces of which the kingdom of Prussia is composed.

A short summary of the constitution of the States of Brandenburg will suffice to show upon what principles this reconstruction was conducted. The other Constitutions differed only in matters of detail, according to the history of each province modified one or other of the multifarious elements that entered into their composition, for 'a strict observance of the historical rights' of each province was already then announced as the principle that was to guide the royal manufacturer in his work. The province of Brandenburg, covering an area of 734 square miles, with a population of above two millions, and some hundred and fifty towns and large boroughs, is composed of three old historical districts—the Kurmark (the old Electorate), the Neumark, and the Nieder Lausitz.

In the absence of any of the great barons of the late German Empire (*Reichsunmittelbare*), the so-called mediatised princes, the States of Brandenburg were only three in number. In those provinces, as, for instance, Silesia and Westphalia, where these mediatised princes had landed property, they formed a separate State by the Edict of 1st July 1823.

The three States were composed as follows :—

I. THE KURMARK :—

<i>The First Estate—</i>	Voices
The Chapter of the Cathedral of Brandenburg	1
Count Solms of Baruth . . . . .	1
Count Hardenberg Reventlow ; Count Arnim	1
Boitzenburg, voting <i>curially</i> . . . . .	1
The Ritterschaft ( <i>i.e.</i> Proprietors of Rittergüter, Manors) . . . . .	20
	<hr/>
Total of the First Estate . . . . .	23
	<hr/>

*The Second Estate—*

Berlin, 3 ; Brandenburg, 1 ; Potsdam, 1	5
1 each : Salzwedel, Perleberg, Frankfurt a/O.	
Prinzau, Ruppin . . . . .	5
The remaining boroughs divided into five groups, each sending a member . . . . .	5
	<hr/>
Total of the Second Estate . . . . .	15
	<hr/>

<i>The Third Estate</i> , composed of eight constitu- encies, being either single circles or unions of circles . . . . .	8
	<hr/>

Total of the Third Estate. . . . .	8
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Total of the Three Estates of the Kurmark . . . . .	46
	<hr/>

II. THE NEUMARK :—

<i>The First Estate—</i> (No Standes Herren) Ritterschaft	6
<i>The Second Estate</i> , grouped into constituencies as in the Kurmark . . . . .	3
<i>The Third Estate</i> , also as in the Kurmark . . . . .	2
	<hr/>
Total States of the Neumark . . . . .	11
	<hr/>

## III. THE NIEDER LAUSITZ :—

<i>The First Estate</i> —Count Solms Sonnenfeld . . . . .	1
The remaining Standes Herren, voting <i>curially</i> . . . . .	1
The Ritterschaft . . . . .	5
	<hr/>
Total of the First Estate . . . . .	7
	<hr/>
<i>The Second Estate</i> (as above) . . . . .	4
<i>The Third Estate</i> (as above) . . . . .	2
	<hr/>
Total States of Nieder Lausitz . . . . .	13
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Grand total of Members composing the Provincial States of Brandenburg . . . . .	70
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The requisites for candidature in all three States were :—

1. Actual possession by inheritance or otherwise of landed or other real property, unbroken for at least ten years.
2. Membership of one of the three recognised Christian Churches.
3. Completion of the thirtieth year.
4. An immaculate moral character.

Possession of a manor (Rittergut), without, however, the necessity of gentle birth, was the qualification for candidature in the *First Estate*.

As candidates for the *Second Estate*, only persons possessed of real property within a town or borough, and filling the office of magistrate in such a town or borough, or *bona fide* engaged in the exercise of a trade, were eligible.

The qualification in the *Third Estate* consisted in the possession of a parcel of land less than a manor (Rittergut), farmed by the candidate himself as principal source of revenue.

The same qualifications were required for the suffrage in each class, except that the uninterrupted possession for ten years was dispensed with, and *actual* possession deemed sufficient.



The manors were confined to those that were *bona fide* such in 1804, and such as the King chose specially to create with those attributes.<sup>1</sup> Diminution of such property beyond certain limits forfeited the suffrage. The most complicated possible rules, different in each district (always on the principle of historical adaptation), settled the minimum quantity of land or real property with which the possession of a vote in the other two estates was connected.

Thus constituted, those States were to meet every two years at such a time as the King might appoint. Their President, the so-called Marshal of the Province (*Landmarschall*), was to be named out of their number by the King, who besides named a Royal Commissary with whom the States were to treat of all matters coming within their cognisance. This latter functionary convoked and prorogued them, but could not be present at their debates, though he might send messages to them and receive deputations from them.

The sphere of their activity, except in a very limited number of unimportant matters, was confined to discussing such measures connected with the general administration of the province as the King might think proper to submit to their consideration, with a view to learning their opinion upon them. They might also, on the other hand, recommend measures to the attention of the executive. In both cases, however, *an expression of opinion* was the full extent of their prerogative. The Sovereign might or might not go by that opinion, and might, moreover, pass general measures without such previous consultation. In a word, they were *consultative*, not *legislative*.

The three States were, as a rule, to consult in common, though even here minute regulations with regard to dress, which decked with gold embroidery the uniforms of the First Estate, and clothed with civic black the backs of the other two, kept up to the eye the visible difference in the social status of the three classes. Where questions, however, affecting the special rights or privileges of any one

<sup>1</sup> They are something under 400 in number in the whole province of Brandenburg.

of the three were to be discussed, they met and consulted separately according to States. The results of the separate discussions thus held were submitted to the King, who could settle the question according to the opinions of the majority or the minority as he thought most advantageous. Such in its principal features was the institution of the Provincial Estates introduced in part payment of the promises made to the nation in 1815.

In looking at it in the present day, one fancies to oneself that there is passing in review before one a procession of medieval mummers, and one can with difficulty realise it as a creation of the nineteenth century.

A very superficial glance will suffice to show how radically different was the institution, as it was actually turned out, from what Stein had intended it to be.

The contradiction between this first offspring of the medieval revival and the prosaic bureaucratic character of the remaining part of Frederick William III.'s administration would seem to militate against the account above given of that ruler, and the principles by which he was governed. The apparent contradiction disappears, however, when it is remembered that, though issued by him, the Constitution of the Provincial Estates was in reality the creation of the Crown Prince; and secondly, that the machinery thus called into existence had no real power to interfere actively with the bureaucratic machinery specially patronised by Frederick William III. It was a parasitical plant forced artificially over the naked masonry of the official system, and intended to cluster gracefully about it, but unable to afford it support or derive nourishment from it.

As was to be expected, the institution met with very little public favour, and during the twenty odd years of its existence it never struck root into the soil. On the one side the persons who composed it became conscious of the undignified position which they occupied with so much of nominal prestige and so little of real power. The squirearchy, who had expected a millennium of whipping posts and parish stocks, soon became aware that they were just as much under the tutelage of the bureaucracy as they had been before.

On the other side, the public in general looked with no little mistrust and misgiving on the reappearance upon the political stage of these ghosts of days which it believed had been in spirit as well as body long since consigned to their grave.

The most practical result was the increased impatience for a *bona fide* general legislative body which should check, once for all, this sort of fantastic impromptu, and which the nation conceived had been promised to it in the Edicts of 1815 and 1820.

The French Revolution of 1830 gave a fresh impulse to this feeling, and the ten years that elapsed between that event and the death of Frederick William III. are marked by its increasing intensity.

It was at its height when Frederick William IV. ascended the throne. More than usually surrounded by the prestige which attends a new reign, this Sovereign's connection with the medievalists, and his share in the organization of the Provincial States, seem either to have been forgotten or not to have been appreciated as they ought. It was known that His Majesty had all sorts of plans fermenting in his head for the construction of States General, and all parties rallied round him, each fondly hoping that it would find in him the patron of its particular specific for the new Constitution.

Seven years were passed in anxious expectation on the part of the nation, and in minute elaboration on that of the Sovereign. At last, in 1847, under the name of States General, the convocation *in pleno* of the eight bodies of Provincial States took place. Great as had been the labour bestowed upon the constitution of this body (principally in the way of historical adaptation), yet no one believed that it was intended even by the King himself to be a permanent institution. The opinion generally prevailed that it was, under the dignified title of States General, to serve the office of a Constituent Assembly, which, in conjunction with the Sovereign, should elaborate a *bona fide* parliamentary system.

On the 11th April 1847 the new States General met, and King Frederick William IV. pronounced the celebrated

speech by which he effectually destroyed the hopes the nation had, in spite of themselves, cherished till then of arriving by the round-about way of 'States' at the desired goal of a Parliament.

However indistinctly others may have realised to themselves the results that would necessarily flow from the latter institution, Frederick William IV., than whom no Sovereign clung more tenaciously to the prerogatives of the Crown, clearly appreciated the difference between the two institutions, and understood that while the former was the natural ally, the latter was the natural enemy, of absolute government, and on this occasion he certainly cannot be blamed for want of clearness in expressing his opinions on the subject.

To the astonishment of even his medieval friends, His Majesty distinctly announced that he conceived himself in no way bound by the promises of his predecessor; that from his ancestors he had inherited absolute authority, and that that authority he should bequeath undiminished to his posterity; above all, that no power on earth should ever make him change this *natural* relation between his people and their Sovereign into a conventional and constitutional relation, or allow 'a piece of written parchment to be placed like a second providence between God in Heaven' (by whom he meant indirectly to allude to himself as God's vicegerent on earth) 'and this land.'

After an eloquent invective against the tone of the Liberal press (probably the first time that that institution has been directly lashed from the throne), he informed the assembled States that they were there only as the *representatives and defenders* of the *rights of their respective* orders, and not to represent opinions; 'that the former was their true historical position, while the latter was an utterly *ungerman* notion,—that it could only lead to grave and useless complications with the Crown, which by the law of God was bound to govern according to its own free inclination, and which never should, as far as he was concerned, be swayed by the verdicts of majorities.'

The effect produced by this royal confession of faith reverberated not only through the length and breadth

of Prussia, but through every portion of Germany, which, with attention strung to a painful pitch, had been watching the result of the first meeting of the States General. The King, who till then commanded the sympathies of the large majority of the Liberal Party, found himself suddenly standing alone with his medieval resurrectionists, and for the first time a gulf seemed to have opened between the Prussian people and a Sovereign of the House of Hohenzollern.

It was amidst the increasing excitement caused by these events that the echoes of the February Revolution rolled over Germany.

Into the events of 1848 and 1849 it is not my purpose to enter,—they are of too exceptional a nature and too much connected with German history not to demand a separate study. Moreover, for the object in view the general results of that volcanic period as embodied in the Constitution of 1850 will suffice.

Promulgated by Royal Patent (*octroyé*, to use the cant Continental term) after the Constituent Assembly, convoked in 1848, had failed of producing any practical results, the Prussian Constitution as it now stands is a curious monument of the various Constitutional schools whose doctrines for the last thirty years have divided the public opinion of Europe.

It is only by a knowledge of the history of these various schools that we obtain a key to its mechanism. Recalling, for instance, in its earlier articles touching the abstract rights of Prussian citizens, the 'doctrinaire' character of French Constitutionalism, we recognise, on the other hand, in the complicated Constitution of the first Chamber many of the features peculiar to the medieval revival, and then again stumble upon what we perceive to be modern adaptations of our own Habeas Corpus Act and other so-called bulwarks of the British Constitution.

On the whole, however, the Constitution of 1850 was a fair embodiment of even the more advanced positions of the Liberal Party. The principles upon which the Stein-Hardenberg reforms had been based seemed to pass, as it were, through second baptism, and with such a 'piece of

written parchment ' between the Sovereign and the people it seemed as if the medieval revivalists were once for all driven from the ground.

Unfortunately, however, the questions on which these doctrines found themselves opposed to those of the Liberal Party, instead of being once for all settled by organic laws embodied in the Constitution itself, were left, as regards their practical solution, to the Chambers called into existence by the Constitution—the principles only on which they were to be solved being laid down in the ' piece of parchment.'

Thus a liberal organisation of the rural Commune was promised (that old stumbling-block over which Stein himself had been unable to pass in safety), together with a liberal self-governing organisation of the ' Circle ' based upon it.

So also the cessation of the exemption of the manors (*Rittergüter*) from the Land Tax and the withdrawal of the rural police out of the hands of the proprietors of such manors, these two being, in fact, the only feudal privileges that had escaped the reforms of 1806–1811.

In the same manner the removal of religious disabilities, the right of association for political purposes, the theory of ministerial responsibility, etc., etc., were proclaimed, subject always to special laws regulating their practical adaptation.

With such a programme everything, of course, depended upon the kind of Chambers on which the practical legislation respecting these subjects would devolve.

On the first Chamber the reaction felt secure. It was composed of the large landed proprietors (who with few exceptions were devoted to the reactionary cause), of life nominees of the Crown, and of a certain number of Oberbürgermeister, likewise (as will be seen later) nominated by the Crown.

Consequently, it was to the packing of a second Chamber, that should legislate in the sense desired, that the whole efforts of the reaction were directed, and this properly brings us to the fifth of the six periods into which our subject is divided.

The Cabinet, after the elimination from it of the few liberal elements that for a portion of the year 1850 had clung to it, and after the melancholy death of Count Brandenburg, consolidated itself, in the commencement of the year 1851, under the presidency of Baron Manteuffel, M. de Westfalen undertaking the Portfolio of the Interior. The Ministry thus formed represented an alliance between two very heterogeneous and, under normal circumstances, two very incompatible elements: on the one side the cold sceptical bureaucratic element, not of the Stein but of the French *préfet* school of bureaucracy; on the other side, the doctrinaire idealistic element of the medieval school we have already treated of.

The common feelings that united them were an equal execration of every shade of liberal opinion, and the contempt of the one and the loathing of the other for the Constitutional system they were called upon to consolidate and inaugurate.

The problem that offered itself to the solution of the one may thus be worded:—

Given a Constitutional system, what means can be found to adapt its machinery to the working of a centralised police system that shall vest discretionary power over every class in the State in the hands of the executive, and yet leave the nation under the impression that these Ministers are responsible to it, and that it is governing itself.

The problem offered to the solution of the other may thus be worded:—

Given a parliamentary system of modern make and build, by what means can it be twisted back into an institution shaped upon that of the 'States,' and having for its basis, instead of the equal citizenship of the modern edifice, the 'graduated social scale' (*ständische Gliederung*) of the feudal fabric.

It is self-evident that, could each of these parties, by a stroke of legerdemain, have realised the objects they had respectively in view, two such wholly different edifices could not have found room on the same piece of ground.

In the way of both, however, (and this is the real key

to the alliance,) stood firm and solid and deeply embedded in the Prussian soil the cyclopean foundations of the Stein and Hardenberg period. To clear these out of the way was the task (and no light task) to which the united efforts of both were directed. Towards solving the problem in the first of the senses above indicated, a very convenient precedent lay close at hand. The last eighteen years of the Constitutional régime, as it had been carried out in France, afforded down to the most minute details the working models required.

To follow in these minute details the birth and growth of the centralised police system, developed under the late Ministry in Prussia, would be an invidious task, though by no means an uninstrusive one. I shall content myself, however, with adverting to its principal features. The two main principles of the Stein administration, namely, localisation of the administration and independence of the status of the official—were subverted, and the contrary principles—centralisation of the administration and dependence of the official, were substituted in their stead.

With a view to carrying out the former principle the nomination of the Landräthe and the Oberbürgermeister was transferred directly to the Crown, by which one measure the assimilation to the French préfet system was in its essence completed. A very liberal bill for the reorganisation of the rural commune, which had passed through the second Chamber,<sup>1</sup> received the Royal Veto, and a provisional system was substituted which left the nomination of all local officers down to the parish beadle in the hands of the Landräthe and Oberbürgermeister named by the Crown.

The moral dependence of the official class upon the check strings of the Ministers was effected in a more insidious manner.

We have seen that the principle of immovability, except upon a sentence pronounced by the Disciplinary Court, had

<sup>1</sup> It was not till the Parliament elected in 1855 that a thoroughly servile Chamber was obtained. The first two Parliaments, that of 1850 and that of 1853, had still many liberal elements in them, but the first Chamber and the Royal Veto together were able practically to neutralise every liberal measure that emanated from those assemblies.



been the expedient by which Stein had endeavoured to secure the independence of the official class. That Court could take cognisance only of cases of breach of public duty or of notorious immorality disqualifying a man for the discharge of public functions.

In direct opposition to the organic statute of 1808, in which it is distinctly set forth that 'the State official, irrespectively of his particular office, remains in all respects a member of the nation and continues in the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of citizenship,' it was officially announced, by various rescripts of the Minister of the Interior, that the holding of political opinions different from those of the Ministry for the time, or at least the recording of such opinions by a vote adverse to the Government, would be considered a breach of official duty.

The curious line of argument by which this principle was laid down in rescripts above alluded to may thus be shortly summed up.

According to the Constitutional doctrines there laid down, a Constitutional Ministry is not identified with any political party that may be in the ascendant, but directly with the person of the Sovereign. Any opposition to it, therefore, though entirely within the limits laid down by the Constitution, became by construction an offence against the majesty of the Crown, and as such cognisable by the Disciplinary Court.

No wonder that after five years of persevering toil devoted to the elaboration of a system on these principles, a servile Chamber like that of 1855 should have resulted from the General Election in that year.

It appears strange that a system so diametrically opposed to their received doctrines should have met with the sanction of the medievalists,<sup>1</sup> and on the whole it must be admitted that this party came off second best in their treaty of alliance with the Manteuffel Ministry.

On the other hand, if little was done in the direction

<sup>1</sup> That the younger and less political portion of the party was not a little galled by the police supremacy established over them was evident by the celebrated Hinckeldey-Rochow duel, in which the Minister of Police was shot by a young guardsman deputed specially for the purpose by a body of the more hot-headed of the 'Junker-Partei.'

they wished to impress upon the internal policy of the State, they had the satisfaction of seeing everything left undone, the accomplishment of which they most dreaded.

The equalisation of the Land Tax, the withdrawal of the rural police from the manor, the liberal organisation of the rural 'commune,' the introduction of civil marriage—one and all, thanks to the union between the ministerialists and the medievalists, remained dead letters.

Besides this, however, almost *carte blanche* was given them in a department which had always been their favourite hobby, Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education. Here, in the persecution of Liberal professors and in the adaptation of a system of Education graduated according to the favourite principle of the social scale (*ständische Gliederung*), they could wage war *à outrance* against one of the most hateful portions of the Stein reforms. Eight years of such government might have been expected to bring about the object desired, namely, the total discrediting once for all of Constitutional institutions,—and, indeed, after the elections of 1855 it almost seemed as if that result had been gained.

From the 'piece of parchment,' torn, blotted, and covered with crasures and contemptuous marginal notes, even the most sanguine Constitutionalists turned away in disgust. A sort of apathy appeared to take possession of the nation at large, and the sense of national self-respect seemed to be fast dying out.

These were, however, but very transitory symptoms. The Prussians of Frederick the Great and of the War of Liberation were a people far too healthy at the core to be permanently affected by, after all, so short-lived a departure from the principles which under some form or other had hitherto governed them.

How little on the one hand the interest taken by the nation in its *de jure* institutions, and on the other its loyalty towards the reigning dynasty, had been really diminished, became abundantly manifest when (exactly a year ago) the present Regent, in assuming the reins of government, declared it to be his intention strictly to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of

1850. He saw rallying around him from the Rhine to the Vistula every shade and section of the Liberal Party, that is, the great mass of the nation, and the gulf which had seemed to open between the House of Hohenzollern and the Prussian people now appeared, as if by magic, to be filled up. Every public act that has emanated from the Prince Regent since that date has only served to confirm this happy union between the sovereign authority and the great body of the nation, as represented in the new Chamber, the election to which, freed from the sinister influences of Westfalen circulars, returned an overwhelming Liberal majority.

The task which these men have before them is no light one, for they have not only to carry political measures, but to restore a moral tone to the whole political character of the country.

The tone and temper brought by the new Chamber to the discharge of these duties augur right well for their ultimate success, and if the debates in the last season about the admission of Jewish proprietors of manors to sit at the quarter sessions of the 'Circle' (*Kreis Tage*), and about the introduction of a law for civil marriages, had little to gratify the taste of an epicurean in foreign politics, they gave abundant proof of the earnest and practical spirit which the Prussian Constitutionalists are bringing to their task.

A few more years of such legislation, and the 'piece of parchment' will have become the organic structure which Stein would have died happy had he seen superposed upon the foundations he so successfully laid down for it.

## CHAPTER XI

## BERLIN

THE year 1859 had begun under ominous auspices. During the preceding summer, in an interview at Plombières, the Emperor Napoleon and Cavour had come to an agreement which, while stipulating that King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia should be put in possession of Lombardo-Venetia, Parma, and Modena, had bestowed Nice and Savoy on France as a reward for her assistance.

At the reception of the Diplomatic Corps at the Tuileries, on New Year's Day 1859, the Emperor expressed his regret to the Austrian Ambassador<sup>1</sup> that relations between the French and Austrian Governments were no longer as good as they had been, an announcement which, looked upon as the forerunner of war, fell like a thunderbolt on Europe, causing universal panic.

The state of affairs in Prussia at the time was depicted by Morier in the following :—

*Memorandum on Prussian Ministry* <sup>2</sup>—May 1859

'The first intimation of the impending European crisis found the Prussian Cabinet both inwardly and outwardly in a position singularly unpropitious for promptly and effectively dealing with the political questions so unexpectedly brought forward for discussion.

'The new Ministry, composed of the most heterogeneous elements, hardly acquainted with each other and wholly unfamiliar with the higher management of public affairs, had taken office, not as an organised political party, disciplined by a successful opposition, but as the personal friends of a prince whose position, until the advent of the Regency, had necessarily been a passive one, and were bound to each

<sup>1</sup> Baron Hübner.

<sup>2</sup> Hohenzollern-Auerswald Ministry.

other by no more positive ties than those of a common appreciation (the two excepted who had formed part of the former administration) of the political rottenness to which their predecessors had been in a fair way of reducing the State, joined to an honest desire to remedy the harm already done.

'The political capital they had at their disposal to work the new undertaking was the popularity enjoyed by the new Chief of the State, and the popular sympathy with which their supposed liberal views invested them; of the former they gladly availed themselves, of the latter they were not a little shy. In a word, the new Ministry were a *camarilla*, but a *camarilla* composed of honest and moderate men, not otherwise than patriotic, and sincerely desirous of seeing a hearty union between the ruler and the ruled, to be brought about, however, not by a profane approximation of the ruled to the steps of the throne, but by emanations of the Divine Right of the ruler. The Constitution was to be recognised, and as far as possible acted upon, but not as a right conquered by the party who had come into power, but as a royal gift which common honesty as well as the dignity of the Crown required should be one *de facto* as well as *de jure*.

'Thus it came about that the new advisers of the Crown found themselves, in a country where routine has ploughed its furrow deeper than in any other, without traditions and without a formulated political creed, occupying the seats vacated by a Ministry whose foreign policy had been essentially one of traditional expedients, and whose internal policy had been based on a political formula narrow in the extreme, but on that very account in the highest degree logical and consequent and thoroughly conscious of the end it had in view. Placed in a state of social quarantine (for their liberal views) by the 'salons' in which they had hitherto moved, yet not a little sharing with these 'salons' in the fear of the 'Red Spectre,' and consequently repelling rather than courting the popular support tendered to them, the Hohenzollern, or as it is more commonly called, the Auerswald Ministry, found themselves at the commencement of the year in a position of isolation very much of their own creation, and occupied above all things in tracing out for

their own particular selves a safe pathway amid the dangers, principally imaginary, with which in their eyes the internal direction of affairs appeared beset. Never had Guizot's dictum been more applicable, "*Le gouvernement prussien n'est pas un gouvernement d'initiative.*" Honesty and weakness, good intentions, with distrust of themselves and others, a willing spirit and a weak flesh, such were their prominent characteristics.

'It was at this juncture, that the Emperor Napoleon's New Year's congratulations broke on the ears of peace-dreaming Germany.

'It is an open secret, not a little worth pondering over, that the French Government in their plans for remodelling the map of Europe, reckoned not a little on the supposed ambition of the Prince Regent and his Ministers and on the co-operation they would accordingly meet with from the youngest of the Great Powers. As far back as last December, overtures were made to the Prussian Government by the Emperor Napoleon, through the agency of the Marquis Pepoli, brother-in-law to the Prince of Hohenzollern. These overtures were of a general kind, but their object was a common action against Austria—giving to France freedom of action in Italy and securing to Prussia territorial advantages in Northern Germany. These calculations, however, suffered total shipwreck on the honesty and plain dealing of the Prince Regent and his Ministers, and a deaf ear was turned to the sirens of the Tuileries. On the other hand, however, the formulating of a distinct and independent German policy, determined alike to oppose the ambitious views of the French Government and not to become the tool of Austria's anti-liberal policy in Italy and the imposing, if necessary, of this policy upon the non-Prussian States of Germany, was a task beyond their strength.'

In Germany itself, opinions on the war were greatly divided. While in the south the population ardently espoused the cause of Austria, and urging their respective Governments to assemble troops on the Rhine, clamoured to be led against the hereditary foe, in the north the feeling

was very different ; in Prussia, neither Schleswig-Holstein nor Olmütz had been forgotten, the cause of Italian independence, moreover, inspiring no little sympathy. Amidst these conflicting currents of opinion, the Prince Regent and his Ministers steered a hesitating course. Taking the line, that the Italian quarrels of Austria were not German quarrels in a sense of having to be necessarily fought out on the Rhine, or solved by an offensive movement upon France, they, nevertheless, considered that any serious defeat of Austria in Italy would endanger the left flank of the German position, Germany being regarded as on the defensive against attack from the west. The entire spring and summer were therefore spent in fitting out and mobilising the army, and after the defeats of Austria at Magenta and Solferino the Prussian Government were preparing to offer their armed mediation to the belligerents, to both of whom, however, this prospect proved equally unwelcome. Little as the Emperor Napoleon desired to find himself confronted by German armies on the Rhine, to Austria the possibility that, after her own defeats, Prussia, by winning brilliant victories, might gain a supremacy which would place her once for all at the head of a united Germany, was even more distasteful. To avert the threatened mediation, therefore, both the contending parties hastened to compose their quarrels, and in a personal interview at Villafranca, the two Emperors, in the space of a few hours, arranged and signed the preliminaries of a peace, afterwards ratified at Zürich, by which Austria, while ceding Lombardy, retained her hegemony in Italy.

The excitement caused by these events had been almost as great in Germany as in Italy ; once more the nation realised with deep dissatisfaction the political nonentity it had been reduced to in Europe, and ideals of unity and longings for consolidation, in abeyance for the last ten years, again began to agitate men's minds. One of the more immediate consequences was the foundation at Frankfort of the National Verein, an association of liberal politicians from every part of Germany and of every shade of opinion, united in a common desire for a German

Parliament and a central executive and in the common aim of promoting national sentiment. Their activity soon extended all over Germany and became a perfect bugbear to the different Governments. Expelled shortly afterwards from Frankfort by the Diet, whom the very mention of German Unity filled with horror, the National Verein found a refuge at Coburg and a protector in Duke Ernst, who warmly shared their aspirations.

Although the Emperor Napoleon's advances, so far, had only met with rebuffs and his bribes of support to Prussia in schemes for extending to the north, *i.e.* the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein in exchange for the Rhine Provinces, had been defeated by the known loyalty of the Prince Regent and his advisers, the Emperor, clinging to his doctrine of 'natural frontiers,' still hoped to compass the end he had in view. As Nice and Savoy had been the price paid for Italy's independence, so, he thought, the Rhine Provinces might become the tribute exacted for Germany's unity. Flattering himself that he might yet succeed in gaining the Prince Regent's consent to his projects of territorial revision, he, on various occasions, with the object of unfolding his plans, sought for a personal interview, which the Prince, firmly determined never to connive at the absorption of an inch of German soil into French territory, repeatedly refused. Finally, however, desirous not to offend his powerful neighbour, he consented to a meeting at Baden-Baden, to which, at the same time, he hastened to invite his brother sovereigns (the Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, Grand Dukes of Baden, Weimar, Hesse Darmstadt, Duke of Coburg), anxious to dissipate any feelings of distrust as to combinations to their prejudice, and it was thus, at their head and acting as their spokesman, that he received the Emperor on 14th June 1860.

With how much circumspection the Prince Regent behaved on this occasion and how fruitless the interview proved from the Emperor's point of view, may be gauged by the latter's jesting utterance to one of his confidants, on his return to Paris, that '*le Prince Régent s'est conduit vis-à-vis de moi comme une jeune fille pudique, qui craint*



les propos d'un vert galant et qui évite de se trouver longtemps seule avec lui.'<sup>1</sup>

This meeting at Baden led to various important interchanges of opinion between the confederated Sovereigns.

*Morier to Lord Bloomfield*

'June 30th, 1860.

' . . . I can now speak with authority on what passed after Louis Napoleon's departure. On the morning of the 18th the Prince Regent requested the Sovereigns to meet him in a room specially set apart for the purpose in the Schloss. There were present four Kings (of Würtemberg, Hanover, Bavaria, and Saxony), the Dukes of Nassau and Coburg and the Grand Duke of Baden. Barring the absence of any subordinates, protocolists, and the like, the meeting had the outward and visible solemnity of a Conference. The parties stood grouped in a semicircle before the Prince, who partly read, partly spoke his address to them. The speech thus delivered I have seen in the original, and had the opportunity of collating with the résumé given of it in the *Preussische Zeitung*, but unfortunately the Prince Regent made it a point that the text should not be made public, and I was therefore obliged to promise not to take a copy. The résumé above alluded to is on the whole correct. The most important omission is when allusion is made to the defence by Prussia of the territorial integrity of Germany. In the *Preussische Zeitung*, the territorial integrity of Germany as a whole is alone adverted to; in the original the integrity of the several territories of the individual Princes is equally alluded to as an object of Prussian solicitude. The passage is a little obscure in construction, but the sense quite clear. It runs *à peu près* thus:—

"I consider it the *first task* (*erste Aufgabe*) of the policy of Prussia, of her European policy as well as of her German policy, to safeguard not only the territorial integrity of the common fatherland as such, but that also of the individual Princes." Another omission was the glorious anniversary (18th June) upon which he (the Prince Regent) had

<sup>1</sup> Miss M. Ellice to Lady Alice Peel, 22nd June 1860.

the opportunity afforded him of repeating the assurances made in his speech from the throne at the close of the session.

'As an enunciation of future policy the speech amounts to this. Prussia will use up her last dollar and her last man to defend Germany against foreign aggression. Moreover, the territorial arrangements within the confederation are viewed by her in the light of sacred rights. The Princekins therefore (as Carlyle calls them) need have no fears about a diminution of their square mileage. The Constitution of the Diet is on the other hand hateful to her, and she will use her best endeavours to bring about a reform therein, though she admits that for an organic change the present moment is not suited. So long, however, as the Diet as at present constituted remains unaltered, Prussia, whilst recognising it, will use her best endeavour to restrain the action of the Diet strictly within the competency marked out for it by its organic laws and prevent an excession of this competency on the part of the Dynasties in an anti-liberal sense against the Constitutional rights of the individual states.'

*Memorandum of a conversation between the Prince Regent of Prussia and the King of Bavaria, written by the former, 20th June 1860.*

The King of Bavaria who, there is no doubt, had been commissioned to do so by the other Princes of Germany, endeavoured yesterday to explain to me at length the allusion, made in the King of Württemberg's speech, and in so doing he specially adverted to the three following points:—

The first had reference to the military convention to be submitted to the Diet.

[The conversation between the King and the Prince Regent upon this point is given at great length, but does not contain matter of such general interest as that on the other two points—those of the 'National Verein' and the relations with Austria.

The King explains the object of the Middle States since embodied in the project of military reform drawn up by

the military plenipotentiaries of the Middle States in the Conference held at Würzburg. The idea that lies at the root of this project is the safeguarding of the sovereign rights of the Middle States by withdrawing *even in the case of war* the disposition of their troops from either of the two Great Powers.

The King urges upon the Prince the giving up of his plan for a divided command of the troops of Germany in the event of war, which should secure to Prussia the military command of the northern contingents of the Confederation and to Austria that of the southern contingents. He proposes instead that in the case of war three distinct armies should be formed, the Prussian, the Austrian, and the Federal, the latter being composed of the contingents of the German states of Germany. He states distinctly that this is to safeguard the sovereign rights of the latter states, who could *never give up into other hands* the command of their troops. The Prince urges the impracticability of this plan and the disunion which would result from it. He points to the history of the various crises in which a war seemed to impend over Germany, and he shows that the plan which he wishes to consecrate as part of the Federal Constitution had ever been the one which circumstances had barred Austria and Prussia practically to have recourse to, and he closes by informing the King in the most positive manner that he would not give up his plan for the divided command which he would submit to the Diet.—M.]

The second point which the King of Bavaria had been requested to talk over was the mode of treating the 'National Verein.' He urged upon me to oppose myself to it with all possible energy, inasmuch as whilst it had subversive objects in view it assumed that it could reckon on Prussian sympathies, and that it was in fact acting in the Prussian sense. I requested him to give me proofs of this assertion, and observed that if the objects of the Society were such as he described them, the answer I had through Count Schwerin given on the subject to the petition of the town of Stettin would still apply. Moreover, I had laid down in my speech from the throne the principles of

my German policy in a manner which I conceived could leave no one in doubt as to the uprightness (*loyauté*) of my intentions. That if by *energy* he meant the adoption of police measures against the Society or its members, I could not lend myself to his desires, because by measures of this nature I conceived that only fresh importance would be given it. I considered that, until the Society had committed acts that were against the law, or that aimed at a subversion of existing institutions, to persecute it would be to invest it with fictitious importance—that if it should become guilty of such acts, I should be the first to compass its ruin. That the persecutions of the Society in Hanover, Saxony, etc., had elicited general reprobation—that in their main features, the objects of the society were national, and that as such, it was not safe to attack them.

I then took the opportunity to explain to the King of Bavaria the principles which ever since my advent to the Regency I have been determined to carry out. Having found a Constitution I consider it my duty to conform myself to it and not to falsify it by unnatural interpretations. I have lived long enough in the proximity of Government to convince myself of the evil which resulted from the system pursued by the late Ministry. I made the above statement to the King, and added, that it was not my intention to discuss whether Constitutions as such were conducive to the well-being of a nation, but only to express the conviction that, where they did exist, the idea of making the measures of the Government public, and of calling the people to a legitimate participation in the legislation, had penetrated into all men's minds, and that in such a case, it would be the height of danger to put oneself in contradiction to a feeling of this nature, as such an opposition would be equivalent to placing on a formal record the distrust of the Sovereign towards his people. Upon this same ground of distrust, it was my opinion, that it was a false policy to seek the security of the throne in the limitations of the Constitution, whereas, according to my view, security of Government consisted in the wise alternation between tightening and loosening the reins of Government; that I had made up my mind to rule in this sense, and that on this ground I had

granted a free movement in the Constitutional sense, but in doing so, that I fully intended to guard against letting the reins fall altogether out of my hands. The King interrupted me here, and said : ' I sincerely hope that you will make no melancholy experiences, which are ever difficult to unmake again, and of which the history of Constitutional Governments have so many examples to show.'

I replied, that I had often put this very same question to myself, and that I had ever found a satisfactory answer in the views I had just detailed to him. I compared the art of government with that of regulating the bed of the river. For this purpose, the banks must be ameliorated and strengthened there, where the stream threatens to overflow and destroy them—but they must neither be drawn too close to each other nor kept too far apart ; above all, the attempt must never be made to throw a dam across the bed, inasmuch as it would accumulate the waters and necessarily bring about a general inundation. The King seemed satisfied with this simile. I added, in England the banks had been drawn too far apart, in Hanover and in Hesse they had been drawn too near to each other—and that I hoped Prussia would be able to hold a mean. The King said he thought he might be able to do the same.

The third point which was touched upon by the King was the *rapprochement* between us and Austria, and he was desirous to know, what significance was to be attached to the allusions to that *rapprochement* made by me. I answered that of late there had been a greater unity of opinion in the manner of seeing the great questions of politics, which had necessarily called forth on both sides more friendly feelings—that amongst other things, Count Pourtalès and Prince Metternich had, in a lengthened conversation, exchanged thoughts, and that the Count had placed in the immediate foreground certain reforms in the internal policy of Austria, that the answer received from Vienna had been favourable, and that measures had been taken in the sense above referred to, which we were justified in considering as partly the result of our observations (Hungary, Reichsrath, etc.).

The King inquired what it was I desired, in order that a real *rapprochement* might take place.

I answered, Austria must cease to treat Prussia as a parvenu, and must of her own free accord recognise her as a Great Power and her equal. The King, 'Do you really consider that she does not do so?'

I replied that I could see no signs of it. Austria looks upon Prussia as a State, which, on the first opportunity, she would force back to the position it occupied before the Seven Years War, and looks upon this result as the main object of her policy. This it is, which accounts for the perpetual opposition, which we find against everything, which raises Prussia, however little, in public opinion. The territorial distribution settled upon for Prussia at the Congress of Vienna had no other object in view, than to prevent her development to the strength and concentrated power such as, after the *levée de bouclier* of 1813-1815, she had a right to expect to be raised to—as in spite of the geographical malformation with which she was invested Prussia continued year by year to develop, and morally as well as physically to make rapid strides. Austria was fain to find other means to weaken her. The means adopted was the calumny that Prussia had no other idea beyond that of uniting the territorial groups of which she was composed by the annexation of the intervening neighbours. Every look, which Austria makes her neighbours take on the map, must convince them that Prussia must tend in that direction. The deduction is evident, that Austria alone can give protection against such projects, as Austria, so she says at least, has no such aggrandising policy—and much more feels called upon to maintain in their integrity those territorial existences which Prussia hankers after.

For these doctrines, Austria has found apt scholars amongst a number of the German Princes. This affords the key to the enigma, that Prussia is universally regarded as the ogre, desirous of swallowing up the States of Germany. The experiences of forty-five years all going to prove the exact reverse have not sufficed to remove this prejudice—nay, it is perhaps more inveterate now than it ever was. I must wait and see whether my last speech from the throne and my present attitude will be able to uproot it; but no one can blame me for feeling hurt at such pre-

conceived opinions against me. But if Austria should cease upon every opportunity from an effort to injure us, and call upon the Princes of Germany to repose confidence in us, we shall be able at once to come to terms—if not, we shall never do so.

The King said that this point of view was exceedingly interesting to him, and that he had hitherto been wholly ignorant of it, and that as far as he was concerned, he never shared it. He asked me whether what I said was my positive conviction, which I energetically affirmed.

He then went on to say, that he certainly could not deny that the fear of aggrandisement on the part of Prussia lived in many heads, and that he had none of it, but that our policy last year in the Austro-Italian question had done us harm, and had given birth to the notion, that we were desirous of precipitating Austria into destruction.

I answered by asking whether people had forgotten that the Prussian army was in full march on the Rhine at the time that the truce was made, and the peace of Villafranca concluded. I repeated to him the military measures taken on the 20th and 29th of April, on the 14th of June, and the 1st of July, and inquired of him when his army was in marching order. He answered, just at the moment when the demand for moving forward, that is the first days of July. I answered him that Prince Frederick of Würtemberg had *ipsissimis verbis* given me the same answer in regard to the Würtemberg army, and that I was bound, therefore, to put the question—how it was possible that in April they could allow the cry to be raised of an immediate march on Paris, when the German armies, with the exception of that of Prussia, were not prepared to wage war, even if I had been willing to undertake it? If I had mobilised my army in the month of April, I should have had to march to Paris alone, whilst they remained immovable till July. I had, however, other reasons for not mobilising so soon. According to the views with which the late Count Hatzfeldt had returned to Berlin from Paris, the Emperor was only waiting to see in Germany a distinct intention of war, in order, with the whole of his force, to change the theatre of war from Italy to Germany.

It became consequently my policy to allow the French to be fairly engaged in Italy, so that at the moment, when Germany declared war to France, we should only find in the latter country a comparatively small portion of her armies, and that thus our game would be made easier. And, I continued, was not July (the date at which we had strategically disposed our army) the moment when such a combination became possible, if in the meantime the Peace of Villafranca had not come across it? The King gave his full assent. He said that the views of Count Hatzfeldt had been wholly unknown to him, and asked, what then I considered the real cause of this sudden conclusion of peace? I answered that, for my part, I found this cause in the ideas which I had just developed to him in reference to the feelings entertained by Austria towards Prussia. Prussia was on the point, at the head of her army, and at the head of the German Confederation, to carry the war to France, at a moment, as I had just explained, when the chances were all in our favour. Had we been victorious, Prussia would have come out with a heightened position in Germany and in the world at large. It was the task and the *will* of Austria to prevent this, and for this purpose the sacrifice, even of Lombardy, did not seem too great.

The King: Do you really and truly believe this to have been the case? I can tell of a letter, which Napoleon showed to Francis Joseph, which contained the expression of your full determination never to draw the sword for Austria.

I: I have heard the same story, and not to discuss the question as to whether it was an anecdote invented for the purpose by Napoleon, I asked him what I was to think of Francis Joseph, if he could believe a statement of this sort from the mouth of his *enemy*, whilst his own Field-Marshal, Prince Windischgrätz, who was at that time at Berlin, was telegraphing to him from hour to hour that the armies were in full march on the Rhine. That Napoleon knew this right well, and on that account in his peace manifesto alleged as his motive for peace the danger of a war on the Rhine. The sudden conclusion of the peace made all clear—it proved that Napoleon's con-



clusions had been quite right and Francis Joseph's quite wrong. The King was evidently very much astonished at my answer and in the motives I alleged as having brought about the Peace of Villafranca. He asked me to give him a short statement respecting the military preparations made by Prussia, which I promised him, and which I gave him next morning in writing.

In a later conversation, the King inquired whether I considered that a meeting with the Emperor of Austria was advisable, and whether, from such a meeting, I thought that satisfactory results were to be anticipated. I replied, that I should have no objection on my part to such a meeting, if the Emperor Francis Joseph gave me the opportunity, as it was impossible for me to take the first step after the manifesto of Schönbrunn, which contained expressions of far too injurious a nature for me—and the impression of which the Emperor had never sought to remove, either by diplomatic means or *auf vertraulichem Wege*.

I took the opportunity once more to advert to the innumerable military measures taken by Prussia and Germany, from April to July of last year, to make the ingenious character of this document clear to him.

The King replied, that he had not known that I had taken the manifesto *en mauvaise part*, but that he likewise was of opinion that the first step towards a meeting must come from Austria. I rejoined that if a meeting were to take place, I declared in advance that I should remain true to my principles not to enter into any hasty alliances, or to undertake any territorial guarantees, but to keep the discussions respecting possible eventualities of war, in which Prussia—not otherwise than in conjunction with Austria and the rest of Germany—should move forward.

It seems to me as if the King were intentioned to bring about a meeting of this kind.

(*End of Memorandum.*)

This meeting between the Prince Regent and the Emperor Francis Joseph took place at Teplitz, on 25th July.

Baden-Baden, which had been the scene of so brilliant an assembly of crowned heads, was described as follows

by Morier, in a letter to his father, dated 18th September 1860.

' . . . Baden, which I had never before seen in the season, pleased me mighty much. It is quite the place for a diplomatist to frequent, as a more cosmopolitan company one cannot well imagine, and many people from various corners of the globe I had long wished to meet and to become acquainted with I found congregated there, amongst others Bacourt, who begged to be particularly remembered to you. Of old acquaintances there were Madame Kalergis,<sup>1</sup> more brilliant than ever, though when I saw her she had been two days *au fond de son lit* crying, and only got up for a couple of hours, intending to go to bed and cry again towards the short hours of the morning! Then my dear friend, the beautiful grandmother, Countess Lottum (*née* Putbus), Madame Decazes (*née* Stackelberg), old Pückler-Muskau, the Loftuses, who have bought a house and charmingly furnished it, and spend their yearly leave of absence there. . . . Of new acquaintances (exclusively of the Ladies' Club, which is the exclusive speciality of Baden) the pleasantest are the Londonderrys amongst the Britishers, and the Duc de Richelieu amongst the foreigners. Lady Londonderry, with the *beaux restes* of extraordinary beauty, is a very pleasant genial body—he, not at all otherwise than agreeable. The Duc de Richelieu full of wit and *esprit* and *comme il faut* to boot. We had a charming *petit dîner à cinq*, the Londonderrys, Countess Lottum, the Duc de Richelieu, and myself. . . . In the Ladies' Club (in which we men are elected by the ladies, and of which I was made a member) the beauties were Princess Obolensky and Countess Edmond Pourtalès, the latter quite lovely, *toilettes mirobolantes*. The cocks, or rather hens, of the Club are Princess Menchikoff and Madame Kalergis, very Russian, as you will perceive. Coco Le Gonidec and a Comte d'Osmond, a wonderful musician and driver of four-in-hand, having only one hand to do both with, were the *esprits remuants* of the party. Two most magnificent rooms, one called the salon Louis xv.,

<sup>1</sup> *Née* Nesselrode, niece of the Russian Chancellor.

finished only last year, furnished the framework of this elegant pandemonium, and two halls and a very good French theatre gave the external circumstance required, and then the jolly hells in the middle, with the fevered gold-thirsting crowd under the glare of the gorgeous candelabra, and then the beautiful wood perfume from the Black Forest, wafted at sunset or later in the night, seemingly fresh from the Great Bear that is resting over the old Château—in fact, a righte merrie queer disreputable sort of a place. On my arrival here I found a telegraphic dispatch, the contents of which gave me no little pleasure, as you may fancy, a pleasure which you will not a little share in. It was a summons from Lord John Russell to attend him during the whole of his stay with the Queen in Germany, and to repair accordingly to Coburg on the 25th instant. As this has been totally unsolicited on my part, I may consider it a feather in my cap. The Queen will be at Coburg for a fortnight, so that it will be a good hole out of this autumn Berlin dulness, and as, I believe, Lady Churchill and Miss Bulteel accompany her, both of them great friends of mine, it will be very jolly. There will be, besides, the Princess Royal's Court, all of them "good friends," and the Duke's own people, with whom for years I have been "hail fellow well met," so that it will be a righte jollie party. . . .

'I had the opportunity of a long talk with Lord Clarendon, who accidentally came over here for a couple of days from Wiesbaden, and I was very graciously received and taken out for an airing by the Princess of Prussia. . . .'

The Princess of Prussia was a strong advocate of an Anglo-Prussian Alliance, which at that time was equally desired by the Hohenzollern Ministry and the Liberal party, not only in Prussia but in the whole of Germany.

#### *Morier to Lord Clarendon*

'September 1860.

'I received this morning a letter from Berlin of which, as I think it might interest you, I venture to send you the enclosed translation. It comes direct from headquarters; in fact, out of the *Cabinet Intime* of the Prince

of Hohenzollern, and therefore contains not only perfectly authentic information as regards the past, but exhibits the views prevailing in those quarters with reference to the present and the future. I cannot conceive a policy more in accordance with ideas prevailing in England than that described in this letter as having been acted upon by Prussia at Teplitz—viz. non-interference with the cause of Italian development as long as it is confined to Italy, common action with Austria if France should once more make this development the pretext of hostilities against Austria. Conditions of alliance—guarantees of religious and political liberty within Austrian dominions, withdrawal of the support hitherto given by Austria to the reactionary policy of the Middle States.

‘ That *our* friends have had a very hard fight in carrying the policy through, I need not tell you ; that they will be surrounded by all sorts of difficulties in further carrying it out, there is no doubt. On the other hand, that an energetic support on the part of the public Press in England and of our diplomacy abroad would to an extraordinary extent remove these difficulties, is a fact which I do not think is sufficiently known or appreciated. The concluding paragraph in the enclosed letter sufficiently shows this one point at least. And to this it would be well worth while to call attention if possible—that the Prussian Ministry by following our advice, *i.e.* the advice of a British Liberal Ministry, and making advances to Austria, has incurred the suspicion amongst its Liberal supporters (who, *n.b.*, are to a man for the English alliance) of estranging England from Prussia and throwing her into the hands of France.

*(Copy of Letter)*

‘ You know that in the meantime our own military organisation has been completed—that we have now 262 battalions of infantry of the line (262,000 men), 81 reserve battalions (Erzatzbatt. 81,000), 116 Landwehr (116 over of the 1st levy, 116 of the 2nd levy) ; moreover, 2000 squadrons of Line Cavalry (20,000), 128 of Landwehr (12,800). Of our own rifle guns that have turned out completely successful, we have sent one as a specimen and model to each of the Governments of Germany, in proof of our being sincere and unegotistical, in our desire

to see the military force of Germany *bona fide* strengthened. The Ministry, as well as the leaders of the party, who have hitherto opposed the organisation, have agreed to its definitive establishment upon the understanding that the Bill for equalising and raising the land tax be passed in the course of next Session.

'We fondly hope here, that England will not allow herself to be misled, either by the last concession of France in Syrian affairs, nor by the attitude of Russia, nor by the Imperial Letter. But we are far from feeling secure that she won't, and least of all I. The position is clearly this, that Louis Napoleon has, by the position taken by Prussia at Baden (and to the last moment he hoped in vain that he would be able to carry out his policy of the Rhine Frontier by means of a friendly arrangement), by the meeting at Teplitz, by Lord Palmerston's speech, and the project of coastal defences in England, received the impression of a possible coalition growing up against him. He sees that Russia, despite the ambition of Gortchakoff and the tenacity with which that Minister holds to his Oriental plans, is nevertheless not in a position to be of much use to him. His object is to strangle in its birth this coalition (in its embryo shape). With this object in view, as nothing can be done either at Vienna or Berlin, he turns again to London. The great question is, whether in London there is any desire to be made further a fool of, and led by the nose.

'What the consequences may turn out to be, if England allows herself again to be caught, no man can tell.

'Our Liberals already reproach us with having caused by the Teplitz meeting this new *rapprochement* between England and France. They see, in this meeting, nothing but legitimist policy, and they maintain that by taking steps, mainly at the desire of England, that we have estranged liberal England from us. They don't observe, that owing to these circumstances, France has changed her position, and fancy that England is nearing France in opposition to legitimist politics. Everything should be done to prevent England from really altering her attitude, and letting herself be again caught. The new confusion which would arise would then certainly have to be paid for by us.'

On 25th September, Morier went to Coburg, where the Queen and Prince Consort arrived with Lord John Russell in attendance.

'I have had a very interesting time,' he writes to his father, on 3rd October. 'Poor George Russell, Lord John's private secretary, having been laid up with a severe attack of bronchitis, I have been thrown very much with Lord

John, not only officially but likewise non-officially. We have had daily drives and long walks together. Yesterday, a regular scramble across country. *Dans l'intimité*, he is more pleasant than it is possible to describe, the pleasantest chief to do business with and the pleasantest companion to live with, an endless flow of anecdotes and a right cheerie vein of humour of a sarcastic but not ungenial kind running through all he says, and withal a real *bona fide* Liberal from conviction and not from mere political capital.'

And of the Queen he wrote a few days later, to the same:—

' . . . On a variety of other occasions H.M. was equally gracious to me. We made various excursions in the most domestic fashion, nobody but the high personages, two or three of the courtiers, Lord John and myself. On one occasion, whilst scrambling up a steep mountain, it coming on to rain, H.M. condescended to accept out of my hand my umbrella (and such a bad un), and to protect her gracious head therewith from the rain. On another occasion, when we went forth to hunt the savage pig, we arrived at a spot in the forest where H.M. had in 1845, on her first visit to Coburg, planted an oak. From this she wished a branch to be plucked, which, having been brought to her, she called to me and gave it to my special custody for the rest of the day, making me responsible for its safe delivery to her in the evening. I, of course, took tremendous care of it, though for one moment I had no small fright in connection with it. A savage pig had been wounded, and I could not resist snatching a spear, to have a stick at him, and in the excitement of the moment the twig was dropped and forgotten about. On returning, the fatal idea shot across me that it was either lost or trampled upon, when luckily I found it on the ground unscathed. Such, O Muse! are the mighty emotions with which a courtier's life is convulsed.'

Many were the hours Morier spent on this occasion with his paternal friend, old Baron Stockmar, in his house in the Webergasse. Together they had rejoiced at the Prince

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Consort's almost miraculous escape from a carriage accident, little guessing how soon he was to be snatched away by illness.

The royal visit lasted till 9th October, and at its conclusion Morier accompanied the royal party to Coblenz, where they passed two days with the Prince Regent and the Princess of Prussia. Amongst those assembled there were the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Baden (daughter of the Prince Regent), the Prime Minister, the Prince of Hohenzollern, and the Foreign Minister, M. de Schleinitz, with all of whom Lord John was enabled to exchange views on the many questions of the day, and to work for a mutual understanding between the two countries.

On leaving Coblenz, Morier paid several other visits on the Rhine. At Bonn he had a long interview with Baron Bunsen, the veteran diplomatist and life-long friend of his family, which proved to be the last political conversation which the then already dying statesman was fated to hold.

At Neuwied, the residence of the Prince and Princess of Wied, he met the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Baden, accompanied by Roggenbach.

*Morier to Lord John Russell*

*'November 1860.*

' Agreeably to the wish you expressed at Coblenz, that I should give you some account of my interview with the Grand Duke of Baden, I venture upon the following relation of my visit to the Prince at Neuwied. I found on arrival there that, besides my host and his wife, the only company consisted of the Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden and Baron Roggenbach, the Grand Duke's political bottle-holder, an old tried friend of mine of ten years standing and a man thoroughly deserving even of English respect, as the alpha and omega of the movement which succeeded in untwining the Concordat from off the body and soul of the Grand Duchy after it had already half smothered it in its folds—a small matter, it may be said, in a small and unimportant country; and small no doubt it is, if such matters are to be measured by square mileage, but a very great matter and an incalculable service it appears to any one acquainted

with the pathology of dynasties and peoples in this by no means unimportant portion of the world,—it was the planting of the right standard in the right place, and if I were asked generally what it is that Germany in a more general way most required at the present moment, I should just say the same thing—the right standard held by the right standard bearer and displayed upon the right watch tower.

‘As I had expected, it was the Grand Duke’s desire to speak *à cœur ouvert* on the subjects which altogether engross his attention at present. This yearning on the part of a *Dei Gratia* Sovereign to find some one with whom freely to exchange thoughts that are highly creditable to himself and of incalculable importance to the people he is called upon to govern, and the extraordinary difficulty of finding such persons, are facts well worth pondering over as curiously characteristic of the sort of political atrophy which the best meaning and most earnest men are reduced to by the provincialism to which the petty prince system has condemned Germany. With the one exception of Roggenbach, there is not a single person in his Grand Duchy, not one of his Ministers past or present, with whom the Grand Duke can exchange ideas on political subjects that are one shade removed from the daily routine of mere administration.

‘I found the Grand Duke very much preoccupied with the conversation he had with you. He had had difficulty in exactly explaining to you all he wished to say (a difficulty, I may observe, arising not only from the hindrances afforded by a foreign language, but from the individuality of the man—in many ways to be accounted for, but with reference to which one thing should be specially noted, namely, that a person in his peculiar circumstances, when he does become possessed of liberal ideas, does so by such perfectly different avenues and such perfectly different trains of thought from those which are used by us, whose lungs have been filled with free air ever since we could breathe at all, that it is often very difficult to trace the process by which the common goal has been attained). Notwithstanding this difficulty, he had derived the most indescribable pleasure from the unreserved *bon vouloir* with which you had entered



with him upon political subjects, and discovering that you did not seem to share the general contempt for everything German which is universally in Germany ascribed to English statesmen, and that you did not seem averse to recognise as a desirable result the obtaining, if this could be done lawfully and by other than revolutionary means, of a new order of things in Germany which, whilst respecting existing rights, should yet afford the unity required for the purposes of national defence and national development. He seemed to long at some future occasion to have again the opportunity of speaking out his views to you, and submitting them thereby to the friendly test of your practical statesmanship.

‘The subject he seems to have been most desirous of explaining to you was a plan of his according to which Prussia, in conjunction with other of the liberal German States, and if possible backed by England, should (on the principle of the respectable partners in a bank calling the spendthrift partner to account) take some strong step to induce Austria to make the internal reforms which seem alone likely to save her from ruin. He talked at great length on this subject, but as the plan is not the least likely to be adopted, and falls naturally into the category of *pia desideria*, I will not trouble you with it.

‘The point of real interest was, of course, the step which the Grand Duke, in conjunction with other of his brother princes, is meditating to take at the Diet with a view to prepare the way for an organic reform of the Federal Constitution. I mentioned to you at Coblenz that something of the sort was being prepared, but I had at the time no idea that the plan was as fully matured as I was now informed it was, or that the Grand Duke was to so great an extent the heart and soul of the movement. The manner and matter of the undertaking will, I hope, be made clear to you in the enclosed Memorandum, translated from a draft drawn up by the Grand Duke and Roggenbach, after several interesting conversations in which His Royal Highness did me the honour of explaining to me at full length all his views on the subject—views which seem to me to be singularly sensible and sober, and totally un-

alloyed by any personal ambition or egotistical *arrière pensée*—and examined and discussed the various lights under which it was susceptible of being viewed. The Memorandum was then drawn up with the object of eliminating all unnecessary details, and of obtaining in the clearest outline possible the principal political bearings (features) of the case. It was, of course, a hurried piece of workmanship, but I think it will nevertheless convey a clearer aperçu than could be derived from an accurate reproduction of any of the lengthier memoranda, Drafts of Constitution, etc., forming part of the actual machinery with which the undertaking is to be worked, and which I found necessarily full of comparatively uninteresting minutiae. The Grand Duke kindly gave me the perusal of the documents in question, and what I now enclose certainly better than any of them conveys an idea of the general bearings of the case. On one point especially the present Mem. seems to me satisfactorily to dispose of a difficulty which, if I rightly understand you, you suggested when we were talking this question over in its merely abstract aspect on the boat bridge at Coblenz, namely, how so great a revolution is to be attained by other than revolutionary means; how, that is, the break between the past confederative plurality and the future unity was to be bridged over without a solution of political continuity in the separate existence of the several States, and without violence to existing rights therefore being somewhere done, especially when the tenacity of individual life more particularly inherent in the four minor kingdoms is taken into consideration. This difficulty, which some observation of yours very strongly impressed upon my mind, I took the liberty of appropriating and urging in the course of our conversations—the basing the new Federal Constitution upon a series of elaborate treaties between the several States, and making the joining of the “Union” an act of independent will on the part of each State, I think satisfactorily disposes of the difficulty.

‘As regards the actual phase of the undertaking, it is this: the Grand Duke of Baden has communicated his plan confidentially to the Grand Duke of Weimar and the Duke

of Coburg, who I believe fully coincide with it, and are ready to adopt it as their own. Before carrying it out, however, two objects have to be gained, a preliminary undertaking with Prussia (not so easy, I fear, as they seem to imagine it), and which would ensure her passive acquiescence, and the beating up of recruits among the other Governments to join in the step. Of the Free Towns and the unimportant Waldeck they are certain, and reckon with much confidence on Oldenburg and Brunswick,—this would represent a very respectable *posse comitatus*.

‘Of the practical results of a motion of this sort at the Diet it is impossible at present to speak with any certainty. That it would strike terror and dismay into the hearts of most of the dynasties, the speeches of M. Borries<sup>1</sup> and Co. as far back as last year are there to witness; that it would set loose a deep and perhaps irresistible current of public opinion in the direction indicated can hardly be doubted. On the other hand, it would be taking the wind out of the revolutionary sails, and by placing the movement within the control of the natural leaders of such a movement, the ‘Magni Barones’ of a German Empire, it would afford a far better chance of success than any democratic movement (in so really undemocratic a country as Germany) could give a prospect of. What the step would really amount to would be the raising of the right standard held up by the right hands and displayed on the right watch tower—which in the chaos to which all things political are at the present moment reduced in Germany seems the one great desideratum. It would be the setting up of the brazen serpent in this political wilderness, to which the children of Israel might look up and live. At the same time, the undertaking is compassed about with such vast difficulties, there are so many prospective slips between the cup and the lip, that it would be folly to attempt any prophecy on the subject. Moreover, they may be such that the whole plan may be destined to come to nothing, though, when I left him, the Grand Duke seemed heart and

<sup>1</sup> Borries, F. W. Graf von, b. 1802, d. 1883, Hanoverian statesman of strong reactionary tendencies and opponent of German unity; Minister of State, 1851–1852, and again 1855–1862.

soul in it, and perfectly determined on carrying it out. If it should come to anything I shall have been able to furnish you with the key to it, and it may prove interesting to you to have had cognisance of the movement from its embryo state. The facts I have communicated to you have, however, I need hardly say, been confided to me in strictest secrecy, though not without the wish that they should be confidentially communicated to you. I do not believe that above half a dozen persons have been made acquainted with them, and I must therefore humbly beg of you that you consider them as furnished strictly for your personal knowledge only.

'I should have given you this account sooner, but I have been laid up since my return to Berlin by a violent attack of rheumatic gout. Things here are in a dismal state. The Liberals are highly dissatisfied with the Schleinitz curtain lectures to the Sardinian Cabinet; on the other hand, they are totally demoralised with the promiscuous scurrility of the *Times*, which they persist in considering as representing the feeling not only of the English public generally, but of Lord Palmerston in particular. They seem to think all hope of an understanding with England impossible, partly from the stupidity and weakness of their own Ministry, partly from the determined hostility of public opinion in England, and under these circumstances I am sorry to say that there are some of the party who desire an alliance with France and Russia, which should exchange the acquiescence of Prussia in Russo-French plans in the East for a settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question in the north. I do not mean to say that is by any means the view generally entertained by the Liberals, but certainly here and there voices are heard to that effect which would not have been so heard this time last year. It cannot be denied that we do our best in England, the *Times* at least, to throw cold water upon the party we could command to a man in this country, and to strengthen the hands of our enemies.'

'BADEN MEMORANDUM

'It is of paramount importance that Germany should develop out of the form of a "Confederation of States" (Staaten-

bund), such as the Federal Act and the Final Act of Vienna constituted her, into that of a federated or "composite State" (Bundesstaat) under a supreme federal Government.

'The word "Composite State" is that expression given by Wheaton as the equivalent for Bundesstaat, but its use is hardly sufficiently generally recognised to warrant its promiscuous adoption. By the convenient word Bundesstaat the Germans express a confederation like that of the United States of America, in which the *external sovereignty* of the several members is absorbed in the central organ, the *internal sovereignty* only remaining intact in the several states, in contradistinction to a confederation like that of Germany, in which the external as well as internal sovereignty of the individual members, except in very unimportant exceptions, remains undiminished. "Federated States" seems the most liberal rendering of the word, but even more the composition requires formal adoption into the language.

'To obtain this object it is necessary that those functions of the several sovereigns of Germany, the divided exercise of which has hitherto failed to secure the results worthy of which a great nation, should for the future be united and concentrated into a central organ.

'These functions may be classed under two heads, namely:—

(1) National Defence.

(2) National representation *vis-à-vis* of foreign countries.

Whilst the sovereignty of the several Princes would in *principle* remain intact, the right can certainly not be denied to these latter of delegating to what institutions or to what persons they consider most fit for that purpose the exercise of certain of their individual sovereign prerogatives. The reorganisation of the German Confederation in this respect would therefore remain an *internal German question*, and Germany could claim, therefore, the non-intervention of Europe as not infringing upon the treaties of 1815.

Of England it is to be wished that she should, with reference to Germany, represent the principle of non-intervention in the same way that she has done so with regard to Italy.

## II.

'In carrying out new federal organisation the following principles should be kept in view:—

'(1) In regard to the relation towards Austria, the present nucleus of reciprocal rights and obligations which invests the German Confederation as with the character of an "everlasting" pact would remain in their integrity.

'For the expression of this relation the most fitting form would have to be sought for, which would probably be that of an international alliance between Austria and the United

States of Germany (analogous to that which at a former period existed between the cantons of Switzerland).

‘(2) The remaining States of Germany would unite together into a federated State, and would surrender to a central federal power the exercise of the two functions above designated.

‘(3) This central power would be composed, first of the Prussian dynasty with a responsible Ministry. Second, of a representation of the German nation in two Houses, in which the one would represent the interests of the nation as a whole in the presence of the individual interests; whilst the other would have to guard the interests of the separate States against the encroachments of the commonality.

‘(4) This representation would on the one side afford to the individual States the guarantee that the central Government would keep upon the terrain assigned to it, and not encroach upon others not within its jurisdiction, which the interest of the single States and the wishes of the population might make it advisable should remain within control.

‘On the other side it would enable the central Government to fulfil effectually the duties assigned in despite of particularistic tendencies.

‘(5) In this manner the new Constitution of Germany would be founded upon a series of treaties between the independent States, and a solid foundation be gained for the carrying out of the Constitutional system.

‘Those German States that would not choose to join the new federated German State (Bundesstaat) would, in order that the defensive power of Germany against France may not be weakened, remain in the same confederate relation as Austria; that is, upon a footing of offensive and defensive alliance. This most specially refers to the probable position of Bavaria.

‘Of England, it would be wished that her policy, which is at present bent upon maintaining concord between the States of Germany, should so far adapt itself to circumstances that, in the event of such a union taking place under the leadership of Prussia, her exertions should be directed towards getting Austria to accept the new position, and not to compromise the peace of Europe by protests against the new order of things in favour of the old untenable impotent federal organisation.

### III.

‘With reference to the way to reach these objects, and the method to be adopted in finding this way, the following propositions should be more particularly kept in view :—

‘(1) The initiative cannot be taken by Prussia, but should best come from some of the smaller States,—on the other hand, Prussia must confidentially express her opinion upon the opportuneness of the moment at which such a step should be taken. In so far as European relations are concerned, it would

be very desirable that England's opinion should likewise be had upon the subject.

'(2) A confidential understanding must be arrived at with Prussia upon the objects to be obtained, lest a great national movement should a second time remain without results.

'(3) During the whole movement it should be kept in sight that the defensive power of Germany against France should never for one moment be weakened.

'(4) The first step towards carrying out any policy of this sort would be a joint motion at the Diet by the Governments who participated in it, somehow to the following effect:—

'That a committee be appointed for the treatment of the question as to the organisation of the confederation to a further development. To empower this committee, by means of their respective representatives at Frankfort, to inquire of the high Governments under what conditions such Governments would be minded to co-operate in the creation of a federal organisation based upon the above principles, and to report within (say four weeks) upon the result of its operation.

'(5) Upon the failure of this attempt the Governments to consider what other step might be taken in this direction.

### *Lord John Russell to Morier*

'PEMBROKE LODGE, *November 12th, 1860.*

' . . . I have reflected a good deal on the German plans you sent me, but am sorry to say I cannot see my way out of the labyrinth, nor does the scheme you send me furnish me a clue.

'The difficulty lies in the double supremacy of Austria and Prussia. Austria supported by three or four Kinglings will never yield to have an equal in Germany; Prussia will never admit a superior.

'I see no practical way of solving this difficulty at present. But much may be done by constantly urging that Germany ought to have an Emperor of Germany, and a Parliament of Germany consisting of a House of Peers or Princes and a House of Representatives.

'If such a Parliament were ever assembled, their first task should be to choose an Emperor, leaving the diplomatic representatives of the separate States to the choice of their several States to keep them up or abolish them.

'If Prussia would have the goodness to agree to a fair

settlement of the Italian question, Schleswig might be left to us to mediate with Denmark, and the German question would be made easier. . . .'

*Morier to Lord John Russell*

*'January 26th-March 3rd, 1861.*

' . . . The difficulties you see in the practical carrying out of the Grand Duke of Baden's project for federal reform are very real ones: that which you specially allude to is, I think, now rapidly disappearing, if it has not already disappeared, the double supremacy of Austria and Prussia, the one representing after a fashion the traditional prestige of the Empire, and ballasted with every variety of existing privilege, dynastic and other; the other representing an ideal, not as yet realised, and having only the gilded hope of a better future to contrast with the imperfect, but to many people tolerable, present. Such have hitherto undoubtedly been the opposing forces which have checked the development of German unity,—and Austria, with her three or four Kinglings, and of late years with a staunch supporter in the person of the Romanticist, now at last gathered to his medieval ancestors, seated on the Prussian throne, has had an easy task of it in maintaining her virtual preponderance. The history of the last two years, however, has altogether changed this relation between the balancing forces, and Austria, since the Peace of Villafranca, and its immediate results upon her internal organisation, has become, *even in the eyes of the Kinglings* (who are some of them, e.g. Bavaria, already speculating on the sick's man inheritance), wholly *impotent* in regard to the internal politics of Germany. Hence Prussia not only has the field clear as regards the practical opposition which could be yielded by her old rival, but (*N.B.*, this is the *real* meaning of the Baden-Weimar project) she has a *positive* element to work with, in the present sense of insecurity with which the impotency of Austria inspires the smaller States. This sense of insecurity is rapidly becoming very like a panic, and if it should reach this point there is no knowing what results it may not bring about. The two principal directions which the various political elements of Germany are



being drifted into, under the influence of this panic, are on the one hand that embodied in the Baden project, namely, a Federal State with an hereditary head and a national Parliament; on the other, that of a close confederation of the non-Prussian and Austrian dynasties *inter se*, necessarily leading *mutato nomine* to something like a Confederation of the Rhine under French protection, necessarily leading to French protection I say, because without such a protection a dynastic alliance of this kind could not hold its own against the people governed by it. That this, at first sight, appears to be incompatible with the virulent anti-French and *Vaterland* hectoring of the Kinglings in 1859 I admit; but this very hectoring was more than anything else the result of a bad *conscience*. They knew that their people did not trust them, and that the popular memory had not forgotten from what foreign manufactory the royal purple was derived that had become the 'motley' wear of the cidevant princekins. In a conversation I had in the spring of 1859 with Prince Wittgenstein, the Duke of Nassau's Prime Minister (the which Duke makes common cause with the Kinglings), he openly owned to me that it was quite *à contre cœur* that his Duke and himself blew the national and anti-French trumpet so loud; they only did so, he said, because if they did not, the Duke's tenure of his Dukery would not be worth twenty-four hours' purchase. About the same period (May 1859) the King of Würtemberg wrote an autograph letter to the Emperor Napoleon in which he said nearly the same thing, adding that he and his house could never forget what they owed to the House of Napoleon, so that the strong language he was obliged to hold in Germany was forced from him *in the way of self-preservation only*. This is an element of danger which it would be unwise to overlook, and which is the more to be taken heed of that it naturally works underground, and that if it should gather to a head its effects will be sudden and inappreciable,—nor must the depth of infamy which such a policy presupposes be urged as an argument against it. I have no wish to be too hard upon the individual Kinglings, most of whom are insignificant enough, but the class of statesmen who rule in these minor German Courts, the crop

raised during the reactionary years, the Hassenpflugs,<sup>1</sup> the Borries, the Beusts,<sup>2</sup> and the Dalwigs,<sup>3</sup> it is impossible to have too bad an opinion. For ten years they have used the protectorate of Austria to secure impunity to their own execrable misgovernment and to emasculate the national spirit of Germany, and, this protectorate failing them, they are ready (God forgive me if I wrong them!) to exchange it for any contingent danger (which any sudden unfavourable conjuncture may make an immediate and pressing one,—for these gentlemen understand each other right well), and against the present danger caused by the daily increasing sense of material insecurity which the crumbling together of the Austrian Empire engenders, the only remedy is the intensifying and giving a practical direction to the national feeling, the urging constantly, as you state in your letter, that Germany should constitute herself under an Emperor with a German Parliament. A strong agitation in this sense, headed by the *natural representatives of it*, the sovereigns of the *third* class States, which would take away from it all revolutionary character, would, I feel confident, carry everything before it, Kinglings and Ministers included, who can no longer, as in 1850, have Austria to fall back on. But such an agitation on the part of the sovereigns in question, and so formal a step as a proposal of the kind intended at the Diet, are impossible except upon a previous understanding with Prussia—and here, exactly as I foresaw and foretold in my last letter, is the *hitch*. A direct negotiation was attempted with the Prussian Cabinet on the subject, and entrusted to the Weimar Prime Minister last November, who came to Berlin specially for the purpose. But he only got civil phrases, and was told that desirable as were the results striven after, Prussia could not enter upon the subject till the pending question of the military organisation of the Confederation was settled; a *non sequitur*, the absurdity of which needs no commentary! The Grand

<sup>1</sup> Hassenpflug, Hans Daniel, b. 1794, d. 1862, Minister of State of Electoral Hesse.

<sup>2</sup> Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand Graf, Saxon and Austrian statesman, b. 1809, d. 1886; Minister of State of Saxony, 1849–1860; of Austria, 1866–1871.

<sup>3</sup> Dalwigk, Karl F. Reinhart Freiherr von, b. 1809, d. 1880, Minister of State of Hesse Darmstadt.

Duke of Baden and the Duke of Coburg, in their late visit to Berlin, again urged with every argument in their power the necessity of coming to an understanding, but they met with as little success—the same generalities and civil formulas, the same real *manque de cœur* for the matter was all they found. Assuming, then, the dangers to be such as I describe them, I have certainly not exaggerated them, and assuming the only remedy to be a rapid development of the national element, we arrive at the melancholy conclusion that the real bar to this development lies in the incredible imbecility of the Prussian Cabinet—in the *small-heartedness* of the Ministers, and (it's no use mincing the matter) the *narrow-mindedness* of the Sovereign. That at a moment like the present the rulers of three such prominent States in the Confederation as Baden, Weimar, and Coburg should have been found ready to make conjointly such a step *vis-à-vis* of Prussia is one of those extraordinarily lucky conjunctures which, for years past, have in succession been placed within the reach of Prussian statesmen, and consistently (the only way they have been consistent) rejected by them.'

## CHAPTER XII

## THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN ELECTORAL HESSE

OF all the questions which at that time agitated Germany, one of the most vitally important was undoubtedly the Constitutional Conflict in Electoral Hesse, where the Elector, his Parliament, and indeed his whole country, were engaged in an internecine struggle, which, at one period seriously threatening to bring about war in Germany, had been protracted for years and years.

As early as 1847 Prince Albert had pointed out<sup>1</sup> to King Frederick William IV. of Prussia the unutterable dangers to the monarchical principle, in the existing state of Europe, of a conflict in which the Sovereign had put himself so flagrantly and entirely in the wrong. In 1850 the Hesse question had been on the point of bringing about a rupture between Prussia and Austria, only averted by the former capitulating to the latter at Olmütz. In 1860 the Hesse conflict was as far from being solved as ever, and still remained one of the burning questions of the day.

*Memorandum on Hessian Constitution*

*February 25th, 1860.*

'The conflict respecting the Constitution of Electoral Hesse, when extricated from the formalities and impenetrable phraseology in which every question that is brought within the range of Dietal politics becomes involved, affords one of the most interesting episodes of the struggle for political liberty in which, since the commencement of the century, the German nation has been engaged.

'It is this identification of it with interests that in some

<sup>1</sup> Letter of 12th December 1847, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Herzog v. Coburg, vol. i. p. 137.

form or other are represented throughout the entire extent of the Confederation which lends to it its special political importance. For, however interesting an isolated constitutional contest in so small a state as Electoral Hesse might be from the merely historical point of view, yet, amidst the vast proportions which the political relations of modern Europe have assumed, a contest of this kind could hardly lay claim to an interest of an immediate and practical kind.

‘The parties to the present conflict, however, are, as regards Germany at large, so to speak, of a “representative” character, the interests they are attacking or defending are (with the one exception of the naked absolutism of Austria) equally objects of defence and attack, the problems they are attempting to solve have corresponding problems equally awaiting their solution, in every one of the States of which the Confederation is composed.

‘Nor is this a merely figurative mode of expression, for in the issue of the question at present pending before the Diet is in a very literal manner involved the settlement of the organic relation in which for the future the Sovereigns of the States composing the Confederation and the peoples ruled over by them respectively, stand towards each other.

‘The question to be solved may thus be broadly stated :—

‘Can engagements entered into between a Sovereign and his people be set aside by a verdict of the Diets based upon a one-sided appeal of the Sovereign to the Diet ? or, in other words,—

‘Can a body composed of the Diplomatic Representatives of the executive organs in the several States of the Confederation cancel, and on its own authority create afresh, organic laws in the individual States.

‘Looked at from the moral rather than from the political point of view, the question assumes this further form :—

‘Can the Diet claim, upon the mere abstract principle of the Divine Right of Monarchy, the right of dispensing a Sovereign from his oath of allegiance to a long established Constitution ?

' Such, concisely expressed, is the question of *principle* involved in the case.

' The question of *fact* may thus be formulated :—

' The *legal basis* on which the relations between Sovereign and people in the Electorate of Hesse were founded, having been destroyed by an act of violence committed by the Elector through the instrumentality of certain Governments claiming to represent the federal body, and by the formal ratification of this act later on by the majority of the resuscitated Diet, and a solution of continuity having thereby arisen in the legal relations obtaining between Sovereign and people, by what means is such a legal basis to be re-established, and how is the intermediate state between the past legal basis and the future legal basis to be bridged over ?

' It is evident that in every attempt to elucidate the facts that have led to the necessity of solving the above difficult problem there are two sides of the question that must be kept distinct from each other, and separately apprehended, viz :—

' 1. The relation between the Sovereign of Hesse and his people.

' 2. The manner in which this relation is affected by the Constitution of the Confederation of which the Sovereign and people in question form a unit.

' The matter, however, is further complicated by the fact that at the time of the violent intervention above referred to, the parties so intervening were not the old German federal body of the Treaty of Vienna, but two distinct groups of States, of which the one under the Hegemony of Austria claimed indeed to represent that body, assumed therefrom the right to interfere, and the other under the Hegemony of Prussia disputed this right. It is true that Prussia afterwards became an accomplice, after the act, in the judicial murder of the Hesse Constitution; but, nevertheless, the difference thus originally noted has left its impress upon the whole of the later transactions in the case.

' A third point, therefore, in addition to the other two, will require to have especial attention paid to it, viz. :—

'The relation which Austria and Prussia respectively stood in towards the Sovereign and Constitution of Hesse at the time of the intervention in 1850-1851.

'With every wish to obtain conciseness it will be impossible in the total absence of any consecutive account of the history of this question to bring out these points in a clear light without entering somewhat into the historical antecedents of the question.

'And in the first place, the attempt must be made to appreciate clearly what were the organic laws that determined the relations between the Sovereign and people in the Electorate previous to 1850, and what was the nature of the conflict that brought about the *de facto* abrogation of those laws by the so-called "Federal Execution," and in the next place to ascertain exactly within what limits is restricted the competency of the Diet in questions touching such organic laws in the individual States.

'The Constitution put out of force by the Executive troops of Austria and Bavaria in 1850, was that generally known as the Constitution of 1831, modified by certain alterations made to it in 1848-1849.

'The great argument used by the Hesse Ministry and their advocates against this Constitution (independently of the imputed incompatibility of some of its articles with the provisions of the Federal Constitution) is, that, as the offspring of the revolutionary impulse given to Germany by the French July Revolution, and as still further modified during the revolutionary movement of 1848-1849, the principles upon which it was based sapped the root of the monarchical principle.

'It is worth while, therefore, to inquire in how far this assertion is carried out by facts,—in how far, that is, the Constitution of 1831 answers to the character of one of the doctrinaire constitutions formed on the *a priori* abstractions of the ultra-Liberal schools of modern continental Europe, of which there are not wanting specimens in the smaller states of Germany, or on the contrary, in how far it is the embodiment of certain organic principles which in some shape or other had pre-existed in the Electorate.

'This examination will show that, far from answering

to the former description, it, in all essential characteristics, answers to the latter, and that on the three principal points on which it has been so fiercely attacked—the right to refuse taxes, the independence and autonomous action of the tribunals, and the independent position of the servants of the State—the Constitution of 1831 is only a more systematised application of principles that have already been in force in the Electorate; and it will thus be seen that the monarchical principle, such as it was understood in the Electorate previous to 1831 (and it should be remembered that the historical basis on which the monarchical basis rests in Germany is identical, or nearly so, in all the States of the Confederation), was in no essential manner modified by the provisions of this Constitution. The absolutistic principle, as enshrined in the formula of the "Divine Right," so constantly put forward in this controversy is, on the other hand, an essentially *new* idea in Germany, as in a momentary impulse of straightforwardness the great organ of the party representing it proclaimed, when it christened it the New Prussian Gazette, and this principle, which the whole conflict respecting the Hesse Constitution was waged to stamp into a federal law, is in its very essence a heritage of the revolutionary years.

' From a period reaching far back into the mists of mediæval times, the absolute power of the great vassals of the Empire (the present independent sovereigns of Germany) over the territories held by them had been restricted by the corporate rights of the "States," through whose instrumentality alone they could raise supplies. Possessed of little control over the use to which these supplies should be put when raised, the "States" in question were invested with the undisputed prerogative of voting or withholding them. In Hesse, more than elsewhere, this prerogative had been preserved intact, and the history of the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries afford continually-recurring instances of its solemn recognition on the part of the rulers *pro tem*.

' The independence of the tribunals was a no less sacred principle recognised from the earliest times amongst the organic laws of the Hessian State. It received its most



solemn consecration in the Edict of the Landgrave Frederick in the year 1743, with reference to the "Supreme Tribunal of Appeal" (*Ober Appellations Gericht*), whose constitutional use of the rights it was thus invested with, as reconsecrated by the Constitution of 1831, became, as the sequel will show, the chief points of attack in the anti-constitutional campaign of the Hassenpflug Ministry. By this Edict there were brought within the competence of the Supreme Court then constituted, all matters touching the Rights and Prerogatives of the Landgrave, as exercised by *himself or by his public or private servants* (Beamte und Bedienten), and it was ruled, that from the decisions of this Court as based on Law and arrived at by the Members composing it as responsible to God and their consciences only, *there should be no appeal*.

'The independence of the servants of the State *vis-à-vis* of the Executive, so loudly declaimed against as a revolutionary innovation, was only an inevitable corollary from the principle established in the creation of this Court. For, the moment these public servants became responsible for their acts to the Law, that Law became on the other side bound to protect them in the discharge of their public duties against the caprices of the Executive.

'Such were the broad foundations on which, from far remote times, the liberties of the Hessian people were based.

'In the year 1816, they received a fresh recognition. The attempt was then made to give to the antiquated "States" that had been handed down much *in statu quo* from the sixteenth century, a form more analogous to a modern Constitution. It broke down from the impossibility of the then Elector and the "States" coming to an agreement on the question of the "Domains" and Crown property.

'In the articles, however, that had been proposed by the Government of the Elector for the acceptance of the "States" the principles above recorded were embodied, and that much in the same state in which they were afterwards incorporated into the Constitution of 1831.

'In that year the work which had failed of being accomplished in 1816 was successfully carried out. A Constitu-

tion or body of organic laws, regulating once for all the relations in which all the members composing the State of Hesse Electoral, from the Elector downwards, were to stand in towards each other, was definitely settled upon, in the only legal manner in which such an organic law could be passed, viz. by the free and untrammelled consent of the contracting parties : the Sovereign on the one part, the constitutional Representatives of the country, *i.e.* the corporations of the States, on the other.

' The Constitution thus arrived at was, as regards the interpretation of the principles above noted, of a certainly very liberal kind ; on the other hand, as regards the composition of the body by which the power of the Elector was to be balanced, it was essentially conservative.

' The Chamber of 1830 was, in reality, composed of the old " States " of the Electorate, only with a more numerous and *bona-fide* Representation of the " third " and " fourth " Estates—of the boroughs, that is, and of the small rural freeholders. Moreover, instead of discussing and voting as before " curially," that is, according to the several estates they sat in, they formed part of one Chamber in which the votes were all equal.

' The following are some of the more important of the powers with which the Chamber was invested.

' As regards the granting of Supplies, it was provided—

' That the States were bound to provide the necessary means for carrying on the ordinary and extraordinary business of the State, and that from the year 1831 no tax, either direct or indirect, could be levied without the sanction of the States.

' That in every writ ordering the levy of a tax, the consent to its levy on the part of the States should be specially recorded, and, in the absence of this record, that no public servant could be authorised to proceed to the levy, nor any person held bound to pay the tax.

' That, after the period for which the supplies have been voted has come to an end, the taxes on the old estimate might continue to be raised for a term of six months, if, in consequence of extraordinary circumstances, either the States could not immediately be called together, or,

if they had been dissolved before a new budget had been voted, or, in the event of the discussion on the new budget being prolonged beyond the term which the former budget had been voted.

'As regards the position of the Tribunals, it was provided—

'That the *judicial* and *administrative* organs should be kept wholly distinct and apart, and

'That in any conflict respecting the sphere of the administration and that of the tribunals, the latter were to decide according to the existing laws.

'As regards the position of the public servants, it was provided—

'That no public servant could be removed or dismissed against his will, or have his salary diminished or withdrawn, except in virtue of a sentence pronounced by the competent Court.

'Every public servant was made responsible for his public acts, and even for an act done by the order of his superior, if such act was against the Constitution, a state official could be prosecuted before the tribunals by the "States," if these were not sitting, by the permanent Committee who represented them, when they were not assembled.

'For the safeguarding of the Constitution, an oath, not merely passively to observe it, *but actively to maintain* it, was required of the Sovereign upon his accession before the oath of allegiance was taken by the States—further, the same oath had to be taken by the States, and by every official of every grade, by the army and by every citizen upon coming of age. Thus the whole male population of Electoral Hesse were bound by oath to maintain the organic law of 1830.

'Further, the right of pardon for offences committed against the Constitution and adjudged to be such by the supreme Court, was not accorded to the Elector. This, it may be fairly argued, is a very direct encroachment upon the prerogative of the Crown; but it is, nevertheless, not much more than a modern adaptation of the Edict of 1743 above referred to.

' Such was the Constitution of 1830. It worked very well for the first few years, and until the reactionary period that followed in Germany on the liberal movement of 1830 had again fairly set in, then, on account of its very success, it became a thorn in the side of the reactionary Governments of the Confederation. From this period down to '48, a struggle was carried on between the Elector and the "States," in which, though the former was unable to bring about a change in the Constitution itself, he succeeded by the use of every sort of chicanery in reducing its action to a dead letter. It was in the early years of this struggle, that the afterwards notorious Hassenpflug (or Hessenfluch, "The Curse of Hesse," as the popular voice designated him) first won his spurs, and displayed his ability in the art of bullying a Representative Assembly, and of twisting the meaning of the plainest laws into the sense the most opposite. Dismissed by the Elector in 1837, for some reason not known, he successively entered the service of the Prince of Hohenzollern, and of the King of Holland, as Civil Governor of Luxemburg, and lastly of Prussia, where in 1845 he accepted the post of Procureur du Roi at Greifswald. His successor at Cassel, however, Schæffer, had been sufficiently schooled by him in the arts in which he excelled to keep up his system in full force up to the year 1848.

' Reduced as the Constitution became, by this process, to almost a shadow, yet its continuing to exist at all for the space of eighteen years was not without great and abiding results. All classes of society became, by the joint defence they had been engaged in of rights that had become dead to all, welded together into a common political existence, and in contradistinction to almost all the other states of Germany, the spirit of revolutionary anarchy found no congenial elements in the Electorate. The remarkable result was that, on the breaking out of the events of the year '48, in Hesse alone no revolution took place; no constituent assembly was called together, and no organic law initiatory of a new era was passed. The Hessian people were fully content with the establishment *de facto* of the Constitution existing *de jure*, and the only change brought about was a

change of Ministry, the new advisers of the Elector being chosen from amongst men who had the confidence not of a majority only, but of the *entire* Chamber.

'The new Ministry did not even proceed to the dissolution of the Chamber, and the Hesse Constitution sailed into the revolutionary waters of '48 with a representative assembly elected during the period of the fierce reaction that had prevailed during the preceding years.

'The only organic modification of the Constitution during the years '48 and '49 was the promulgation of a more extended electoral law, by no means, however, based on universal suffrage, and of an enactment making the Minister of War responsible for acts done by the Elector as supreme head of the army.

'These two years were marked by the complete quiet and order that prevailed throughout the Electorate, and by the loyalty and good feeling displayed both by the Chamber and the people towards the Elector. In their external policy the Ministry, unanimously supported by the Chamber, were very fervent adherents to the cause of German unity. When the Frankfort Constituent Assembly broke down, however, a split took place in the Chamber, the constitutional or conservative majority with the Ministry at its head adhering as the last hope of the realisation of this idea to the "Union" of States under Prussia known as the Three Kings' Alliance (*Drei-Königs-Bund*), which proposed by means of the Constituent Assembly of Erfurt to bring about a German "Federated State" to the exclusion of Austria; the democratic minority, on the other hand, with a more correct calculation of the political chances of the undertaking, opposing themselves to this scheme.

'Thus matters stood when on the 3rd of February 1850 a change of Ministry was announced. The date at which, and the circumstances under which, the announcement was made, are worth noting. Nothing had occurred to disturb the internal tranquillity of the Electorate. The existing Ministry was at perfect unity with the constitutional majority of the Chamber, and that majority fairly represented the country at large. The time had arrived, however, when the conquest of Hungary by the Russian

army and by the re-conquest of her Italian Provinces by her own army, Austria was enabled to resume her natural position in Germany as the *point d'appui* for the reactionary policy of all the smaller States. The armed revolution in Southern Germany had been put down by the arms of Prussia, the more invidious task of putting down the Constitution as legally established was reserved for Austria.

'Electoral Hesse presented the most flagrant case, for there, with the exception of some half-dozen pupils of Hassenpflug, the whole country was unanimous in its attachment to the Constitution. This, it is true, increased the difficulties of the case, but, on the other hand, in the event of success, it promised a victory doubly brilliant. One man and one only was supposed to be equal to the task, and Hassenpflug was recalled from Prussia. The infamy of his private character almost simultaneously became notorious by his being traduced before the Prussian tribunals on the charge of forgery. He got away in right time, however, and assumed his ministerial functions. Shortly afterwards he was sentenced *in contumaciam* by the Criminal Court of First Instance to fifteen years' imprisonment and hard labour. The Superior Court later on, it is true, reversed this sentence on a formal ground, but left the moral certainty of his guilt untouched.

'There can be no moral doubt that the conflict brought about by Hassenpflug formed a part of a preconceived plan, and that the two objects he was created Minister to obtain were, on the one hand, the separation of Hesse from the "Union" or "Three Kings' Alliance," with a view to assist Austria in resuscitating the defunct Diet, and on the other, the bringing about of a state of things in the Electorate which should enable him either of his own power to crush the Constitution or afford an opportunity to the resuscitated Diet to interfere by arms in the affairs of the Electorate, and to, by a formal act, give proof to Europe of its recovered prestige.

'The means used for compassing these objects and the conflict resulting therefrom are well worth a few minutes' consideration, as they probably afford a unique specimen of their kind in the annals of constitutional history.

'The people of Hesse well knew that they were fighting against hopeless odds, and that a recourse to arms as a last resource was denied them on account of the overpowering external force that could be brought to bear upon them—the only weapon they had in their hand was the text of the Constitution. Hassenpflug, it is evident, at first thought that he could have recourse to the same arsenal, and, by casuistical interpretations of that text, conquer the Chamber and reduce the Constitution to a dead letter; the steadiness with which the game was played on the other side, however, soon rendered this a hopeless task, and he was soon forced into the most glaring violation of some of the clearest provisions of the Act of 1830.

'The main outline of this conflict, which lasted from the 28th of February, the date of the formation of the Hassenpflug Ministry, to the 1st of November 1850, the day upon which the Austro-Bavarian corps of execution crossed the Hessian frontier, must be here given.

'The object of Hassenpflug, it must be kept in mind, was either to reduce the Chamber to a state of servile dependency upon the Elector and his Government, or to force it into a refusal of taxes and thereby bring about the desired collision with the provisions on this subject in the old federal Constitution. To cover this impending deficit he proposes the immediate appropriation of 644,000 thalers, out of a fund created for the purpose of reducing tithes, etc.

'This proposition is negatived by the Chamber on the ground, firstly, that the appropriation of the above fund for other purposes than those for which it was intended was against the distinct provisions of an article in the Constitution; and, secondly, that until the budget had been discussed, it was impossible to know what the probable deficit was likely to be, inasmuch as until this discussion had taken place, it could not be determined whether even, if the items of income were likely to be less than they were estimated at, the expenditure might not, on the other hand, be diminished to a corresponding extent.

'This answer was returned on the 15th of March; immediately upon its being communicated to the Ministry the House was adjourned to the 17th of May.

' On its reassembling, the House finds that no budget has been prepared for them by the Government, but a new financial proposition lies for their acceptance. In this new proposal there is no mention of the former deficit for the current year, but a real deficit in the last year is announced, and the consent of the House to a loan of 760,000 thalers is asked for. This demand is met by the same answer as the former, viz. that until the budget has been discussed it is impossible for the Chamber to make an extraordinary vote with reference to an unproved deficit, and that the necessity for an examination of the budget is rendered all the more patent by the extraordinary discrepancy in the two statements with regard to it, put forward in two months by the same Ministry. The House further inquired whether the old budget was still to be considered as under discussion, and being answered in the affirmative, the Committee on their part, and the House on theirs, engage to get the report and their decision on it over before the end of June, so as to enable the Government to continue raising the necessary taxes from the 1st of July onwards, at which date, in the absence of a new budget according to the clear provisions of the Constitution, the power of raising the necessary taxes would be extinguished.

' Hassenpflug replied to this, that it was the Elector's intention immediately to dissolve the Chamber, and that just sufficient time would be left it to vote another provisional levy of taxes for six months, upon which the dissolution would immediately follow.

' The Chamber answered that a second provisional levy was wholly unprovided for by the Constitution, and that such a measure would be as distinctly against its letter as against its spirit. They again engaged themselves, if they were allowed to go on with the discussion of the budget, to finish the work in the quickest space, and to get the regular supplies voted before the resolution.

' The reply to this was immediate dissolution in the most insulting form that the ingenuity of Hassenpflug could suggest to him.

' He was getting near his desired goal, that of establishing



a case of refusal of taxes, and his ally, the resuscitated Bund, was fast quickening into renewed existence, a meeting of some of the States, under the Presidency of Austria, having already taken place at Frankfort. Hitherto, however, though riding roughshod over one provision of the Constitution after another, he had taken his stand on the paragraphs, which left, firstly, the Elector free to choose whom he would for his Ministers, and secondly and thirdly, those which gave him the right to prorogue and dissolve the Chamber when he thought fit. The ingenious Minister had met the prayer of the Chamber to be allowed to discuss the budget by charging it with a direct attack against the prorogation, and the right of the Crown to dissolve!

'According to the provisions of the Constitution, when a Chamber is adjourned or dissolved, it elects a standing Committee whose duty it is to safeguard the rights of the Chamber against the executive during such time as the former is not assembled, and in the event of any extraordinary events occurring, which would require the immediate action of the executive, they are made as it were responsible for this action not being exercised unconstitutionally.

'Upon the dissolution of the Chamber, Hassenpflug, in virtue of § 95, determining the sphere of action of the Committee, called upon it to give its consent to the continued levy of taxes. He rested his appeal upon the ground that the extraordinary circumstances foreseen in the section in question had come to pass by the refusal of the Chamber, and that the non-levy of taxes would throw the whole machine of Government into inextricable confusion. The Committee reply that they are only, so to speak, the lieutenant of the Chamber, and that as such, it would be absurd for them to consider themselves as having a more extensive power than the Chamber itself. The latter had declared themselves incompetent under the existing Constitution to grant a continued levy of taxes until a budget had been laid before their consideration. The Committee could only abide by this decision. They could, however, to prevent as far as possible the confusion

which would result from a stoppage in the machinery for the collection of taxes, give their consent to the continued levy of the indirect taxes, upon the condition that the taxes so raised should be placed under seal in the public Treasury, and that no disbursement should be made until a decision had been arrived at upon the subject.

'Consequently from the 1st of July, no more direct taxes were raised, and the indirect taxes were consigned to the coffers of the Treasury.

'The new Chamber met on the 22nd of August.

'In the last Chamber, the Government had had one supporter. In the present Chamber this solitary individual had lost his seat.

'Again Hassenpflug refused to lay a budget before the House, but this time he changed his ground, and instead of asking for a loan, demanded, *purement et simplement*, the continued levy of taxes.

'The Chamber, preparing their answer by a unanimous vote of want of confidence, replied that there was a formal impossibility of entertaining the proposal, inasmuch as the old budget and the half-finished report thereon having died out with the last Chamber, the only cases in which the Constitution provided the provisional levy did not exist. This decision was taken on the 30th of August.

'They were themselves on the 2nd of September again dissolved.

'Thus ended the first phase of the conflict, that namely with the Chamber. Hassenpflug, so far as his object was to conquer the Chamber and force it into a violation of the Constitution, had totally failed. The Chamber had kept itself strictly within the meaning of the paragraphs of the Constitution, which applied to the question they were called upon to decide. They had not moved one hair's-breadth beyond the path marked out for them by their oath to maintain the Constitution intact. They had further, by their readiness to get the budget discussed in an incredibly short space of time, gone out of their way to remove all practical difficulties from the path of a Government that was lying at the time under a formal vote of want of confidence, and the head of which was a condemned felon.

'Hassenpflug, on the other hand, by his endeavours to force the Chamber into unconstitutional acts, had become clearly guilty of misprision of treason as provided by the Constitution.

'The second phase of the conflict is now entered upon with the Standing Committee and the public organs of the State, the administrative and judicial functionaries.

'On the 3rd of September, the day after the dissolution, the Standing Committee is invited to attend a Council of Ministers with a view to the publishing of a Ministerial rescript ordering the levy of taxes.

'This invitation, as being one to an act clearly opposed to the fundamental law of the State, the Committee refused to accept.

'Thereupon on the 4th of September, the Ministerial rescript ordering the levy was published. An ingenious device in the preamble of this rescript, well worthy of its author, should not be left unnoticed, as thoroughly characterising the casuistic spirit in which the whole crusade was carried. In § 95, the expression used for the required intervention of the Standing Committee upon extraordinary emergencies is the word *zuziehen*—to draw to—*i.e.* by the section in question, and the Ministry were bound before coming to a determination on such occasions "to draw them," the Standing Committee—this expression, the meaning of which was plain enough, had, moreover, on former occasions, been distinctly ruled to have an identical meaning with *Mitwirkung* or co-operation. Nevertheless, in the preamble of the above rescript, the monstrous assertion was made, that by the invitation of the Committee the act "of drawing the Committee to them," provided by the Constitution, had been fulfilled by the Ministry, and that the validity of any act was not impaired by the refusal of the Committee to be drawn.

'The Ministerial rescript of the 4th September was answered on the part of the Committee by a formal protest, and an address to the public functionaries, administrative as well as judicial, was issued, reminding them of § 98 of the Constitution making any levy of taxes, without the authorisation of the Chamber, illegal. Not a single ad-

ministrative official could be got to proceed to the collection, and the Tribunals formally adhered to the order by discontinuing the use of stamped paper.

'In his next move, Hassenpflug fairly threw off the constitutional mask with which he had endeavoured hitherto to cover the real features of his measures. On the 7th of September, without even the appearance of wishing to consult the Committee, amidst the most profound tranquillity, as far as the maintenance of public order was concerned, he proclaimed the whole Electorate in a state of siege. It should be noted that the only state of siege provided for by the Constitution is in case "of acts of violence having been committed against private persons or property by disorderly mobs, who have for their object *the hindering the course of justice or the action of the administrative organs.*" The only persons at present moving in the matter were the administrative organs. An important fact, connected with the declaration of the state of siege, must be noted. In the rescript announcing it the reference is made to the decrees of the old defunct Diet, viz. to the celebrated resolutions of 28th July 1832, in which the imminence of a state of anarchy is to be met by extraordinary measures on the part of the Government, and in case of need, by an appeal for armed intervention on the part of the Diet.

'The Diet thus invoked was represented at Frankfort by a minority of the States formerly belonging to the old federal body. Hesse formed part of the "Union" and Three Kings' Alliance under the Presidency of Prussia, which had formerly protested against the resuscitation of the Diet—the Hesse Chamber had in most unanimous manner given in its adhesion to this anti-Dietal policy, whilst Hassenpflug publicly had in the name of the Government declared on the 7th of March, *i.e.* three weeks after his nomination as Minister, that in the opinion of the Elector and his Government "there existed no federal organ which could in any way influence the internal affairs of a German State or alter or suspend a Constitution, and that it (the Hessian Government) would in every way resist every attempt of the kind. Further, that the Government pledged themselves not to enter into any negotiations

for the creating afresh of such a federal organ without the co-operation of the Chamber." In the face of this declaration, and whilst still belonging to the "Union," Hassenpflug proceeded as Plenipotentiary to Frankfort, and, as seen above, proclaimed the state of siege in virtue, not of the former organic laws of the Confederacy as settled by the Congress of Vienna, but of an exceptional resolution of (1832) a former Diet, thereby proclaiming the resuscitation, not of the Diet only, but of all the ultra-reactionary legislation that had disgraced the Diet during its previous existence.

'The Standing Committee replied to the Declaration of the state of siege by a protest against its legality, and as regarded the presumed authority derived from Dietal sanction, it referred to the solemn declaration made by the Government above referred to, and took its stand upon the principles therein put forward. They were desirous of citing the Ministry before the Supreme Court of Appeal on a charge of High Treason, but the Constitution only gave the Chamber itself the right. They drew up, therefore, an act of accusation against them on the ground of misuse of official power. The Supreme Court, however, ruled on a technical ground, that until the charge of treason had been proved, the smaller charge of misuse of official power could not be proceeded with—the conflict consequently, instead of being decided by one great general engagement, as had been hoped, took the form of a lengthened struggle between the military and the civil authorities. The details of the struggle that occurred between the civil and the military authorities, interesting though they are, are too complicated to be entered into. The military themselves could not under the Constitution be brought before the ordinary Tribunals, but whenever a civilian got implicated in any of the measures carried out by the military authorities, he was immediately traduced before the Tribunals, and further the Staats Anwalt (*Procureur du Roi*) was made responsible for certain acts against the Press committed by the military authorities under his sanction, and called upon by the Upper Tribunal to account for his conduct. The Commander-in-Chief, General Bauer, who was an honest old

soldier, and had few ideas in his head beyond obeying the Elector, was nevertheless completely beaten by this attitude of the Tribunals, and the conviction he arrived at of the total illegality of his proceedings. The general result of this second phase of the conflict was, that not a single tax was raised, and that the action of the military became paralysed by the sentence of the Tribunals. In the meantime the most complete tranquillity continued to reign, so that the state of siege became daily a more glaring absurdity. The population placed the most unbounded confidence in the administrative and judicial organs, agreed to let the contest be fought out on the ground of legal rights, and settled amongst themselves with singular forbearance to abstain from every kind of demonstration,—the coffee-houses were emptied earlier than usual, and the common workpeople entered into reciprocal engagements not to frequent public-houses, for fear of possible excesses committed under the double influence of political and vinous excitement.

'This tranquillity was so patent a fact that Hassenpflug, with his usual casuistry, used it as an argument to prove that the population were quite indifferent to the Constitution, and that he had only to do with a handful of lawyers and officials. Nevertheless, he began to fear that the case of anarchy which would have to be established to enable the intervention of the Diet might be difficult of proof. He determined, therefore, upon the further and ingenious step of making the Elector fly from his capital—with a view to a further step in hopes of attaining the desired end, and persuaded the Elector, accompanied by all the Ministry, to "fly" from Kassel to Wilhelmsbad, a little town on the extremity of the Electorate and close to Frankfurt, where, besides the advantage of the scandal he looked to produce by the "flight," he was immediately within reach of the resuscitated Diet, and of the advice of its Imperial Presidents! The "flight" took place on the 13th September; the place had been well selected, as it afforded the Hesse Ministry the necessary facility for concerting the further steps with the Representatives of the so-called Diet, and more especially with the able assistance of Count Hartig, the Austrian Plenipotentiary.

' With this "flight" the second phase of the conflict, that of the Government with the administrative and judicial organs, may be said to have ended in a second total discomfiture of Hassenpflug by the complete triumph of the civil over the military authority.

' The third and last phase of the conflict, that with the army, alone remains to be related.

' Once at Frankfort, or at Wilhelmsbad, which was synonymous with it, the co-operate action with the so-called Diet was the more easily arranged. On the 19th of September Hassenpflug gave in his report of the state of things in Hesse, of which the following were the most salient points:—

' 1. That a refusal to pay taxes such as that intended in Paragraphs I. and II. of the Dietal Resolution of 28th June 1832 had been incurred by the decision of the Hesse Chamber on the 31st of August.

' 2. That the above Resolution of the 28th of June 1832 was still binding.

' 3. That the rescripts of individual Governments based upon that Resolution had the force of laws which no Tribunal or Chambers could withstand.

' 4. That the Diet consider what measure it should take to enforce such rescripts. This application having been submitted to a Select Committee composed of the Representatives of Austria, Liechtenstein, and Bavaria—

' The Committee reported favourably, and on their report a Dietal Resolution was passed to the effect that—

' 1. A refusal such as that described had been incurred by the Hesse Chamber.

' 2. That the Diet had the same power in such a case as in one of open rebellion.

' 3. That the Hesse Government was to use all constitutional means to force the Chamber to comply.

' 4. That all the judicial and administrative organs were implicitly to obey the orders of the Government.

' 5. That when the Elector had exhausted all other means, the Diet was bound to give him the necessary assistance to *restore order* !

' Armed with this authority, a new state of siege was proclaimed, and General Haynau (a brother of the celebrated

Austrian General of the same name) was appointed Commander-in-chief, with far more extensive powers than those that had been given to General Bauer. The first stage of the siege, as seen before, had broken down from the resistance of the Tribunals. The powers now given to General Haynau suspended the action of the Tribunals and subordinated them to the supreme military command. In a word, the Constitution was for the time being abrogated, and that in so glaring a manner and with such total absence of any regard for appearance, that the officers of the Hessian army, from the highest to the lowest (with only some dozen exceptions)—a body of men, it should be observed, totally without a political nuance—became painfully impressed with the dilemma in which they were placed between their feeling of military discipline and their oath of allegiance to the Constitution.

‘ After concentrating a large body of troops in Kassel, General Haynau appeared there in October, issuing a number of proclamations, every one of which contained the most flagrant violations of the Constitution. From words he proceeded to deeds: obnoxious individuals were thrown into prison without the shadow of legality, and the attempt was even made to arrest the Standing Committee. Nothing daunted, however, this body, supported by the opinion and the sentences of the Supreme Court of Appeal, boldly stood up to the General, and on the 4th proceeded to impeach him before the Supreme *Military* Tribunal of misuse of official authority and of high treason.

‘ This Tribunal consisted of a Major-General, a Colonel, the Judge Advocate General, and the Attorney General. Bound by their official oaths to administer justice according to the laws, they were not to be deterred in this extraordinary crisis from acting up to their duty, and, having deliberately examined the acts of accusation, they returned a true bill (the functions of the Tribunals were similar in the present case to those of a Grand Jury) against General Haynau, and ordered the Garrison Tribunal to proceed to place the General under accusation. This measure could not have been carried out without bloodshed, as a part, though a very small part (a few squadrons of



hussars under the twelve officers above adverted to) would have stood by the General, but it brought matters to the final crisis.

'The whole matter was referred to the Elector at Wilhelmsbad, who answered by dissolving the Supreme Military Tribunal and giving more extensive orders to Haynau.

'All doubt, however, as to what was their line of duty had by the sentence of their own Supreme Court been removed from the minds of the Hessian officers, and on the 9th October the whole corps of officers, with the exception of the twelve young officers above adverted to, two hundred and forty-one in number, sent in their resignation. When it is considered that the largest number of these men were old tried soldiers, very many of them scarred with wounds received a generation before in the great wars of the Empire, and whose fidelity had never once been known to fail; and further, that the greater part of them, with families dependent upon them, had no means of subsistence beyond their pay—moreover, that as a body they were traditionally without any political tendencies, this act of theirs may well challenge comparison with any act of an analogous kind in the great story of the struggle. Hassenpflug had now attained (at what price need hardly be asked) the object he desired. A state of anarchy had been produced,—not indeed the anarchy of rebellious mobs, for the most complete tranquillity continued to prevail, the tranquillity of a deeply dejected population, knowing the odds against which they were contending, and which rendered armed resistance impossible, yet elevated with a dignified sense of the devotion displayed on the part of all those who had been concerned in the struggle,—but the anarchy, or absence of government, resulting from an executive that would give no orders but such as neither administrative, nor judicial, nor military organs could obey without perjuring themselves.

'The execution of the so-called Diet had become necessary.

'On the 1st of November the troops of execution, composed of an Austrian and a Bavarian army corps, entered

the Electorate, and simultaneously a Prussian army crossed the frontier,—not, indeed, to safeguard the liberties of the allied State, and who had in the late struggle for political power in Germany nailed its colours to the Prussian mast, but on the futile ground of maintaining its right of military right of way. With the entrance of the troops of execution the Constitution of 1830 was superseded by the illegal absolute rule of the Elector exercised by means of *foreign* troops. Further resistance was of course hopeless, but punishment had to be inflicted. It was of a simple but effectual kind. All judges of tribunals in any manner implicated in the late events, and all officials who had in any marked manner contributed towards the resistance and the relations of the above, had bodies of troops quartered upon them,—these they had to board and *lodge in their own houses*, and to pay a daily sum of money to in addition. In case of a continued refusal to act in obedience to the orders of Hassenpflug, the number of troops was doubled and trebled till either compliance was attained or the party to be quartered on resigned his post, which in most cases was tantamount to beggary. A great number of the highest officials in the country, and amongst them some of the most illustrious names in the country, chose the latter alternative. It should not be forgotten that the so-called Federal Commissioner who carried out this iniquitous sentence was Count Rechberg, the present Prime Minister of Austria, and that in many individual cases where he had to decide on the quantum of punishment to be administered his decisions never leant to the lenient side. The Standing Committee were brought to a court-martial and sentenced to many years imprisonment in a fortress.

‘The troops of execution remained in Hesse till 1851, and it was not till 1852 that the attempt was made to recover a legal basis on which to place the relations between the Elector and his people.

‘We must now examine the relation which the Diet bears to this whole question.

‘That the action hitherto of the Assembly of Representatives, sitting at Frankfort in the matter, was clearly

devoid of all legal basis is sufficiently evident from what preceded. The old Federal Diet of 1815-1820, based upon the unanimous consent of the States forming part of the Confederation, had by a like unanimous consent been dissolved in 1848. Its legal reconstitution could only result from a like unanimity. The Governments represented at Frankfort formed a minority of those States that had been parties to the old Constitution, and every shadow of legality thereby disappeared. As regards the individual participation of Hesse in the Assembly thus resuscitated, it has been seen that even by the express declaration of Hassenpflug such a participation, except with the co-operation of the Chamber, was deprived of all the sanctions requisite for its legality. That not only the paragraphs of the old Federal Confederation were appealed to (which, as having once formed part of the Public Law of Europe, might with a certain show of plausibility have been invoked), but that the exceptional decisions of the former Diets should after the formal unanimous declaration of their invalidity, made by all the Governments of the Confederation in 1848, have been reinvested with the obligatory force of organic laws, was an outrageous act, which, in its application to the Hesse question, resulted, as we have seen, in the triumph of brute force over the clearest rights. It had, however, a wider signification than this, and was in reality a challenge thrown down by Austria to the Unionist States—a challenge which Prussia refused to take up. The details of the negotiations between the two Powers upon the subject need not be entered into: the general result is well seen in the agreement arrived at at Olmütz between Baron Manteuffel and Prince Schwartzberg, on the 29th of March, and was, as regards Prussia, a surrender at discretion to Austria. The Prussian Government had all along protested against the right of the Frankfort Assembly to interfere in Hesse. When the intervention actually took place they shifted their ground, and put in the idle plea that they entered Hesse not to dispute this right of intervention, but to safeguard their right of military way across the Electorate. It was easy to negotiate on such a basis,—Austria pledged herself to respect the right of way of Prussia; and Prussia,

on the other hand, pledged herself to offer no obstruction to the action of the executive troops against the inhabitants of Hesse. To save appearances a Prussian Commissary was, in conjunction with the Austrian or Federal Commissary, as he was styled, to regulate matters for the Elector.

‘There was now a chance for Prussia to act a part in accordance with her natural position as the representative of the Liberal element in Germany. Having by the punctuation of Olmütz virtually given her consent to the reconstituting of the Diet, she could have frankly thrown the weight of her influence in that body in favour of the constitutional rights of the Hessians, and, by restricting the Diet within the strict sphere of its competency, have recovered for the people of the Electorate those liberties, or nearly all of them, which they had lost by her pusillanimity. But, unfortunately, the triumph of Baron Mantauffel’s policy at Olmütz had only been bought by the secession from the councils of the Prussian Crown of all the patriotic elements, with the Prince of Prussia at their head, who had up to that moment continued to stem (with little result it is true) the spring-tide of the reaction, and to stay the impending national disgrace. The sole power devolved thereby on a set of men whose principles were identical with those that had been celebrating so signal a triumph at Kassel, and who regarded Hassenpflug as a brother of the craft to whose superior genius they bowed. Under these circumstances the person appointed Prussian Commissary—a M. de Uhden—became, as might have been expected, the most zealous partisan of the Hesse Ministry, and Prussian ascendancy was so far regained that, in the crusade against the liberties of the Hesse people, the astute Prussian lawyer displayed far greater ability than his Austrian colleagues, and that it was upon his report that the Dietal Resolution with the octroyé Constitution of 1852 was based.

‘By the policy which Prussia adopted subsequently to the intervention, and to which the other Unionist States could not help adhering, the resuscitation of the old Federal Diet became a *fait accompli*. This could not, it is true, invest past acts in their very nature illegal with a retrospective legality,—granting, however, this retrospective legality, and

assuming that the Federal Diet had at the time of the intervention, as well as since, been—together with all its exceptional legislation—*de jure* in existence, the question arises: in how far the intervention, as it was practically carried out, was within the competency of the Diet; and secondly, how far the Diet is competent to restore the legal basis it had itself destroyed. And this is the question which at present is the one really at issue; for neither the present Prussian Government nor the Hessian people (so far as can be gathered from the present provisional Hesse Chamber, and from the addresses sent in to it from all parts of the Electorate) dispute the binding force of the provisions of the old Federal Act; but in opposition to the Hesse Government and to the hitherto majority of the Diet and the leaders of that majority, the Austrian and the Manteuffel Governments, the Prussian Cabinet disputes the competency of the Diet as *de facto* existing.

‘ It would be an impossible task to analyse the arguments that have been adduced pro and con in the numberless promiscuous reports of the committee and official notes, etc., drawn up on this subject during the last ten years; but the attempt must be made to appreciate, from an examination of the paragraphs of the Federal Acts themselves, what the nature of the Diet’s jurisdiction is in the internal matters of the Confederation, and in how far the sphere of this jurisdiction has been exceeded in the present question.

‘ In the final act of the Congress of Vienna, of the 15th of May 1820, the paragraphs alleged by the Hesse Government and the Frankfort Assembly of 1850 are the 1st, 26th, 27th, 57th, 58th, and 61st.

‘ They are as follows:—

‘ 3. The German Confederation is an international union of the Princes and Free Towns of Germany for the defence of the independence, etc. of Germany, and for the maintenance of external and internal tranquillity.

‘ § 26. When by the rebellious conduct of the inhabitants the internal tranquillity of one of the States of the Confederation is immediately endangered and a spread of such rebellious movements is to be apprehended, or when an actual rebellion has broken out and the Government of

the said State, *after exhausting all constitutional and legal means*, has claimed the assistance of the Diet, it becomes the duty of the latter to take the promptest measures for re-establishment of order. Should in the last case that of open rebellion, etc. (this part of the paragraph need not be given, as there was notoriously no open rebellion).

' § 27. The Government that has been in receipt of the Dietal aid referred to in the above paragraph is bound to inform the Diet of the original cause of the disturbances, and to make a tranquillising report to it (*beruhigende Anzeige*) of the measures taken for the definite re-establishment of a state of legal order.

' § 56. The Statal Constitutions existing in recognised activity can only be altered by means recognised by such Constitutions.

' § 57. As the German Confederation, with the exception of the Free Towns, consists of Sovereign Princes, the Sovereign Power (*die gesammte Staatsgewalt*—the united Power of the State) must in accordance with the root principle involved herein, be united to the Head of the State, and the Sovereign can only be tied to the co-operation of the "States" in the exercise of certain determined Rights (*Ausübung bestimmter Rechte*).

' § 58. The Sovereign Princes united in the Confederation cannot by any Constitution be hindered or restricted in the fulfilment of their federal obligations.

' § 60. Where a Constitution has been guaranteed by the Diet the several parties may claim the mediation of the Diet for its maintenance.

' § 61. Except in cases provided for by the guarantee referred to in Paragraph 60, the Diet is not competent to interfere in the constitutional arrangements of the several States, or in the conflicts between the Princes and their States, as long as they do not assume the character noted in Paragraph 26, in which case the permission of that article and the following one (27) come into force.

' Besides these articles of the organic acts of the German Confederation, there were two Resolutions of the Diet, respectively dated the 28th of June 1832 and the 30th of October 1834,—the former intended to give a more stringent

meaning to Article 57, and the latter having for its object the creation of a Court of Arbitration for the purpose of settling disputes that might arise on constitutional questions between the Sovereigns and their Representative Assemblies in the several States.

‘ Article 2 of the Resolution of the 28th of June 1832 was to the following effect :—

‘ Since, according to the spirit of Article 57, and to that of the deduction drawn from it in Article 58 of the final Act, the means necessary for carrying on a Government—able to fulfil its engagements to the Confederation, and to the Constitution of the country—cannot be refused to a German Sovereign by his “ States,” it is hereby resolved that cases in which “ States ” shall either directly or indirectly make the granting of the taxes necessarily to carry on the Government—conditional upon the carrying out of other wishes or proposals—shall be considered as in the number of those cases to which Articles 25 and 26 apply.

‘ By Article 1 of the Resolution of the 30th of October 1834 it was provided, “ that when a misunderstanding arises in a State of the Confederacy between the Government and the “ States ” respecting the interpretation of the Constitution, and especially when there is a refusal to grant the taxes necessary to carry on the government, and when all constitutional means and all measures conformable to the laws of the country have been tried to remove the difficulty, and have remained without result, then the Governments of the Confederation bind themselves each individually not to invoke the aid of the Diet until they shall have referred the matter to a Court of Arbitration constituted as follows : the members of which are in each case to be chosen in equal proportions by the Sovereign and the Chambers.

‘ Such are in full the provisions of the Federal Acts to which reference can be made in the present conflict.

‘ The conflict itself has in the foregoing pages been given in sufficient detail to allow of each successive step in it being tested by these stipulations of the Federal Constitution, which, it must be remembered (inasmuch as they take in the “ Resolutions of 1832 and 1834, passed after the

"Final Act"), form the *extremest limits* within which the competency of the Diet can be made to reside.

' This examination, even if superficially done, will suffice to show, on the one hand, the total inapplicability of any one of the articles in question to the present case; and on the other, the gross manner in which most of the distinct provisions, or some of them, have been broken through.

' The cases in which the intervention of the Diet can be claimed, according to the provisions of the "Final Act" (Articles 26 and 27), are manifestly those, and those only, in which public tranquillity is threatened—they are mere corollaries to Article 1, which states one of the objects of the Confederation to be the maintenance of internal order. As has been abundantly seen from the above, the public tranquillity was never for one moment jeopardised, and there was notoriously no prospect of the disturbance of public order. The cases provided for in Articles 26 and 27 not having occurred, it was clear that Article 61 was the one that ruled in the case—consequently it was the exceptional resolution of the 28th June 1832 that was appealed to; but here again the special case provided for had not occurred: there was no refusal of taxes either directly or indirectly "with a view to carrying out, as against the Government, other wishes or proposals." The Hesse Ministry had no proposals they wished to force upon the Government; they were not as the Chambers in 1832, against which the resolution was passed, bent on increasing their privileges, but solely on the defence of those they had. The Ministry had forced the Chamber, not into a refusal of taxes, but into a position where they could not vote them without the clearest infringement of the clearest provisions of the Constitution.

' If the Resolution of 1832 was binding, that of 1831 was *a posteriori* binding. The former had plainly gone far beyond the sense of the articles of the "Final Act," and the latter was meant to modify the *trop de zèle*. To declare a refusal of taxes by a Representative Assembly as at once a case of rebellion appeared, in 1832, too strong even to the Frankfort Representatives, and the *via media* of a Court of Arbitration was proposed—to which both parties



might appeal. If any part of the Federal legislation then, according to Hassenpflug's theory, applied to the case, it was this; but this even did not apply, because no attempt had been made to set aside the difficulty by the legal or constitutional means provided by the Constitution.

'After the execution had once been obtained, however, the Articles 26 and 27, and the Resolution of 1832, were carefully kept in the background by the Hesse Ministry and in the Diet by Austria, and the paragraphs laid stress upon, as rendering the intervention of the Diet necessary, were the 57th and 58th of the "Final Act," which provide that the Sovereign Power is concentrated in the Head of the State, and that a Sovereign Prince can only be tied to the co-operation of the "States" in the exercise of certain demanded rights; and further, that he cannot be restricted by any Chamber in the fulfilment of his federal obligations, and with which it is maintained that the provisions of the Constitution of 1831 are incompatible.

By, however, attacking the Constitution itself the particular question seemed to have been overlooked, thus admitting that the ground of the intervention that there remained—the only basis upon which they could hope to stand in so doing—was not a rebellion against the constituted authorities (the only ground allowed by the Federal Act), but the pulling down of an existing Constitution.

'The above will suffice to prove the entire illegality of the proceedings of the Frankfort Assembly up to the time when it was called upon to decide what steps should be taken for restoring the legal order respecting which Paragraph 27 requires that after an intervention a "tranquillising report" should be made.

'The examination of the question as to how far the provisions of the Constitution of 1831 are incompatible with those of the "Final Act" need not be entered into on the present occasion, inasmuch as until the Diet has adopted the recommendation of the present Prussian Government, to return to that Constitution with the elimination of such incompatible promises, the question will not be mooted. It will be sufficient to confine our-

selves to what has been hitherto done by the Diet, as well as to what has been left undone.

'It was in March 1852 that the Austrian and Prussian Commissaries gave in their report on the Hesse question to the Diet, and that the Assembly was called upon to come to a decision on the subject.

'Granting all the charges against the Constitution of 1831 to have been valid, the provisions of the "Final Act" were clear as to what was to be done under the circumstances. The Constitution still existed *de jure*, and its organic laws contained the necessary power, for its revision distinctly laid down the rule that no existing Constitution could be altered except by means provided for within such Constitution and Paragraph 57, the rule that such revision could only take place by the means thus afforded by the Constitution.

'The course, therefore, for the Diet to adopt was clearly marked out for it. Its duty was to invite the Elector, in conjunction with the "States" as then constituted, to revise the Constitution on those points in which it was evidently at variance with the provision of the Federal Act. That this revision—with the overpowering moral influence which the now unanimously recognised Diet could bring to bear upon it, and with the recovery of a legal standing which the country would have attained by this recognition of their right to revise—would have been carried out, cannot for one moment admit of a doubt.

'Instead of this, by the Dietal Resolution of the 27th March 1852, the Constitution of 1831 was put out of operation—the Elector was empowered to publish as a law a draft of Constitution, and a new electoral law prepared by Hassenpflug and the Federal Commissioners.

'The draft of Constitution so revised was to be submitted to the Diet, and the Diet was then to guarantee it.

'The Chambers (for the new law created two Chambers), called together on the electoral law thus octroyé, were to come to an agreement as to the definite establishment of the draft of Constitution into a permanent and organic law, and until such agreement was come to, the Con-

stitution was to have provisional force. It is evident that by giving the above powers to the Elector the Diet had far exceeded its competency; but nevertheless, with a people less determined upon maintaining its liberties an agreement of the sort might have been come to, the new Constitution would have been a *fait accompli*, and the fatal precedent have been established of the Frankfort Diet undoing existing Constitutions and creating new ones at its pleasure.

'The new Chambers, however, though elected upon a law so exclusive and limited in its nature that the Federal Commissioners themselves were obliged to confess that, if the Elector could not get docile Chambers upon such a basis, the fault must lie with him, refused altogether to come to an agreement with the Elector upon the draft of the Constitution which it should be observed *en passant* not content with remaining the provision of the Constitution of 1831, supposed to be incompatible with the Federal Act, subverted *in toto* the organic laws which had existed in the Electorate previous to 1851.

'Thereupon the Elector, having made upon his own authority what revisions he thought fit, submitted the Act so revised in 1855 to the Diet, and requested the Dietal guarantee to it. Austria was ready to vote this guarantee, but this even to a Manteuffel Ministry seemed too glaringly to overstep the competency of the Diet, and the Prussian Cabinet having brought the Austrian to its view of the case, the two Powers officiously requested the Hesse Government to withdraw its motion and to try once more to come to an agreement with the octroyé Chambers.

'Upon this Hassenpflug, by an organic change in the whole "Communal Constitution" of the country, altered *in toto* the electoral basis of the Chambers as octroyéd by the Diet, and that in such a manner as to eliminate as much as possible all the educated classes from the suffrage.

'With these new Chambers a fresh series of negotiations were entered upon. Only the second Chamber was affected by the new electoral law. The upper Chamber, necessarily restricted to a very few members, though also in opposition to the Elector and his Government, have not taken up the

same high ground as the other, and have allowed themselves in a great measure to be separated from the constitutional cause by a selfish regard for certain feudal privileges which they thereby hoped to recover.

' These Chambers, not less than the last, were determined to uphold the liberties of the people of the Electorate, but, wearied out with the length of the struggle and seeing no quarter from whence hope could come, and plainly conscious that the state of material misery to which the country was reduced by the prolonged state of anarchy to which it was reduced, they attempted a compromise with the Government. The misery to which the people of Hesse have been reduced by the despotism of the Hassenpflug Ministry has become a byword throughout Germany. Industry, commerce, and agriculture are in a state of total prostration, and the population is rapidly decreasing. According to the maxims of the Hassenpflug school, however, this is a desirable result. Schæffer, who succeeded Hassenpflug as Prime Minister in 1837, and who, being on a public occasion taunted with the misery to which the country was reduced, replied, " It is a good thing, and the people ought to be grateful to the Elector for it, as it will bring them to a knowledge of their sins ! " They took the draft of the Constitution, adopted some of its provisions, and substituted for others their own emendations. In this form the Constitution was returned to the Hesse Government for presentation to the Diet,—the Chambers, however, placing formally on record that their assent was given to the Act *en bloc* as received by them ; consequently, that any fresh alterations made by the Elector would cancel their consent to the whole document.

' The Elector, not deterred by this, proceeded to the total revision of the draft, removed almost all the emendations made by the Chambers, and supplemented their plans by his own ; and then, without further consulting the Chambers, submitted it to the Diet as the agreement come to on the subject between himself and his " States." This took place in July 1858, and the Diet referred the matter to a Committee. The report of the Committee was given in July 1859. This remarkable document (which has not been published) had

at least the merit of taking up new ground, and of introducing an element of originality into a question which seemed worn threadbare. Wholly ignoring the fact that the Chamber consulted upon the matter was elected upon an electoral basis, totally different from that octroyé by the Diet, and that therefore, even from the Dietal point of view, these assemblies had no valid force, they took the emendations voted by the Chambers and those put in by the Elector as representing the views respectively of the Sovereign and his people, and, constituting themselves as the arbiters between the two (for which, according to the Acts of the Confederation, they were wholly incompetent), proceeded to a selection of articles from the two sets; and having thus got together a completely new draft of Constitution, they recommended the Diet, after obtaining the consent of the Elector to this "medley," to authorise him to "octroyer" it in the Electorate without further consulting the Chambers, and when thus octroyé to place it under the guarantee of the Diet.

'There is not the shadow of a doubt that, had the Manteuffel Ministry still been in power, this proposition, which had the assent of Austria, would have likewise had that of Prussia, and that by this means a Constitution essentially manufactured at Frankfort would have been, without any authority derived from the organic laws of the Confederation, forced upon the people of the Electorate.

'With the access to power of the present Liberal Cabinet at Berlin, however, a new hope had dawned upon the Hessian Constitutionalists. The Ministers now at the helm of affairs in Prussia were for the most part the very men who had seceded from the councils of the Prussian Crown upon this very Hessian question at the time of its fatal turn at Olmütz. They were in honour bound, as far as possible, to undo the work of their predecessors. True, however, to the programme adopted by the Prince Regent, not violently to break (at least during his brother's lifetime) with the past, the Prussian Ministry, instead of entering a protest, as they would have been quite justified in doing, against the work of the political antagonists whom they had at last driven from power, abstained from entering into

the question of competency involved in the Dietal Resolution of '52, and took their ground upon the practical merits of the question, but did not the less on that account arrive at the only solution of the case conformable to law and right, viz. a return to the Constitution of 1832, as the *point de départ*.

'The Prussian Memorandum of the 30th of October 1859, after describing the total failure of all attempts hitherto made to restore a legal basis for the question, and laying stress upon the expression used in the Resolution of the 28th March 1852, to the effect that the Constitution of 1831 "was placed out of operation," which, it contended, only implied a suspension of it, and not an abrogation of it, announced that according to the views of the Berlin Cabinet the only principle upon which a way out of the difficulties with which the case was beset could be found, was a reintegration in its full force of the Constitution of 1831, and its then revision on such points as might be found incompatible with the provisions of the Final Act, *n.b.* not with the exceptional resolutions of later years.

'The Prussian Plenipotentiary at Frankfort gave a vote to this effect on the 13th of November of that year.

'The effect produced by this attitude of Prussia (independently of the salutary influence it exercised upon public opinion in Germany) was that the Representative Assembly in Hesse voted by a large majority an address to the Elector, which he of course refused even to receive, praying for a restoration of the Constitution of '31, and thereby declaring their own incompetency, and further, that the Diet rejected the Report of their Committee, and appointed a new one to consider the matter of which the Representatives of Austria and Prussia formed a part.

'This new Committee is at present engaged in drawing up their Report, which will in a few days be presented to the Diet.

'Such is a succinct account of the "Hesse Conflict" from its first origin up to the present day. Amidst many conclusions to which a study of it necessarily leads one, the most inevitable one is this: that the central organ of a Confederation composed exclusively of the Diplomatic

Representatives of Cabinets, and uncontrolled by the action of a Representative Assembly, necessarily degenerates into a secret dynastic society in a state of chronic conspiracy against the liberties of the several States forming part of the Confederation, and that, however liberal the organic laws of those individual States may be, they can never protect themselves against the combined action of a central organ so constituted.

'No wonder that towards the obtaining in some form or other of a Representative Assembly at Frankfort, the whole efforts of the national party in Germany are directed.'

In connection with this memorandum, Morier was led to take what he himself described as the wisest step in his diplomatic career. Lord John Russell, who, as Morier wrote, "never could keep his finger out of any international pie," was so struck with the report and the solutions pointed out as those which might lead to an arrangement, that a confidential letter from him arrived one day to Lord Bloomfield, instructing him to send Morier to Cassel, there to place himself in communication with the rebellious Parliament, and to advise them to endeavour to come to a compromise with the Elector on the Constitutional basis he had suggested. Morier at once asked Lord Bloomfield to telegraph the impossibility of his accepting such a mission, and to point out its uselessness and compromising character—nobody being more fully persuaded than he was, what an unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of a foreign State such a proceeding would have been.

It was left to the Baden Government, of which, since 30th April 1861, Roggenbach had been Prime Minister, to take the first decisive steps towards the reestablishment of the Constitutional Rights of Hesse. On the 4th of July 1861, Roggenbach caused the Baden Representative, R. von Mohl,<sup>1</sup> to move a resolution in the Frankfort Diet, which, couched in forceful language and strongly animadverting on the state of legal anarchy into which Hesse had sunk, called upon the Elector to reintegrate the legal basis of the Constitution of 1831.

<sup>1</sup> Eminent Professor of International Law at Heidelberg.

This action of the Baden Government was received with unalloyed approval by the German nation, with deep indignation by the Elector and his advisers, whose only answer was a curt refusal. The Prussian Government more or less rallied to the Baden point of view, and in a feeble way proposed to the Diet on 8th March 1862, in conjunction with Austria, a platonic declaration: that the legal basis of 1831 was to be reconstituted, without, however, pointing out either ways or means, which, as Roggenbach remarked, left the question not much nearer solution than it was before. Fortunately at this juncture the Elector saw fit grossly to insult General von Willisen, who had been sent to him as special Envoy by King William, which led to Prussia's threatening armed intervention, and obtaining in this manner the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1831, on the electoral basis of the law of 1849. The conflict thus terminated.

After the war of 1866, Electoral Hesse was annexed by Prussia.



## CHAPTER XIII

## BERLIN. LETTERS TO LAYARD ON THE SITUATION

ON his return from Berlin, in the autumn of 1860, Morier was laid up with a sharp attack of rheumatic gout. Writing to his father on 28th November, he says: 'I am taking very great care of myself, not going out at night, eating meat only every other day, drinking nothing but water, and, in every way, leading a miserable and disconsolate life.' At the same time he was grieving over the impending departure of Lord and Lady Bloomfield, in whom he lost 'two warm friends, who made life pleasant to me.'

Lord Bloomfield had been appointed Ambassador at Vienna, being succeeded at Berlin by Lord Augustus Loftus.

In December, Morier spent a fortnight at Prinkenau, the Duke of Augustenburg's place.

'It was an experiment not unaccompanied with risk, but it turned out most satisfactorily. The change of air set me up most wonderfully in spite of the cold. . . . On the third day I went out shooting for a couple of hours, and on the fifth I was out a whole day. . . . We sat down forty-eight to dinner every day, a very good band and a first-rate pianist engaged for the fortnight afforded us dancing and concerts alternately, so the time was spent right merrily. The Princesses, the Duke's daughters, two of them at least, are old friends of mine from Holstein days. They are quite English in their ways, and, being in a sort of way an invalid, I was immensely petted, which I very much like. The daughter-in-law, the Hereditary Prince's wife, a *geborene Hohenlohe*, and our Queen's niece, is likewise pleasant and cheery and very pretty. . . . I was a *coq en pâte*, to the extreme disgust of the stiff, bowing and scraping forty-two Prussians, who made up the rest of the party.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Morier to his father, 23rd December 1860.



*David Richard Morier.*

LOTHIAN EDWARDS & SONS



The first week of the New Year he was shooting with the Duke of Coburg at Gotha :—

‘ The shooting we got was very good, but the cold beyond anything I ever felt—19° below zero Réaumur. The coachman that drove my sledge had to be taken straight off his box to hospital, his legs being hopelessly frost-bitten—two other coachmen likewise. The King’s<sup>1</sup> funeral, which I luckily had not to attend, has had no end of victims—one general<sup>2</sup> (old Gerlach, the villain) dead, two or three more dying, and no end of common soldiers with their legs and arms amputated.’<sup>3</sup> And a few days later, ‘ Anything more dismal than Berlin is now you cannot imagine . . . the whole place in deepest mourning for the King and seeing nobody, and till yesterday all the theatres shut, and to-day a great thaw, so that the skating even is over.’<sup>4</sup>

In March, Lord Breadalbane arrived at Berlin, with the mission of investing the new King with the Garter.

‘ We have two missions here, the Garter and our own. I have every sort of thing to do, politically, socially, and garterially. I am dining at the King’s and the Prince Royal’s and dispatching messengers and writing private letters on most critical business all in one breath . . . the ceremony comes off to-morrow. Being short of hands, Garter King-at-Arms has pressed me into the service, and I am to do page and carry the book of statutes.’

The ‘ critical business ’ mentioned here referred to an unpleasant incident which at that time had led to much angry recrimination, and threatened to bring about a serious estrangement between England and Prussia. Arising from the most trivial cause, a dispute about a seat in a railway carriage between a Captain Macdonald and the railway authorities, in which both parties, the former by his ignorance of the language, the law, and the customs of the country, the latter by their harsh and arbitrary

<sup>1</sup> Frederick William IV., 2nd January 1861.

<sup>2</sup> Gerlach, Leopold von, b. 1790, d. 1860, Prussian General, head of reactionary camarilla under Frederick William IV. (See Correspondence with Bismarck.)

<sup>3</sup> To his father, 16th January 1861.

<sup>4</sup> To the same, 22nd January.

behaviour, had placed themselves in the wrong, this affair, which ought to have been terminated by an expression of regret and the acceptance of an apology, had been allowed to drag on for months, and to give rise to violent newspaper polemics, a Blue Book, and finally to heated discussions in the Parliaments of both countries. Lord John Russell, always temperate and conciliatory, had, from the first, tried to smooth matters over: not so Lord Palmerston, who, allowing himself to be carried away by his violent anti-German feelings, delivered a speech, in the House of Commons, of such arrogant aggressiveness that even Vincke, the Liberal leader and strong advocate of an Anglo-Prussian understanding, had been moved to sharp retort in the Prussian Chamber, whilst Baron Schleinitz, the Foreign Minister, declared on the same occasion that 'the impression produced by Lord Palmerston's words was most painful and lamentable,' and that 'without underrating the value of an understanding with England, I may say that Prussia, thank God, need not in any way sacrifice her independence for the friendship of any Power.'

Simultaneously with these proceedings there appeared a studiously insulting leading article on the subject in *The Times*, which, adding fuel to the flame, goaded into greater vehemence the indignation already existing at Berlin.

The incessant attacks by *The Times* on Prussia and everything Prussian were a source of deep concern at that time to all those whose hopes were based on a mutual good understanding between the two countries. Morier never failed to report in almost every letter home the growing alienation engendered by the contemptuous and insulting tone adopted by the leading English journal towards Germany, while to the Prince Consort the subject was one of the gravest disquietude. So serious did the matter become, that when, a few months later, Lord Clarendon was sent to represent the Queen at the Coronation of the King of Prussia at Königsberg in Germany, he felt himself impelled to inform the Queen 'of the enormous and wanton mischief done by the articles in *The Times*.'

'The mischief,' he wrote a few days later, 'is incalcul-

able that all the recent articles have done us with a people that ask no better than to be our friends, and who are indignant that we should meddle with their affairs for no other purpose than insult.'

Finally, in consideration of the damage done to the Crown Princess's position, materially affected by these attacks, Lord Clarendon suggested that 'the Queen should call Lord Palmerston's attention to the subject. After the intervention of the latter, generally credited with having been the instigator of these articles, the tone of *The Times* somewhat improved.

Although absorbed by the widening claims of his profession, and throwing himself with ardour into all the political and social questions of the country in which his duties lay, Morier had never failed to keep in touch with all his home interests, not only by an indefatigable correspondence with his father and his many friends, but also by frequent visits to England. One he paid in the summer of 1861 was to prove an eventful epoch in his life.

For some years past, ever since the void his mother's death had created, his mind had been preoccupied with thoughts of marriage. I perceive that I have arrived at that age, not in years only, but in the history of my mental and spiritual development, at which I must either dry up into a selfish, cold-hearted, self-indulgent man of the world or *retremper* my whole existence in the only well which can furnish the restoring power—that of the home affections,' he had written to his father in March 1860. 'I need not tell *you* all that a home can give. . . . Holding marriage as the most sacred thing in life, and as a matter which most certainly decides the whole ascending or descending tendency of one's innermost soul, I am totally unable to reconcile myself to a marriage of *convenience*. . . . I have come to the conclusion that I must either marry according as I find a being who will fulfil the higher demands upon my future wife, or must once for all give up the whole idea.'

High as were his ideals, he was nevertheless fortunate enough to realise them to the uttermost. In August 1861 he became engaged to Alice, second daughter of Lieutenant-

General Jonathan and Lady Alice Peel,<sup>1</sup> whom he had met at the house of his old friend, Lady Waldegrave, and their marriage took place shortly afterwards on 26th September at Twickenham. Chichester Fortescue, afterwards to become Lady Waldegrave's fourth husband, acted as his best man, and Jowett hurried back from a holiday in Scotland to figure amongst the officiating clergy.

Her father, younger brother of the great Sir Robert Peel, and himself Secretary of State for War in 1858 and again in 1866, had been thus described by the Prince Consort to Baron Stockmar—'His likeness to his deceased brother in manner, in his way of thinking, and in patriotic feeling, is quite touching: he is a pearl in the Ministry, for he is fearless, and holds the service of the Crown to be his first duty.' And her mother, Lady Alice, had been the great friend, not only of Princess Lieven, but of Guizot, Thiers, and other Statesmen. Mrs. Morier had from her childhood, therefore, been brought up amongst people of high political interests and in the most brilliant society of both London and Paris, and was thus eminently fitted by taste as well as by early associations to take her place by her husband's side in foreign capitals, to become the centre of every circle she frequented, and the delightful hostess as which she still lives in the memory of many.

This marriage inaugurated for both a period of unalloyed happiness, which was to last until his death, thirty-two years later—and her wise counsels, practical wisdom, and independent judgment proved a very real help and support to him throughout his career.

After a short honeymoon spent at Holnicote, Sir Thomas Acland's place in Somersetshire, Morier returned to his post at Berlin, accompanied by his wife, paying a visit to the Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden at Karlsruhe on their way.

### *Morier to Earl Russell*

'CARLSRUHE, November 6th, 1861.

'I have paid, or rather I am in the act of paying, my visit to the Grand Duke of Baden and to my friend Roggenbach, his Libero-Conservative Prime Minister, and I have

<sup>1</sup> Daughter of 1st Marquess of Ailsa.

found them hard at work upon the German plans, of which in their embryo state I sent you, at the Grand Duke's request, a sketch last year. I arrived just in time to be initiated in the preparations they are making for definitely launching their project into official waters, it being the intention of the Grand Ducal Government to address within ten days or a fortnight a circular dispatch to its Representatives in Germany (for communication to the Governments to which they are accredited) containing the outlines of a scheme for the reorganisation of the Federal Constitution identical with that which I sent to you. The only change in the programme is that the communication is to be made in the above form instead of assuming the shape of a motion at the Diet. It seemed to them, on second thoughts, hardly delicate to call upon an assembly to discuss a resolution involving its own *arrêt de mort*, and, moreover, the form now proposed, by involving the necessity of an answer of some sort from the several Governments, will have the desirable effect of forcing the latter to define their several positions with reference to the German question. If the step about to be taken by the Grand Duke were an isolated one, it would probably remain sufficiently barren in results, and would not amount to more than the recording in official black and white of "pious desires" long known to be entertained by the Grand Ducal Cabinet. The importance which attaches to it arises from the fact that it is taken with the knowledge and connivance of the Prussian Government, strange as this may sound. You may remember that in my last year's letter I told you that this connivance formed a *sine qua non* condition of the putting into execution of the scheme. You may also recollect the cold reception which the feelers put forth officially at Berlin last winter met with, as well as the almost hostile attitude assumed by Schleinitz towards the German party in the Prussian Chambers. That in the teeth of these experiences and of the marked reactionary language of the King at Königsberg, so complete a conversion should have taken place as that implied in sanctioning the step now proposed by Baden, and in expressing readiness to accept all the consequences of this step, seemed to me, at



first, almost incredible. The riddle is, however, of easier solution when the motives for this apparent contradiction are known. In the first place, the favourable reception which the present project met with was immediate at the hands of the King, when His Majesty was away from his Ministers and braced by sea-bathing at Ostend. It was then that the Grand Duke and Roggenbach worked upon him. Now, as you know, King William's political instincts are often better than his illogical application of them would lead one to infer, and in this instance I really believe that he was personally moved warmly to take up the present scheme from a feeling of its political expediency and of the false position from which it would extricate him. In the next place it was Bernstorff<sup>1</sup> and not Schleinitz who had to be consulted in the matter, and it was Bernstorff before he had fairly got into his Berlin *assiette*, and before he had been submitted to the numbing influence of the Berlin Foreign Office. The Grand Duke, who had lately had several interviews with him, told me that the predominating feeling with which he had returned from England, was that of the sorry figure cut politically by Germans abroad, and that for the present, at least, all his thoughts seemed to be bent on remedying this evil. Far more powerfully, however, even than these moral influences seem to have been the motives suggested by the present difficulties of the political situation in Prussia. King and Ministry are seriously alarmed at the growing discontent of the Liberal party, and at the prospect of a very considerable addition to the more advanced sections of it in the ensuing elections ; as a temporary measure a little reaction is indulged in, and speeches of the Königsberg manner have been given vent to, but the King, it appears, has grown fully alive to the fact that this will not suffice really to meet the danger, nor the so-called policy of *la main libre* any longer suffice for the exigencies of the times, and that he must at length commit Prussia to some line of action or other in the German question or run the risk of finding himself *vis-à-vis* of an un-

<sup>1</sup> Bernstorff, Albrecht Graf von, b. 1809, d. 1874, Prussian statesman and diplomatist; Prussian Minister in London, 1854-1861; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1861-1862; Ambassador in London, 1862-1874.

manageable Chamber at a time when, for his army reforms, and with a prospect of a loan of ten millions for the fleet, he most requires a well-disposed money-lending Assembly. The apparently easy step of acquiescing in the proposal of Baden to discuss a plan of federal reform more or less conformable to the wishes of the expected majority in the new Chamber, seems the readiest way of acquiring the desired position *vis-à-vis* of that majority without, on the other hand, binding the Government to a policy of initiative, the policy always the most hateful to a Prussian administration. These, as far as I could gather from the Grand Duke and Roggenbach, are, roughly sketched, the motives which have led to the unexpected acquiescence of the Prussian Cabinet in the Baden scheme. Whatever the motives may be, however, the fact is an undoubted one that *at present* (the Prussian ministry are quite the people to hark back at the last hour) there is a complete understanding between the two Cabinets as to the present being the right moment to take the step, as well as to the details of the proposals to be made—and solemn assurances have been given that the King's Government will stand fast by the Grand Duke's Government whatever be the consequences. That these *pourparlers* have taken place between the two is, of course, a *profound secret* between the King and his Ministers on the one hand and the Duke and Roggenbach on the other, and it would be inconceivably damaging to the scheme were it prematurely to come out.

' As regards the details of the scheme itself, the Grand Duke was very anxious that you should be put in possession of them, and as soon as the draft of the circular is definitely *rédigé*, I am to have a copy of it, which I will forward directly to you, so that you will have the earliest possible information of the document itself.

' In the meantime, he gave me the perusal of the draft in its present (and most probably its definite) form, from which I extract the following six points as constituting the *charpente* of the scheme.

' 1. A central Government with monarchical power exercised according to constitutional principles, wielding the Executive in the name of the United States,

'2. Exclusive competence of this Government in all executive functions appertaining to national defence and representation of the nation *vis-à-vis* of foreign countries.

'3. By the side of this central Government a national representation in two Chambers—the one representing the Governments, the other the populations of the several States.

'4. The business of this central Government to be carried on by a Minister responsible to this national Representation.

'5. The maintenance between the United States so constituted and such of the German Governments as are unable to submit themselves to this central authority of the international rights and obligations as laid down in the existing federal treaties.

'6. All portions of the existing federal territory to remain for the future, also the territorial constituents of the German Confederation.

'The last two paragraphs have special reference to the intended relation of the new Federal State (Bundesstaat) to Austria, and possibly to Bavaria. The offensive and defensive alliance in all its main features which constitutes the present Confederation is to remain intact, only instead of continuing between the present mob of States, it is to exist between two or at the most three large and powerful individuals. The circular makes no mention of the Prussian Dynasty as that proposed for the future head of the Union, but the copies sent to Vienna and Berlin are to be enclosed in covering dispatches in which this is distinctly enunciated. The draft of the dispatch to Berlin had not yet been written, but that to Vienna had, and was shown to me. It was couched in the most friendly and considerate form, entreating the Imperial Government not to refuse to join in the discussion of this most vital question. It urged the imminence of the danger incurred by allowing it to remain the monopoly of the agitating classes, and by according to the latter the vantage-ground of a good cause, it shows the impossibility of any other solution, and adduces the reasons why Austria with her geographical position, such as it is, and four-fifths of her population not German, cannot aspire to

the post which Prussia alone can fill, and it points out in a strong light the immense advantages that would accrue to the Austrian Empire in being leagued by the present offensive and defensive obligations of the Confederation to a mighty Power like the new United States.

'I should not be clearly representing the views of the Grand Duke and his Ministers, were I to say that either of them were sanguine as to any immediate practical results from the step they are about to take, even if Prussia should turn out to be much more keen in the matter than there is any likelihood of her being. But the end which they do hope to compass is analogous to that attained by Cavour when he deposited the Italian Question upon the green cloth of the Congress table at Paris. It is the simple but very important step of raising the question of German Unity to the dignity of a political question, of removing it from the society of pamphleteers, demagogues and more or less disreputable societies to the more respectable and select coterie of statesmen and politicians, and the forcing the Governments of Germany and Europe generally to recognise it as such. I am inclined to think, even if Prussia at the last moment withdraws (a possibility which they do not lose sight of), the circular will be dispatched all the same, and the result intended attained.'

Before the close of this year England was to be plunged into mourning by a most unforeseen catastrophe, the death of the Prince Consort at the early age of forty-one. If to the widowed Queen the loss was that of 'Husband, Father, Lover, Master, Friend, Adviser, and Guide,'<sup>1</sup> as, in the first days of her bereavement, she wrote to his oldest and dearest friend, Baron Stockmar—to the nation the loss was equally great. At one of the most crucial moments of the world's history, with changes taking place all round, with unknown forces and new ideas everywhere coming to the fore, the country was suddenly deprived of the guidance of the Sovereign's 'permanent Minister,' whose knowledge, unerring sagacity, and discreet advice had helped so materially to shape a successful line of conduct, and who had wrung, even from

<sup>1</sup> Martin's *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. v.

his detractors, the unwilling admission that—'In him we have had as true an Englishman as the most patriotic native of these islands . . . at no period has our foreign policy been less subject to the imputation of subservience to foreign interests and relations than during the last twenty years.'<sup>1</sup>

Owing to the deep mourning for the Prince Consort the members of the British mission in Berlin spent a very quiet year. Morier's residence at his post was only broken by a visit to Wiesbaden in May for a cure, and by a stay at Coburg, whither he was again summoned in September by Lord Russell, who had gone there as Minister in attendance on the Queen during Her Majesty's visit to the home of her late husband.

But if quiet from a social point of view, Berlin was in a state of political activity caused by the Constitutional struggle in the throes of which Prussia was then labouring.

King William, who as Regent had shown Liberal tendencies, had, since the death of his brother (King Frederick William), developed more and more reactionary ideas, and his exposition of the Divine Right of Kings during the Coronation ceremonies at Königsberg had met with general dissent from all Liberals. His scheme, too, for Army Reform, on which his whole soul was bent, was strongly opposed by the Chamber of Representatives, and indeed by the whole country, and eventually led to the ending of the so-called 'New Era.'

The Prince of Hohenzollern, though he had practically withdrawn from the conduct of affairs, still nominally remained at the head of the Cabinet, but the retirement of the Liberal Ministers, Auerswald, Schwerin, Count Pückler, Patow, and Bernuth left Van der Heydt and Roon<sup>2</sup> as the leading spirits in it. But this Ministry was also doomed to failure, and in September 1862, Bismarck (then Minister in Paris) was called in by the King and charged with forming a Cabinet.

From this date a total change came over the scene, the first evidences of which were soon to be perceived in the

<sup>1</sup> *Times* Article, 16th December 1861.

<sup>2</sup> Roon, Albrecht v., b. 1803, d. 1879, Field-Marshal.

domain of foreign policy. At the beginning of January 1863, a revolution had broken out in Poland, and Prussia, who had up till now under the Liberal régime followed a pro-English and anti-Russian line of policy, hastened to send General Alvensleben to the Emperor Alexander to assure him of her help and support, and followed up these assurances by mobilising half her army (four army corps out of nine) on the Polish frontier.

The following series of private letters written by Morier to his old friend of Cosmopolitan Club days, Layard, at this time Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, depict the situation :—

‘BERLIN, *March 4th*, 1863.

‘ . . . I would like nothing better than to give you a faithful picture of the state of things here, from a somewhat more general point of view than that necessarily taken in an official correspondence ; and could I but skilfully select from the many facts and impressions which my long acquaintance with this country places at my disposal the right materials for the purpose, my task would be an easy one. But it is in this selection that lies the difficulty. I find it very hard to sift lasting facts from ephemeral gossip, or to marshal the passing crowd in anything like historical perspective. It is easy to record official data, as they successively come up for registration, but to step beyond this, and group these in the order of their true historical significance, is a very different thing. I will try, however, not to be too ambitious, and, as you ask only for an unofficial twaddle, I will just garrulously run on whither my pen may take me, remembering ‘*que le mieux est l’ennemi du bien*,’ and that a bad sketch actually executed is better than a fine painting only imagined.

‘The *dramatis personæ*, from whose relations to each other must be evolved the plot of the serious and somewhat heavy piece being acted here, are the King, Bismarck, and the Chamber. If I can throw light on these three, I may perhaps add something to your stock of information.

‘It is an error to look upon the King, as I see *The Times* does, in the light of a mere tool in the hands of the feudal party, or as a medievalist enthusiast for the principles of

the Holy Alliance. This is to confound him with his late brother, which is a radical mistake. In theory, and as far as a cramped and undeveloped intellect like his is capable of generalising and seizing first principles, the King's tendencies, as regards foreign politics at least, are, though certainly not what we should call Liberal, nevertheless, in a direction opposed to those of the Holy Alliance. The great event of his life, his breach with his brother, and his retirement to Coblenz after the Olmütz episode, was too intimately connected with the question of Russian suzerainty over Germany, not to leave a lasting impression on his mind, and so, during the Crimean War, he worked heart and soul with those who were countermining the attempts of the feudal party to urge King Frederick William into active co-operation with Russia. It is true that since Königsberg he has broken with much of his former life, but not, I think, on questions like these. Hence the story generally put about with reference to the Convention, viz. that the King had rushed into it for political purposes, and had drawn Bismarck reluctantly into it after it was done, might have been satisfactorily refuted on *a priori* grounds. I have, however, very reliable data to show that the exact reverse of this was the case. You will remember that the week before last there were rumours very generally accredited of Bismarck's resignation. I was told so positively, and on such high authority, that he had done so, that, being in charge, I felt bound to telegraph to the Foreign Office that these rumours were based on good authority. The whole thing came to nothing, but I gave myself great pains to ascertain what had really taken place, and I believe the following to be a correct account. The King, when he first saw the Convention as forwarded to Berlin from St. Petersburg by General Alvensleben, was strongly impressed with the feeling that it bore the character of a political alliance, or at least that it was capable of being interpreted as such, whereas all he wanted was a military arrangement *pur et simple*. He was, however, talked out of this view by Bismarck, but when the scandal caused in England and France by the Convention became known at Berlin, he naturally returned to his first impression, and a serious misunderstanding

between him and his Minister undoubtedly existed in the early part of the week before last. Whether an actual resignation on the part of Bismarck took place I have not been able to ascertain with certainty, but I believe on Monday, 23rd February, he did place in the hands of the King a memorandum of some sort on the actual state of affairs, in which, directly or indirectly, he put his resignation as an eventuality to be taken into His Majesty's consideration. His great readiness to back out of the whole thing, and his clever invention of the non-ratification dodge in respect to an agreement never intended to be ratified, and in its very form not admitting of ratification, got over present difficulties. The King's political sagacity had had a triumph over the Minister's, and His Majesty, as was natural on such an occasion, being put into good humour with himself, extended this good humour to his adviser. The attacks in the Chamber, as was to be expected, strengthened Bismarck instead of weakening him, and he has come out of the Polish complication with a fresh lease of power. It remains, however, a fact that in the first part of the week before last he was for the first time since he came into office fairly shaken in his saddle; and, in connection with this, another fact, for which I can positively vouch, is worth noting, namely, that simultaneously with these events (on or about the 23rd ult.) Manteuffel (the ex-Minister President, not the General) wrote a letter in which he explained at length the reasons why he could not *at present* take office. To whom the letter was written, and what had called it forth, my informant (an intimate friend of many years' standing on whom I can absolutely rely) would not tell me, but he had seen and read the *actual letter*.

'To return, however, to the King. Not only absence of political sympathy with Russia, but the presence of a real feeling of pique against Austria, keeps him from Holy Alliance phantasies. He has never forgiven the Schönbrunn manifesto, and he is constantly alive to the feeling that Austria wishes to treat Prussia as a vassal of the Holy Roman Empire, and refuse her that parity of rank in the Confederation which, not unjustly, he considers her due. On both points he diametrically differs from the



late King, his brother. Frederick William IV. was fairly cowed by the Emperor Nicholas, and worshipped him as the incarnation of the law of cosmic order, and destroyer of the powers of Darkness and Anarchy. The Emperor of Austria, on the other hand, he fondly looked upon in his political opium dreams as the possible head of a future readjusted German Empire, and on more than one occasion expressed to his intimates (the Niebuhrs and Gerlachs of other days) the pleasure it would give him to act as cup-bearer at his Coronation.

‘These, you see, are radical differences between the two Sovereigns, and it would be a great error to confound the two. It is, of course, comparatively easy to say what the King is *not*. To build up synthetically what he *is* is a more difficult operation. A few facts not generally known may, however, help us to do so. First of all, for the greater portion of his life he did not believe that he would ever be King. Being nearly of the same age with his brother, it had become a sort of fixed idea that he would never come to the throne, and he had habituated himself to look upon his son as the next King of Prussia. Up to 1848 he had never seriously thought of educating himself politically for the contingency of his accession. He cared for little beyond soldiering, and what political ideas he had were the stereotype absolutist military notions of the Hohenzollern school, such as they are religiously taught in all the cadet establishments of the kingdom. The substratum of his character, therefore, *i.e.* his natural temperament and his antecedents up to ’48, were essentially cast in a narrow and absolutist mould. With the events of ’48, however, and the great probability of an abdication of the late King, and with his flight to England, there began a necessary course of political education for which his intellectual capacities did not well fit him. The dirt Prussia had to eat in 1850 (with his true and fine feeling for the honour of his country) so far gave the definitive direction to this education that it effectually estranged him from his former associates and from the medieval entourage of his brother, with whom from a social necessity he had hitherto forgathered. In his retirement at Coblenz

the Princess of Prussia did her best to instil Liberal principles into him, and he was put through a course of Liberal instruction. The Liberals, however, with whom he associated were not men of a stamp to take any real or powerful hold upon him. Schleinitz and Auerswald, his great intimates of that period, are milk-and-water politicians of a school to whom the Germans apply a rarely good proverb, "Wasch mir den Pelz, aber mach mich nicht nass." (*Wash me, but don't wet me!*)

'He did, however, honestly try to make unto himself a new political creed which should be Liberal and yet fit in somehow with his own instincts and with what, for forty years, had grown with his growth.

'I am in possession of a very curious document (or rather a copy of it), a memorandum which he drew up himself when Prince Regent, of a conversation he had in 1860 with the King of Bavaria, just after his meeting with Napoleon III. at Baden, and after the Conference he had held with his brother Sovereigns of Germany. It is very characteristic, and gives, I think, a key to his character, and to a great deal that has since happened, and I will therefore give you the following extract from it.'<sup>1</sup>

'BERLIN, *March 10th*, 1863.

'To resume my letter of the 3rd instant. The following is the extract from the King's (Prince Regent's) private memorandum of his conversation with the King of Bavaria in the spring of 1860.

"I then took the opportunity to explain to the King of Bavaria the principles which ever since my advent to the Regency I have been determined to carry out. I said that, having found a Constitution, I considered it my duty to conform to it, and not to *falsify it by unnatural interpretations*. I had lived long enough in the proximity of Government to convince myself of the evil which resulted from the system pursued by the late Ministry" (namely, the Manteuffel-Westfalen Administration). "I added that it was not my intention to discuss whether Constitutions as such were conducive to the well-being of nations, but

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

only to express the conviction that where they did exist the idea of making the measures of the Government public, and of calling the people to a legitimate participation in the legislation, had penetrated into all men's minds, and that in all such a case it was the height of imprudence to put oneself in contradiction to this feeling, as an opposition of this kind would be equivalent to placing on formal record the distrust of the Sovereign towards his people. In relation to this same question of distrust, it was in my opinion a false policy to seek the security of the Throne in the limitations of the Constitution,—whereas, according to my view, security of government consisted in the wise alternative between the tightening and loosening the reins of government (!!!). I added that I had made up my mind to rule in this sense, and that on this ground I had granted a freer movement in the constitutional sense, but in doing so that I fully intended to guard against *letting the reins fall altogether out of my hands.*" The King of Bavaria here interrupted me and said: I sincerely hope you will make no melancholy experiences, which are ever difficult to unmake, and of which the history of constitutional government has so many examples to show.

"I replied that I had often put this very same question to myself, and that I had ever found a satisfactory answer in the views which I had just detailed to him. I compared the art of governing with that of regulating the bed of a river. For this purpose the banks must be ameliorated and strengthened there where the stream threatens to overflow and destroy them, but they must neither be drawn too close to each other nor kept too far apart; above all, the attempt must not be made to throw a dam across the river's bed, as this would necessarily accumulate the waters and bring about a general inundation. The King of Bavaria seemed well satisfied with this metaphor (!!!). I added that in England the banks had been drawn too wide apart, whilst in Hanover and Hesse they had been drawn too close to each other, and that I hoped that in Prussia I should be able to hold a mean between the two. The King said he thought he might be able to do so."

'The bit of daylight which the above throws upon the

motive principles of the King's political activity is, I think, very conducive to a right understanding of his character, and explains much that has happened since. One's first impulse is, of course, to burst out laughing and to say, "Oh, ye gods, that the destinies of nations should be committed to the charge of such royal Dogberrys as these!" but I think that a more careful examination leads to a less cynical conclusion. It must be remembered, in the first place, that there is no Ministerial inspiration in the memorandum in question. The Prince Regent went to Baden to meet Napoleon unaccompanied by any Minister. His conversations with the Emperor, and afterwards with the Kings and Princes of Germany, and with their spokesman, the King of Bavaria, were perfectly spontaneous. He had not even a private secretary with him, and he not only wrote the notes of these conversations himself, but *himself copied them out clear*. Consequently, what we do get at are the *bona fide* convictions of the individual such as during the years immediately preceding his advent to power he had painfully hammered out for himself from the two incongruous sets of materials adverted to in my former letter, namely, the narrow and pedantic traditions of a Prussian General, who had turned the meridian of life without ever expecting to be more than a Prussian General; and a new set of ideas which the accident of his being thrown into opposition in 1850, and the conviction which since 1848 he had arrived at, that he would be King, had forced him, not otherwise than against the grain, to master and to fit in for better or for worse with his former prejudices. That the opinions so formulated have become, as it were, stereotyped into a kind of political dogma, I have had more than one opportunity of assuring myself, as on several other occasions I have learnt that in private conversations he has repeated the same opinions almost *ipsissimis verbis*. Hence the general psychological result, to which I think an unprejudiced consideration of the memorandum leads one, exactly tallies with what I have been repeatedly told by persons who intimately know the King, is that which specially characterises him, namely, a very sound judgment where the subject-matter lies fairly within the grasp of his comprehension, and

a total helplessness of judgment where the subject-matter lies outside the circle of this grasp. This is a very common phenomenon, but one which I think is often not sufficiently taken into consideration. It is the old story of the brigadier making a bad general of division, the attorney a bad lawyer, the lawyer a bad judge. In the first part of the above extract, where the King (or rather the Prince Regent) records his personal experience of the Manteuffel Ministry, with the acts of which he was very thoroughly acquainted, and which had come to his cognisance in the shape of concrete phenomena, his judgment is eminently sound, and he exactly hits the central vice of the system, namely, *the falsifying of the Constitution by false interpretations*. When he leaves this ground and tries to formulate an abstract theory of government, he immediately runs into the absurdities of the tightening and loosening rein theory, and the metaphor of the "river's bed," etc. Of course, the above would not suffice to establish his claim to the sound judgment I claim for him in the limited sense adverted to, though it would be all-sufficient to establish his claim to the folly of the more unlimited kind, and corroborative evidence as regards the former is therefore wanted: this I think is fairly afforded by his conduct both at Baden and at Teplitz, but more especially at Baden. I received at the time the most detailed information from eye and ear-witnesses of all he said and did on those occasions, and certainly it fully justifies the claim I put in for him. In the delicate ins and outs of the situation at Baden, in his peculiar relation to the tempter of the Tuileries on the one side and his jealous and frightened crowned confederates on the other, he never once stumbled or behaved otherwise than as a King and a gentleman. By one of these said crowned confederates who was present at the various meetings, and who is not prejudiced in his favour, I was told that the Prince Regent never once showed the least embarrassment, whereas the Emperor Napoleon on several occasions, and especially at first, did so very much. He was sure of the ground on which he moved, he had *no doubts or misgivings* as to what was the line of his political conduct, and so he acted *correctly* with perfect ease. He showed the same tact at

Teplitz, and if what I stated in my last letter is correct (and I have no doubt it is), he showed the same right judgment in being the first Prussian to see the tendencies and follies of the Russian Convention. Besides the above proofs I have the testimony of a man of extraordinary good judgment, who is no admirer of his, and who has had a great many opportunities of seeing his Minutes on questions of administrative detail, and who assures me that he is often quite dumbfounded at the remarkable sense and clearness of the decisions evidenced by these Minutes, and the contrast they afford to the blunderings and confusions exhibited by the same hand in the higher walks of "Executive" art.

'What I have above said will, I think, be found very compatible with a peculiarity which he has in common with other men in high office, namely, great impatience of the society or advice of men intellectually gifted.

'This must finish my sketch of the psychological character of His Majesty as far as I have been able to acquaint myself with it.'

'BERLIN, *July 3rd*, 1863.

'I paused in my sketch of King William in the hopes that I should be able to collect more data respecting him, and by their assistance be enabled to find some point of view from which the King of 1863 could be harmonised with the Prince Regent of 1858, but I have not succeeded in doing so. I cannot reconcile the King's personal acts during the last year with the idea of the man which the memorandum of 1860, of which I sent you an extract, had suggested to me, and I must therefore give up my attempts at psychological photography, and content myself with putting together what facts I know, and leave you to draw your own inferences.

'These facts I must, moreover, dot down together promiscuously, or I shall never bring these letters to a close.

'A very important one is the effect that was produced upon him by the attempt on his life in 1861. It acted in this way. From one end of Prussia to another the danger he had incurred called forth a true and loudly expressed feeling of loyalty. The personal popularity he still enjoyed (for the unpopularity of his quasi-Liberal Ministry which

had been steadily increasing had not yet reached the King), combined with the large reserve fund of loyalty to the reigning house which still exists in Prussia, and with the demonstrative *bonhomie* of the German character, resulted in a national display of sympathy with what had nearly been a victim, and of execration against what had nearly been a regicide, which ought to have convinced His Majesty that sounder monarchical state of public feeling no Sovereign need wish for than that prevailing in Prussia in the summer of 1861.

‘When, however, a few months later, the General Elections took place, the same crowds which had flocked to make demonstrations of loyalty eagerly collected to return the opposition members. Never before had so large a proportion of the electors participated in the elections, and never before had such unanimity prevailed in framing a common programme to embrace the various shades of the Liberal Party, the point of agreement being a common determination to resist the imposition by unfair means of the King’s particular hobby, the reorganisation of the Army.

‘Now, the only fair, and at the same time the only true, inference to be drawn from these two demonstrations was that a great progress had been attained in the political education of the people, and that they had learnt to distinguish clearly between their *general* duty of loyalty and their *special* duty as citizens of contending for their manifest rights without regarding persons, and no better proof could be given that they had clearly apprehended that these were compatible duties, not necessarily clashing, and both of which they were ready to attend to. This was an immense step, when we consider that it was a *German* people that had learnt this lesson,—for with them there is far greater danger than elsewhere of a false personal sentiment influencing political actions.

‘Unfortunately, the inference drawn by the King and his *personal* advisers (of whom I will talk later, a distinct class, however, from his *public* advisers) was exactly the reverse. Nothing would induce him to believe that the people who had expressed their loyalty in summer were identical

with those who recorded their votes against his own particular policy in the autumn. All the instincts of absolutism revolted against admitting the unwelcome truth that the same man who, with voice broken with emotion, had returned thanks to the Almighty for the preservation of the King's life, could deliberately use his political privileges to thwart the same King's personal wishes. In the royal code, loyalty and obedience were inseparable ideas,—and obedience, strange as the theory sounds in our ears, implied the using of the franchise to further what was known to be the will of the Sovereign *pro tem*.

'Hence there rooted itself in the King's mind the conviction, never afterwards to be eradicated, that the population of Prussia was composed of two bodies,—an immense majority who had unmistakably expressed their loyalty on the occasion of the attempt upon his life, and who *consequently* approved of everything he might be inclined to originate and carry out, and a small minority who voted at the elections, and who by showing their opposition to his wishes had clearly proved themselves capable of every revolutionary crime, and must necessarily have abstained from participating in the loyal demonstrations of the preceding months and this in spite of the hundreds of thousands of electors who had registered their votes, and who included in their numbers almost the entire wealth, and certainly all the intelligence, of the country.

'That this idea did permanently establish itself in the King's mind I have abundant data to prove; moreover, in a celebrated interview which he had with a deputation of the clergy shortly after the elections of 1861, His Majesty, with an abundance of royal sobs and tears, did amply testify to this strange hallucination. It has guided all his acts since, and is an *idée fixe*.

'Immediately in connection with these two events came the "Divine Right" burlesque, enacted on the occasion of the Coronation in October '61. The extraordinary tomfooleries connected with that event you doubtless remember,—they proved satisfactorily that what had been believed to be a mere personal aberration of Frederick William iv. was "in the blood," and extended itself to the



supposed sober-minded and simple-mannered soldier who inherited his crown.

'The General Election and the Coronation, which fell almost simultaneously in the autumn of 1861, inaugurated the campaign between Divine Right and Constitutional Government which is being fought out now, and before I can speak of Bismarck to any purpose I must give a sketch of the principal events in this campaign which I perceive is still misunderstood in England. Before doing so, however, let me briefly resume what we have got at with reference to the King.

'We started with him as a not over-intelligent soldier brought up in all the narrow associations of the Prussian military school. He is considered honest and straightforward, and quite incapable of the sophistries of his brother, whose artistical and poetical temperament he is deficient in. Those who know him well, however, describe him, even at this early period, as impatient of contradiction and arbitrary,—all unite in considering him as essentially obstinate.

'At an important period of his life he is thrown, or rather suddenly jerked, out of all the habits and ways of thought in which he has hitherto lived. He comes to spend a considerable time in England, and is necessarily, on his return to Prussia, surrounded by men occupied with a quasi-opposition to Government. These people, more courtiers than politicians, doctrinaires rather than men tried in the fire of real party strife, spend their leisure in fashioning constitutional schemes and teaching him constitutional lessons, the real burden of which is, that he can be a constitutional King and yet give up nothing of his absolute power. At last the day comes when he has to act, and he makes a very fair beginning; he has learnt his lessons, and can repeat them off quite pat,—nay, I verily believe that in repeating them he fancies he is speaking his own sentiments. I do not doubt that the memorandum to which I have referred was written by him in the firm belief that those were his own self-elicited opinions; the popularity, into an immense share of which he suddenly comes, is peculiarly pleasant to him, and for a brief while every-

thing appears *couleur de rose*. In the early portion of his Regency he seldom takes the initiative, but allows his Ministers almost entirely to act for themselves. On almost all the points of internal policy which characterise the Liberal school to which his Ministers belong, and which especially distinguishes them from the feudal party, he is either indifferent or shares the view of his Ministers,—civil marriage, extension of the land tax to the exempted manors, detachment of the rural police from seignorial jurisdiction, reform of the administration of the rural Circles in an anti-feudal spirit, and many other similar measures, all have in him, if not a warm supporter, at least an unprejudiced approver. On all these questions the teachers of the last few years had found a blank on which it was easy for them to write their own characters. Nor on the ground of German and foreign politics (winter of '58 to '59) is there yet anything which can estrange him from the coterie of his political friends and the great bulk of the nation. Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein were the two questions connected with the defeat of Olmütz, that great day of Prussian humiliation, which had rankled so poisonously in his mind and thrown him into open opposition to his brother. They were the only German questions then open, and on both of them he shared the views of the Liberal Party. Austria was then at the height of her prestige, and stood erect with unbroken power, the champion of reaction and the walled city of refuge to the minor dynasties. She was lukewarm in the Schleswig-Holstein question, and in the Hesse question the warm patron and supporter of the Elector against his people. The popular feelings, therefore, in reference to both these questions were coincident with the strong sense of "*rancune*" which the Prince Regent bore to Austria for the days of Olmütz. Out of Germany, closer alliance with England seemed marked out as his personal wish not less strongly than it was the national desire. Everything, therefore, in 1858 seemed going on prosperously. The general elections had yielded a large majority of the so-called "Old Liberal" or Constitutional party, equally opposed to the democrats or radicals and to the feudals ;

at the head of this majority stood Vincke, and to this party three of the most prominent members of the new Cabinet nominally belonged, namely, Prince Hohenzollern, Auerswald, and Schleinitz. I say nominally, because none of these men had really taken a part in the Parliamentary life of the party, and belonged to it rather by abstract doctrine and social ties than by the companionship of common warfare. Moreover, true to Prussian tradition, they from the first associated themselves immediately with the Crown, and repudiated the idea of close connection with the Parliamentary party. The majority, therefore, though at the first apparently very much identified with the Cabinet, never came to stand to it in the relation of a Government majority. They stood to it more in the relation of a chorus in a Greek play, criticising the acts of the "dramatis personae,"—mostly approving, but sometimes censuring, and always lecturing, always, however, as a body foreign to and not in any way identified with the actors.

'Such were some of the leading features of the most prosperous time of the present Sovereign's reign,—everything, as I said before, appeared in the autumn of 1858 *couleur de rose*. But in the events at this early date there were not wanting forebodings of a change. In the celebrated programme which he published on assuming the Regency, the Regent had declared that it was "not his intention to break violently with the past, but only to grasp the future with an ameliorating hand." This, which was taken at the time as a mere phrase, had a deep signification attached to it, and was in reality the record of the Prince's determination not to enter on a course of radical reform (the only reform that could be of any good), and indeed not to depart from the absolute principles which had guided his brother. To carry out this programme he retained in office two of his brother's Ministers—Simeon, the Minister of Justice, a mere tool of Manteuffel; and Van der Heydt, the Minister of Commerce, a man of no small official capacity, but utterly without principle, and loving his portfolio for its own sake. Besides these two, he kept in office the President of the Police, Zedlitz, a man thoroughly identified with all the worse parts of the previous

reactionary system, an ardent worshipper of police autocracy, and deeply versed in the arts of petty persecution and intrigue, in which a system of this kind lives and moves and has its being. The Liberal Ministers remonstrated strongly against these "beaux restes," but did not make the stand against them which they ought to have made, and which *then* the Prince Regent could not have resisted. On the same principle of not breaking with the past, all, or nearly all, of the leading spirits of the former régime were kept in their places, and as the natural result in a country bureaucratically governed like Prussia, a considerable disharmony in the administrative machine was the consequence. Comparative freedom having been restored to the Press, the complaints against this state of things naturally became loud, and the result, with the King's peculiar temperament, was to make him obstinately stand by his reactionary protégés, and look upon resistance to the wishes of his Liberal Ministers and to the clamour of public opinion as an act of piety to his brother, and of assertion of his own independence and will. Another result was that by this means a class of persons obtained constant access to him whose detailed knowledge of local affairs contrasted with the inexperience of his Liberal advisers, who were new to business, in a manner unfavourable to the latter. Now, this kind of knowledge, especially the gossip of the President of Police, and his morning reports of what had taken place in the town overnight, was exactly of a kind in which the King delighted, and those who could furnish it naturally became favourites,—for the King hates general principles and loves the details of common life. Another class of persons came into daily contact with him who were unconnected with his political advisers properly so called, and those were the members of the Military Cabinet, headed by General Manteuffel (a cousin of the Minister). These people are one and all reactionaries of the worst type, and, under cover of talking mere military details, they soon began to exercise a strong influence over the King (or Prince Regent, as he then was), and so out of these two classes there sprang up that body of personal advisers above

alluded to, whose influence runs in an occult stream side by side with that of the public advisers, to the great detriment of the public service.

'It was amidst this apparent prosperity—but this real weakness—that the Italian War broke out, and that the Cabinet of Berlin was called upon to take some definite line of policy, which could not fail, whatever might be its direction, to be pregnant with important results to the general political interests of Europe.

'With reference to the then position of the Prussian Cabinet I will quote a passage from a memorandum I wrote upon the subject at the time (May 1859), because it records the impression left upon me *then* and *there*, and when I had tolerably frequent intercourse with some of the leading men of the Cabinet or their immediate entourage. It is, moreover, amusing to call up the contemporaneous impression produced by a Ministry which the contrast of later Ministries has accustomed one to describe as *par excellence* the Liberal Ministry.<sup>1</sup>

'The above is in reality a digression, as we are still immediately concerned with the King, but it is not altogether out of place in bringing out two facts clearly,—one, of the contemptible impression which a contemporaneous watching of the so-called Liberal Ministers left on an unbiassed spectator; the other, the honesty of the King's *foreign policy*.

'I had at this time (the spring of 1859) considerable opportunities of knowing from day to day what went on, in consequence of the presence at Berlin of the Duke of Coburg, with whom I am on very intimate terms, and who at that time was on the best footing with the Prince Regent. I cannot go into details respecting the Prince Regent's policy at the commencement and during the duration of the Italian War, but I can record my conviction founded on very intimate knowledge that it was perfectly straightforward and honest, and that nothing could be more utterly unfair than the reproach of double-dealing which the Austrian Government afterwards cast upon it, or more treacherous than the attempt made by the French Govern-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, page 264, "Morier on Prussian Ministry."

ment to give this reproach the colouring of probability. The Prince Regent *from the first* marked out the line of policy he conceived that his German obligations imposed upon him, and he stuck to it, although sorely tempted to deviate from it. This line was the following : not to consider the Italian quarrels of Austria German quarrels in such a sense as to cause them to be fought out *ab initio* on the Rhine (which was what Austria wanted); but, on the other hand, to regard any serious defeat of Austria in Italy, or anything that should seriously endanger her position in the Quadrilateral, as a danger to the left flank of the German position, Germany being considered as on the defensive against an attack from the West. Now, the entire spring and summer of 1859 were spent by the King in preparing against this eventuality; he mobilised the Prussian Army, and strained every nerve to get the various contingents of the Federal Army into fighting order, and to arrive at something like unity of plan and organisation in the military apparatus of the Confederation, meeting the while with every possible difficulty and thwarted by every sort of mean jealousy on the part of Austria, no less than of the smaller States. He did at last succeed in getting a formidable military power and fighting order, and the result was . . . the Peace of Villafranca. Now, I am not going to examine whether this was a right or a wrong policy, but what I wish to impress upon you is that, *morally* speaking, the King deserves credit for the way in which he carried it out,—because he did so amidst such obloquy, and whilst his advisers were disagreed amongst each other as to the course to be followed, and divided into two camps, each giving contradictory advice, in a direction opposed to the Prince Regent's own views—one set being all for a great immediate coup against France in the German sense, and with a view to putting Prussia at the head of Germany as the *Spada de Germania*; the other set for a great "coup" against Austria, on the theory of crushing a rival when he is down, and in contemplation of the solidarity of Italian and Prussian interests and the applicability of the Cavour method to Prussia. An additional merit, which cannot be denied to the Prince in his resistance to the latter project,

was the strong personal feeling of "*rancune*" against Austria, in recollection of Olmütz, to which I have often alluded, and which many episodes in the negotiations now carried on between the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets tended to increase. All his personal feelings he, however, did most thoroughly subordinate to what he conceived was his duty as a great German Power, and he should get the full credit of this.

'The Peace of Villafranca resulting in a great European war having once more been fought out without Prussia bearing a share in it, and with obloquy cast upon her for having selfishly stood aloof, the excitement of great angers with no deeds for them to be quenched in, and the totally new political combinations, both European and German, brought about by these events, all acted powerfully in politically demoralising the Prince Regent. He was conscious of having acted honestly and of having been wilfully misunderstood. The divided counsels of his advisers had afforded him no support in time of need, and now a new set of political ideas, noisily claiming to be heard, were loudly proclaimed and acted upon in Italy, and re-echoed in Germany,—ideas which, according to his old creed, were the worst of heresies, and which had no place in the new creed which had been taught him. There was no one at hand of sufficient calibre, or with the knowledge and foresight that could harmonise these disharmonies to him, and show him a path along which he could with safety and honour tread. Amidst this chaos and confusion of ideas there was one peculiar kind of chaos and confusion, which the Prince Regent was peculiarly fitted to appreciate and reorganise, and this was the military confusion of the defensive apparatus of the Confederation and the shortcomings of his own military organisation.

'I told you in a former letter that in practical questions the King has a remarkable quick and sound judgment. Personally superintending as he did the whole business of the mobilisation of the Prussian Army, and carrying on the negotiations for the joint action of his army with the federal contingents of the other German States, he became aware to their full extent of all the radical defects with which in every portion of it this double apparatus abounded,

and he set himself most seriously to work to remedy, if possible, these defects. The reorganisation of the Prussian Army and the reconstruction of the military constitution of the Confederation became the all-engrossing objects of his thoughts. Puzzled and faltering in his political views and with reference to the line which he should adopt in presence of the new combinations, he saw clearly where the old systems had in practice broken down, and set to work to remedy these defects, thinking that the military machinery could be separately mended without organic political changes.

' *Pari passu* with the labour he had thus entered on, came the great anti-Divine Right changes in Italy. That a German princekin should have been deeply affected by the fate of the Dukes of Modena and Parma, that a King of Hanover or Würtemberg should have broken out into a cold sweat at the tidings of Garibaldi's entrance into Naples, was natural; that a King of Prussia's sympathies on the other hand should have shunted themselves off to this side of the rails, and should not have felt themselves rather attracted towards the part played in Italy by Victor Emmanuel, shows that the ties of caste are in some organisations stronger than all else besides. Certain it is, that in all Europe no Sovereign (not even Lord Normanby<sup>1</sup>) more genuinely hated, despised and abhorred Victor Emmanuel and Cavour than did and does King William of Prussia. Exactly, however, in proportion as this effect was being produced on the Ruler, the Ruled began to appreciate the full and true bearings of the new birth of Italy, and a true and genuine sympathy for the Italian nation began to spread through Prussia and the north of Germany. The natural result was that the King began to believe the daily reiterated croakings of his feudal entourage that Liberal and revolutionary ideas were one and the same, and that the Liberal measures which he still patronised were but the top of the inclined plane infallibly leading into chaos of all things human and divine like that existing in Italy.

' The resolution passed in the Lower Chamber in 1861, recommending the Government to recognise the Kingdom

<sup>1</sup> Former British Ambassador in Paris, known for his strong Conservative sentiments.



of Italy, contributed more than anything else to estrange the King from all sympathy with Liberal plans of reform in Germany.

'In the meantime, the want of success which attended all the measures of his Ministers tended not unnaturally to exasperate him with them, though in a great measure this want of success was owing to his own thwarting of them. To conciliate the Upper House, as well as the King, these measures were only half Liberal, which led to endless bickerings with the Lower Chamber, without satisfying the Upper. Measure after measure painfully passed in the Lower Chamber was thrown out by the Upper, and legislation was brought to a complete standstill.

'To make matters worse, two occurrences almost simultaneously contributed to render the Ministry most unpopular. One was the discovery of some gross police scandals under Manteuffel, but in which the actual President of Police, Zedlitz, was implicated; the other was the dismissal of the most constitutional of the Ministers, General Bonin, the War Minister, for opposing the King's plan for the reorganisation of the Army and the substitution in his place of General Roon, a military bureaucrat, ready to do the King's bidding in all matters great or small.

'In reference to the first, the King protected Zedlitz through thick and thin, and the Ministry most foolishly, on the principle of maintaining the King's authority, aided and abetted him. In the case of Bonin, though sharing his views, they allowed him to be sacrificed without making common cause with him.

'Little by little the details of the King's plan for the reorganisation of the Army became known, and a very general opposition to it on various important points simultaneously took possession of the public mind. To these points I shall refer later—for the present it is sufficient to say that this opposition exasperated the King to the highest degree. Opposition is what he hates. He had hated the feudals because they had opposed him as Prince of Prussia, and he had taken to the Liberals, because they at first went with him. He could not understand that it was he who had changed,

' On the other hand, the Liberal Ministers fell into the fatal mistake of using the military organisation as a means of pushing the King onwards in their sense on other questions. Though opposed to some of the principal points of the reorganisation in the bottom of their hearts, they offered to do their best to pass it, if the King would but remain true to his Liberal programme. Everything now tended to centre round this question. How it gradually, like the fat kine in Pharaoh's dream, ate up all the other questions, and became a question of constitutional life and death to Prussia, how it broke the neck of one Minister after the other till it got into the hands of Bismarck, where it remains as unsolved as ever, must form the subject of another letter. In the present letter I have endeavoured to show you something of the King's relation to the politics of Prussia since his accession to power. The two facts to be borne in mind are the way in which constitutional lessons gradually wore off, till the ancient Adam was once more there in his integrity, how in default of any other creed the Divine Right creed gradually became the only one which his mind was capable of grasping, and secondly, how his plan for the reorganisation of the Army became the one absorbing object of his policy, driving everything else into the background and possessing him with the sort of intensity with which the Reformation may have possessed a Luther.

' In corroboration of which, I will in conclusion mention two facts. The first, that he told a person this spring, who repeated it to me, that were his brother to come to life again, he would kneel before him and ask his forgiveness for having by earlier acts of his administration so misjudged him.

' The second fact is his constantly repeating and his having moreover written in a letter of which I have seen a copy, that he would rather abdicate than give up one man or one week's service of his reorganisation.

' Let us, however, in conclusion not forget that in his foreign policy, and especially in relation to his German relations, he has never acted otherwise than as an honest man and a gentleman. . . .'

'BERLIN, *August 3rd*, 1863.

' I announced in my last letter that the present one would be devoted to the history of the reorganisation of the Army and its expansion into the constitutional conflict which at so inopportune a moment has stricken down Prussia with paralysis. I must beg you to remember that in this military question lie the Alpha and Omega of this present struggle, and that by its solution alone can vitality be once more restored to the palsied limbs and the "arise and walk" sound in the cripple's ears. Moreover, it is not a question that admits of being patched up and its solution deferred to more propitious opportunities. The time for this is gone by. Two radical principles respectively co-extensive with absolute government on the one side and constitutional government on the other stand facing each other, and between them no "transaction," as a Frenchman would say, is possible. If the one principle triumphs, the other is vanquished, and *vice versa*. Let the military question be solved as the King and Bismarck desire, and Prussia falls out of the ranks of Constitutional States and returns to the category of "enlightened despotisms." Let it be solved as the country and the Chamber wish, and Prussia exchanges her formal Constitutionalism for a *bona fide* popular Government.

' This is not understood in England, and is not clearly apprehended even here, except by the few heads that have kept cool, while others have been heating in the turmoil. The combatants on the side of the Government have consciously and purposely sought to withdraw attention from the concrete difficulty by inscribing on their standard the abstract principle of "Personal" *versus* "Parliamentary" Government. The optimism and "wash me but don't wet me" of the Constitutionlists have refused to see the radical importance of the principles at stake, and their leaders have preached accommodation and compromise where these terms were synonymous with defeat. The clearer thinkers amongst the party of Progress and the correct instinct of the nation have, on the

other hand, seized the true bearings of the question. The King likewise. Both are equally determined not to yield, and therefore, as I said before, when the one, whichever it may be, goes to the wall, the victory of the other will be a decisive victory.

'At the risk, therefore, of being tedious (some detail will be unavoidable) I must enter fully into the question.

'Let us first clear the ground by getting rid once for all of our English notion on the subject. We are in the exceptional position of a great Power recruiting its army solely by voluntary enlistment. Hence the Army with us is a matter of estimates only. So many men, so much money. So much money, so many men. By the votes so taken, nobody's ulterior rights are interfered with. As between the men engaged into or dismissed from the Service and the authorities that engaged or dismissed them, the question is one of private contract only. The burden added or removed is placed upon or taken from the shoulders of the taxpayers by their natural Representatives in Parliament assembled, and there the matter ends. The organisation, or rather "formation" (to use the technical term employed in French and German to distinguish between the mere tactical distribution of troops and the organisation or general constitution of military force) of the men once voted remains in theory, at least, the prerogative of the Crown.

'Not so where conscription exists, *i.e.* where the military apparatus of a country has to be furnished by its citizens in *kind* as well as in money. Here the question, instead of being one of estimates only, becomes one touching the personal status of each individual citizen, and therefore involving allsorts of ulterior considerations. It is plain, therefore, that the action of the Legislature cannot be restricted to the mere sums voted for the maintenance of the Army, but must extend to the modes under which the personal service has to be rendered; it has to deal with a blood tax as well as a money tax, and if the essence of a constitutional form of Government is that the Sovereign cannot impose taxes upon the nation without the latter's consent, it is self-evident that this canon must be applied to taxes

levied in kind as well as to those levied in money. This seems so plain as to render the stating of it apparently superfluous, and yet it is the non-appreciation of this obvious truth in Prussia which has led to all the present mischief, and there is the less excuse for this, inasmuch as other continental Constitutions as, *e.g.*, Belgium, have had to go over the same ground, always resulting in the distinction being arrived at which is noted by the above terms of "formation" and organisation, *i.e.* the tactical distribution and arrangement of the troops committed by the nation to the Sovereign has remained the prerogative of the Crown; the constitution of the Army, *i.e.* the larger principles ruling the conditions under which the citizens are to serve the term of their service, the laws under which they are placed, whether military or civil, the proportion between the peace and the war establishment, etc., have been determined by the Legislature.

'It is, however, fair to state as regards Prussia that the very peculiar origin of that State which may be described as having been shaped out of a standing army by the plastic skill of its former rulers, does so far stamp an exceptional character upon it, that it is not to be wondered at if its actual Sovereign should be more mindful, in regard to his relations towards his army, of the past traditions of his House, than of the requirements of modern political ethics.

'Having laid down these general principles, let us test them by what has gone on here.

'In German political phraseology the Sovereign figures in a double capacity. He is "Kriegsherr," *i.e.* Supreme Head of the military forces, and he is "Landesherr," *i.e.* Supreme Head of the State. The first of these functions he exercises in virtue of his prerogative, the latter he exercises in conjunction with, that is, under the control of, his Parliament. Now, freed from all extraneous matters, the question at issue between King William and his subjects resolves itself into this—Is the organisation of the Army, in its wider sense, involving the amount and the conditions of the personal service to be rendered by the individual citizen, as well as the sum total of military services, to be

rendered by the State, to be ordered by the will of the Sovereign as "Kriegsherr," *i.e.* Head of the Army, or is it to be settled by him as "Landesherr," *i.e.* Head of the State, and as such in conjunction with other branches of the Legislature? Is the nation to have or not to have a voice in the imposition of the blood tax paid by itself?

' This, I repeat, is the real point at issue. Not, indeed, that it has been officially formulated in this manner by the Cabinet in its corporate capacity, though individual Ministers have said as much, but that the Cabinet has attempted by crooked ways to apply the principle in practice. The reproach to which they are justly obnoxious is their not having from the commencement had the honesty to place the question on this, its true issue. They have acted on the principle of the organisation of the Army, in its most extended sense, being a prerogative of the Crown, by sanctioning the calling into life of a new constitution of the Army without Parliament being consulted, and they have gone so far as to ride rough-shod over the budget rights of the Lower House, when by their exercise, the new organisation was jeopardised; but, on the other hand, as a makeshift, and to get a pretext for putting the Chamber into the wrong, they have brought in a Bill for the retrospective legalising of the organisation, giving out at the same time that nothing would induce the Crown to agree to less than was contained in the Bill, and that, if therefore it were rejected, the reorganisation would be maintained just the same.

' The stand, therefore, made by the Chamber against that portion of the budget, which represents the extra cost entailed by the reorganisation, is a stand made for the right of the nation to have a voice in the imposition of the taxes on bone, sinew, and blood furnished by it in kind.

' I want you to keep this in mind as a key to what I shall now relate.

' The organisation of the Army with which Prussia entered upon her constitutional existence dates back to the year 1814. The new chart of liberties left the old conditions of service untouched, and, until 1860, the two systems went on peacefully side by side, apparently well suiting each other.

Let us note at the threshold of our inquiry, that the demand for a radical reform of the system of 1814, which should revolutionise the principles on which it was built, came *not* from the Parliament created by the Constitution but from the Crown.

' The peculiarity of the military system inaugurated by the law of 3rd September 1814 consists in this—that whilst it laid a military burden upon the Prussian people such as no nation had ever before borne, it did so to the great joy and contentment of the people so burdened, and that, whilst this law was promulgated as the legislative act of an absolute Ruler, it was, nevertheless, a great popular measure passed, as it were, by public acclamation in the hour of national triumph. That which is the most remarkable feature about the matter is, that though called into life under such exceptional circumstances, it has not diminished in popularity during the long period that has elapsed since.

' The principle on which the law of 1814 is based is not like that in force in other continental states, that every able-bodied Prussian citizen fit to carry arms should be *liable* to military service, but that every such citizen *should actually serve*. By this provision three main features of the Prussian national character were done justice to: its patriotism, which may be said to be a new feature evoked by the great war of liberation, but destined to remain henceforth a very prominent one; its love of military glory, the tradition of the days of the great Hohenzollern Rulers, and lastly, its democratic tendencies, to which we have already adverted.

' Such being the dominating principle of the law of 1814, let us briefly review the manner of its application.

' For nineteen years, *i.e.* from his twentieth to his thirty-ninth year, every Prussian citizen fit to carry arms was to be an enrolled soldier. The first five of these nineteen years (*i.e.* from his twentieth to his twenty-fifth year) he formed part of the *standing army*. The next seven years (*i.e.* from his twenty-fifth to his thirty-second year) he formed part of the *First Levy* of Landwehr. The last seven years (*i.e.* from thirty-two to thirty-nine) he formed part of the *Second Levy* of the Landwehr.

' Of the five years in the standing army, however, the law of 1814 ordained that the three first only should actually be spent under arms ; for the last two the soldier was dismissed into the Reserve to his home and civilian occupations. The service of the Landwehr was of a light kind in time of peace, the men only being called out for a few days' yearly drill. On the other hand, in time of war, the Landwehr of the First Levy was placed upon a perfect equality with the standing army, and, from the fact of its containing all the men in the real prime of life, *i.e.* from twenty-five to thirty-two, the Landwehr of the First Levy as constituted in 1814 was *de facto* the strong arm that should defend Prussia's Right and Might. The Landwehr of the Second Levy was only to be employed within the frontiers for defensive purposes, the garrisoning of fortresses, etc. The only privilege allowed was in favour of education. Such persons as had passed the higher examinations at the Public Gymnasium, and who went to the expense of clothing and equipping themselves, serving three years instead of five in the standing army, *i.e.* one year actively and two years in the Reserve.

' The Army organised on this principle was of course based on the population of 1814, and its framework was so laid down that the men actually under arms, *i.e.* those serving the three first years of their term in the standing army, should include the great bulk of the able-bodied population between the ages of twenty and twenty-three. To provide, however, for supernumeraries, a system was originally started of Landwehr recruits, so that those who were not trained in the standing army should receive their military education in the Landwehr. A certain margin for the increase of the population and for the raising or diminishing of the standing army was thus left without encroaching on the principle of universal service, and the law of 1814 distinctly laid down that the strength of the standing army should be determined by the actual circumstances of the State. An important modification was in consequence introduced into the system soon after its commencement, by the discontinuance of the practice of Landwehr recruits.



'Such were the principal features of the organisation of 1814, with regard to which let us specially note, that whilst the bulk of the population gladly served their term in the standing army, the really popular institution was the Landwehr of the First Levy. The men who composed it had returned to their avocations as citizens, and only met at stated intervals to renew, in the spirit of old companionship, their old warlike exercises. As of equal rank, however, with the Army, and with the consciousness that in time of war the brunt of fighting would fall upon them, they were filled with a strong sense of their own importance, and with what will probably be to an Englishman an incomprehensible idealism, the feeling that military service is the highest duty which can devolve upon the citizen. This *esprit de corps* animating the Landwehr is especially strong in the body of Landwehr officers. A distinct corporation from the officers of the standing army, they have felt themselves not to be a separate caste with no sympathies with the nation at large, but on the contrary immediately bound up with it. To the fulfilment of their duties as soldiers they brought the free spirit of the citizen, and to their daily avocations as citizens they brought the habits of order, obedience, and command of the soldier, plus the reasonable pride confirmed by uniform and epaulettes. When to all this we add the tradition that to the breaking to pieces of the Regular Army at Jena Prussia owed her overthrow, whilst to the Landwehr of 1813 and 1814 she owed her new birth, it is not to be wondered at that the institution of the Landwehr assumed a sort of sacred character in the eyes of Prussia. It was hardly an exaggeration for one of its apologists, in discussing the question last session, to describe it as the constitutional bulwark of Prussia in her preconstitutional days.

'It was, on the other hand, natural enough that the officers of the standing army, brought up, as it were, from their cradles in military colleges (*Cadetten-Häuser*), one and all the veriest hot-beds of the narrowest spirit of caste, should look upon the Landwehr with jealousy and an ill-merited contempt, and should above all lust after the strong thews and sinews of the three first classes, viz. the men between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-eight. For a

long while, therefore, in military circles the Landwehr had been looked upon with an evil eye.

' I have one more fact to note, and that is, that although the readiness of the Landwehr *to fight* cannot be doubted by any one who saw Prussia in 1850 and 1859, their being called from their avocations for other than fighting purposes, such as mere military demonstrations of a political nature, where no fighting is intended, was a source of considerable irritation. Whenever, however, the Prussian army is placed on a war footing (or mobilised, as it is here termed), the Landwehr has to be called out. In 1850, they were kept under arms for several months and marched and countermarched through a hard winter solely that Baron Manteuffel should be able to say "*that a strong man can courageously give way.*" Again in 1859, they were called out, also to return to their homes with unfleshed swords. Now there can be no doubt, that the calling out of the cream of the working population for mere political display is an evil of vast magnitude, and generally felt as such. The remedies to be applied, however, are very different, as prescribed by the military theorists or by the Landwehr men. The one says, "Let us make our demonstrations with a larger standing army." The other says, "Don't make demonstrations. Don't draw your sword until you want it, but when you have drawn it, then verily strike your adversary with it."

' Such then in general outline was the organisation of the Prussian Army in 1860. The idea of an entire reform of this system had long occupied the King's thoughts. It was in 1860, however, after the experiences he had made during the mobilisation of the Army in 1859, that his own plans for the reorganisation were matured.

' Now as I was at Berlin during the whole of 1860, and an unbiassed listener to what was said on all sides, I consider myself a fair judge of what then took place and of what was public feeling with regard to a change of system at that time. Party passion has since risen so high, that both sides would probably deny the truth of my assertions, without however my feeling any misgivings respecting their truth on that account.

'The King in 1860 was still very popular. The Chamber was the same that had been elected in 1858, and therefore predominantly a Ministerial Chamber. True it is, that it was getting dissatisfied with the Ministry, but, as the only alternative was a reactionary Cabinet, it was ready to go a very long way to keep it in power. The idea of a reorganisation of the Army was, moreover, popular. There was a general wish to see the military power of Prussia increased. To make Prussia *de facto* the Sword of Germany, preparatory to her becoming it *de jure*, coincided with the German aspirations of the country and the Chamber. Moreover, there were three reforms ardently desired.

'The *first* was the removal of the injustice caused by the yearly levy not including the whole able-bodied male population fit to carry arms. We have seen that the institution of the Landwehr recruits had been discontinued, whilst the actual framework of the Army remained based on the estimate of the population in 1814. The population had since increased from about thirteen to seventeen millions; consequently though by law every Prussian was bound to serve, yet with every exemption which could possibly be devised there remained yearly nearly a third of the population who were not called upon to serve. This was plainly an immense injustice to those who did, and was, moreover, the destruction of the principle which alone gave vitality to the entire system.

'*Secondly*, there was a strong prejudice against the three years' actual presence under arms, the country generally, and with it high military authorities, being of opinion, that under such a system as that in force, two years of actual drill were quite as efficient as three, and that the tax of three years out of every citizen's life was a larger proportion of the sinew of the country than it could afford to apply to unproductive employment.

'I cannot enter into the arguments pro and con urged in this question, but I must guard against the usual judgment passed by foreigners and especially by Englishmen. The latter accustomed to a minimum of ten years' service, and well knowing that it is only in the third and fourth year that our recruits become efficient soldiers, dismiss

at once the idea of a two years' service as absurd ; but this is taking the question away from its true issue. It is the arguing as if the point to be determined were the comparative efficiency between the systems represented by a small professional army on the one hand and the training of an entire nation to arms on the other. In the former case it is evident that neither two nor indeed three years will suffice to induce on average human nature the mechanical perfection which we associate with the idea of a professional soldier, but the question has never in Prussia been put upon this ground. All parties here are for the maintenance of a "nation in arms" principle. The standing army is described in the law of 1814 as the "military training school of the nation"; and the point to be decided is whether such training as is required to render every able-bodied citizen capable of serving as a soldier if required can be given in two years, or whether three are necessary. Very high military authorities maintain that all that can be taught can be taught in two years, that as long as he is being taught, the Prussian citizen soldier is well content and does his work well, but that when he has done learning, *i.e.* in his third year, he gets discontented, and takes to thinking of his civil career, and is no longer a useful member of his country. The great argument used in favour of the two years is that the system was practically carried out for twenty years from 1830 to 1850, the men being dismissed after two years' training, and that the men so turned out were quite equal to those drilled for three years. This may, or may not, be the case, but it is evident that if *omnium consensu* (and on this point everybody is agreed) the system of universal service is to be continued, or rather re-established, the only way of preventing the Army Estimates from slipping altogether away from the control of Parliament, is—for the Parliament to have a control over the term of service actually passed under arms.

'*Thirdly*, there was a general wish that the Landwehr, or at least the older classes of it containing the married men and heads of families, should be eased from the labours imposed on them by mere military demonstrations.

'Such then was the constitution of the Chamber, and such the feeling of the country when the King's plan for the reorganisation of the Army was made known to his Parliament. A more favourable opportunity could hardly have been chosen for a change, as it was not likely that a Chamber would again be found so ready to go to the utmost limit of concession. One condition to a satisfactory arrangement, however, failed, and that was that both parties should be agreed upon the cardinal point—that the question was one that could be solved only by mutual co-operation. This condition was wanting as regards the King. He considered that the matter was one with which in reality he alone was concerned. He looked upon it as an immense concession that the proposed change should be invested with the form of a Parliament Bill, and that the least that could be given in return for this concession was the immediate granting of all he asked. The only point on which he admitted that he required the consent of Parliament was for altering the length of service in the standing army and the two levies of the Landwehr. This had been fixed by Law and could therefore only be altered by Law, but this was a very different thing from submitting the whole *charpente* of his Army to the approval or disapproval of his Parliament. The law of 1814 gave him the services of the whole able-bodied population for three years absolutely, for nineteen years contingently, and he could do with this "material" what he liked, if he only had money enough. Moreover, the Chamber was bound to give the money, if the Minister of Finance could show where the money was to be got and if the King was of opinion that it was *bona fide* required for the Army (this is word for word the reasoning of one of General Roon's speeches). The Judge as to what was required for the Army was the King as "Kriegsherr." This was constitutional law in Prussia. All of which, of course, is very well in theory (if at least "Right" prove equal to "Might"), on the two points that a law is required to alter the term of service and that money is required to keep up a larger force. These two points remain in the hands of the Chamber and give it the key of the posi-

tion, so long as the battle is fought out within the limits of the Constitution. Hence the necessity of extra constitutional means, and of a Minister who would have recourse to these means.

'I have purposely named the measure the King's measure, not only because it has been thus described by himself, but because it has also been so described by his Ministers, and because the possibility of its being so named at once reveals the true source of the confusion of principles from which all the present mischief has arisen. If the reorganisation of the Army had been an act which the King could have performed of himself, *i.e.* in virtue of his prerogative, it necessarily fell under the category of such acts as he could perform in his capacity as Kriegsherr or Head of the Army, and this, and this only, can be meant when the act is described as his in *contradistinction* to its being the act of his Ministry; but the moment a Ministerial Bill was brought into effect for this purpose, the admission was made that the proposed reorganisation was an act which the King could only carry out when acting as Landesherr, *i.e.* in conjunction with his Parliament.

'The Liberal Ministers in 1860 *started* correctly. They brought into the Lower House a detailed Bill reconstituting the entire organisation of the Prussian Army, and asked for the additional money required for giving effect to this Bill.

'The Bill so presented was something very different to what the country wanted. It proposed to increase the military burden borne by the individual citizen and by the State at large, to a wholly unexpected extent, and did not offer any equivalent, or at least nothing which the country considered equivalent. It proposed to extend the five years' service in the standing army to eight, and far from proposing a reduction in the term actually spent under arms, it kept the three years intact for the infantry, and proposed to extend the service of the cavalry and artillery to four years. It did away with the distinction of the First and Second Levies of the Landwehr, and degraded the whole Landwehr force to the position of the Second Levy, by ordaining that it should only be used for

defensive purposes, thereby forfeiting its characteristic property of equality with the Line.

'The Bill from the first to the last line was the work, not of the Constitutional Ministry who introduced it, but of the King and his military Cabinet. I have mentioned in a former letter that General Bonin, the original War Minister of the Liberal Cabinet, had been dismissed because he opposed the King's plans, and that General Roon, a military bureaucrat, had been chosen by the King in his stead. The first great error of the Cabinet was not making common cause with Bonin, as it is well known they thoroughly disapproved of the measure. Their apology is that the King was so set upon the plan that to thwart him in reference to it was to doom the Liberal Ministry and to bring a reactionary Cabinet into power.

'As soon as the provisions of the Bill were known in the country, the greatest possible opposition everywhere became manifest. In the Chamber it was referred to a Committee which at once rejected it as inadmissible, and drew up a draft of a Bill in its stead representing the extreme limit to which it was supposed the country was ready to go.

'According to the proposals of the Committee, the five years' service in the standing army was to be extended to six (instead of the eight proposed by the Government measure), but the actual service under arms was to be reduced for the infantry to two years; the cavalry and artillery were still to serve three years. The distinction between the two Levies was still to be kept up, the service in the First Levy being, however, reduced to six years. If we compare the two systems we shall see that the latter, whilst making the concession of one year (and that an important one, viz. the service of men twenty-six years old) to the military party, thereby largely strengthening the standing army, nevertheless kept all the three principles above described as the desiderata of the country safe and unscathed.

'Let us, to appreciate the real differences between the plans proposed (which still *mutatis mutandis* represents what the King wishes on the one hand and the

country on the other), roughly put a few numbers together.

'The recruits actually levied in 1858 (the last normal year, the Army having been put on a war footing in 1859) amounted to about 40,000. The number of men fit for service who, for want of room, could not be levied was something under 20,000.  $40,000 \times 3$  will give, when added to the permanent staff of officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., the standing peace army, *i.e.* the men actually under arms with no reserve called in, *i.e.*  $40,000 \times 3 = 120,000 + 30,000$  (the permanent staff) = 150,000 men. The same number  $\times 5$  gives the war establishment of the standing army, *i.e.* 5 times 40,000 is 200,000 + 30,000 is 230,000.

'Hence, roughly stated, under the old system the peace establishment of the standing army of Prussia was 150,000—the war establishment of the standing army (without recourse being had to the Landwehr) was 230,000 men.

'The plan proposed by the Committee would have raised yearly 60,000 men for two years' service, leaving the peace establishment nearly the same, *i.e.* twice 60,000 + 30,000 is 150,000, twice sixty being the same as three times forty. On the other hand, the war establishment would have been enormously increased, *viz.*  $60,000 \times 6 + 30,000$ , *i.e.* 390,000, thereby fulfilling all the desiderata of the country, *viz.* equal levying, two years' service, a comparatively small increase in the estimates, the Landwehr of the first Levy retained in its position of equality with the Line, but a very much larger standing army for the purposes of mere demonstrations.

'The Government plan, on the other hand, proposed an increase in the peace establishment shown by the following numbers:  $60,000 \times 3 + 30,000 = 210,000$  men, in the war establishment represented by  $60,000 \times 8 + 30,000$ , *i.e.* 510,000!

'These numbers are only quite rough, no allowance is made for the longer service of the cavalry and artillery than the infantry. The 30,000 men of the permanent staff is a large proportion for the smaller army—a small proportion for the larger army, etc., but they are quite correct



enough to show in broad outlines in what consists the difference between the various plans proposed.

'No one the least acquainted with public opinion in Prussia in 1860 will pass another verdict than that the King's plan was from its cradle condemned, and never had a chance of being accepted by the country except by the use of violent measures.

'As soon as the Committee had finished their report condemning the Government plan and recommending their own, the Government *withdrew their Bill*. The *motive assigned* was that, the Upper House having thrown out a Bill for the extension of the Land Tax, the passing of which was required for the financial side of the reorganisation question, the said question required reconsidering in its financial parts. The Government, therefore, preferred to apply only for a *temporary additional grant* to maintain the increased state of military efficiency required by the Prussian Army in view of the then state of Europe. The *real motive* was the certainty which the Government had acquired that their measure would be thrown out, and that by their own Chamber, and that the Bill proposed by the Committee would be passed. This is self-evident to any one who will take the trouble of even superficially acquainting himself with what then took place, but I have in addition to this the curious testimony of a man immediately connected with the Government who told me exactly what the course *would be*, and the motives for this course, *before the Bill was withdrawn* ! Yet, in spite of all this, the present Government supporters persist in maintaining that the Government Bill would have passed in 1860, and that the whole agitation got up against it is a Red Republican and anarchical, etc., opposition, an afterthought of the Radicals, who got into Parliament at the last election.

'The withdrawal of the measure with the knowledge that the King and his new War Minister, Roon, would nevertheless carry it out, and their remaining in office under such conditions was the inauguration by the Liberal Ministry of that miserable policy of subserviency which gradually led them to the ignominious position they have since permanently occupied. The Chamber, on the other hand, did

not act much better. It was, as we have seen, beyond all things anxious to avoid an open breach with the Ministry, and therefore much too readily availed itself of the compromise afforded it by the withdrawal of the Bill, and granted at once the extraordinary grant of nine millions in addition to the ordinary military Budget for the purpose, as the Bill was worded, " provisionally to keep up the state of military preparation " ! Knowing the sort of people high in military office, it ought to have laid down very definite conditions as to the use to which this money was to be put. It is, however, only fair to say, that by the mouth of its leaders, it did directly guard against this extraordinary vote being considered as an acquiescence in the principle of the Bill that had been withdrawn.

' With the extraordinary grant of money so obtained, the military department at once set to work to carry out the definite reorganisation of the Army *upon the basis of the Bill withdrawn*. An entire new military apparatus of a *permanent kind* was called into life. One hundred and nine new battalions of infantry, ten new regiments of cavalry, were created with a permanent staff of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and everything else to correspond, all on the basis of the *extermination* of the whole system of the Landwehr and the increased term of service in the standing army.

' The Liberal Ministers saw the new banners consecrated, the reorganisation with great pomp officially promulgated and—said nothing !

' In order to make quite plain what are the real merits of the question at issue, I have unfortunately gone to such length that I must condense what follows into the shortest space.

' The Session of 1860 was followed by that of 1861, which was the last the then Parliament had to sit (we have triennial Parliaments here), the General Elections were to fall in the autumn of 1861.

' It was of course expected that the Ministry would bring in the Bill they had withdrawn the year before, and explain the measure of the reorganisation by the hypothesis that this measure was what they supposed the country wished

for, and which in the present Session Parliament would give its sanction to. Instead of this, no Bill was brought in, and in the Budget presented to the House, extraordinary expense incurred by the reorganisation was entered in the ordinary expenditure of the military department, and asked for as part of the current expenses of the country.

' This of course was the moment when the Chamber should have made its stand, but, unfortunately, half measures again prevailed. Instead of refusing the money asked for, the Chamber contented itself with severing it out of the ordinary Budget, making an extraordinary grant of it and—*n.b.*—reducing the amount.

' The extraordinary grant so reduced was voted and given to the Government under the express condition, however, that if the Government intended to maintain the reorganisation they stood bound to bring in a Bill to that effect next Session.

' It was under these circumstances that the General Election in the autumn of the year 1861 took place. The country was thoroughly angry with the subserviency and what appeared the trickery of the Ministry, and highly displeased with the weakness shown by the Chamber. The result was that a new Chamber was returned pledged against the reorganisation. We have seen the effect of this feeling of the country upon the King. The new Chamber met in January 1862, and upon a comparatively unimportant point the Ministry was at once beaten by a large majority.

' The cry of anarchy, revolution, attack on the King's prerogative was then raised by all the Government organs, the Chamber, not three months old, was dissolved! and the country appealed to to decide, not on the real issue above given, *i.e.* whether the nation had or not a voice in the imposition of its blood tax, but on the abstract principle as to whether for the future the King or the Parliament was to govern in Prussia! The Liberal portion of the Ministry, after dissolving the Chamber, sent in their resignation, which was accepted, and their places were filled by unknown bureaucrats, whose whole idea of the Ministerial office was implicit obedience to the King's will. Of the

old Ministry there remained, as the quasi-Premier, Van der Heydt, the last representative of the Manteuffel Cabinet, Roon, the great agent of the reorganisation, and Bernstorff, who had only lately joined the Ministry, and who only had a voice in foreign affairs, not caring for, or pretending to know anything about, internal matters. I should mention that in the short Session that preceded the dissolution, a short emendatory Bill altering the Law of 1814, in so far as the term of service in the standing army was concerned, and extending that term to seven years, was introduced into the Upper House and at once carried, almost unanimously, by that august Assembly.

'In spite of every kind of illegal means to influence elections and to get a docile Chamber, the very same Chamber was returned that had just been dismissed. When it reassembled it stood face to face with a Ministry hostile to every shade of Liberalism, and who counted only ten supporters in the House.'

## CHAPTER XIV

## BERLIN

THE deplorable state of affairs caused by the constitutional struggle was, as Morier wrote to Lord John Russell on 7th February 1863, 'ripening slowly to a crisis which may be attended with very fearful consequences. The devilish sophistries which endeavour to prove that the Government have a standing ground for their acts in the Constitution, and which six months ago were only timidly put forward in semi-official papers, have now become political dogmas which the King, the Ministry, and their feudal supporters fanatically adhere to as saving truths. In proportion as this judicial blindness has gathered over the eyes of those in authority, the people has, by the continuance of the conflict, opened its eyes to the real stakes at issue, *i.e.* whether or not its representatives have a right to control the expenditure of its own money, the Bismarckian theory crudely laying down that the Crown has an *equal* right with the representative Chamber to vote the public expenditure and that, until the two can agree, the Government has the right to expend what money it pleases. Under these circumstances the situation has certainly been "cleared," as Bismarck has it, but it is a clearance which exhibits the *Dynasty* and the country at deadly strife on the vital question of Absolutism or Constitutional Government and a formula, the simplicity of which has forced many, who six months ago would have shuddered at the thought, to ask themselves whether it is possible to hope for free institutions under a *Dynasty* grown grey in the tenets of military despotism.'

Under these circumstances it became the aim of the Liberal party in the interests of the *Dynasty* to dis-identify the Crown Prince, whose constitutional views were well

known, from the policy of his father. Hitherto the Crown Prince's attitude had been purely negative, attending, it is true, the Councils, but taking no part in them; but on 5th June 1863, at Danzig, in replying to an address from the Liberal Burgomaster, he openly dissociated himself from the acts of the Ministry by expressing his regret at the 'variance which has occurred between the Government and the people which has occasioned me no small degree of surprise.'

This incident was exploited to the utmost by Bismarck, who for some time had been doing his best to sow discord between the King on one hand and the Crown Prince and Crown Princess and their entourage on the other.

'Every kind of calumny was spread,' wrote Morier, a few years afterwards, referring to this incident, 'respecting the persons supposed to be the Prince's friends. Spies were placed over him in the shape of aides-de-camp and chamberlains, conversations were distorted and imagined till the Danzig episode brought matters to a climax and very nearly led to the transfer of the Prince to a fortress.'

It was afterwards maintained by Bismarck that the Crown Prince had at this time been acting under Morier's influence, but the latter 'never once saw him (*i.e.* the Crown Prince) or had any kind of communication with him at the time before or after the Danzig episode,' as he wrote later. Indeed, it transpires from correspondence between him and E. von Stockmar (son of Baron Stockmar), that they both disapproved of the Crown Prince's speech.

An article in *The Times* of 6th June, commenting on this incident and containing certain revelations about the Crown Prince and Princess's correspondence, created a great sensation throughout Germany. As Morier had been accused by Bismarck of inspiring the Crown Prince's speech at Danzig, so the paternity of *The Times* article was attributed to E. von Stockmar.

'There is a devil of a row about *The Times* article,' the latter wrote to Morier on 4th July 1863, 'concerning the Crown Prince's correspondence with his father, and of which

they, that is the Ministers, suppose me to be the author. I am as innocent as a newborn babe. Can you give me a clue? It might possibly be useful to know whence the article came. They swear it cannot be of English growth, because there are continentalisms in it.'

A few days after this, on 9th July, E. von Stockmar announced the death of his father to Morier, to whom this loss, though long expected, was very great, following so soon, as it did, on that of the Prince Consort. More than ever did he regard the Anglo-German Alliance, always the dream of his political existence, as a labour of love; and the remembrance of having co-operated with two such men as the Prince Consort and Baron Stockmar made him consider it a sacred duty to carry out the legacy which he conceived they had bequeathed him.

All the affection which Morier had given to the father, he now transferred to the son, of whom, on his death in 1886, he wrote to Jowett:—

'Stockmar's loss is irreparable. He and you were the two friends of my life. Now only one remains. I had become *verwachsen* (grown together) with him by an unclouded intercourse of friendship for thirty-two years, as I have with you by one of forty years. It is a portion of myself which dies with him, for we had all our thoughts and sympathies and much most important work in common.'

E. von Stockmar, soon after his father's death, was obliged to resign his position of secretary to the Crown Princess, on account of ill-health.

'I am an orange squeezed out,' he wrote to Morier on that occasion; 'but this, my dearest friend, ought in no manner to affect you. You are still full of juice and vigour, and what you considered our common task will still remain the same grand thing, "*würdig des Schweisses der Edlen*." Its fulfilment does not at all depend upon a poor little molecule like myself. It is difficult for the molecule to imagine that its absence would be felt by anybody. But the poor molecule would certainly become much poorer still, if it should be ordained that it was to be deprived of the great comfort it has always derived from

its relations to a certain big fat molecule to which it is so gratefully attached, and to harmonise with which was one of its few pleasures. This would be a serious loss indeed.'

In Germany, Federal Reform continued to occupy all men's minds ; for, by universal consent, the Diet had entirely broken down, having proved worthless as a defensive association, whilst in interfering in the internal affairs of the smaller States it had done much harm. Political consolidation was the goal aimed at by all, but in the attainment two totally antagonistic principles that had long agitated the public mind of Germany sought for mastery. The adherents of the one and the other were known in Germany as the party of Great Germany (Gross Deutsch) and the party of Little Germany (Klein Deutsch). They had both of them, so far, got the same object in view, that they equally desired a reconstruction of the German Confederation with a view to intensifying its powers of offence and defence. They both agreed in considering that this result was alone to be obtained by substituting organic structure for the actual inorganic mechanism, but they differed in this, that the Great-Germany party believed that this was compatible with the retention of the two Great Powers of the Confederation within the organic body to be reconstructed, and the Little-Germany party held this to be impossible. The latter's doctrine, *i.e.* a centralised confederacy with external rights of Sovereignty merged into one Head, the internal rights remaining intact, that Head to be Prussia as the only *bona fide* German Great Power, was that of the National Liberal party all over Germany, and the scheme of the Grand Duke of Baden and Roggenbach to which they had been vainly trying to gain Prussian adhesion since 1860. Their endeavours had failed, and as Prussia, hopelessly immersed in reaction and constitutional struggles, could apparently no longer be counted upon, even such earnest Liberals as the Duke of Coburg now turned their eyes towards Austria. It is generally believed that it was at the Duke's instigation that the Emperor Francis Joseph, rather to the general surprise, invited the Sovereigns of Germany to an Assembly



at Frankfort in August 1863, to deliberate on the question of Liberal reform.

*Morier to Earl Russell*

‘BERLIN, August 8th, 1863.

‘The summons of the Emperor of Austria to his German peers to meet him in solemn conference at Frankfort is, at the present juncture of affairs and in the present temper of men’s minds in Germany, a step of such vast importance, that I cannot but think that any authentic information on the subject must be interesting to you, and I therefore make no scruple in writing to tell you what I learnt last night on undoubted authority, viz. that *the King of Prussia has distinctly refused to attend the meeting*. It appears that the proposal was made by the Emperor to the King verbally at Gastein. It took the King completely by surprise—and he seems *at first* to have not altogether rejected the idea. In a later interview, however (having, I presume, in the meantime talked the matter over with Bismarck), he rejected the proposal absolutely, and stated at length all his reasons for so doing. I *infer* from what was told me that the King and Bismarck, both of them, felt convinced that the refusal of Prussia would at once quash the whole scheme, and that Austria could never get on with it in the face of such a refusal. They were, therefore, very much surprised by the announcement that a circular autograph letter, dated 31st July (*i.e.* before the Gastein interview), had been despatched by the Emperor to his brethren inviting them to Frankfort; the transmitting despatches, however, in which the Austrian representatives at the German Courts are instructed as to the delivery of these autograph letters, being dated 4th August (*i.e.* after the Gastein interview). These dates are worth noticing, as they prove the determination to take the step whether Prussia said yes or no, and at the same time the desire to come to a previous agreement if possible.

‘As may be supposed, the King and Bismarck are making very wry faces at the position in which they now find themselves placed.

‘It is worth remarking and very characteristic of the present state of things in Prussia, that the *Kreuz-Zeitung*,

which has always preached union between Austria and Prussia and the joint action and personal forgathering of the Sovereigns of Germany (always, of course, with a view to direct that action against Liberal tendencies), is the most dead set against the Austrian proposal, and that the Liberal papers, though preaching caution, are evidently rather for than against the plan.

'I do not expect any practical results from the meeting in regard to Federal Reform, as on this point the radical differences between North and South are so great, but such a meeting at such a moment might be turned to the most stupendous uses directly in regard to Prussia, indirectly in regard to France.'

In September, Morier was sent for to Coburg to attend upon the Queen.

*Morier to Earl Russell*

'COBURG, September 6th, 1863.

'Upon the Queen's arrival at Rosenau I received a summons from General Grey<sup>1</sup> to attend upon Her Majesty, and on my arrival here on the 27th ult. I learnt to my very great satisfaction that I had been sent for with your knowledge and approval.

'It appears that Her Majesty was desirous to have some one at hand to whom she could refer for any technical knowledge she might require in connection with German political questions.

'Her Majesty spoke to me on the following subjects:—

'1. The state of Prussia with special reference to the position of the Crown Prince and the Crown Princess. I gave Her Majesty all the information I was possessed of, and ventured to hint that any appearance of interference on our part would be prejudicial to the interests of Their Royal Highnesses, as the idea that the Crown Prince was being *prompted* from over the water would materially diminish in the eyes, even of the Liberal party, the value of his opposition to the present régime. I also adverted to the mischief that had been caused by the publication in *The Times* of facts connected with His Royal Highness's doings previous to the

<sup>1</sup> Private Secretary to Queen Victoria.

Danzig episode, which were entirely unknown to the Prussian public. Her Majesty told me that she had never been able to discover how the indiscretion took place.

' 2. On the Schleswig-Holstein question. You are fully aware of my views on this subject, so I need not refer to them here. They are, I believe, for all purposes of practical application exactly identical with yours. I thoroughly deprecate resort to a federal execution as the greatest of follies. The present case of Germany against Denmark is one of an international nature. To use a federal instrument to obtain redress for an international grievance, or rather to enforce the fulfilment of international engagements, is to give the Danes a perfect right to treat the federal as an international weapon. The only possible treatment of the question *at present* is for the Great Powers to look at the difficulties with indifferent eyes, and to insist upon Denmark doing what she has engaged to do. It was the way pointed out in your despatch, and the British public will only awake to the folly of not having supported you with every nerve at their disposition, when some fine morning they find war imminent, a French army on the Rhine, and a blockade of Hamburgh and the Baltic ports.

' 3. On the all-engrossing topic of the Austrian plans for Federal Reform. Now with every sympathy enlisted on the side of regenerated Austria, and with every antipathy intensified by personal hatred against Bismarck, moreover with the strongest desire for a united Germany, I have been unable to come to any other conclusion than that the Austrian plan is totally unfeasible, and that with many plausible sides to it, it not only does not offer to the German nation what the latter desires, but something diametrically opposed to its wishes. The fallacy into which Englishmen are likely to fall in judging of the project, is to suppose that because Austria is *bona fide* engaged in Liberal reforms whilst everything Prussian stinks of absolutism and reaction, what Austria proposes must have a Liberal tendency, what Prussia considers her interest must have a contrary tendency. The fact which is ignored is, that what the whole German population of Austria, *i.e.* the great Liberal lever of the Empire, desires is something radically different from what the

national party in non-Austrian Germany, that is the great Liberal lever in the North, desires. The one honestly looks upon every Austrian interest as a *bona fide* German interest, and their notion of federal reform is some plan that shall identify German interests with specific Austrian interests. They wish for a strong Power at their backs upon which they can rely to support them in Italy and defend them in the East. The national party in the North refuse to identify German interests with specific Austrian interests and regard their standing surety for the inviolability of the German territories of Austria as the fulfilment of their engagements towards her. What they ardently desire is the creation of some organ for the expression of the national will and some means for the enforcing of this will—a National Assembly, and an Executive responsible to this National Assembly; this is the goal towards which the national party is straining every nerve. A realisation of this project is the last thing the Liberals of Austria would desire, for in such an Assembly the Austrian element would be swamped, and the Assembly would always have German interests before them *en première ligne*. The natural allies of Austria in Germany are the Cabinets, and she would therefore never consent to enter into a German Bundesstaat in which the Sovereigns of the individual States would have to bow their heads before the representatives of the nation as a whole.

‘ Now, if we examine the Austrian project, we shall find that it proposes to change the present defensive association of the Confederation for a body united for offence as well defence. The vital functions of such a body are those connected with its foreign relations—Peace and War. In the complicated machinery proposed for the new union, where does the exercise of this sovereign prerogative lie? In the organ representing the national will, *i.e.* the Assembly of Delegates, or in that representing the Sovereigns? It is placed in the Bundesrath or Federal Council—the body identical with the present ordinary assembly of the Diet, in which Austria can always secure a majority, *i.e.* an Assembly composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Cabinets who, it is proposed, shall decide by a simple majority whether Germany shall engage in a foreign war

unconnected with the defence of her territories. This is the keystone of the entire project, it is that which recommends it to every patriotic Austrian and makes it inadmissible by every North German who belongs to the national party. No modification of the plan in the sense of the latter is therefore conceivable other than one which would so radically alter it as to make it totally unacceptable to the former. The Duke of Coburg, who did his best to paint the present project as a stepping-stone to something different, was obliged to admit that Austria never would consent to place the decision of peace or war (*i.e.* the foreign relations) out of the hands of the Sovereign into those of the national representatives.

‘The experience, therefore, of the last month has only confirmed the conviction to which I have since come—that there are but two kinds of reform possible, and that any attempt at a compromise between the two can only result in a political *lusus naturæ*. Either a *bona fide* reform of the present federal Constitution in the way of making it *de facto* what it is *de jure*—a great international defensive association, a radical reconstitution of its worthless military apparatus, so as to make the *noli me tangere* very visible to the trans-Rhenan eyes, and a reducing of the Constitution to its purely international character by the elimination of all the abominable federal machinery invented for the purpose of checking the growth of Liberal institutions in the several States—OR, a complete *tabula rasa* of the present system and the substitution in its place of a strong North and Middle German centralised Confederacy with an elective or hereditary head—a national Parliament—and a responsible Ministry.

‘This is a Revolution, however, and not a Reform, and one for which the nation is not ripe, and which depends on conditions at present not the least likely to be fulfilled, and it seems to me therefore a hundred pities that Austria and Prussia cannot be got to work peacefully in the direction of the former reform.

‘The Queen desired me to draw a memorandum for her in which the features of the present Federal Constitution should be intelligibly laid down and the proposed reforms

also described with explanations of the terms Bundesstaat, Staatenbund, Engerer Rath, Plenum, etc. I enclose a copy on constitutional grounds, and also because it may not be altogether useless to you to have a general *aperçu* of a question likely to occupy public attention for some time to come. I have carefully avoided the expression of individual opinion, and have, as the Germans state, only placed on record *objective* facts. In my conversation with Her Majesty, however, I stated at length what I have now attempted concisely to relate to you.'

*Present Constitution of the Germanic Confederation*

*September 1863.*

The existing Federal Constitution is laid down in two acts : 'The German Federal Act of the 8th June 1815' and the 'Final Act of Vienna of the 15th May 1820.' The Union created by these Treaties is what in German is termed a 'Staatenbund,' that is, an International Alliance between equal and independent States, whose rights of *internal* as well as of *external* Sovereignty remain intact, except in so far as they are limited by the objects of the Union. These objects are defined in the second paragraph of the 'Federal Act' to be—the maintenance of the external and internal security of Germany, and of the independence and inviolability of the individual German States.

Hence the essential features of the present Confederation are those of a *Defensive Association*. This Association, it is true, is invested with the right of declaring war, but paragraph 35 of the 'Final Act,' in which this right is recorded, distinctly lays down that it is to be exercised for *defensive* purposes only, and paragraphs 36 and 37 lay down—that if a member of the Confederation should provoke a quarrel with a foreign State, the Confederation is to judge of the justice of the quarrel, and should the wrong lie on the side of the Federal State, take part by force if necessary against the latter. As regards the wars in which the members of the Union may become involved in connection with their North German Provinces, they only come under the cognisance of the Confederation when danger to federal territory is to be apprehended (paragraphs 46, 47 of the 'Final Act').

It results from the above that the external character of the present Confederation is purely *negative*. The vast federal territories stretch across the centre of Europe powerless for attack, powerful—if *at least their military constitution were reformed*—for defence.

In fulfilment of the internal objects of the Union its members bound themselves not to make war against each other, but to submit their differences to federal arbitration, and for the maintenance of the internal peace of the Confederation various other provisions were enacted.

It should be noted, however, in regard to these internal functions that there is a marked difference between the Federal Act of 1815 and the Final Act of 1820. Both, it is true, safeguard the independence of the several States, and lay down the principle that the Federal Power cannot interfere directly with the internal concerns of these States, but the Act of 1815 associates with this theory of State independence certain general principles of a Liberal kind apparently intended to secure to all members of the Union alike a certain minimum standard of political freedom. Thus paragraph 13 guarantees to the several States representative institutions (*Landstände*), paragraph 16 provides for religious toleration and for the removal of Jewish disabilities, paragraph 18 hints at the liberty of the Press.

The Act of 1820, on the contrary, though it does not cancel the above provisions, confines their application within the narrowest limits. Besides a great many articles tending to establish a very effective system of supervision and repression on the part of the federal authority over any revolutionary tendencies that might show themselves in the Confederation, paragraph 57 distinctly stipulates that inasmuch as, with the unimportant exception of the Free Towns, the monarchical form of Government is that established in the Confederation, it shall not be lawful for any State to modify its constitution in a manner detrimental to the prerogative of the Sovereign *in whose hands the full and undivided power shall continue to reside*. 'Da der Deutsche Bund mit Ausnahme der freien Städte aus Souverainen Fürsten besteht, so muss die gesammte Staatsgewalt in dem Oberhaupte des Staats vereinigt bleiben'—a stipulation equivalent to a permanent disqualification of any *bona fide* form of Constitutional Government.

In the Act of 1815, we still catch the echoes of the great popular movement which won the victories of the War of Liberation; in the Act of 1820, we are aware that the full tide of reaction has set in.

From the above it results that as regards the internal concerns of the Confederation its actual constitution on the one hand guarantees representative institutions, but restricts them on the other hand in such a manner as to prevent them interfering, except in a very limited manner, with the absolute power of the Sovereigns. Neither the one stipulation nor the other has been observed. For thirty years after the signature of the Federal Act no representative institutions

had been established either in Austria or Prussia. Within the last fifteen years Constitutions, theoretically at least encroaching upon the prerogatives of the Sovereign, have been established in all the States of Germany.

The conduct of the affairs of the Confederation was provided for by Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Federal Act.

A Diet (*Bundestag*), composed of the representatives of the thirty-eight States then forming part of the Confederation, was to be permanently assembled at Frankfort, under the presidency of Austria. Their manner of voting was to be determined by the nature of the subject upon which they were called upon to decide. For the current business of the Confederation they were to vote in the ordinary assembly, termed the Engerer Rath. In this council the thirty-eight States were so classed as to have seventeen votes, the kingdoms and the Middle States each having one, whilst the lesser States were collected into groups, each of which exercised a collective vote. For matters of graver import, especially such as involved the creation or alteration of any permanent federal institutions, the representatives voted in the Plenary Assembly (*das Plenum*). Here the votes were so distributed that each of the thirty-eight States should have at least one; on the other hand, to restore the balance between the larger and smaller States, the kingdoms each had four votes, the grand Duchies each three, and so on—the total number amounting to sixty-nine. A majority of two-thirds was required in the *Plenum* to pass a measure of the kind above described. But if the measure were one affecting the fundamental constitution of the Confederation it could only be passed by a *unanimity*. Any radical change, therefore, in the Acts of 1815 and 1820 can be prevented by the veto in the *Plenum* of one State,—of Waldeck, for instance, or Liechtenstein.

If the Federal Constitution above described be examined, as well in its original structure as in the modifications which successive federal decisions have brought about, it will be found to suffer from two radical defects—the one having reference to its external, the other to its internal functions.

In regard to the former, the military object required for the primary object of the Union, namely, the maintenance of its external security, is admitted *omnium consensu* to be worthless; and in regard to the latter the supposed guarantee of State independence has degenerated into an oppressive machinery for arresting the growth of free institutions, and into what had been satirically described as a mutual insurance society for the absolute prerogatives of the rulers.

There, where the federal power should have been strong, it has proved itself weak, and where it should have remained weak it has grown to an unhealthy strength.



By the two provisions: firstly, that during peace the contingents of the various States should not be amalgamated into organic bodies, and that this should only be done when the *casus belli* had arisen; secondly, that upon a declaration of war *the entire army* of the Union, including the armies of Austria and Prussia, should be placed under *one* Commander-in-chief, to be *elected by the Diet*, whose orders he was to obey, and who could bring him before a court-martial in case of disobedience, a system was created which could not fail at the moment of danger to throw the whole military apparatus of the Confederation into hopeless confusion.

By a series of feudal decrees passed between 1830 and 1840 a fatal power over the constitutional liberties of the individual States has been acquired, as evinced by the federal suppression of the Hesse Constitution in 1850. On both these points, therefore, the present Constitution calls loudly for radical reform.

#### PROPOSALS OF REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

There are two systems, radically differing the one from the other, towards one or other of which every plan of federal reform has a natural tendency to gravitate. The one aims at the improvement of the existing organisation with a view to making it more effectually fulfil the present objects of the Union. The other proposes to substitute for the present organisation one wholly different and with a totally new set of objects. One desires to maintain the *Staatenbund*,—that is, the international character of the present Union; the other desires to substitute for the *Staatenbund* the *Bundesstaat*,—that is, a centralised confederacy in which the external sovereignty of the several States shall be merged into one common head, whilst their internal sovereignty, though remaining theoretically intact, shall be modified by the organic institutions to be given to the new federal body. What direction the first of these two reforms would have to take is evident from the vices described in the foregoing paragraph as those inherent in the present system. A radical reconstitution of the military constitution of the Confederation, and the clearing away of all that portion of the federal mechanism which has been invented to check the free development of Liberal institutions in the several States, would be the objects to be effected.

The direction, on the other hand, which a reform in the sense of a *Bundesstaat* would have to take is indicated by the definition above given of the nature of such a body. There are, of course, a great variety of schemes for carrying out such a reform, but they all agree in certain cardinal points to which alone any attention need be paid. The idea from which they all start is that a real organic unity is alone attainable by the subordination of all the parts to one central head, and the problem to be solved is how to effect this subordination with-

out making the several subordinated States bondmen to the presiding State. This it is proposed to effect by parliamentary institutions—a National Assembly elected directly from the entire area of the Union would represent the nation as a whole and safeguard its common interests; an Upper House, composed of the Sovereigns and the mediatised Princes, would represent and safeguard the interests of the several States. The executive would be vested in the hands of an hereditary or elective president selected from amongst the Sovereigns of the Union, who would exercise his authority by means of a Ministry responsible to the National Parliament. The functions of the National Parliament and of the central executive would be absolute as regards the foreign relations of the Union, strictly limited by the fundamental laws of the same as regards the internal affairs of the several States. The several armies would be merged into one common army, the command-in-chief of which would be vested in the president. The diplomatic representation of the individual States would cease and be merged in the diplomatic representation of the supreme Head of the Union. Such a Union looked at from without, a political body one and indivisible; looked at from within, the individual sovereignties which exist at present would still be discernible.

Such a Union, it is clear, could not comprehend within it *two* great European Powers, still less a State whose centre of gravity lies outside of Germany and more than three-quarters of which is composed of non-German elements; and consequently the Bundesstaat thereby presupposes the non-inclusion of Austria within the Union, and as a natural consequence regards Prussia as having the natural claim to the presidency. A national German Parliament in which the federal provinces of Austria should not be included, with a responsible Ministry and the presidency hereditary in the House of Hohenzollern, such is, or rather was till lately, the programme of the national party and its recognised organ, the National Verein, in non-Austrian Germany. It should be observed, however, the national party do not regard the non-inclusion of Austria in the Bundesstaat to be created as identical with her *exclusion* from the Confederation. All the international ties which now bind the members of the Confederation together the nationalists desire to see continued in full force between the new Union and Austria, or any other State that might not join the Union; for *voluntary* adhesion to the Bundesstaat is part of the doctrine of the national party—a permanent defensive alliance, reciprocal guarantee of their territorial possessions, everything, in short, that can be accomplished by the closest union between sovereign States would be the future connecting links between Austria and Germany; and by these, it is argued, Austria would be an infinite gainer, acquiring

for all the defensive purposes of the present Confederation a strong and mighty ally instead of the disjointed and powerless group of States who now constitute her allies.

From the above it will be seen that the characteristics of a Bundesstaat lie in the central executive lodged in the *one* hand, and in the representative assembly, the true centre of gravity—that is, the real political power—lying in the latter. Whereas, in a Staatenbund, what federal power there is is invested in the hands of a diplomatic body representing only the Cabinets, *i.e.*, the *Sovereigns* of the Union.

If the doctrine of the Bundesstaat be critically examined its strong side will be seen to be that it is theoretically self-complete; logically, its weak side, that is, practical application, is beset with difficulties at present, at least, insurmountable. The theory that the external sovereignty of the individual States may be merged into one, and that the internal sovereignty may yet remain intact, is more specious than correct. The analogy to which reference used always to be made was that of the United States, where the most absolute State sovereignty was found compatible with the centralisation of the external (power) sovereignty; but the present American War has proved that this was a favourable accident, owing to temporary causes rather than a permanent characteristic,—when a strong exercise of the central power became necessary the internal sovereignty of the A.U.S. was necessarily sacrificed. In a country like Europe it is hardly possible to conceive that this should not be the normal state, and therefore a realisation of a Bundesstaat in Germany could hardly fail to result in the *de facto* mediatisation of the present German Sovereigns of Germany, and in their being reduced to the position of great barons. It can scarcely be looked upon as probable that so radical a change can take place without some great catastrophe from without, or some great revolution from within. Moreover, it is a fallacy to suppose, as the more sanguine portion of the national party does, that the opposition to an amalgamation of this kind lies only in the Sovereigns. The particularism (*der Particularismus*) which would have to be surmounted lies deep rooted in the sub-soil of German society; it is still very strong in Prussia, all powerful in Bavaria, and more or less in the other States, the very small ones excepted, and it therefore cannot be said that the nation at large is yet ripe for such a change. In addition to which internal difficulties, there is the determined hostility to any plan of the sort on the part of Austria, now all-powerful in the well-earned success of her Liberal regeneration.

The Austrian plan submitted to the Frankfort Congress may be considered as an attempt to effect a compromise between the systems of the Staatenbund and the Bundesstaat. It proposes to replace the present single organ of the Confederacy,

namely, the Federal Diet, by four new organs: an executive lodged not in the hands of a single president, but in a directory composed of the six Sovereigns; a Federal Council composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Sovereigns of the Confederation—the Engerer Rath of the present Diet under a new name; a legislative Assembly composed of delegates from the Parliaments of the several States; and an assembly (Fürsten-Versammlung) of the Sovereigns of the Confederation. From what have been before defined to be the distinctive attributes of the Staatenbund and the Bundesstaat, it is apparent that this plan borrows from the Bundesstaat the executive and representative organs, and retains from the Staatenbund the diplomatic representation in the Bundesrath, and the personal representation of the Sovereigns in the Fürsten-Versammlung. The test to be applied to ascertaining which of the two forms it most approaches, is to see in which of these four bodies the centre of gravity—that is, the real political power—lies. For internal matters there seems to be a preponderance of power on the side of the representative element; but for all the important external functions of the Union, the decided preponderance lies in the Bundesrath,—that is, the body representing not the nation at large, but the Sovereigns of the individual States. In the decision of the question of peace and war (and it must be remembered that the proposed union would no longer be a mere defensive association, but a body united for offence as well as defence) the issue is not committed to the hands of those who represent the tax-paying portion of the nation, but is left to the decision of a majority representing the Cabinets of the Sovereigns. For the most important functions, therefore, that such a Confederation could exercise, the attributes of the Staatenbund have been retained.

That this programme does not in any way satisfy the wishes of the national party is self-evident, as in most of its fundamental principles it is diametrically opposed to their leading doctrines; but there is, nevertheless, a difference of opinion as to the policy to be observed respecting it, the most sanguine and less doctrinaire members looking at its acceptance as a stepping-stone to something more in accordance with their wishes and as the initiation of a peaceful revolution that must lead ultimately to the desired goal. The less sanguine and more dogmatic examine the plan on its own merits, and, finding it other than they wish, refuse to embark in a ship chartered to sail in one direction in the hope that adverse winds may compel it to sail in the adverse direction.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst all these attempts at Federal Reform were taking place, the constitutional conflict on Army re-organisation

<sup>1</sup> Coburg, 5th September 1863.

was being waged at Berlin with ever increasing bitterness. This was regarded with much anxiety both by Queen Victoria and Lord Russell, on account of the position and future prospects of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess, and their earnest wish was that a compromise should be arrived at; they therefore entrusted Morier with the delicate task of trying to ascertain whether there was any possibility of so desirable a result being achieved.

*Morier to Earl Russell*

'BERLIN, November 14th, 1863.

'It is only this week that the M.P.'s have arrived at Berlin, and I have therefore only within the last day or two had the opportunity of seeing any of them, and hinting how desirable you thought it that an arrangement should be come to between the House of Deputies and the Government. I have been obliged to be extraordinarily cautious, as this is the metropolis of calumnies and lies, and were the least suspicion to get about that I had been talking politics with any of the opposition, the *Kreuz-Zeitung* would at once have a leading article stating that I was furnishing the King's enemies with Orsini bombs manufactured at Woolwich.

'I have spoken to two members of the left Centre, or quasi-moderate party of the Opposition, which now numbers a hundred members, and which, if a basis of arrangement could be found to which it could adhere, would certainly be able in conjunction with the Right of the House and stragglers to secure a majority. That this body sincerely and ardently desires reconciliation is as certain as that it entirely despairs of it. Having stated confidentially to my informant (an old friend of mine on whose discretion I could implicitly rely) what your views were, he said he would tell me equally confidentially what was going on amongst the leading men of his party.

'1. They were to a man convinced that unless a reconciliation could be effected at once the gravest possible dangers threatened the country.

'2. Strenuous exertions had been made for some weeks

past in very influential quarters to determine them to leave nothing untried that could bring about such a reconciliation. These *quarters* were such as it went most against their personal wishes in any way to run counter to (I have reason to believe from other information that has reached me that those *quarters* are respectively the Queen of Prussia and the Grand Duke of Baden).

' 3. They had therefore, without previous concert, arrived at Berlin with an olive branch in the hand.

' 4. The King's speech, however, had cut away the ground from under their feet. A compromise was *alone* possible on the basis of the House yielding on the *material* question, *i.e.* granting the King the money he has already illegally spent on his re-organisation and more to go on with, till a definite law for the re-organisation has been passed, with a large concession on the part of the House with regard to that law, and the Government yielding on the constitutional question, *i.e.* admitting the right to vote the supplies and binding itself for the future not to spend money that had been refused by the House.

' In the King's speech (and there is no sort of hope of H.M. taking back an iota of what he has said) both points are prejudged and placed outside the boundary lines of negotiation. He claims for his re-organisation the character of a permanent institution, derived from a prescription of three years' illegal existence, and will therefore not admit of its being any further treated as an open question, and he decides the constitutional question in a sense opposed to what the most moderate of his old Liberal advisers (Schwerin and company) deemed the shibboleth of constitutional government, by declaring *that he will not sanction a refusal on the part of the Commons of any item of expenditure* necessary to the maintenance of his re-organisation, thereby publicly proclaiming the monstrous doctrine just put forward by the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, that the King and the Upper House have an equal voice with the Lower in voting the supplies! The one penny worth of bread in all this quantity of Divine Right sack being the proposal of *a law that shall consecrate this principle*, but guard against too great an abuse of its application by

certain indefinite limits to the right of spending a Budget not voted.

'To give me exactly what his views and those of his friends were, he allowed me to peruse a paper (which I have reason to believe was to be submitted to the Queen, or the *influential quarter*) containing the basis upon which alone they considered an arrangement possible.

'I have extracted from it the following:—In return for the House voting the military Budget the Government to give the following equivalents:—

- '1. Admission of the right of the House to refuse supplies.
- '2. The effectual supervision of the expenditure by placing the auditing of the accounts in some sort of organic connection with the House.
- '3. A Liberal reorganisation of the administrative machinery and of the local government.
- '4. A Law of Ministerial Responsibility.
- '5. A reform of the Upper House.
- '6. The two years' service for the infantry.

'The sixth point, however, my informant said he thought might be waived, as practically two years was the utmost ever enforced, and that there would never be money enough forthcoming to carry out both the increased recruiting and the full three years.

'As regards the reform of the Upper House (which sounds to our ears a very Radical measure), it must be remembered that it is not in reality a House of Peers (not above one-third at the most being Peers), but a recent article of manufacture, for the most part composed of Government nominees and the representatives of groups of small squires and petty nobility who have no kind of business there, but would do very well in the Lower Chamber. This reform is a *sine qua non* condition of constitutional government, as is proved by the fact of a total standstill in the legislative machinery during the three years of the Liberal Ministry, from the Upper House throwing out measure after measure brought in by that Ministry, and passed by the Lower House.

'I cannot therefore, you see, hold out to you, from

what I have as yet seen and heard, any hopes of the wished-for reconciliation being come to. The fact most characteristic of the present situation is, that the temper of the Opposition, as far as yet I have been able to judge of it, is depressed and full of forebodings of evils which they would fain avert, whilst that of the governmental and feudal clique is insolent, overbearing, and full of hope for the future.

‘It is incredible how deep seated is still the feeling of loyalty to the Crown, and how intense is the actual feeling of pain caused even to men of very advanced opinions by having been branded by the King’s own lips as *illoyal subjects*. Their depressed feeling, however, is but only too likely to give place to uncontrollable passion if the present system of adding insult to injury is continued much longer, and though there is undoubtedly at present a strong and general wish for accommodation (as proved by a tacit agreement not to vote an address which could not but at once have brought on a general battle), ten days of Bismarckian bull-baiting will certainly put an end to it. The feudals are absurdly flushed with their victory of 37 seats, and believe that the next election will give them a majority! The only person who could preserve the country from the impending catastrophe is the King. But what I have ascertained of H.M.’s present temper gives me no kind of hope in that quarter. He sees things alternately *couleur de rose* or through the medium of violent passion, in which he declares that the sword is the only solution of the question. He is in perfect good humour with himself and his Ministers. He is convinced that his 37 seats, for obtaining which he takes the credit to himself, are the nest-egg that shall secure to him in future obedient majorities.

‘He has become the mere tool of a wicked and unscrupulous faction, whose passions he has lashed himself up, contrary to all Hohenzollern precedent, to share, whilst he religiously believes that he is God’s vice-regent, and that he is fulfilling the Almighty’s commands.’



## CHAPTER XV

## SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

By the death of King Frederick VII., the last male descendant of the elder line of the House of Oldenburg, on 15th November 1863, the long-threatened crisis in the Schleswig-Holstein question suddenly became acute.

Of all the humiliations which Prussia, and with her the German nation, had had to undergo as a consequence of the political events of which the Convention of Olmütz—that record of national impotence—had been the outward and visible sign, this humiliation had been the deepest; for it is hardly possible to conceive a more ignominious part than that which the German nation had then been forced to play by its rulers.

In the war between Denmark and the Duchies, 1848–1850, Germany had participated first as a belligerent, identified with the cause of the latter; afterwards as a neutral, friendly to that cause; lastly as an armed mediator, ready to restore by force the authority of the King-Duke,—and the German troops who had entered the country as liberators had remained as gaolers to hand over the inhabitants of the Duchies to their oppressors. Little wonder, then, that the nation bowed its head with shame, and all the more as this result had been brought about by internal dissensions.

Threatened and pressed on all sides, Prussia had given way. Stockmar wrote on 14th May 1850:—

‘It is unbelievable, and yet I cannot doubt it, that in Berlin, in order to avoid a war, they will appeal to the great Powers, to a European congress, and there submit this German question to the decision of foreign countries. They have really taken steps in this sense. . . . The demands which Austria makes upon Prussia, the threats which it allows itself to employ, are suggested by Russia. Austria tries, by carrying out the wishes of Russia in German affairs, to discharge

the obligation under which it laid itself to that Power for the help afforded it in Hungary.<sup>1</sup>

Of all the Powers, Russia, at that time omnipotent in Europe, was the one most interested in the integrity of the Danish monarchy. The Radical dream of a Scandinavian Union had ever been her bugbear, and she thought that, with a Denmark weakened by the loss of the Duchies, such an eventuality would become more possible; moreover she saw, and rightly saw, in the Schleswig-Holstein question the seed of German unity, the prevention of which she had openly declared to be a European necessity.<sup>2</sup> Russia it was, therefore, who took the leading part in deciding on the fate of Schleswig-Holstein. Of French support she was already secure, and of English assistance she was now assured by an unforeseen contingency. At that time the English Government had allowed itself to become involved in serious European complications, owing to Lord Palmerston's hasty action in regard to what is known as the Don Pacifico affair. In honour of this Gibraltar Jew, resident in Athens, whose house and property had been destroyed by a mob of Orthodox Christians, Lord Palmerston had ordered Admiral Parker and fifteen ships of the Mediterranean Fleet to Salamis, and laid an embargo on Greek merchantmen. Russia and France had both protested strongly against this step, and Lord Palmerston, finding himself in unexpected difficulties, sought some means of escape, and found it in the extreme desire of the Emperor Nicholas for the integrity of the Danish monarchy. The rights of Schleswig-Holstein were therefore unhesitatingly sacrificed by him to effect a compromise.

The Don Pacifico affair enabled Lord Palmerston to obtain one of his greatest oratorical triumphs in the House of Commons, but this success would hardly have been possible had not a secret bargain with Count Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, assured him of immunity from the results of his action.

'The poor Schleswigers have to pay for everything,' the Prince Consort wrote to his brother, the Duke of Coburg, after

<sup>1</sup> Stockmar's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 415.

<sup>2</sup> Nesselrode's *Circular Dispatch*, 1851.

the signature of the London Protocol, 9th August 1850,—‘even for the sins of our Angel of Foreign Affairs [Lord Palmerston], who has bought back with the Protocol the lost friendship of Russia and France at the expense of Germany, and so has settled the Greek business. Germany only gets her deserts if she is despised abroad, but woe to them whose fault it is.’<sup>1</sup>

By this Protocol, signed by Russia, France, Sweden, and Denmark, the alteration in the law of succession had been agreed upon, for had matters been allowed to take their natural course the Landgravine Charlotte of Hesse, sister of King Christian VII., would have become Queen of Denmark on the death of the last male descendant in the direct line, whilst the Duke of Augustenburg, the representative of the male line, would have succeeded as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. To obviate this contingency, and the consequent severance of the Duchies from the monarchy, became therefore the first care of these Powers, and the succession was settled between the Emperor Nicholas, as chief of the Gottorp line, and Frederick VII., as representing the royal line. Their first consideration had been to exclude all the Princes of the House of Augustenburg, and, with one exception, those of the House of Glücksburg, which they did under pretext that their participation in the so-called Rebellion of ’48 had invalidated their claims. After various Princes of the House of Oldenburg had been considered, and on various grounds rejected, the choice of the two Sovereigns fell on Prince Christian of Glücksburg, the husband of Princess Louise, the Landgravine Charlotte’s daughter. It was arranged that the claims of her brother, Prince Frederick of Hesse, were to be passed over in her favour, on condition of her transferring her rights to her husband and his male descendants, who were thus to become Kings of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. Prince Christian had, in the war of 1848, given his allegiance to the King of Denmark, thereby gaining in a high measure the approbation of both Sovereigns, and had thus proved the solitary exception to the ban of rebeldom under which the other members of his House had fallen.

In order to give the stamp of legality to this arbitrary arrangement by which alone the integrity of the Danish

<sup>1</sup> *Denkwürdigkeiten*, Herzog E. v. Coburg, vol. i. p. 460.

monarchy could be maintained, the King of Denmark had agreed to settle the pretensions of the female lines, the Emperor of Russia to waive the Gottorp rights, and the King of Prussia undertaken to obtain from the Duke of Augustenburg, on the plea of European interests, the renunciation of his rights; Bismarck, then Prussian Minister to the Diet of Frankfort, being charged with the latter negotiation.

The whole of the Duke's property had been confiscated in the war of '48; his consequent poverty was now used as a lever to obtain from him the required submission, and he eventually sold his claims for a sum of money representing little more than half the value of his estates. But his son, Duke Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein,<sup>1</sup> never was a party to this transaction, and in 1859 actually lodged a protest against it in Copenhagen.

The results of all these protracted negotiations were embodied in the Treaty of London, signed on 8th May 1852, by the five Great Powers and the two Northern Kingdoms. Bunsen, the Prussian Minister in London, who had refused to append his signature to the first Protocol, which he had stigmatised as "a work of injustice or folly," was on this occasion obliged to do so by the express order of his Sovereign, King Frederick William IV.; but he recorded his conviction that the Treaty "was as much a necessity for Europe as it was a humiliation for Germany."

The Treaty was based on the following terms: Germany gave up the political union between the Duchies; Denmark gave up the incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark, engaging neither to incorporate nor to take steps towards incorporating the Duchy into the Kingdom; and by thus sacrificing on a common altar the two principles of Schleswig-Holsteinism and Eider-Danism, the conflict between which caused the war, it was hoped that peace would once more be restored to the country.

The King of Denmark was reinstated in his sovereign rights over Holstein, and obtained the adherence of Austria and Prussia to the London Protocol, *i.e.* the recognition of the altered law of succession.

<sup>1</sup> Frederick, Duke of Augustenburg, b. 1829, d. 1880, father of the German Empress.

Thus the statecraft of Cabinets had thought once for all to settle this question in arbitrary disregard of the rights of those nearest in succession, of the Duchies, and of Germany; but with prophetic foresight old Baron Stockmar said to Samwer in the summer of 1854: "Were I as sure of the fulfilment of all my wishes as I am that in its time the Treaty of London will fall to pieces of itself, I should rest content."

That the enthusiasm of a great nation for the liberties of Schleswig-Holstein, and the sympathies of her thirty Sovereign Princes for the hereditary rights of the Augustenburg family should have led to such sorry results was indeed a mortification to Germany; but on the other hand, Denmark was not much better pleased. The Eider-Dane party, who had remained predominant, saw with dismay that by this treaty its aims, namely, the incorporation of Schleswig and, at the death of Frederick VII., the Scandinavian union, with Copenhagen as its capital, were as much thwarted as were those of the Duchies themselves. Moreover, the prospect of a Prince of German descent and language as their future Sovereign was so unpopular with the Danes as to cause the Government to delay for a year presenting the new Law of Succession to the Riksdag.

On the conclusion of the treaty the federal troops of Austria and Prussia, who had occupied the Duchies since the war, were withdrawn, and the country once more handed over to the Danish authorities.

Frederick VII., a weak and immoral character, already divorced from two wives, was completely under the dominion of his former mistress, Christine Rasmussen, ex-dressmaker and ballet dancer, whom he had morganatically married and ennobled under the title of Countess Danner. This lady's ambition caused her to ally herself with the Eider-Dane party who remained paramount in the Government in spite of frequent changes of Ministry, and the King consequently became the obedient tool of this party.

It was not surprising, therefore, that, as soon as the Danish troops had re-occupied the Duchies, the triumphant Danish democracy should have begun a relentless persecution of all persons who had taken any part in the

so-called insurrection. Of floggings and incarcerations there was no end, especially in Schleswig, the connection with the German Diet affording to Holstein a certain amount of protection which was denied to her more unhappy sister Duchy.

This reign of terror, and the fact that the provisional Constitutions elaborated in 1855 had never been laid before the States of the Duchies, constituted such flagrant violations of the treaty that the Duchies were driven to protest; protests, however, which in the then state of Europe found but faint response. The Crimean War, with its preceding and following events, allowed of little heed to be paid to their complaints. In Prussia, the only power likely to champion their cause, the reactionary Manteuffel Ministry, authors of the Olmütz convention, wholly responsible for the existing state of affairs, turned no favourable ear to clamours for constitutional liberties. So openly, however, did Denmark disregard her treaty obligations that in 1856 Prussia and Austria half-heartedly protested at Copenhagen, whilst in 1858 the Diet had been moved to threaten Denmark with a federal execution. Real hope for the amelioration of their lot only began to gleam on the Duchies with the advent of the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Ministry of the New Era who had always been openly favourable to their cause.

The following is a memorandum written by Morier in the spring of 1860, on a forthcoming Debate in the Prussian House of Representatives on the Schleswig - Holstein question :—

‘A petition having for its object “To call upon the Government for an inquiry as to whether the conditions agreed to in the negotiations with the Danish Government of the years 1851 and 1852 in respect of the Duchy of Schleswig have been fulfilled, and if not fulfilled to solicit the Government to take the necessary measures to obtain their fulfilment,” comes on for discussion next week in the House of Representatives.

‘A question more pregnant with important consequences, both as regards the external policy of Prussia in particular and that of the German Confederation at large, could hardly

at the present moment have been brought before the Forum of the only popular assembly deserving the name in Germany. Hitherto the negotiations respecting the fulfilment on the part of Denmark of the engagements entered into by the Danish Government towards the Confederation have been restricted to the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg. This restriction of the question to territories forming integral portions of the Confederation has necessarily confined it within the limits of a *German* question, a *home* question in fact, with which the other members of the European family were only indirectly concerned.

' On the other hand, the engagements taken by Denmark towards the Confederation as regards the Duchy of Schleswig, though not less clear and binding in their nature than those taken as regards the other two Duchies, have necessarily assumed the nature of an international compact, and any measures taken by the Confederation to obtain the fulfilment of those engagements with respect to a country not forming part of the Confederation must, from an equal necessity, assume an international character.

' Probably reckoning upon this fact and on the proverbial incapacity of the German Diet to carry on any foreign policy of its own, trusting withal to the sympathy which in the former phases of the conflict Denmark has received from other European Powers, the Danish Cabinet has been at little pains to keep up even the appearance of a fulfilment of these engagements, and it is unfortunately a notorious fact that none of the guarantees given to Germany to respect the German nationality in Schleswig, to place the two races in that Duchy upon a footing of equality, and to keep intact all the bonds not of a political nature which united that Duchy to Holstein, have been respected by Denmark.

' The patriotic spirit which undoubtedly characterised the struggle of the Danish monarchy against the Confederation in 1848 has, as is too generally the case where different races are brought into forced political contact, manifested itself since the peace in a spirit of systematic hostility against the German element in a Duchy which, from the point of view taken by the political party in power

at Copenhagen, is, or at least must eventually become, a Danish dependency, and the energy and passion which when opposed to an overpowering antagonist could not but command (independently of the political merits of the question) admiration and sympathy, have, since they have been directed against a weak and comparatively helpless minority, degenerated into a persecution for which the Danish Cabinet can hardly claim on the part of Europe the sympathy which was before bestowed upon it.

‘ This persecution which has of late, at the time of and since the meeting of the Schleswig “ States ” at Flensburg, assumed a more violent form, has excited throughout Germany a strong feeling of resentment against the Danish Government and of sympathy for the sufferers, and the petition about to be discussed in the Prussian Chamber is the expression of this feeling.

‘ As the petitioners have wisely limited themselves to a solicitation of an inquiry as to the bare and literal fulfilment of engagements solemnly entered into by the Danish Cabinet, there can be no doubt as to the position which the Government will assume toward the petitioners.

‘ I will now content myself with saying that the present Government, if it were even less determined than it undoubtedly is, to make good, as far as it lies within its power, the shortcomings of its predecessors in matters touching the honour of Germany at large, could not, except at the price of forfeiting its own position in Prussia, and the position of Prussia in Germany, do otherwise than follow the lead which, there is no doubt, will be given to it by the Chamber in the forthcoming debate.

‘ Of the two legacies, which were left by the Manteuffel Ministry to that of the Prince of Hohenzollern, the Hesse question and the Schleswig-Holstein question, the former could not be settled in a manner conformable to the political principles of the new Cabinet without the evident risk, whilst conciliating the sympathies of the people of Germany, of estranging from the Prussian Government the Dynasties and Governments of Germany; in the latter question, Prussia, in calling upon Denmark to fulfil her engagements, will carry with her the Governments as well as the people,



and it is not too much to say that the present question is perhaps the only one upon which a real *entente cordiale* can be expected between all the different elements of which the Confederation is composed.

'I should add that the feeling excited in Germany is much intensified by the conviction, very universally held, that the Danish Government could hardly venture so openly to reckon on impunity if it was not assured of assistance on the part of the French Government, and that this conviction is increased by the language of the Ministerial Press in Denmark.'

From the time of his first visit to Germany in 1850, and ever since his experiences on the battlefields of Schleswig-Holstein, Morier had taken a deep interest in the fate of the Duchies. His close acquaintanceship with most of the principal Schleswig-Holsteiners and intimate knowledge of Germany enabled him, better than most, to form a correct opinion of this intricate subject, and to gauge the depth of German national feeling. Moreover, as he wrote to Lord Derby many years later,<sup>1</sup> he was seized at times 'by a kind of fierce burning eagerness which appears to be like a force external to myself, and which fastens on to some particular subject, leaving others untouched, but which, when once aroused, enables me, by a kind of second sight, to see quite clearly beforehand where a mismanaged question will land us. I had this almost to the extent of *mania* in regard to the Schleswig-Holstein question, and it made me endeavour by every possible, and impossible means, for the three years preceding 1863, to prevent the catastrophe which came upon us, and from which we have never recovered, when we left Denmark in the lurch. I had, it is true, the satisfaction, though a poor one, that Lord John Russell had the generosity on two occasions to say before a mixed company, "If we had only taken Morier's advice and seen through his eyes, the Schleswig-Holstein question would have been settled before Frederick VII.'s death," *i.e.* before it had become the starting-point of a new Europe built up on blood and iron.'

<sup>1</sup> 19th November 1884.

Morier was well aware, as he often reiterated, that English foreign policy was but the echo of English public opinion, and that no English statesman would ever have the courage to run counter to popular prejudice, however erroneous he might think it. The fanatical manner in which the English Press, with but little knowledge of the subject, had taken the Danish side of the quarrel caused him therefore much anxiety. An article in *The Times* in this sense induced him to write to Dasent, the assistant editor, with whom he was personally acquainted, the following letter, dated 8th May 1860:—

‘BERLIN, May 8th, 1860.

‘I endeavoured in a few hurried lines to wake you up to the danger to the common cause, which will arise from the English Press, and especially *The Times*, getting once more upon its unfortunate Danish hobby-horse and running amuck against the national policy and national sympathies involved in the Schleswig-Holstein question throughout the length and breadth of Germany.

‘I think that you (second person plural including all parties whose business it is to guide public opinion in England) cannot sufficiently lay stress upon the large simple principles upon which alone a successful resistance against the policy of the Sphinx of the Tuileries can be looked for; that cold impassive marble can alone be put into a state of fusion by the living fire of the national principle. This sounds very *exalté* and sentimental, but it is not the lesser truth for its being proclaimed on the housetops and at the corners of the streets. England has recognised this as regards Italy, and the instinct that guided her is every day vindicating its truth, and Lord John deserves well of his country for having carried out this idea and helped to carry it out in Italy. The split between Louis Napoleon and Sardinia or the King of Italy, or whatever it is to be called, is daily growing more evident, and the mission of Lamoricière and the organisation of an armed reactionary power in Italy that shall keep Cavour in check are, as you must have ere this guessed in England, as much the results of inspiration from the Seine, as the votes in Savoy and Nice. . . . Frankenstein is frightened at the thews and sinews of the great hairy man he has called into existence. The organisation of an Italian nationality is, however, for a successful resistance of Napoleonic ideas as nothing compared with the imperative necessity of Germany being united by the only bond which can unite her, that of national *Bewusstsein*. To run amuck against this, therefore, is the most suicidal act which England can be capable of, unless indeed our legitimate

policy is an alliance *à tout prix* with Napoleon for ever and ever Amen.

‘Why can England find sympathy for the wars of oppressed Venetians and Lombards and none for oppressed Germans? Why is it a noble sentiment to feel the touch of kith and kin on the Po and mere dreaming sentimentality to feel the same on the Eider? The difference consists in this, I shall be answered, that Denmark is a small state and Austria was a large one; but am I to submit to being kicked and trampled upon by a man because he is smaller than myself? Is not the shame for a powerful race like the German all the greater? I am a big fellow, but if a very small man (with big friends, *N.B.*, at his elbow) comes up to me in Regent Street and spits in my face and punches me in the stomach, surely I shall not be considered as doing a very ungenerous action if I give him in charge of a policeman; and this is the exact case in point. Denmark is the aggressor, the aggressor in 1848 when, a few weeks after the Sovereign had sworn at his Coronation an oath to keep the Duchies ever united, a mob forced him to decree the disunion and the inclusion of Schleswig into Denmark; the aggressor in its daily acts since 1852, when, by the infamous policy of Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg, she had obtained the disunion of the Duchies and engaged herself, as the minimum, by a solemn convention not to incorporate Schleswig and to respect and yield equal protection to the German nationality. Her whole policy since then has consisted in the most ruthless attacks upon that nationality, and in a series of measures resulting in a state of things only differing from incorporation in the name. It is the sense of the impotence of Germany to remedy such patent evils, to obtain redress against such grievous wrongs, to enforce the fulfilment of such plain obligations against a pigmy like Denmark, which brings the hot blood into the cheek of every German who has still the commonest sense of shame and honour left, whenever the name of Schleswig-Holstein is whispered. Not but that Germany could finish the matter off in twenty-four hours with Denmark, if it was with the pigmy alone that she had to deal. The pigmy would then soon come to its senses and fulfil to the letter its engagements and take off its hat and say: Sir, it was altogether by mistake that I spat in your face and punched you in the stomach. It is the humiliating feeling that she cannot hold her own against the big friends at the pigmy’s elbow, that through the miserable policy of her rulers and the stereotyping of dynastic *Sonderinteressen*, her voice is as nothing in the counsels of Europe, and that anything like a common action, if it is only to vindicate the barest fulfilment of the most patent obligations, is met by a hue and cry all over Europe against the autonomous action of a political body which by the solemn edicts of the Congress of Vienna was doomed to a mere negative existence and to everlasting immovability.

Russia may have a policy, France may have a policy, even Prussia and Austria may have a policy, but you, Germans, are not to have a policy, the admission of this principle would create an overpowering power in the centre of Europe which would certainly preserve the peace of the world and keep once and for all France and Russia within their limits, but it would disturb the balance of power. This is the song to the burden of whose tune Schleswig-Holstein have for the last ten years been lulled in the arms of Danish gendarmes. That we, *i.e.* *The Times*, should, and, at this particular moment to boot, join in this hue and cry, is a fact quite inconceivable to me.

'*The Times* article is based upon such a total misapprehension of what is really going on in Germany and of the relations which Prussia stands in towards Germany and Prussia *versus* Prussia, that it takes one's breath away to think what this ignorance in so influential a quarter at such a time may lead to. It talks of the sympathy which she ought to bestow upon herself. Why, good God! what is to become of Prussia if she is not to consider Germany in the same light as herself, and if she is to keep her sympathy for the loose disjointed straggling territories surrounded by her impossible frontier? It is on account of this very sympathy with herself, that she is bound to identify her interests and embrace with her sympathy those other German lands that are her only allies. Again, the article in question talks about Prussia's meddling in her neighbour's affairs, thus taking the view that Holstein, an integral portion of Germany, is a neighbour, *i.e.* a stranger. Why, is not the whole drift of this argument to drive Prussia into taking up a line of pure Prussian policy, *i.e.* an abandoning of her German policy, from which alone, is again and again reiterated, the only hope is to be derived of a barrier being raised against France? Surely *The Times* cannot wish to recommend in 1860 the policy which disgraced Prussia in 1804-1805? Such a policy can only lead to one result, the *arrondissement* of Prussia within Germany at the price of a confederation of the Rhine States. Preserve England from being the first to point out such a road. Again the article talks of a menace to Denmark. In this century of New Year Day congratulations, it is rather too absurd to call a menace the adhesion given in by the Minister of the Crown to a petition asking for an inquiry as to whether the stipulations of a convention have been fulfilled.

'Again, when the article talks of what would be Prussia's best allies in a contest with France, including Denmark under the term, is *The Times* so grossly ignorant of European politics as not to know that in every European struggle Denmark has always and always been on the side of France, and that her official papers are daily preaching making common cause with France in an attack on the Rhine? The case is different

with Sweden, but it is equally well known that Sweden does not stand on a common line with Denmark on the Schleswig-Holstein question.

'Then the notion of the present Ministry engaging in a "sentimental quarrel" with Denmark is so gorgeously ridiculous that if the matter were not so serious one might laugh oneself into an appetite. The Hohenzollern Ministry a sentimental one—oh, good God! où la sentimentalité ira-t-elle se nicher? Prosaic, honest mediocrities, who wish nothing more than to do their duty in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call them, but who find their task a well-nigh hopeless one. They know that sooner or later they must drift into the battle of the giants, and believe me, whatever you hear to the contrary, they are bent on no selfish and particularistic ends, but wish to fight for and with Germany, and they cannot therefore separate themselves from a German cause. If not in Germany, where are Prussia's allies? She must stand and fall with Germany, and if the struggle is to come, better, far better, for her that it should overtake her whilst *bona fide* carrying out a national policy and at the head of Germany heartily supporting her in such a policy, than in some doubtful personal quarrel, when dynastic jealousies would be sure to put her conduct in a false and odious light. Let *The Times* run amuck, but don't let it fancy that it is running against the Prussian Ministry; it is running it against all that is best and patriotic in Germany, all that goes to bed at night and wakes up in the morning with the one idea of an Anglo-German alliance. I have seen the impression produced on many of the leaders of this party by *The Times* leader, and my heart has sunk within me.'

*Morier to Lord John Russell*

(Letter begun 26th January, ended 3rd March, 1861)

'The plan you suggest of a reasonable arrangement respecting Holstein between the contending parties themselves and of an English mediation in respect to Schleswig is certainly the most natural one, and that which would have the best chance of success if the fanaticism and ignorance of English public opinion upon the subject allowed of our mediation being undertaken upon a tolerably fair basis. The immediate bar to such a scheme, however, lies in the imbecility of the present Prussian Cabinet and the impossibility of their taking a simple and straightforward course in any question whatever. By their last step in the matter at Frankfort they have succeeded in

winning the applause of their worst enemies in Germany, the Beusts and their friends, and in incurring the censure of what should be their natural allies, the national and Liberal party. They are, of course, furious with the latter and accuse them of the grossest inconsistency in having constantly urged the taking up of the Schleswig-Holstein question with a strong hand, and now that the Government has taken a step forward, in universally disapproving this step. But the national party (the more sensible amongst its leaders, I should rather say) are in the right, and the Government are in the wrong. The step just taken by the latter merely intensifies the quarrel and makes a European hubbub without bringing the question one step nearer to its real issue. That issue is so simple, and the real question at stake between the two countries is so plain, that it has required all the bungling of which German statesmen alone are capable to keep it so long veiled from the face of Europe. Whether it is politic to attempt to bring the question to its issue now, or indeed to bring it to an issue at all, is of course a distinct matter, but merely to aggravate the sore without being able to apply the remedies which alone could cure it, all sensible men, outside the Ministerial circles, who really care about the matter, feel to be the gravest of mistakes. What the question really at issue is—what every German with any sense for the honour of his nation has not only a right but is bound to feel for it, what in other words an Englishman in the same position would undoubtedly feel and not less undoubtedly endeavour to shape into acts (and this, I think, is the only fair test which we can use, when treating such questions *abstractly*), has *never*, that I know of, been fairly submitted to the consideration of H.M. Government, and has certainly never been admitted to a hearing by the English public.

‘Now as being the only question which really separates the healthy, honest Liberalism of England from the healthy, honest Liberalism of Germany, it seems to me of such very real importance that it should be viewed from this point of view, that I cannot refrain from carrying myself back in fancy to one of our walks round the Coburg Fortress, and indulging in the privilege you then accorded me of speak-

ing *à cœur ouvert* on the otherwise in all respectable society tabooed questions of German politics.

' The real cause of the false position in which the Prussian Government stands with reference to the question, and the origin of nine-tenths of the prevailing unclearness about the matter, are to be found in the fact of the former Prussian Government, on Divine Right and reactionary principles, the present Government from timidity, want of *savoir faire*, and the hopeless endeavour to reconcile irreconcilable things, having never honestly admitted to themselves or to the world at large that the true point of gravitation in the whole question lies in Schleswig and *not* in Holstein. They have all along worked for the Holstein end of the question and through the interminable tomfooleries of Dictal rescripts, protocols, and the like, trusting to Providence to be able to smuggle in the Schleswig grievance *tant mieux que mal* amidst the dirty linen of the federal clothes-basket—a mode of procedure somewhat analogous to the attempt to drive in a wedge by the big end! The consequence has been that the whole contest has been turning round and round upon wholly irrelevant points, and that both parties are now just exactly where they were ten years ago. The late step taken at Frankfort is a glaring instance of a continuance in this wrong path, and this is what the national party have the right instinct to feel—till Prussia can fairly join issue on the merits of the question from its Schleswig side, it is folly on her part to move forward. She cannot at present join issue on that ground, because (1) without a fleet and without a maritime ally to supply that deficiency, she can never bring a war with Denmark to a decisive end, which alone would admit of a solution of the matter; (2) because with the present King and with his present Cabinet, she will never be able openly and honestly to proclaim to herself and to the world the treachery of which the late King and his Government were guilty towards the Duchies in 1850, in the recognition of which treachery, and in the duty of making it good to the Duchies, is involved the question of the *point d'honneur* for Germany.

' Of the engagements taken by the King of Denmark towards Prussia and the Confederation we hear much—of

the engagements taken by Prussia and Germany towards the Duchies we hear *nothing*, and yet it is on the latter that the whole question rests—whilst they are just as formal, just as distinct, and just as binding as the former, not dating back into medieval times, and get-at-able only by the light of antiquarian inquiry as *The Times* writers do vainly talk, but entered into immediately before those taken by the King of Denmark, standing in direct and organic connection with them.

‘What these engagements are and how binding upon the national conscience I think I can show in a very few sentences. Previous to March 1848, the Union of the two Duchies *inter se*, and their political separation from Denmark, was established beyond a doubt. It was the fundamental law of their political existence, and recognised as such by the present King equally with his predecessor, when upon his accession to the throne he took the usual oath which contained the formula, “That the Duchies should remain for ever undivided” (*ungedeeult*), and that they owed their allegiance to him as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein and not as King of Denmark (*nicht als einem Könige zu Dänemark*). What this union meant, practically, is soon enough stated. It meant municipal autonomy and integrity of the national element. Disunion meant loss of municipal autonomy and systematic treading under foot of the national element. That this union did so exist *de jure* and *de facto* is sufficiently proved by the fact of the Eider party having for years previous to ’48 been organised upon the basis of *destroying this union* and incorporating Schleswig in Denmark. The dissolution of this union and the incorporation of Schleswig into the monarchy in March 1848 was the cause of the war waged between the Duchies assisted by the German confederates on the one hand and Denmark on the other. Were the Duchies justified or not in waging war against their legitimate sovereign (*N.B.* waged in the most legitimate way a war could be waged, viz. in the name of the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein against the King of Denmark) after that Sovereign had in the most public manner struck a death-blow at the fundamental rights of their Constitution? This is a question to which it seems to me there can



be but one answer in England. But it was this original character stamped upon the matter that operated in so disastrous a manner upon it, as regards the action of Prussia—for a principle of this kind was the thing the most abhorrent to the Divine Right feeling of King Frederick William IV., who finding himself forced, by the pressure of circumstances, to support the cause of the Duchies, tried to quiet his conscience by an act towards the cause he supported and by compromising the honour of his army. His secret instructions to Marshal Wrangel not in any way to bring matters to extremity and *not* to attack the Danes, if he could by any means avoid it, are now matters of public notoriety. Hence of all the absurd misconceptions on the matter, that of King Frederick William IV. having been influenced in his conduct by motives of ambition or by the wish to annex the Duchies to Prussia is perhaps the most glaringly untenable.

‘That Prussia and the German Confederation, independently of the international right of every independent state to side with either party to a civil war, *a fortiori* in a war between two really independent states joined to each other by a *personal* union only, were bound to defend the right of union which the federal state of *Holstein* had with Schleswig, a reference to the *status quo* agreed upon between Christian VIII. and the Confederation in 1846 would suffice to prove.

‘The war entered upon under these auspices was brought to a close, *re infecta*, as regards Prussia and Germany, by the Peace of Berlin of 1850, a peace pure and simple, in which all the political positions asserted by the belligerent parties, such as they existed previous to the war, were reserved, and were to form the subject of future negotiations. The legitimate nature of the struggle now carried on single-handed by the two Duchies against Denmark was formally recognised by Prussia—and this struggle went on till the close of the year 1850.

‘With the close of that year set in the full tide of the reactionary movement in Berlin and Vienna. The Prussian Cabinet received at Olmütz the *mot d'ordre* from the Emperor Nicholas to treat the Schleswig-Holstein question

as a rebellion of liege subjects against their lawful sovereign—and an Austro-Prussian army of execution was marched to Altona to re-establish the authority of that sovereign in his Duchies.

‘Upon the circumstances attending this measure depends the view we are to take of the subject.

‘It is therefore necessary clearly to apprehend what the relative positions of the various parties at this conjuncture were. The Schleswig-Holsteiners, governed by a Lord-Lieutenancy acting in the name of the Duke and up to that moment recognised as the legitimate authority by Prussia and the great body of the German States, are in actual military possession of the whole of Holstein and of an important portion of South Schleswig—the key to their position being the fortress of Rendsburg, the northern portion of which is situated in Schleswig. From this position the Danish forces are unable to expel them, and the approaching winter, if accompanied with the ordinary amount of frost, promises to give to the army of the United Duchies a very decided advantage over the Danish Army, the strength of whose position consists in its being protected by extensive bogs passable at every point when frozen over (these are all facts personally known to me, as I was in the country in September of that year and went over all the positions occupied by the Schleswig-Holstein troops). The object for which they are in arms is not to throw off the authority of their legitimate sovereign, but solely to maintain a corporate union they have an undoubted right to and which has been *de jure* destroyed by the formal act incorporating the Duchy of Schleswig into the Danish Kingdom.

‘The King of Denmark, unable to reconquer the army opposed to him, and having tried in vain to obtain assistance elsewhere, invokes that of Prussia and Austria as Representatives of the German Confederation, on the plea of the necessity of restoring order in the federal state of Holstein. Having, as before stated, received their instructions from the Emperor Nicholas, the then patron saint of so-called “European order,” these two Powers set an army of 50,000 men in motion and send their Commissioners,

Count Mensdorff, our Coblenz acquaintance, and General Thümen, with a summons to the Lieutenancy to lay down their arms. Even at this culminating period of the reaction, however, the scandal of appearing on the scene of action as *allies* of the King of Denmark would have been too great—and consequently the character in which the intervening Powers notified their arrival was that of armed mediators who were bound to see that hostilities ceased, but who at the same time were prepared to assert there and then by force, if need be, all the rights and privileges of the Duchies *vis-à-vis* of Denmark. It was not till a distinct written engagement to that effect and a promise that the intervening Powers would protect “the old-established relation founded upon Right between Schleswig and Holstein (*das alt herkömmlich berechnigte Verhältniss zwischen Holstein und Schleswig*) had been given by the Commissioners to the Lieutenancy, in other words, by Germany to the Duchies, that the latter obeyed the summons and disbanded their army, thereby *at once* restoring to Denmark that portion of the southern part of Schleswig which they had occupied—Holstein remaining in the occupation of the federal troops until a definite regulation of the pending questions was settled between Denmark and the Confederation, the evacuation being made conditional upon this definite agreement being come to. The form which this definite agreement took was the Convention (*Vereinbarung*) of 1851–1852, the provisions of which you have admitted to be pending in honour of Denmark. The form was the worst possible that could have been chosen, as it was framed upon the principle of the absolute and divine right of monarchy, and stood thereby in direct contradiction to the vital principle upon which the whole contest had turned, that of the right of a people to maintain their undoubted privileges by the force of arms. This was the cause of the engagements taken by the King of Denmark having been allowed to assume the shape of a declaration of the sovereign will, instead of that binding contract between himself and his German subjects enforced by the armed mediators—a quibble, now adroitly used by the Danish Cabinet to deny the

Sovereign having taken any engagements at all—the fallacy of which, however, immediately appears disposed of, when the circumstance is kept in view that whatever the from of the engagement, the “sanction” by which it was enforced was the occupation of Holstein—being the fulfilment of the engagement as the condition of its evacuation.

‘This side of the question, which the Danish Government has carefully misrepresented, is not, however, that to which I particularly wish to call attention, but the relation which this Convention bears to the engagement entered into by the Commissioners to the Lieutenancy, *i.e.* by Germany to the Duchies. As seen above, the Commissioners describe themselves generally as there to secure once and for all the just rights and privileges of the Duchies and specially to safeguard the old-established relation between the two. On the strength of this assurance the Duchies laid down their arms and the King Duke recovered his authority. The Convention of 1852 is by way of being the redemption of this pledge. It, however, distinctly yields to Denmark the point of the historical union between the two Duchies, and endeavours to set up instead a state of things totally incapable of being practically carried out, *i.e.* a conglomeration of four states independent of each other with representative institutions and out of all organic connection with each other—a state of things which could only lead to the chronic anarchy which has since resulted and to the perfectly logical conclusion of the ultra-Danish party to have done, once for all, with Germany and to buy the full incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark, at the price of the total abandonment of the German Duchies.

‘I am quite sure that the term the “old-established relation between the Duchies” is capable of every sort of interpretation, and that the actual *organic* union, such as it existed during the period of the Lieutenancy, was not in existence previous to the breaking out of hostilities in 1848, therefore that the mediating Powers did not actually bind themselves to maintain this organic union. But most undoubtedly what they did bind themselves to

do, what every inhabitant of the Duchies and every German out of the Duchies considered at the time that they had undertaken to do, was to secure that sort of corporate connection (necessarily of a political nature) between the Duchies which would have secured Schleswig against the incorporating policy of Denmark. This they not only did *not* do, but by *formally* yielding the point of the political union they rendered such a corporate union impossible, and acted in direct opposition to the *spirit* of the engagements they had taken. The rights they had bound themselves to safeguard were constitutional rights, the Convention was a "Divine Right" Convention—the old, old story! And so the intervening Powers broke their plighted faith and made the Confederation and the German people parties to this act of treachery.

'In the meantime, of the minimum supposed to have been obtained from Denmark not one iota has been fulfilled by that Kingdom, every one of the promises made in the Convention of '51-'52 has been broken, and now the Danish Cabinet goes so far as to repudiate altogether having *entered into any engagements whatever*. This is the humiliating state of things, in presence of which the Liberal party in Germany find themselves—and that they should wish to get out of it is, to say the least of it, natural. What they feel about the matter is this, that the non-fulfilment of her engagements by Denmark gives them a *right* to return to the *status quo ante* and to insist on the corporate connection between the Duchies, according to the spirit of the promises made to the Duchies by the federal Commission in 1850. What, however, they would consider a perfectly fair compromise would be the acceptance of the English proposal in '48, the incorporation of the German part of Schleswig into Holstein, of the Danish part into Denmark, with the fullest possible municipal autonomy and equality of rights to the two bodies so formed. This was announced by Vincke in his great speech on the question last year, which he considered as the natural solution, and has been over and over again repeated to me by the leaders of the party as that which they consider the only possible exodus out of the difficulty.

' It is a great nuisance and an intolerable political bore that it should be so, but it's no use by the pooh-poohing system to try and fancy that it may be better for Europe that Denmark should be treated as the *enfant gâté* of the European family, and Germany as the big awkward boy who, whatever he does, is always to be snubbed and put in the corner, but then this should be done openly, and Europe, and above all others, England, should fairly look at the facts in the face and see that her policy is a policy of "petting" and not a policy which leads to justice, and not to say that it is the big boy who stole the apples whilst they can actually be seen bulging out in the little boy's pocket ! We have, that is the Press in England have, never done this. They have all along made themselves the violent and indiscriminating partisans of Denmark. There has not been published one article or one letter in *The Times* in which I could not point out the grossest misstatement and the most childish blunders. This is a mode of discussion which even towards a political enemy is disloyal enough, but when used towards one's *friends*, what is one to think of it ? The party in Germany, whom we have so systematically held up to contempt and ridicule, which has stuck fast to the English alliance through good report and evil report, and which, though having no brilliant victories to record, can fairly claim to have at last broken the neck of the anti-English Holy Alliance system, how has public opinion in England treated this party on the only question upon which we could have been of real service to them ? Can anything be more insolently inconsistent than the demands made of that party by *The Times* in the name of the English people—You German Liberals side with the Italians against the Austrians in Italy on the plea of nationality and the right of a people to govern itself, but with the Danes in Schleswig against the German nationality and the right of a people to manage its own affairs on the plea—that it bores us, the Editors of *The Times*, to death to enter into a question which we have not got the time to get up ? Be strong-minded, and take up an imposing attitude in Europe, but leave the Schleswigers, whose rights you have guaranteed, to their fate, and unless you mean to incur our sovereign

displeasure, don't exact of the King of Denmark that he should keep his engagements, *because* (this is the usual line of argument) we destroyed the Danish fleet at the commencement of the century. Living as I do here in relations with the men who are the working bees of this party, I have been made most painfully conscious of the mischief done by this sort of arrogant pooh-poohing peculiar to the English Press on questions they don't understand, and I have had better occasions than most people to judge of its excessive ungenerosity. As far as my very humble sphere of activity goes, I have endeavoured by every means in my power to keep up the feeling of solidarity between their interests and ours; but under the tremendous fire from our own batteries, which has been for months kept up on this, to the honour of Germany, so vital question, this has been no grateful task.

'Nothing can be more modest than that which this party asks at our hands. It is merely that we should *cease from being partisans*, and that we should condescend to look fairly at both sides of the question, as in common with yourself the party I allude to, many of them at least, look upon an English mediation as the natural solution of the question, and desire nothing more heartily. Under these circumstances the one spot of light that has appeared in the darkness, the one fact that has done more than everything else to keep up the gradually-disappearing good feeling in the ranks of the party towards England, has been the publication of the despatch in which you enter into the question of the engagements taken by Denmark, and admit that they are binding at least in honour. It is impossible for me to exaggerate the amount of good which this despatch has caused in the way of keeping up the good understanding between England and the Liberal party in this country.'

It was Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Foreign Minister, who was doing all he could to avert war, and who had made the confidential suggestion to Morier to the effect that Schleswig should be divided according to nationalities—the Danes being incorporated with Denmark and the

Germans with Holstein—a suggestion which, had it been acted on, would have brought matters to a successful issue, and which had been Lord Palmerston's original proposal in 1848. Count Bernstorff dared not suggest this officially or publicly, for fear of the effect on public opinion in Germany in the event of the English Government rejecting it. Neither could Morier mention the proposal to his then chief, Sir Andrew Buchanan, on account of the latter's strong Danish proclivities, but he thus conveyed it to Lord John Russell, who would gladly have accepted it, but Lord Palmerston and the rest of the Cabinet were colour-blind, and refused to look at it.<sup>1</sup>

During the visit of Queen Victoria to Coburg in the autumn of 1862, when Lord Russell was Minister in attendance, and Morier acting as his secretary, the celebrated despatch, dated 24th September of that year, was drafted, which offered mediation to the contending parties.

### *Earl Russell's Despatch*

*September 24th.*

It appears from the accounts received from various quarters that the correspondence between Austria, Prussia, and Denmark, which it was asserted would lead to a settlement of the dispute so long subsisting between Germany and Denmark in regard to the obligations of Denmark in the affairs of Holstein, Lauenburg, Schleswig, and the common Constitution of the Danish Monarchy, has grown more and more bitter. The longer the lapse of time, and the further the negotiation is carried, the wider is the space which separates the two parties, and the stronger the language which they use towards each other.

Upon considering, with pain and regret, this unsatisfactory aspect of the affair, and contemplating the unfavourable results which may be expected from further direct communications between Powers so adverse in their opinions, Her Majesty has directed that you should be furnished with instructions which may, it is hoped, tend to the long-desired settlement.

In framing these instructions it is advisable to throw out of the calculation, in the first place, those matters upon which controversy may be said to be exhausted.

The first of these matters relates to the question whether any taxes can be imposed, or any laws enacted, in Holstein or Lauenburg without the express consent of the representatives of those Duchies.

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Jowett, 1884.



This question has been resolved in the negative by the German Confederation, of which the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg are members.

Another question which need not be further discussed is the Constitution of 1855.

It is clear that whether a representation according to numbers of the kingdom, as well as the Duchies, be a good or a bad Constitution, yet, not having been accepted by the Duchies, the Constitution of 1855 has no force in Holstein, Lauenburg, or Schleswig.

Neither is it necessary to discuss the rights of Denmark in reference to her Rigsraad. It is quite clear that Denmark can legislate for herself, and impose taxes to be levied upon her own people, without the consent of Holstein, Lauenburg, or Schleswig.

Two questions of great importance remain. The first regards the Duchy of Schleswig; the second, the common Constitution of the Monarchy.

Schleswig was formerly in a position altogether anomalous. Unconnected with the German Confederation, it was yet connected with Holstein, which formed part of that Confederation. Later arrangements have dissolved this inconvenient tie, and Schleswig is at present only connected with Holstein by non-political relations affecting the two communities.

There are, however, relations between Germany and Denmark in respect to Schleswig which have given rise to the present controversy.

The obligations of honour contracted by Denmark towards Schleswig, and imparted to the German Confederation as such by the King of Denmark in 1852, chiefly regard two points. The first of these is the Royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated with Denmark. The second is, in substance, an engagement that the Germans in Schleswig shall be treated on an equal footing with persons of Danish or any other nationality.

The grievances of which Germany complains as violations of these promises are thus summed up in the recent Prussian note of the 22nd of August :—

‘The systematic destruction of national and neighbourly connection between Schleswig and Holstein; the disregard of the determination concerning the University of Kiel; the filling of the Duchy of Schleswig with Danish officials in the Administration, with Danish clergy in church and school, as well as the whole spirit of the Administration in this Duchy; finally, the violation of all actual and practical relations by the maintenance of the language Edict, are matters of fact which are notoriously public, and of which the evidence is in the hand of every one.’

For all practical purposes, it would be vain to attempt a constant supervision by Germany of the nomination to civil

offices of Danish officials in Schleswig, or the administration in church and school by Danish Ministers of religion. Such superintendence would lead to a constant renewal of quarrels, and a perpetuity of ill-will.

The best mode, therefore, of remedying these evils for the present, and of preventing complaints for the future, is to grant a complete autonomy to Schleswig, allow the Diet of Schleswig fairly to treat, and independently to decide, upon questions affecting their university, their churches and schools, the language to be used where the Danish population prevails, where the Germans preponderate, and where the races are mixed.

I come lastly to the question of the Constitution, the most entangled and the most embarrassing question of all those in discussion.

Treaties, protocols, and despatches afford us little light upon this subject, and the glimmering rays which they do afford tend rather to lead us astray than to guide us right.

For what could be more destructive of all union, all efficiency, all strength, and, indeed, of all independence, than to lay down as an absolute rule that no law should be passed, and no Budget sanctioned unless the four States of the Monarchy all concurred? What would Austria say if she were asked to accept a Constitution which should paralyse the action of the Reichsrath at Vienna till separate Diets in Hungary, in Galicia, and in Venetia should have adopted the same law or sanctioned the same Budget? How would Prussia herself bear an absolute veto on the proceedings of her Parliament given to the Diet of Posen?

If such a Constitution must lead to an early and decisive rupture, let us consider whether each portion might not have its due independent movement without clogging the wheels of the whole machine. For instance, if the sums required for the navy were represented by 90, of which Denmark were to furnish 60, and the other States 30, Denmark might vote, and apply her contingent of 60, independently of the vote of the other three portions.

There is only one objection to be made to this suggestion which deserves consideration.

If the 1,600,000 people of Denmark were taxed to pay the army and navy, and the 50,000 of Lauenburg were to refuse any grant for these purposes, a hardship would be suffered by the inhabitants of the kingdom when compared with the situation of the King-Duke's subjects in Lauenburg.

The remedy for this inequality is to be found in a proposal for a normal Budget, to be laid before the Rigsraad, and before the Diets of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig for their consent.

It is obvious that the Government of an independent

kingdom like Denmark must, for the maintenance of that independence, require a certain amount of expenditure for the Civil List of the Sovereign, for the Diplomatic Service, for the Army and Navy of the State.

'Let this be reckoned as economically as possible; for the least amount of royal dignity; for the most frugal establishments of profound peace.

'Obtain that sum from the four Representative Bodies. Confide its distribution to a Council of State formed, two-thirds of Danes and one-third of Germans. Let the votes of this Council be taken in public, and accounts of the expenditure published yearly.

'The normal Budget to be voted in gross for ten years. The distribution or expenditure to be voted yearly.

'Extraordinary expenses beyond the normal Budget to be voted freely by the Kingdom and the three Duchies separately.

'The suggestions I have made may be summed up in a few words:—

'1. Holstein and Lauenburg to have all that the German Confederation ask for them.

'2. Schleswig to have the power of self-government, and not to be represented in the Rigsraad.

'3. A normal Budget to be agreed upon by Denmark, Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.

'4. Any extraordinary expenses to be submitted to the Rigsraad, and to the separate Diets of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig.'

" The part which Morier played in this matter was described by him in a letter to Jowett many years later:—

' . . . I was the moral author, when attending Lord John Russell as private secretary at Coburg, of the celebrated Despatch proposing mediation on terms which, if accepted, would have prevented the international deadlock, which three years later forced on that series of great European wars, from the consequences of which we are still suffering. An episode, known hardly to any one, notes one of the practically most important acts of my diplomatic life. Count Bernstorff was then Prussian Foreign Minister. He was a man who had great confidence in me and was in the habit of speaking to me in the most confidential manner. He had made up his mind to reject Lord John Russell's proposal, but consulted me before doing so (remember I was only a paid attaché). I placed the matter in a light which led him to change his mind and

to accept Lord John Russell's proposal, my main argument being that, as it was certain Denmark would refuse it, Prussia would obtain gratis the creditable position of having done her best to solve the question in a fair and equitable manner involving considerable sacrifices. You may ask, why I wished to give this advantage to Prussia? My object was a very simple one. In suggesting Lord John Russell's mediation, which I never expected would be accepted, I wished to give Her Majesty's Government the means of withdrawing on legitimate grounds from the obligations of the Treaty of London, which would have obliged us to go to war in the event of the death of the then King of Denmark, if Germany, not recognising the right to succession of the present King,<sup>1</sup> the creation of the Treaty of London, which the Diet<sup>2</sup> unless it had ratified that Treaty before the death of the late King,<sup>3</sup> could not legally do. What I saw, and so far as I know no one else saw, was that however effete the Diet had become, and however hostile the then Governments of the great States of the Confederation were to the Liberal ideas associated with the vindication of the Rights of Schleswig-Holstein, there was growing up day by day a popular force which on the death of King Frederick would certainly break forth on such a scale that the Governments would be compelled to yield to it and place themselves on the legal basis occupied by the Diet in the matter. My wish had therefore been that Lord John Russell, in the event of one party agreeing to the proposal and the other not, should declare, that having failed to obtain the constitutional basis presupposed by the Treaty of London, Great Britain withdrew from obligations which would involve the violation of constitutional rights that the other parties of the Treaty had refused to call into existence. Lord John Russell saw this; the rest of the Cabinet pooh-poohed it, with the result that we returned to the *status quo ante* and that when the *casus fœderis* arose, we abandoned like curs the country, whose resistance to all compromise had been solely and entirely based

<sup>1</sup> Christian IX.<sup>2</sup> The Diet had not recognised the Treaty of London.<sup>3</sup> Frederick VII.

on the belief that we should keep faith with her and acknowledge the sacredness of our Treaty Engagements. With the abandonment of Denmark began that decadence of our position and *prestige* in Europe which has landed us in the *quantité négligeable* of Prince Bismarck.'

Lord Russell's temperate and impartial proposals met with hearty approval from the majority of the European Cabinets, who recognised in them the only means of getting rid, for once and all, of the Schleswig-Holstein question, which was what they all ardently desired. Russia and France adhered to them; the Austrian Minister, Count Rechberg, judged them favourably; Bismarck, who had just taken up the reins of office, in a despatch of 27th October to Count Bernstorff, now Prussian Minister in London, expressed the opinion that 'the four points of Lord John Russell's despatch might form an acceptable basis for a solution'; the only two dissentients being the Danish Cabinet and English public opinion. The latter clamorously condemned them on the ground of their being ill-timed, uncalled-for, and meddlesome, and that they opened up the whole question which, it maintained, had gone to sleep and was likely to remain in that state! Also, that they were a general departure from the traditional policy of Great Britain which, it urged, consisted in indiscriminately backing up Denmark.

'The Danish Cabinet felt the pulse of Printing House Square, returned an uncourteous answer to the Government which had steadily befriended it, and the interminable dispute entered upon a fresh lease of existence.'<sup>1</sup>

The time was singularly unpropitious for combined action amongst the Powers; Prussia was in the throes of a life and death constitutional struggle; Austria, menaced with Hungarian troubles and heavy deficits; Russia with the Polish insurrection; whilst the diplomatic campaign of the Western Powers, in conjunction with Austria against Russia, and the possibility of a French attack on Prussia, threatened at any moment to bring about a general Euro-

<sup>1</sup> *The Dano-German Conflict*, by Morier.

pean conflagration. Encouraged by these complications, the Danish Government, not content with refusing the offer of mediation, went a step further and, pressed by the Eider Dane party, issued Royal Letters-Patent on 30th March 1863, announcing the project of a common constitution practically incorporating Schleswig and thereby virtually abrogating her Treaty obligations. This act could only be considered as a direct provocation to Germany and the Treaty Powers, of so flagrant a nature, that even Prince Christian of Glücksburg, the eventual successor to the throne, was moved to protest.<sup>1</sup>

The summer was spent in endless negotiations and useless remonstrances, but the Danish Cabinet stuck to their point, the more so, as on 23rd July Lord Palmerston had made a speech in the House of Commons, which was looked upon by them as a direct encouragement. ' . . . I am satisfied,' he had said, ' with all reasonable men in Europe, including those in France and Russia, in desiring that the independence, the integrity, and the rights of Denmark may be maintained. We are convinced—I am convinced, at least—that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow those rights and interfere with that independence, those who made the attempt would find in the result, that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend.'

As Morier, commenting on this speech, observed :—

' Lord Palmerston's Schleswig-Holstein speech has produced all the effect which the most determined well-wisher to European disquiet could desire, laming the action of those who, like Austria, desire, even by threats if necessary, to force a settlement of the question on the basis of 1851—to the leaving intact of the *London Protocol* and strengthen the hands of those who preach that the only thing to be done is to remain quiet for the present, only declaring the engagement of 1851 as broken and the Protocol of 1852 as no longer binding, and the leaving therefore everything on the basis of 1846. Such are the results of people talking of what they don't understand.'

<sup>1</sup> Ward to Earl Russell, 8th May 1863.

After Lord Palmerston's speech, nobody at Copenhagen, nor indeed in Europe, doubted any longer but that in the event of hostilities, English help would be forthcoming, and the Danish Government resolved not to be deterred by the prospect of war, which in fact they now rather welcomed, from taking any measures they might choose. They therefore continued the framing of their Constitution, which was passed in the Riksråd on 13th of November. On the same day, Hall, the Prime Minister, hurried to obtain the Royal signature, but found the King too ill to be able to sign. Two days later, Frederick VII., last King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig-Holstein in the direct line, was dead.

## CHAPTER XVI

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN—*continued*

' WERE we not blessed with a fair share of national self-complacency we might chance at times to feel no slight misgivings respecting the soundness of our "Popular Views" upon foreign questions. We consider it a national privilege to talk freely upon the concerns of the whole world, but we do not always remember that this privilege involves the corresponding duty of understanding, or at least trying to understand, the subjects we discuss. On the contrary, we claim the right to have an opinion and to pass a judgment, and that not diffidently, but boisterously, on questions which we not seldom ostentatiously declare that we cannot take the trouble to comprehend. This is a very grave and a very real evil, for the expression of public opinion on what to us seems indifferent subjects, and which therefore, in our ears may sound but as the tinkling of a cymbal, may, and often does, shape itself across the seas into solid political fact, influencing the counsels of princes and determining the policy of statesmen.

' Upon no question has the vice here adverted to been so prominently exhibited as on that touching the relations between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. For fifteen years the English press, with but few exceptions, has gone on hysterically pronouncing the question to be unintelligible, and yet sitting in judgment upon it. The practical results of this mode of treatment are highly characteristic, and should serve as an example and a warning, for they have drifted us to the very opposite point to that which we desired to reach.'

Such were the opening paragraphs of a pamphlet entitled, *The Dano-German Conflict and Lord Russell's Despatch of*



24th September 1862, written by Morier at the instigation of Lord Russell. Very few people were in the secret of the authorship, a secret which was at first jealously kept, but which eventually became known. Its object was to change the current of English public opinion and to vindicate Lord Russell's proposals, convinced as Morier was that 'ignorance, and ignorance only, caused the mistake into which public opinion fell when it last year condemned the policy of our Foreign Secretary.'<sup>1</sup>

It was an exposition of the whole Schleswig-Holstein question, treated in a lucid and masterly manner.

'Your pamphlet will be useful in explaining what the real merits of the case are, and in checking any support to Denmark in matters in which she is decidedly in the wrong,' wrote Layard, then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; whilst General Grey, to whom Morier had sent a copy, writing from Osborne on 23rd December 1863, said:—

'I had already got a copy of the pamphlet, and had been so much struck by the clear and just view it seemed to me to take of the question, that I had already obtained and disseminated to Ministers and others upwards of two dozen copies of it. Nothing can be more conclusive than your statement of the case.'

One very important effect of this publication should be recorded. An amendment moved by Kinglake, to a vote of censure on the Government in February 1864, resulted in a vote of confidence, and Kinglake's entire speech, as he himself told Morier many years later, had been built up out of the pamphlet which had been sent to him *ad hoc* a few days before the motion.

The pamphlet, however, was destined to have a most disastrous effect upon the career of its author.

'For eight years,' so Morier wrote to Stockmar,<sup>2</sup> 'I was *boycotted* by the Foreign Office for the pamphlet on Schleswig-Holstein, published in 1863. The legend which the Foreign Office, from the Foreign Secretary downwards, firmly believed in, was that the pamphlet, though professing

<sup>1</sup> 'Dano-German Conflict,' by Morier.

<sup>2</sup> Morier to Stockmar, 30th October 1884.

to defend Lord Russell's views, was really an act of treachery towards him, and written to curry favour with the Crown Princess and as a tool of the Augustenburgers. Now, you know as well as I do that the Crown Princess knew nothing whatever about it, and was much puzzled to discover who had written it. I could, of course, have at once cleared myself by showing the letter in which Lord Russell had urged me to write the pamphlet, and that in which he heartily thanked me for it. But, at the very moment the pamphlet became known, the scene had entirely changed, and Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston were the two Ministers who were for going to war with Germany. Under these circumstances Lord Russell, as patron of the pamphlet, would have been placed in a most absurd position, for though the future historian would be perfectly able to reconcile the two attitudes as logical—the one *before* the King of Denmark's death, the other *after* the King's death—the contemporary politician could only have seen an absurd contradiction. Lord Russell had been a true friend to me, and I therefore resolved to suffer anything rather than put him in a false position, and therefore held my tongue, and never broached the matter even to him. But after seven years I could stand it no longer, and therefore, in 1870, just before Lord Clarendon's death, I placed the case before Lord Russell, together with a full statement of all the circumstances connected with the genesis of the pamphlet, and asked his permission to lay it before Lord Clarendon, which he, of course, in a very warm letter of acknowledgment, at once did. This statement I have shown to every succeeding Foreign Minister, and so in high official quarters the legend has been destroyed, but the old Foreign Office virus remains, and I am thwarted by it at every turn.'

Small wonder, then, that he bitterly wrote :—

' . . . The devoting myself to one idea of this kind (the Anglo-German Alliance) is the very worst thing professionally which a man can do. One is considered *un homme à idée fixe*, and marked out as that most dangerous of individuals, a zealous public servant. I have on many

occasions, as in the Schleswig-Holstein question, when I thought good might be done, grievously compromised myself personally and injured myself professionally.' <sup>1</sup>

King Frederick VII. had died on the 15th November ; on the 16th his successor, Christian IX., was proclaimed King of the United Danish Monarchy, the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg at the same time issuing a proclamation in which, in virtue of the abdication of his father, Duke Christian, in his favour, he assumed the government of the Duchies as Duke Frederick VIII. of Schleswig-Holstein, and called upon the German Diet, which had never recognised the Treaty of London, to uphold him in his hereditary rights. In Holstein, where his family was well known and had many adherents, he was received with enthusiasm ; but in Schleswig, where hopes were still directed towards the new monarch at Copenhagen, the attitude was one of anxious expectation as to the outcome of events in the Danish capital.

Gladly would Christian IX. have fulfilled the hopes of his German subjects, the justice of whose claims he had openly admitted, but he was placed in a terrible position. Himself a German, it was almost impossible for him to run counter to the loudly expressed wishes of the Danish nation, who clamorously demanded the sanction of the new Constitution. With a seething mob at the palace gates, a mob whose passions the Eider-Danes had for years sought to inflame ; pressed by Hall, the Prime Minister, with scarcely veiled threats as to the consequences of his refusal, the King gave way, and on 18th November signed the Constitution.

As soon as the news reached the Duchies the effect was electrical. Schleswig now joined Holstein in unanimous adherence to Duke Frederick ; the majority of the officials refused to take the oath of allegiance to King Christian, and Danish administration ceased where there were no Danish troops to enforce it.

But this effect was not confined to the Duchies alone. What Morier with unerring instinct had long foretold did not fail to come to pass. A great wave of patriotic

<sup>1</sup> Morier to Sir H. Ponsonby, 22nd May 1871.

enthusiasm for the rights of the Duchies swept over Germany; nor was this confined to the people only, for the Sovereign Princes took the side of the Duke of Augustenburg, and even some of the most reactionary Governments, finding it impossible to swim against the strong national current, were obliged to place themselves at the head of the movement. Rulers and ruled, Conservatives and Democrats, Catholics and Protestants, men of the most divergent views throughout Germany, all joined issue in the common cause. The Grand Duke of Baden, and Roggenbach, always at the head of all Liberal aspirations, immediately authorised the Baden representative in the Diet to take over the interests of the Duchies; the Bavarians demanded that their King should place himself at the head of an army for the purpose of installing Duke Frederick in his Duchies; the Prussian House of Representatives declared by 261 votes against 63 that the honour and interests of Germany called for his recognition.

Now, all depended on the attitude of the Governments of the two great German Powers, Austria and Prussia; but both of them were signatories to the Treaty of London, neither of them was animated with enthusiasm for the national German cause.

Bismarck had always been adverse to the rights of the Duchies. He had, from the first, openly declared that it was not in the interests of Prussia to wage war for Schleswig-Holstein, nor to create another Grand Duke, who, from the fear of Prussia's annexationist desires, might vote against her in the Diet. A member of the Junker Party and a representative of *Great Prussandom*, whose tenets, in contradistinction to *Great Germanism* and *Small Germanism*, were the absorption into Prussia by conquest or other means of as much of Germany as could possibly be acquired, and *nothing more*, he had told Schleinitz that he was perfectly ready to conquer Schleswig-Holstein for Prussia, but not for the Augustenburger,<sup>1</sup> and in November had gone so far as to say:—

‘I will stick to the London Treaty. If I am outvoted

<sup>1</sup> Jansen and Samwer, *Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung*, p. 117.

I shall leave the Diet,—Denmark is to me a more valuable ally than the German States.’<sup>1</sup>

His line of policy was : first, the conquest of Schleswig-Holstein for Prussia ; second, the retention of the Duchies by Denmark ; third, as a last alternative only, the acknowledgment of Duke Frederick. As the first eventuality seemed at that time beyond possibility, Bismarck had been, ever since the 15th November, anxiously bent on assuring the Duchies to Denmark. Added to political considerations were personal motives : Duke Frederick’s strictly constitutional views, his pronounced Liberal entourage, and the warm friendship which, since university days at Bonn, had united him to the Crown Prince of Prussia, were all so many reasons for rendering him an object of dislike to the reactionary statesman.

But if in Bismarck the Duke had a strong opponent, in the Royal Family of Prussia as well in the Liberal party he found warm allies. The Crown Prince and Crown Princess were his devoted friends to the last, as also Queen Augusta ; while King William had always been so firmly convinced of the justice of his claims and of the rights of Schleswig-Holstein, that it required all Bismarck’s sophistries and influence over the mind of his Sovereign to induce him to alter his views. To this, more than to any other reason, was due the vacillating policy of Prussia during the ensuing months, and the fate of the Duchies was only decided upon when at last King William gave in to his all-powerful Minister.

Events now followed one another in rapid succession. The crossing of the Eider on 1st February 1864 by the allied Prussians and Austrians, who had now taken matters into their own hands ; the short and decisive campaign which resulted in the occupation of Schleswig by Prussia, and of Holstein by Austria ; the long and indecisive conference in London ; the protracted negotiations in which the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg and of the Duchies were used as pawns in the game alternately by Prussia and Austria, until finally the question of Schleswig-Holstein

<sup>1</sup> Jansen and Samwer, *Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung*, p. 117.

became merged in the larger issue of the struggle for supremacy in Germany between these two Powers, all this is now so much a matter of history as to require no recapitulation.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was the direct cause of three great wars,—those of 1864, 1866, and 1870; indirectly of a fourth.

† Lord Kimberley, then Lord Wodehouse, had at the eleventh hour been charged with a mission to the Prussian and Danish Governments to try and induce them to come to an agreement, a mission for which neither his knowledge of the subject nor his diplomatic talents in any way fitted him. As an instance of the former it transpired, from a conversation on 14th December 1863 with Mr. Ward (Consul-General at Hamburg), that he was not even aware of the fact that the Schleswig-Holstein officials had refused to take the oath of allegiance to King Christian;<sup>1</sup> as to the latter, they had, during his mission to Russia in 1856–58, been thus characterised by Gortschakoff—

*‘Milord Wodehouse est un jeune homme qui, je ne doute pas, s’entend parfaitement en affaires agricoles, mais qui ne sait rien du métier de diplomate. C’est flatteur pour nous qu’on nous l’envoie pour apprendre son A. B. C., et je peux me vanter de lui avoir donné quelques leçons’—*

a dictum which was to adhere to him ever after like a Nessus’ shirt. Had he, however, possessed the genius of a Talleyrand there would have been but little likelihood of his mission proving a success at that late stage of the proceedings. The one palpable result with which he returned from Berlin was a violent dislike to Morier, whose opinions were in direct contradistinction to his own, and whose pamphlet on Schleswig-Holstein he believed to have been written in the interests of the Court against the Government. Though his eyes were eventually opened by Lord Granville as to the true story of the writing of the pamphlet, his ill-feeling against Morier persisted.

‘You know, Lord Kimberley has always been an enemy of mine,’ wrote the latter to Jowett on Christmas Eve,

<sup>1</sup> Jansen and Samwer, *Schleswig-Holsteins Befreiung*, p. 156.

1880; 'he has twice done me deep wrong, and prevented my appointment to important posts.'

When Morier was British Minister in Portugal, single-handed and in the teeth of incredible difficulties he drafted, negotiated, and signed the Lourenço Marques Treaty, which, by giving egress to the Boers and ingress to British troops via Delagoa Bay, would have undone the injustice inflicted on the former in persistently preventing them from obtaining access to their natural and only harbour, and have obtained for England a military hold over them which would have rendered the war of 1899-1902, with all its loss of blood and treasure, an impossibility. This Treaty, in May 1881, after three years of incessant toil was within sight of ratification. It had been passed by a large majority in the Lower House of the Portuguese Cortes, an unquestionable majority for it in the Upper had been secured, when suddenly Morier was ordered by telegraph to drop it. This order was owing to the opposition of the Colonial Office, where Lord Kimberley was at that time enthroned as Colonial Secretary. The old animus had remained, and the Treaty was consigned to the waste-paper basket.

Now that the Schleswig-Holstein question was nearing its solution, the British Cabinet suddenly developed a feverish activity. Notes, despatches, remonstrances, advice, and recriminations flooded the Chancelleries of Europe; but as this energy assumed a purely literary form, and as there were no indications that any of these proposals would be backed by armed force, they evoked in general but scant recognition,—from Bismarck the scathing comment that he '*had wasted several years of his political life by the belief that England was a great nation.*'

The breakdown of English policy was complete; the causes leading to such lamentable failure were analysed by Morier in the following letter to Lady Salisbury,<sup>1</sup> a very clever woman of great intellectual gifts and singular fascination, a long-standing friend of Mrs. Morier's, with whom since his marriage he had kept up a constant political correspondence.

<sup>1</sup> Mary, second daughter of 5th Earl De la Warr, m. (1) 2nd Marquess of Salisbury; (2) 1870, 15th Earl of Derby.

‘BERLIN, *March 15th*, 1864.

‘ . . . Living abroad and occupied exclusively with foreign politics, I know, of course, little of what is going on at home, but I feel very sure that whatever home reforms are really necessary will be accomplished sooner or later, no matter who sits on the Ministerial benches. Our foreign policy, on the other hand, requires immediate and radical reform. The process which in every other department of human affairs all thinking men admit has become more and more necessary, to wit, that of *reconsidering first principles*, has, in regard to the system on which our foreign relations should be carried on, become of immediate and paramount necessity. No Englishman in England can feel on this point with the keenness or see with the correctness of vision which an Englishman can who lives abroad, in contact with the machinery by which our foreign relations are worked. You can form no conception of the intricacy of the political gymnastics which an English diplomatist has to go through in his attempt to vindicate the wisdom and consistency of the foreign policy of his country, or perhaps, more correctly speaking, of the public opinion of which that policy is but the echo. If Italy be the subject of conversation he must be able to explain to the Divine Right statesmen and courtiers whom he meets at drawing-rooms and levées, the grounds on which England has adopted the principle that, in the international polity, communities have the same right of self-destination which in our own polity we have vindicated for individuals. That Parma and Modena and Naples and Tuscany had an inalienable right to turn out their dynasties and amalgamate themselves into a common state, and that any coalition under the name of Holy Alliance or the like which should interfere with this right is to be held an accursed thing. On the other hand if, in some modest beer garden, he chance to be conversing with a Liberal, and Germany be the subject of conversation, he must be able to explain that, in the eyes of England, the one sacred thing is a treaty, that international contracts are the inspired writings of man political, that any departure from



their letter or spirit is the one unpardonable sin, and that a community whose fate has once been sealed (whether with or without its consent) by the *ipse dixit* of a congress or conference has no appeal and must consider its destinies as irrevocably fixed. If political morality be the subject touched upon, he must be able to show that the principle of free discussion has led us to consider everything connected with politics in the light of open questions, that we can make no exception to the general principle in favour of the much-vexed question of tyrannicide, and that it is therefore consistent with our political ethics that a member of the Government should open up a branch post office for Mazzini's correspondence. On the other hand, he must be able to work himself up to the proper pitch of moral indignation if the subject talked of should be the sharp practice of an exiled Prince, who sells his heritage for a mess of pottage, knowing the deed of sale to be invalid, and he must be able to demonstrate that, according to English ethics, this is an act of such moral turpitude, that it not only destroys the actor's claim to consideration, but infects his whole family, whether they were consenting parties or not to the crime, and bars their claim to make good any rights they may otherwise have had.

'I am not, as you will perceive, going to make any treasonable revelations respecting what the Foreign Office has been about. It is our entire system of dealing with foreign nations, as borne witness to by statesmen of all parties, and still more by the leading organs of the Press, with which I am so heartily dissatisfied. I believe all our hack statesmen, no matter of what party, would have brought us in this unfortunate Dano-German conflict to much the same kind of inglorious pass to which we have come. My theory is something to the following effect: In every field of human thought and human action there is one persistent phenomenon by which, in the middle of the nineteenth century, we are met, to wit, that owing to the immense pace at which we live, two distinct generations, which at a slower rate of life would have followed each other, are co-existent, the older as it were *overlapping* the younger, which two generations are as totally incapable of understanding each

other as if they were inhabitants of different planets. I am, of course, using the term generation in a figurative sense as representing not the actual human crop supposed to grow to maturity every thirty years, but the crop of ideas and systematised experiences which in a specific manner belongs to each successive human crop. The entire phraseology and terminology, no matter on what subject, whether theology, politics, or social questions, of men under forty, is unintelligible to men of sixty, a larger proportion of the men under forty, of course, belonging to the generation of the men of sixty (though by no means as much as they themselves fancy—it is a very instructive phenomenon to watch how constantly younger men in trying to fight their contemporaries with the weapons of orthodoxy are caught out using weapons stolen from their adversaries' arsenal). You know better than any one to what an extent this is the case in regard to theology, and how impassible is the barrier which separates those who can read Renan and see in him one side at least of the truth, from those to whom such a work is the very incarnation of blasphemy.

'Most fortunately for us this phenomenon is, as regards England, least perceivable in the matter of politics—our own politics are the one thing in the world we seem thoroughly to understand, and on this field the two generations (though even here I don't believe they really understand each other) have established a sort of *lingua franca* by which they can at least communicate with each other, and work on for the common good without flying at each other's throats. On the other hand, in that not unimportant portion of Europe, which lies outside the United Kingdom, it is on the field of politics that the antagonism of the two generations is to be found in its acutest form, and that the process of transformation, consequent upon the *overlapped* generation getting the better of the *overlapping* generation, is the most rapidly going on. In England there are a thousand different questions, the first principles of which we are occupied in reconsidering. Abroad, in Italy, Germany, Russia, Scandinavia (in France the business is a subject of Imperial monopoly), this reconsideration of first principles

is exclusively confined to politics. Into what new forms the process may ultimately cause Europe to settle down, no human being can at present tell. Those who are the most contributing to force her out of her old grooves, the *overlapped* generation themselves, don't know. They are working in a great measure in the dark—following more or less blindly instincts which they would find it hard to give an account of. The thinkers alone, in each State, can amidst the apparent chaos see the operations of certain general laws, and give an approximately correct guess respecting the direction in which the whole body is moving; but, as a rule, they are *doctrinaires*, and as such, see only a part of the truth, and even when they get hold of the correct law seldom know how to gauge the strength of counter-acting influences and disturbing causes. It is only when by some rare accident the thinker and the statesman have coalesced in the same individual, when the gifts of Prospero and Ariel, the student's knowledge of the laws by which the elements are governed and the practical knowledge of the arts by which these elements may be made subservient to a given purpose, are united in the same person, that the tremendous power of the principles at work in the overlapped generation is made manifest. Within the last sixteen years two men, and two only, have combined the double set of qualifications—the Emperor Napoleon and Cavour—and behold the results!

' Now to apply my theory to our own foreign policy. Since the days of George Canning, our foreign policy has been essentially in the hands of men belonging to the *overlapping* generation, the Foreign Office with its peculiar traditions belonging exclusively to it. Those statesmen who have *à tour de rôle* filled the post of Foreign Minister have all belonged to it, and none more than Lord Palmerston. The fact that a more correct appreciation of Italian affairs has forced itself upon them than the generation can as a rule lay claim to, has been owing to the accident of Italian politics having assumed a melodramatic form which has interested the public, and given birth to men of the Garibaldi stamp, who have supplied the popular craving for hero-worship, and also to the other accident of our

having had a man of the overlapped generation in the person of Sir James Hudson at Turin. This is, however, the exception which proves the rule, and how much of an exception it is, is best seen by reading the speeches and written apologies of the defenders of Italy in and out of Parliament, which exhibit in an extraordinary degree the real ignorance of Englishmen respecting the great changes which are going on in European society. Nowhere have I been able to detect a knowledge of the specific nineteenth century laws at work, but everywhere the most far-fetched and most absurd attempts at drawing parallels between what was going on and the events of our own constitutional and parliamentary history !

' Now, in seeking for a general or first principle which should rule our foreign policy, I think that the first fact to be realised is *that England stands outside the cycle of organic changes now going on in Europe*. Here and there an enthusiastic Junior Lord of the Admiralty may work himself up into a blind admiration of an exiled patriot, and in a sort of confused way believe that the triumphal re-entry of such a man, laurel-crowned, into his native capital would tend to the glory and advantage of England, but looked at soberly, every one, I think, must admit that, to use a very convenient French word, there is no real *solidarity* of political interests between ourselves, and any of the great political parties contending for the soul of Europe. There may be any amount of sympathy, but there are no common interests, in the sense that the victory or defeat of the one or other party would affect our well-being in any appreciable degree. We are not in any sense bound up with any political body now struggling on the Continent in the sense that in Elizabeth's time we were bound up with the Protestants of the Continent. There was then a perfect solidarity of interests, that is—any serious check received by the Protestant interest in Germany or the Netherlands was a real peril to us, and *vice versa*. Now this kind of solidarity does exist between political parties on the Continent. A revolution in Paris or an insurrectionary movement on the Danube vibrates through all Europe, but if the Bourbons were to-morrow to be reinstated

in Italy and the Holy Alliance to stand up once more armed *cap-a-pie*, or if, on the other hand, republics were proclaimed everywhere, we should certainly remain perfectly impassive—not one more Radical or one less Tory would be returned to Parliament, and we should go on moving forward at our own rate of motion, or standing still or sliding back, just as if the victories gained or the defeats incurred had been by the Taepings or Imperialists of China. With regard to the other great principle at work in the transformation of European society, that of nationality, we are still more without any real point of contact (the case of Ireland being totally exceptional, and when examined closely having no real analogy to any existing state of things in continental Europe). When we talk of ourselves as Englishmen it is always synonymous in our minds with talking of ourselves as inhabitants of the United Kingdom, and we are totally incapable of realising either the ideal craving of people of the same race to coalesce into a great and powerful community or the thousand practical wants of modern days such a coalition can alone satisfy. Had we remained a Heptarchy we should know more on the subject.

‘The next fact that requires to be realised is that the organic changes going on are very *real* changes, and that the parties concerned, both the attacking and defending forces, are very much in earnest, and that it is childish to throw mere words at them and entreat them in God’s name to be quiet.

‘When these two facts are realised and admitted I think the deduction which naturally follows is that it is no business of ours to step across the channel and enter the lists on the one side or the other—that standing as it were on vantage-ground above the two parties it is no business of ours either to assist or retard the work of transformation going on—that it is not our vocation to compete with the Emperor Napoleon in his professional pursuits as surgeon accoucheur to the ideas of the nineteenth century or, on the other hand, to put ourselves forward as the champions of the *status quo*, and to spend our capital in maintaining the arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna as if they were the final forms into which Europe

was to be moulded. I know that there are a great many people who would not admit this deduction. That many of our statesmen believe that the latter would be a right way of disposing of our surplus capital, and that, had we inherited the spirit of our forefathers, we should have gone to war rather than see Austria stripped of Lombardy and France enriched by Savoy and Nice, whilst others again would have had England espouse the cause of Hungary and Poland and Italy and wage war against Austria and Prussia in the cause of the "good time coming." I believe myself both these courses would have been wrong policy, but either of them would at least have been a *policy*, logically defensible and leading to practicable results. The party of the overlapping generation and the party of the overlapped are real and very powerful parties, and to espouse the cause of the one or the other is to have warm friends and powerful allies. That which I think is totally unfeasible is what we have already tried to do, viz. to side with neither party but yet to remain *active*, trying to carry out certain objects of our own by alternately encouraging and reviling first the one party and then the other. I do not know anything more contemptible than the exhibition we made of ourselves by the national expressions of exaggerated triumph at the unification of Italy and the national expression of impotent rage at the price paid for that unification by the cession of Savoy and Nice. Italy could not get free alone—she required assistance, and paid for that assistance. If the unification was matter of national rejoicing it was childish to be angry at the price paid for it, if the one thing to be dreaded was the aggrandisement of France, it was childish to rejoice at the cause which produced that effect. This is one of the hundred instances in which within the last few years the total absence of the power of grasping the realities of foreign politics which characterises English public opinion and its echo, our foreign policy, has manifested itself.

'If once public opinion fairly seizes the principle that to effect any practical purpose in Europe and to avoid a repetition of the reiterated fiascos of late years it would be necessary for England to embark her fortunes definitely

either with the Holy Alliance or with the party of the rectifiers of the European map, it will (from the total impossibility of getting British taxpayers to adopt either course) come logically and by a sound process of reasoning to the conclusion which vaguely and not upon any definite principle it has already more than half come to, viz. that non-intervention is the true policy for England, and this brings me to the point of my long letter, to wit, that the task which will devolve upon any Ministry that desires to merit well of the country will be to follow a policy of systematic non-intervention based on a definite *principle*, instead of the unsystematic policy which, proclaiming in theory that it will not intervene, does practically meddle in every question, now on one principle now on another the most opposed to it. Dignified, intelligent non-intervention *versus* undignified, unintelligent non-intervention, that is the change we require, and for this purpose it is absolutely necessary that our Foreign Minister should belong to the overlapped generation—that is, should be thoroughly able to grasp and comprehend the organic changes out of whose sphere it would be his duty to keep England. . . .’

Though the question of Schleswig-Holstein was now practically removed from the sphere of English diplomatic action, Morier did not fail to keep Lord Russell informed of all the subsequent negotiations concerning the Duchies, as indeed of all matters pertaining to Prussian politics, more especially the constitutional struggle still being waged, in spite of attention having been diverted from it by the war.

*Morier to Earl Russell*

‘BERLIN, November 12th, 1864.

‘Having been detained longer than I expected at Bonn, I was unable to prosecute my journey to Carlsruhe as I had intended. I regret this the more as from a despatch from Lord A. Loftus, a copy of which passed through Berlin under flying seal yesterday, I perceive that rumours are again rife of intrigues between Louis Napoleon and the Middle German States. As regards Lord A. Loftus’s despatch, however, my long experience of German Middle

States statesmen has taught me that, like certain plain middle-aged women, they delight in nothing so much as to talk with pretended indignation of attacks supposed to have been made upon their virtue. That Louis Napoleon should have been ready to intrigue with the Middle States lies in the very nature of the relations between the two, but that he should pick out for this purpose a person likely indignantly to repel the overture is not on the face of it probable. Moreover, at the present moment I am very much inclined to believe that his game is to encourage Bismarck in his annexation policy. On one point in Lord A. Loftus's despatch I think I can with certainty say he is wrong, viz. that an overture was made by the King of Prussia for an interview with the Emperor Napoleon. I am all but certain that the contrary was the case, that the Emperor gave a hint that he would like to meet the King, and that this hint was not taken by the latter.

'I had upon my return to Berlin some long and interesting conversations both with the Crown Prince and Crown Princess. To my very great satisfaction I found that the supposed brilliancy of Bismarck's successes during the last four months had altogether failed to produce any impression upon them, except the deep disgust which well-ordered minds feel at successful villainy. They have neither of them swerved for one instant either in the Schleswig-Holstein question or in the Constitutional question from the attitude they took up from the very commencement, the treating of the former as one in which Prussia's honour and *interest* required her to play a purely unselfish part, and to seek her indemnity in the moral *prestige* which the undoing of the results which had flowed from her perfidy in 1850 would clothe her with; the identifying, as regards the latter, the interests of the Crown with the constitutional rights of the people. To replace the Duchies where they were when disarmed by the troops of Prussia and Austria, to make them the arbiters of their own destiny, and to look for any advantages that might accrue to Prussia and Germany by a more intimate military connection between the Duchies and Prussia solely to a free compact that might be entered into by the Duchies



as a Sovereign body, such is the plain and straightforward programme that has all along stood like a dead wall against the cynical sophistries of Bismarck. The determination, on the other hand, to resist, as was done at Danzig, any fresh step towards the subversion of the Constitution has been equally well known to the latter, and I have reason to believe that this knowledge more than anything else has tended to paralyse his action in this direction.

‘That in the atmosphere in which they are compelled to live these two young people should have thus remained unscathed is no small merit to them. Now that Stockmar is gone, there is not a single person in their entourage who is not a devoted Bismarckian, and the two men more immediately brought into daily and business contact with the Prince are, I have reason to know, Bismarck’s creatures, body and soul. Luckily these Divine Grace Knights have on many occasions overdone their part, and have said words and done acts personally wounding which have left a wholesome sting behind them. Nevertheless this isolation is terribly trying, and trudging along the long, long lane, the feet get sore and the heart gets heavy, however much the belief is entertained that a “turning” must come at last.

‘I have not yet seen a sufficient number of people to speak with certainty as to the prospects of the next meeting of Parliament, but one thing is quite clear, and that is that Bismarck has totally failed in his threat of being within six months of the 1st of February last the most popular man in Germany! With the exception of some few of the old Liberals and of the ultra-Radicals, the former of whom have kept up a portion of the foolish vertigo which for a short time after Düppel was more or less general, the latter of whom were from the beginning averse to the war as supposed to be connected with the legitimate rights of the Prince of Augustenburg, and who are therefore pleased with Bismarck’s annexation plans, with these two exceptions parties are just where they were this time last year, the great body of the Liberal party staunch to the Constitution looking upon Bismarck as a kind of Strafford whom they will fight with what weapons they can. Beyond another undignified petty word-war, however, like that of

the last two sessions, I do not expect any result. The feeling of the country is not unlike that which prevailed in England about the time of the Rye House Plot ; the best men, like the then Lords Russell and Essex, convinced that armed resistance would be justifiable in the abstract, but not practically justifiable unless with a far greater prospect of success than that visible at present ; the great body of the people thoroughly discontented, but oscillating between their discontent and the fears occasioned by the recent recollections of the misfortunes resulting from the revolutionary movements of 1848. Another session and another prorogation without result one way or another seem to me, therefore, the most probable contingencies. There is, moreover, one thing to be borne in mind in regard to the present struggle, which is, that however broken the Constitution has been in letter and in spirit, on the one radical point of *levying* taxes the privileges of Parliament have not yet been tampered with. The Crown has the right of levying all taxes that have once been imposed, until these shall have been repealed, though it has not got the right of spending the money so levied without consent of Parliament. Not a farthing has therefore been as yet illegally taken out of the pockets of the nation. The tug will come when a new tax has to be imposed. This could not be attempted without a formal abrogation of the Constitution, and for this Bismarck has certainly (for the present at least) not got the courage. The Prussian finances are, moreover, in so flourishing a state that there will be no practical necessity to do this for some time to come.'

*Morier to Earl Russell*

'BERLIN, November 19th, 1864.

' In September last, that is at the very time that Bismarck made his curious confession to Sir Andrew Buchanan to the effect that annexation had been the object, but that he had in vain attempted to debauch the King and the Crown Prince, he expressed his readiness to see an agent of the Prince of Augustenburg, a desire which was at once acceded to. With this gentleman he had a long and friendly inter-

view, in which after discussing many matters in a general way, and very sensibly and moderately, he stated that immediately on his return from Biarritz he would be ready to see him again and to enter into regular *pourparlers* with him. Accordingly on his return from France, this gentleman waited upon him, but instead of the former friendliness and urbanity found him once more the sneering *sic volo sic jubeo* Bismarck of European notoriety; he avoided entering into any of the questions which he had promised to discuss with him, and dismissed him with a statement to the effect that he might have again occasion to see him, or he might not, that it might be in a few weeks, or it might be in many months hence. This, therefore, is the present state of the relations between Prussia and the person whose rights Prussia acknowledged at the conference and used as a pretext for her further action.

'Upon the exact correctness of the above you may implicitly rely. The following is conjecture, based however upon the statement of persons most likely to be informed on what is taking place. According to these Bismarck is more bent than ever upon his plan of annexation. He does not despair of debauching the King, and he thinks that the Crown Prince, now without any advisers of any brains or power, will be unable to stand his isolation, and must give in. He is not afraid of Count Mensdorff, and thinks that the sop with reference to the Treaty between Austria and the Zollverein will suffice to keep Austria quiet.

'He has no idea, however, of going straight to his point, and feels more reliance than ever on his system of procrastination. His immediate objects, therefore, are the getting rid of the federal troops out of Holstein and of the *administration of that Duchy by Federal Officers*, the latter being the really important step, as it insures the administration coming nominally into Austro-Prussian, but really into Prussian hands. According to the last reliable information I had respecting Austria, Count Mensdorff had not as yet determined on any policy in regard to the question of the removal of the Federal Troops, but the idea entertained by the Austrian *Chargé d'Affaires* here, was that Austria equally with Prussia would take steps for the exodus of the

Federal Troops and administrators from Holstein, but that there was this difference between the two as regards the *modus operandi*. That Bismarck wished to do it on the *sic volo sic jubeo* principle, *i.e.* by threats, whereas Austria wished that it should be done by a vote of the Diet itself, to which should be appended some declaration respecting the question of succession which should pledge the two great Powers to the principle that the Duchies were to pass over sooner or later into the hands of the legal possessor, whoever he might be.

‘Whether these are the present views of the Austrian Cabinet or merely an echo of what Rechberg’s views were, and whether Károlyi, who arrived Wednesday, has brought anything definite from Vienna, I cannot tell, as I have been laid up with gout all these days, but such were the Austrian views (mild enough in all conscience) a week ago, and before Mensdorff had come to any formal determination.

‘I will now say a few words on what I learn is the state of matters in the Duchies.

‘In Holstein there is a strong feeling of exasperation against Prussia, and it is all they can do to keep civil words on their tongues. Even there, however, there is an annexationist party composed exclusively of the small feudal party who at the time were for the maintenance of the “nexus” with Denmark. The object of these men is twofold—they want a personal union with Prussia, which would guarantee them their old rights and privileges, and what they aim at, therefore, is a step similar to that taken by Lauenburg, ergo shelter from a Liberal Constitution and a Liberal Sovereign; secondly, the loaves and fishes which, with Prussia’s poverty in great and old families, are sure to fall to persons of good family.

‘Karl Plessen, who is the only one of the number who has the qualities of a statesman is, I understand, for unconditional annexation, which would make the Duchies integral portions of the Prussian monarchy.

‘These people, however, are a mere handful, whose names can be counted on a man’s fingers. There is besides them a goodly number of the gentry, however, who are

for the Prince of Augustenburg, but who are coquetting with Bismarck in hopes of getting pressure put on the Prince of Augustenburg, and thereby a revocation of his Liberal Constitution.

‘The overwhelming majority of the Duchy, however, is for autonomy under the Augustenburgs, and is exasperated to a high degree against the policy pursued by Bismarck.

‘The case of Schleswig is somewhat different. There the feeling is predominantly one of alleviation from the system carried on by the Danes, and of gratitude at this being over once for all (I speak, of course, only of the German population. I have no reliable data respecting the feeling in the north of Schleswig). It was on the Schleswigers (on the Holsteiners only by ricochet) that the real hardship of the Danish rule had fallen, and therefore this feeling is very natural, but there are other reasons for the greater friendliness there exhibited towards Prussia. First, great tact and skill have been displayed in the administration of the Duchy by Prussia (Austria having hardly meddled with it and her Commissioner having been hardly anything but a lay figure). Whilst keeping the reins in the hands of a few upper officials, pure-bred Prussians (the headman, Zedlitz, an able tool of Bismarck’s), they have distributed all over the country Schleswigers and Holsteiners, who in the days of trouble in 1850, ’51, and ’52 had taken refuge in Prussia, and been admitted to State employment there. These people were, of course, treated by the country as martyrs returned from martyrdom, whilst on the other hand they brought with them a very natural sense of gratitude towards their benefactors and much of the *esprit de corps* contracted during their ten years’ service as a portion of the Prussian bureaucracy. Secondly, and this is a point to be noted, neither in Schleswig nor in Holstein was there at the time of Frederick VII.’s death any personal feeling of attachment for the Augustenburg family. The old Duke’s very questionable transactions at Frankfort in the matter of his domains and the engagements he entered into had been very ill taken by the Duchies, and he himself

had not even in 1848 and 1850 been a popular person. It was only as representing their own rights that they clung to those of the Augustenburg family. Now, under the federal rule in Holstein, the Prince of Augustenburg has been able to make himself personally very thoroughly known in that Duchy, and possessing to a high degree the special characteristics of a Schleswig-Holsteiner, he has become personally immensely popular. Into Schleswig he has, of course, not been allowed to penetrate, and is therefore hardly known there, and this constitutes a further difference between the two Duchies. But, nevertheless, there is not the remotest doubt that in Schleswig as well as in Holstein the great overwhelming majority of the population are for union with Holstein, autonomy, and the Prince of Augustenburg.

'Bismarck, however, knowing this difference of feeling in regard to Prussia in the two Duchies, and believing this to be owing solely to the fact of the Prussian administration of Schleswig, is at present bent *à tout prix* on getting the Holstein administration into his hands.

'The despatch in which Bismarck promises to Austria that Prussia will admit of a clause in the renewed treaty between Austria and the Zollverein, to the effect that the two parties will within the next twelve years negotiate for the entrance of Austria into the Zollverein, has caused the most violent displeasure to the Free Trade party in Prussia, and most justly.

'Quite apart from all political considerations, this is a most fatal step on the part of Prussia, or rather it would be a most fatal step if such a clause were to be introduced into the treaty, which is, however, very unlikely, as a treaty of Commerce requires the sanction of the Chamber, and such an article the Chamber will never sanction.

'Bismarck's organs say that such a promise means nothing, as Prussia has only thereby expressed a *hope* which it lies in her power should never be realised (*N.B.* a good specimen of Bismarckian morality). They entirely ignore, however, what the practical operation of such a hope would be, and it is to this I would call your attention, as it is a point which in England we don't half sufficiently

see, even so enlightened a paper as the *Economist* having two years ago advocated the commercial union of the Zollverein and Austria.

'It is this: if Austria can be once got to see that all hope of union with the Zollverein is vain, that the latter is embarked on a career which must with increasing velocity lead towards Free Trade, she will in self-defence be forced to look about her and establish a freer intercourse with us, with France, with Italy, and all other trading communities, and so be dragged *volens volens* in a Free Trade direction.

'If, on the other hand, she believes she can force an entrance into the Zollverein, she will never let go the idea that such a union would give the bodies so united an area of so vast an expanse to build up a protectionist wall. This is the dream which it was of the utmost importance should be once for all banished out of Austrian heads, and to meet a momentary political exigency, and in perfect bad faith, Bismarck has stereotyped this dream at the very moment it was fast dissolving into thin air.

'That one clause in the Treaty of 1853 gave to Bavaria and the recalcitrant States the lever which enabled them for two years to paralyse the French Treaty; its re-insertion would have a precisely similar effect, whenever the Zollverein should attempt to take a further step in a Liberal direction.'

*Morier to Earl Russell*

'BERLIN, *September 7th*, 1865.

'My positive information, *i.e.* information drawn from actual official documents, does not reach later than this date, and I know nothing but what has appeared in print of what took place at Gastein. From the knowledge furnished by the above, however, and from information I gathered at Vienna of the motives at work with the Austrian actors in the drama, I think that a pretty safe guess may be made at the real meaning of the Gastein Convention as far as Austria is concerned, and above all, I think I can assert with pretty considerable confidence that the French

story about the secret articles is a myth. It is evident from the above what was the particular thing which Austria dreaded, and to avoid which she was ready to make large concessions. The thing she feared was the fulfilment of the threat held out in July, that if Austria did not consent to assist Prussia in taking violent measures against the Prince of Augustenburg and the inhabitants of the Duchies, Prussia would do so on her own account. To consent to this was (after the line she had taken up in the Duchies) to brand herself before Europe as the Jack Ketch of Bismarck; to risk letting Prussia begin the work on her own account was to risk the chance of a collision such as that evidently in the mind of Mensdorff when he talked of the possibility of the Prince of Augustenburg finding a refuge amongst the Austrian troops. That Prussia would have carried out her threat of taking violent measures in the Duchies without the consent of Austria seems to me likely, it is certain that Austria thought she would. The Austrian Cabinet lives from hand to mouth, and from one day to the other sees only the danger of the day, and concentrates its attention upon it. To avoid this danger was what it was intently bent upon. At one moment they thought it could be avoided only by actual and immediate rupture. The Gastein Convention afforded a path which led past the difficulty. It was a rugged path, and no man could tell where it would lead them to, but all they saw was that it avoided the one particular danger which filled their minds. It withdrew the Austrian Army from the command of a Prussian Commander-in-Chief, and it freed Holstein of Prussian troops and the possibility of the dreaded measures regarding which Austria could not make up her mind to be either an actor or a spectator. This, I feel sure, is the real history of the Gastein Convention. What its ultimate result may be, I cannot pretend to say. Austria seems to me in the position of a man who has stripped and stood looking on for awhile at the cold water, and then put on his clothes again, and made up his mind to wait till it looks a little warmer. To a man who has done that the water will probably always be too cold,



and therefore it is impossible to tell what further line of conduct Austria may not be forced into by her having beaten a retreat at Gastein. For the present, however, I feel convinced that in her own mind she is only thinking that she will wait till the water is a little warmer, and that she has not by any secret articles pledged herself to a definitive solution of the question. Moreover, I feel very sure of two things : (1) that as long as Mensdorff is Minister, Austria will not consent to *sell* her co-partnership in the Duchies ; (2) that as long as Bismarck is Minister, Prussia will not enter into a guarantee of Austria's Italian possession.'

END OF VOL. I.